1.0

1.1

1.25

2.8 2.5

3.2 2.2

3.6

4.0 2.0

1.8

1.4 1.6

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

South Africa
a country study

South Africa
a country study

Foreign Area Studies
The American University
Edited by
Harold D. Nelson
Research Completed
December 1980

On the cover: South Africa's national emblems—
springbok, blue crane, and protea

Second Edition, First Printing, 1981.

Headquarters, Department of the Army
DA Pam 550-93
Supersedes 1971 edition

Foreword

This volume is one of a continuing series of books written by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, under the Area Handbook Program. Its title, format, and substance reflect modifications introduced into the series in 1978. The last page of this book provides a listing of other country studies published. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its economic, national security, political, and social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political, and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system and political order within which they live.

The contents of the book represent the views, opinions, and findings of Foreign Area Studies and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions.

William Evans-Smith
Director, Foreign Area Studies
The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016

Acknowledgments

Contents

James L. McLaughlin

THE PRE-EUROPEAN PERIOD—ARRIVAL OF THE
EUROPEANS AND DEVELOPMENT OF BOER
VALUES—The European-Xhosa Clash—Entry of the
British—The Great Trek—Settlement of Natal—
BLACKS, COLOUREDS, AND INDIANS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY—The Xhosa-Speaking Peo-
ples—The Zulu—Emergence of the Basuto Kingdom—
The Tswana—Development of the Coloured Commu-
nity—The Coming of the Asians—GROWTH OF THE
BOER REPUBLICS—DISCOVERY OF DIAMONDS
AND GOLD—THE ANGLO-BOER WAR AND
CREATION OF THE UNION—POLITICAL DEVEL-
OPMENT AMONG BLACKS, COLOUREDS, AND
ASIANS—SOUTH AFRICA IN WORLD WAR I AND
THE POSTWAR DECADE—The First Nationalist
Government—White and Non-White Labor—The 1929
Elections and the Black Specter—CREATION OF THE
UNITED PARTY—SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVE-
MENT IN WORLD WAR II—RISE OF THE NA-
TIONAL PARTY AND DEVELOPMENT OF APART-
HEID—BLACK AFRICAN RESISTANCE (1940s–50s)
—YEARS OF CHALLENGE (1968–76)—Verligtes vs.
Verkramptes—Separate Development and the Home-
lands Idea—Coloured and Indian Political Develop-
ments—The Shrinking White Redoubt—Polarization of
White Politics—Black Consciousness and Renewed Ra-
cial Unrest—The Soweto Riots

Irving Kaplan and Harold D. Nelson

PHYSICAL SETTING—Boundaries and Internal Sub-
divisions—Natural Regions—Climate—Terrain and
Drainage—POPULATION—RACIAL CATEGORIES
AND ETHNIC GROUPS—Language and Language
Use—Whites—Black Africans—The Coloureds—Asians

List of Figures

Preface

In economic and military terms, South Africa is the most powerful country in sub-Saharan Africa. Its location at the continent's southernmost tip with coasts on the Atlantic and Indian oceans is perceived as one of considerable strategic importance, and its role as the source of much of the Western world's gold, diamonds, and industrial minerals gives it substantial economic significance. Insistent on maintaining a social order in which a White minority dominates a non-White—largely Black—majority, the republic has been barred from the councils of many international organizations and has incurred the censure of most countries of the world. The South African government in turn seeks to explain and justify its policies in terms of their appropriateness for the society's complex racial heterogeneity.

In these circumstances, descriptions and analyses of South African society often conflict and are characterized by varying degrees of distortion. *South Africa: A Country Study*, like its 1970 predecessor the *Area Handbook for South Africa*, is based on a wide sampling of the many published sources of information about the country noted for adding the word "apartheid" to the international lexicon. This book attempts to provide in compact, convenient, and balanced form an exposition and analysis of the dominant social, economic, and political features of South African society.

The republic has two official languages—Afrikaans and English. All laws and other government documents are published in both. *South Africa: A Country Study* has generally used the English version of official usage. But in the case of nongovernmental institutions, such as churches or certain economic and political organizations, Afrikaans has been used if the institution is of Afrikaner origin and English if it is of English origin. Names or special terms of this sort are rarely translated in South Africa but are used in the original form regardless of the mother tongue of the speaker. Place-names are spelled in accordance with those established by the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN) in its gazetteer of April 1954 and supplement of August 1972. An exception has been made in the case of South West Africa, formerly a League of Nations mandate under South African control. Inasmuch as the United Nations regards the territory as being under its administration and has renamed it Namibia—a position to which the United States subscribes—Namibia has been used here in a contemporary context.

Available books, articles, and other documents that provide important amplification of subjects treated in this work are noted in the bibliographic paragraphs at the end of each chapter. Full references to these and other valuable sources used by the authors in the preparation of this book are included in the Bibliography.

All measurements are presented in the metric system. A conversion table will assist those readers who may not be familiar with metric equivalents (see table 1, Appendix).

Country

Formal Name: Republic of South Africa.

Short Form: South Africa.

Administrative Capital: Pretoria.

Legislative Capital: Cape Town.

Judicial Capital: Bloemfontein.

Geography

Size: About 1,229,260 square kilometers; southernmost country of continental Africa.

Topography: Major features broad, lofty plateau surrounded by steep semicircular escarpment and narrow belt of coastal lowlands

in west, south, and east. Terrain features range from temperate and subtropical farmland, grassland plains, and verdant valleys to craggy mountain peaks, semiarid scrubland, and sparsely inhabited desert. About 70 percent of total land area consists of mountains and semidesert; no more than 15 percent cultivable.

Climate: Despite location, country has wide variety of climatic conditions. Southwestern Cape area Mediterranean climate, but northeastern Transvaal and eastern Natal subtropical. Western coastal region, much of northern Cape Middleveld, and parts of Karoo desert climate. Central Highveld climate varies from warm to hot in summer and from mild to cold in winter. Southern and eastern coastal regions warm to hot and generally humid. In most regions summer occurs from November through April and winter from June through August. Mean annual temperature varies from about 16.5° C in south to 16° C in Pretoria and Johannesburg.

Boundaries: Western limits formed by coastline of Atlantic Ocean and southern and eastern extremities by Indian Ocean. Inland frontiers shared with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Swaziland. Country's landmass completely surrounds independent state of Lesotho. All borders either demarcated or delimited and undisputed by contiguous states. Small enclave of Walvis Bay on western coast of Namibia regarded administratively part of Cape Province.

Society

Population: According to preliminary results of 1980 census, South Africa's population estimated at about 28,411,000, growing at rate of 2.2 percent per year. By law population separated into four officially recognized racial categories: Whites, Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians (mainly Indians). Total population estimates by racial group: Whites 15.7 percent, Blacks 72.5 percent, Coloureds 9 percent, and Asians 2.8 percent. Annual growth rates by racial group: Whites 1.7 percent, Blacks 2.5 percent, Coloureds 2.2 percent, and Asians 2.4 percent. Total population expected to increase to about 47.8 million by year 2000.

Ethnic Groups: Each of four officially defined races composed of several historically important ethnolinguistic groups or categories of varying social and political significance. Of Whites, about 57 percent Afrikaners, and about 40 percent English speakers. Among Blacks, central government delineates at least ten categories, few homogeneous. These correspond to recognized Bantu languages plus North and South Ndebele. Cape Coloured major group among Coloureds; Cape Malays constitute important minority. Regional distinctions of some importance exist among Indian population.

Languages: English and Afrikaans official languages; both spoken by most Whites. English primary language of minority of Coloureds,

primary or secondary language of many Asians, and secondary language of educated urban Blacks and some others. Afrikaans language of majority of Coloureds and secondary language of many Blacks who have worked for White Afrikaners. Several Southeastern Bantu languages and dialects (Xhosa, Zulu, Swazi, North Sotho, South Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga, Venda) widely used and officially recognized for educational and radiobroadcasting purposes. Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, and Telugu home languages of Indians.

Religion: Most Whites and Coloureds, more than half of all Blacks adhere to Protestant Christianity; important Roman Catholic minority among all three groups. Asians largely Hindus; about one-fifth Muslims. Dutch Reformed churches, primarily Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, predominate among Afrikaners; Anglicans, Methodists, Roman Catholics predominate among English speakers. Methodists, Roman Catholics, and various independent African denominations predominate among Blacks; more than one-fourth of Blacks adhere to indigenous religious systems. More than one-fourth of all Coloureds are Dutch Reformed; others Anglicans and Roman Catholics; Cape Malays are Muslims.

Education: Under multinational development, separate education systems exist for Whites, Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians. In 1979 about 5.3 million students (all races) enrolled in primary and secondary schools; more than 152,000 attended seventeen universities; nearly 148,000 teachers in primary and secondary systems. School attendance compulsory for Whites and Coloureds aged seven to sixteen, and Asians between ages seven to fifteen; compulsory education for Blacks living outside homelands scheduled to begin January 1, 1981, in six selected townships of Transvaal urban-industrial complex as part of new program to phase in compulsory education for Blacks over several years. Cost of all compulsory education borne jointly by provincial and central government agencies; availability of school facilities and qualified teachers and problems connected with language of instruction requirements generate vast disparities between four systems, particularly that of Blacks. In 1979 about 80 percent of all South Africans between ages of twelve and twenty-two literate, according to United Nations (UN) standards; rate for Whites, Coloureds, and Asians over 90 percent and about 58 percent for Blacks.

Health: High rates of tuberculosis, gastroenteritis, venereal disease, kwashiorkor, pellagra, and other diet-associated illnesses among Blacks and others of lower income groups; these peoples also experience severe incidence of malnutrition among children and high rates of infant mortality (over 115 per 1,000 births among Coloureds and more than 200 per 1,000 among Blacks in 1979); higher incidence of cardiovascular disease, strokes, and tumors among Whites. Modern private and government-sponsored medical services available to most of urban population, but quality and availability decline in

rural areas and among lower income groups everywhere. Neglect of preventive medicine, maldistribution of doctors and health services, weak development of ancillary services, and apartheid's deep permeation of medical practices identified by international medical specialists in late 1978 as root causes of high morbidity rates.

Economy

Salient Features: Sharp division between industrialized economy of White area and predominantly subsistence economies of Black homelands. Former, capitalist oriented and dominated by private enterprise, although significant participation by state occurred in certain industries considered basic to economic development or important strategically. Country's large diversified mineral resources, advanced stage of manufacturing development, and great agricultural production capabilities continued to provide strong base for economic expansion in 1980. But cumulative effects of long-standing government apartheid policies, particularly shortage of skilled labor, acted to keep growth rate below potential.

Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, and Fisheries: Under 75,000 market-oriented farms in White area produce about 90 percent of total agricultural output; remainder largely accounted for by subsistence agriculture in Black homelands. Highly variable climate causes great fluctuations in crop production, but extensive use of modern technology in White area results in adequate food supplies for domestic market and surpluses for export; in contrast, homeland agriculture does not meet minimum food needs of inhabitants. Wide range of crops, including maize, sorghum, wheat, potatoes, beans, oilseeds, deciduous fruits, cotton, tobacco, groundnuts (peanuts), citrus, and sugarcane. Livestock raising favored by country's extensive natural pastureland. In late 1970s White area had about 32 million sheep, raised mainly for wool, and over 9 million cattle, mostly for beef. Homelands had about 3.5 million additional cattle and unknown numbers of sheep and goats. Area suited to natural forests very limited, but South Africa essentially self-sufficient in timber output as result of large-scale production by private commercial and government forestry plantations. Fisheries of continuing major economic importance, but prolific area off west coast overfished by foreign operators by mid-1970s. Exclusive fishing zone of 200 nautical miles along entire coast established in late 1977.

Mining: Mining sector principal mainstay of economy at beginning of 1980s accounting for roughly one-fifth of gross domestic product (GDP); major employer of Black labor; mineral exports foremost earner of foreign exchange. Country has remarkable array of minerals, including gold, platinum, diamonds, chromium, iron, manganese, vanadium, antimony, asbestos, fluorspar, titanium, coal, and uranium. Private interests predominate in mining operations, but control largely concentrated in several major conglomerates.

Manufacturing: Dominant sector accounting for almost one-fourth of GDP in 1980. Highly diversified plant, centered mainly in Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area and around Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth, produces large part of requirement for consumer goods, substantial part of intermediate products, and increasing proportion of production machinery. Largest employer among nonagricultural sectors. Private entrepreneurship preponderant, but significant government involvement through varying degrees of ownership by quasi-public Industrial Development Corporation and major public enterprises producing iron and steel, synthetic fuels, and other products.

Energy: Vast reserves of coal and uranium; traces of petroleum and some deposits of natural gas exist, but through 1980 none proved commercially viable; hydroelectric potential extremely limited because of surface water shortage. In 1980 almost all energy requirements satisfied by coal (about 75 percent) and petroleum products (about 25 percent). In 1979 State Electricity Supply Commission provided over 93 percent of electricity consumed, chiefly from coal-fired plants. Entire White population had access to electricity, as well as most of Asian and Coloured groups. Still limited but increasing proportion of Black urban residents had electricity; rural areas and semiurban agglomerations in homelands without power. Country highly dependent on imported petroleum, refined domestically, principally to fuel motor transport but also important for industrial, agricultural, and household use. Foreign oil requirement to be reduced by output of two large oil-from-coal plants beginning in 1982. Country has large strategic oil reserve estimated in late 1970s as sufficient for eighteen months to four years supply. Nuclear power facilities under construction in 1980; earliest start of operation estimated at late 1982.

Foreign Trade: Agricultural products, including maize, sugar, and wool, have long been major export items, but in late 1970s minerals and base metals advanced to first rank. Among principal mineral exports gold (not recorded in trade figures), diamonds, coal, iron ore, and several strategic minerals. Imports led by machinery, transport equipment, and spare parts; large, but unreported amount of petroleum and petroleum products also imported. Main destinations of exports European Economic Community, United States, and Japan; those countries also principal sources of imports. Main bilateral trading partners United States, Britain, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Japan.

Currency: Rand (R). At end of 1980 US$1 equaled about R0.74; conversely R1 equaled about US$1.34.

Fiscal Year: April 1 through following March 31.

Gross Domestic Product: Approximately R44.5 billion in 1979.

Transportation

Railroads: Rail system most important transport mode in 1980. About 23,000 route kilometers of state-owned railroads operated by South African Railways and Harbours Administration (SAR&H) interconnect all principal population centers and economic regions; substantial electrification of main lines. Long-standing government policy favors railroads as principal means of transport, in part because of need to move large quantities of bulk goods produced by economy over long distances separating different parts of country.

Roads and Road Transport: Dense system of modern all-weather roads totaling some 185,000 kilometers, of which almost one-fourth paved, remainder gravel and earth surfaced. Road transport services largely legalized monopoly of SAR&H; private carriers restricted generally to short-haul activities and local deliveries.

Civil Aviation: Major domestic, international, and regional air services furnished by South African Airways (SAA), element of SAR&H. In 1980 SAA largest national airline on African continent. About fifteen foreign airlines engaged in international services to and from South Africa.

Ports and Shipping: Six major ports, including Cape Town, Durban, East London, and Port Elizabeth in existence since colonial times, and Richards Bay and Saldanha Bay constructed in 1970s. All operated by SAR&H. Based on total cargo handled, Durban was largest port in Africa in 1980. Oceangoing shipping services furnished to all parts of world by South African Marine Corporation Limited, which owned and operated fleet of about forty ships. Coastal services provided by several private companies.

Government and Politics

Government: Parliamentary form of central government; independence achieved May 31, 1910, when Union of South Africa created; became sovereign state of British Empire in 1934; became republic on May 31, 1961, and left Commonwealth of Nations in October 1961. Under 1961 Constitution executive functions served by state president (chief of state) and prime minister (head of government), who heads Executive Council (cabinet). In 1980 bicameral legislature consisted of 165-member House of Assembly and fifty-one-member Senate, but constitutional amendment had approved elimination of Senate as of January 9, 1981, and change in House of Assembly to 177 members. Regional government by four provincial councils, whose administrators appointed by central government. Voting rights limited to Whites over age eighteen. Under government's program of separate development by racial categories, ten Black homelands have local government based on unicameral assemblies; three—Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda—granted independence by South Africa in 1976, 1977, 1979, respectively; in

1980 Ciskei voted to achieve same status; independence of these territories not recognized by any country in world except South Africa and involved homelands.

Administrative Divisions: Four provinces of Cape Province, Orange Free State, Natal, and Transvaal.

Judicial System: Based on locally modified derivation of Roman-Dutch and English law. Highest court Appellate Division of Supreme Court; has only appellate jurisdiction. Supreme Court also has seven divisions throughout country having original and appellate jurisdictions. About 300 magistrates combine administrative and judicial functions; these courts have limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. In cases involving Blacks, modified customary law may be applied at discretion of special courts staffed by civil servants.

Politics: Formal political power legally concentrated in hands of country's White minority. National Party, based largely on Afrikaner segment of White population, dominated government and all political activity since 1948. Expression of opinion on national issues and establishment of political groups by non-Whites severely controlled and frequently suppressed by statute and broad exercise of police powers. Nationalist cabinet essentially dictates course of public policy, but legislative excess to some degree held in check by some White parliamentary opposition groups, critical English-language press, reactions of disenfranchised non-White majority, and foreign opinion.

Foreign Relations: South African foreign policy aimed at reinforcing common political, economic, and strategic interests with industrialized West as safeguard against perceived encroachments of communism in Africa. Dialogue and development of working relations with Black African states also sought but with little success. In 1979 South Africa had 103 embassies, legations, consulates, and special missions abroad, but because of its racial policies only twenty-four countries maintained similar facilities in South Africa. Member of UN and some of its specialized agencies, but relations with UN clouded by long-standing dispute over future of mandated territory of Namibia and imposition of mandatory arms embargo by UN Security Council in 1977. Member of customs union with Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

National Security

Armed Forces: In 1980 South African Defence Force totaled about 350,000 personnel. Components regular cadre Permanent Force (20,000); Citizen Force, composed of conscripts on active duty (65,000) and ready reservists (155,000); and paramilitary territorial reserve Commandos (110,000). Standing force functionally organized into army (71,000), air force (10,000), and navy (4,500). Two years of compulsory continuous military service required of all

qualified White males aged seventeen to twenty-five, followed by ten-year active reserve obligation. Standard reserve commitment included eight camps of thirty days each, but reservists subject to mobilization for up to three months annually in late 1970s as required for active duty. About 4,000 non-White volunteers served in Permanent Force, and efforts to recruit more were under way. White women volunteers, accepted in auxiliary capacity since 1972, numbered more than 2,000.

Major Tactical Military Units: In 1980 army organized into conventional and counterinsurgency task forces. Cadre for two full divisions (armored and mechanized infantry) brought to full strength by mobilization of Citizen Force. Standing force included airborne brigade at full complement and missile units. Counterinsurgency task force deployed in Namibia and in operational areas in South Africa. Air Force composed of strike command with two light bomber and three fighter squadrons, transport command with three fixed-wing and five helicopter squadrons, maritime command engaged in joint operations with navy, light aircraft command assigned to army, and Citizen Force reserve with six counterinsurgency squadrons. Equipment inventory included more than 200 combat aircraft. Small navy engaged in coastal and harbor defense and counterinsurgency operations. Naval inventory included three antisubmarine warfare frigates, three submarines, and increasing number of fast attack craft armed with ship-to-ship missiles. Commandos organized into infantry and air components.

Major Equipment Suppliers: South Africa self-sufficient in production of most categories of military equipment. Production and procurement coordinated by state-controlled Armaments Development and Production Corporation, known as ARMSCOR. Mandatory arms embargo imposed in 1977 by UN has limited availability of imports. Some items produced in South Africa under licenses from foreign firms. Arms acquired prior to embargo include modern aircraft from France, Italy, United States, and Britain; tanks and armored vehicles from France and Britain (some purchased from Jordan); French missiles; and naval vessels constructed in France, Israel, and Britain.

Military Costs: Defense expenditures in 1980 estimated at R2.07 billion (equivalent of US$2.75 billion) or more than 15 percent of total allocations and about 3.5 percent of estimated GDP.

Police: South African Police (35,500) trained for law enforcement, riot control, and paramilitary counterinsurgency operations reinforced in emergencies by Police Reserve (20,000). In 1980 regular police force 45 percent non-White.

Figure 1. Republic of South Africa

Introduction

MOST COUNTRIES AND their societies possess attributes, whether physical or cultural, that form the basis of their international reputations. In some cases a state may possess the wealth of vast natural resources and the proven potential for expansive socioeconomic development, factors sure to win the envy of less endowed countries and attractions likely to assure a favorable role in foreign trade. In other cases their political and social orders earn some countries a pariah status in the eyes of the world. The Republic of South Africa—the Saudi Arabia of mineral wealth and the land of apartheid—occupies a position of prominence in all of these categories.

As it enters the 1980s, South Africa has a well-publicized image as one of the richest countries in Africa and certainly the most economically developed. Yet it is equally well-known as the only country in the world where a White minority maintains total political, economic, and social control over a preponderantly non-White—largely Black—majority. This domination is ensured by effective police action against any organized opposition that questions the basic assumptions of the system and by the imposition and enforcement of laws, regulations, and discriminatory practices that equate the rights of inhabitants to the color of their skin. Such are the generally recognized marks of South Africa's uniqueness.

All citizens of the country are subjected to a system of racial classification that designates them officially as White, Coloured, Asian, or Black. Roughly 60 percent of those classified as Whites are Afrikaners, who are descendants of early Dutch and assimilated French Huguenot and German settlers—an ethnic stock that in 1980 had thrived in the area for roughly 325 years. The second largest element of the White group are English speakers, most of whom have British forebears. The Coloured classification is applied to people of mixed ancestry. The Asian group consists largely of people whose ethnic origins are in the East Asian subcontinent. Most of them are Indians, a term that has gained wide use in societal transactions; a small number of Chinese also fall within this official classification.

For most of the White population, living conditions and the quality of life in general terms compare favorably with those of the more developed Western nations. Most people in this category characterize themselves as sturdy and independent, fond of outdoor living and sports, hospitable, and free and easy in ordinary social intercourse. A wide disparity, however, exists between the standard of living of most Whites and that of most Blacks—a function of both income patterns and opportunity. Living conditions for the Coloureds and the Asians range somewhere between these two extremes. Marked racial disparity exists in income, housing, education, levels of health and nutrition, medical facilities, public amenities, social welfare, and leisure activities.

South Africa in the late twentieth century is an enigma, and explanations of its underlying motivations have largely been limited to racial terms that describe a Black-White confrontation. In light of the discriminatory practices that pervade their daily lives, most Black South Africans tend to agree with this explanation. Although racism undeniably plays a decided role in the functioning of the society, a fuller understanding requires an examination of other factors, mainly the role played by the insistent drive of Afrikaner nationalism, a phenomenon that has struggled to achieve and consolidate political power over the last century.

To understand the impact of this nationalism on South African society, it is necessary to recall the climate of conflict that has been endemic throughout the country's history. Beginning in 1652, when representatives of the Dutch East India Company established a station at the Cape of Good Hope to reprovision its international trading fleet, the southern tip of Africa became the scene of conflict of one kind or another between the Whites and the indigenous peoples of the area. With the establishment of British colonial rule in the early nineteenth century, discord arose between different segments of the White population: the English speakers and the Boers (ancestors of the present-day Afrikaners). Some of the English-speaking Whites officially represented the British Empire in its colonial quest for territory. Others were permanently settled in the area to exploit the newly found vast deposits of gold and diamonds and to control the production effort. The Boers (Afrikaans for farmers) were agriculturalists who devoted their efforts to raising crops and livestock. The English speakers tended to gravitate toward an urban environment, and their presence gave rise to a growing number of towns and cities. They imported and established systems of education and justice based on the British model and attempted to implant them among the rural Boers. The differences in language, patterns of living, and cultural heritages rapidly gave rise to feelings of superiority among English speakers, who regarded the farmers as an inferior lot. The Boers, aware of the growing discrimination, regarded the English speakers as a threat to the survival of their culture, and the lines of battle were drawn.

The ensuing struggle in Cape Colony led to the Great Trek northward—a move by Boer pioneers who sought a new land of their own, a land in which they would be free of British interference. Their quest for cultural preservation in time led to the creation of the two Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State, but their clashes with the British were not ended. By the time of the second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) the indigenous Black population had already been subjected to White rule and had ceased to be the prime goal of the subjugation efforts. The British won the bitterly fought conflict, subjecting the stubborn but outnumbered Boer forces to ultimate defeat on the battlefield and thousands of their women and children to inhumane treatment in the world's first concentration camps, where many of them died.

Although the country remained a British dominion when the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, it enjoyed full internal self-government. The arrangement, confirming White domination and permitting Afrikaner nationalism to reassert itself, was to result eventually in Afrikaner political control.

Custom and law had defined race relations and established White social, economic, and political dominance in the heterogeneous society long before the Afrikaner-based National Party came to power in 1948. Most White South Africans, whatever their language or origin, accepted the prevailing pattern. But there were occasional gaps in the structure of written and unwritten rules that limited the rights and opportunities of non-Whites and the relations between members of the different races. In 1948, however, a tightening-up process began as the National Party—supported by most Afrikaners and actively opposed by only a few Whites—introduced a systematic effort to organize the relations, rights, and privileges of the races through a series of parliamentary acts and administrative regulations. The Nationalist government gave its policy an Afrikaans name—apartheid (separateness)—based on the principles espoused by a leading Nationalist newspaper editor, H.F. Verwoerd. The policy was to serve as the cornerstone in the master plan of Afrikaner nationalism.

During the period in which apartheid was developed as an idea and implemented as a system, South Africa's economy was flourishing. The gold, diamonds, and other valuable minerals that attracted foreign trade and investments provided a foundation for the development of a substantial industrial base. During the depression years of the 1930s the economy began its expansion and diversification, in good part with government support. Of considerable importance were the concerted efforts of Afrikaner organizations to mobilize capital and to train and help their people who were moving into the industrial world from a rural existence. At the time the average income of the Afrikaners was substantially less than that of the English speakers. Not only were new commercial and industrial firms formed in this way, but a relatively skilled labor force was also developed. At the same time Blacks from South Africa and neighboring countries were available as unskilled and semiskilled labor at relatively low cost.

Recognizing when they came to power that they were but one element of a White minority in a country with an overwhelming non-White majority, the Nationalists immediately rejected the concept of racial integration in any form. South African industrial growth needed Black labor, but the Afrikaners had not won power only to be overwhelmed by these dark-skinned inhabitants in what the new political victors considered to be their cities and towns, their villages and farms. The history of an existence as a subjugated, "inferior" people remained a painful memory for the Afrikaners. They had struggled too long to gain power and were determined to protect their newly won status. In their view, the survival of their culture

was at stake. The solution was maximum feasible separation of the races and, where separation was not altogether feasible, maximum control of the residence, movements, and behavior of the non-Whites.

Many Blacks, Coloureds, Asians, and a few Whites tried to oppose the implementation of apartheid through the courts, by passive resistance, and by public protest. Opposition to the system led to the enactment of stringent security measures intended to minimize the perceived threat. The institutions and practices that developed to safeguard the existing social order were largely supported by the White minority. Given the absolute supremacy of the country's parliament, there was little that the courts could do. Over the next three decades Blacks—the racial group that suffers most under apartheid—have been frustrated repeatedly by the impossibility of change through institutional channels and have resorted at times to violent means. But these efforts have made little headway against a determined and well-trained internal security force.

When South Africa declared itself a republic in 1961, it had already experienced the sting of international disapprobation arising from its racial policies. Early plans for continued membership in the Commonwealth were abandoned when it became clear that other member nations would demand changes in the apartheid system. Since then expressions of disapproval have continued to mount.

The United Nations (UN), of which South Africa is a member, has been the major forum for peaceful moves against apartheid. Initially its actions were admonitory resolutions grounded in the country's violations of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. But as more and more sovereign Black states of Africa joined the world body, the resolutions escalated to the level of condemnations. In the early 1960s both the Security Council and the General Assembly voted to regard apartheid as a danger to peace and security and thus gave legal status to its discussion as an international issue. In 1961 the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting member states to take "separate and collective action" on a voluntary basis. Most countries of Black Africa, backed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have complied in principle and many in practice. More recently a mandatory arms embargo has emerged.

Further pressures from OAU members have led to South Africa's loss of membership in a number of the UN's more important specialized agencies, and since 1974 its delegates have been prevented from assuming their seats in the General Assembly. Repeated attempts have been made to expel South Africa from the UN—an action without precedent—but as of late 1980 these efforts had failed. For the preceding two decades concerted action had been directed toward the peaceful achievement of independence for the former German-held territory of South West Africa, which the League of Nations mandated to South Africa for administration after World War I. In 1969 the UN General Assembly created an eleven-nation council to administer the area as a trust territory and

renamed it Namibia. The Nationalist government in Pretoria has consistently refused to recognize the legality of the UN action and has acted to thwart all subsequent attempts by the world body to negotiate Namibian independence.

In addition to being condemned for its racist policies and actions by the UN and the OAU, South Africa has also incurred the disapproval of international religious organizations such as the World Council of Churches. Religious ostracism is regarded as totally unwarranted by South Africans, who testify with pride to their firm belief in the guiding principles of Christianity. Responsible church officials abroad, questioning the doctrine followed by the country's Dutch Reformed churches, contend that Afrikanerdom is buttressed by what has become over the years a civil religion whose purpose is to ensure the dominance of a hostile environment by its followers.

For many years the government in Pretoria and White South Africans in general found a measure of comfort in the protective buffer provided by the other White-controlled territories that separated them from the Black states that advocated their downfall. But the 1970s brought disturbing changes to the shrinking White redoubt as Portugal gave up its colonies in Angola and Mozambique and Ian Smith's White-ruled Rhodesia became Robert Mugabe's Black-led Zimbabwe. In addition Namibia hung like an albatross around South Africa's neck as Black insurgents operating out of Marxist-led Angola battled the South African Defence Force (SADF) in attempts to free the territory. Mozambique was seen as a suspected haven for other communist-backed guerrillas.

According to most knowledgeable military analysts, South Africa in 1980 had a more than ample military capability to deal with insurgent threats from Black African sources. In terms of leadership, training, technical proficiency, equipment, and general fighting ability, the SADF was the strongest and most combat-capable defense establishment in Africa south of the Sahara. It was backed by a formidable and growing domestic defense industry that some foreign analysts credited with the ability to produce and deploy nuclear weapons.

Since the advent of the energy crisis and increasing publicity on the growing shortage of strategic minerals within major industrial countries, South Africa has mounted a strong bid for Western support by emphasizing the importance of its vast mineral resources. The tempo of these overtures has increased since the late 1970s in the form of declarations that South Africa is under siege by international communism and that Marxist takeovers in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia are forerunners of planned attacks on the primary target. Communist success, warns the government in Pretoria, would deny vitally needed strategic minerals to the West—an event of stark economic, political, and military significance. The potential of such an occurrence has forced Western capitals to weigh these interests against their distaste for South Africa's domestic course.

In an era of growing international interdependence, South Africans have found their relative isolation both uncomfortable and disquieting. Many have come to realize that the protective device of apartheid is becoming a dead end. The 1980 census revealed that White population growth rate continues to fall behind that of Blacks. South African industrialists have predicted that within the next decade the White community will be unable to meet growing demands for technically trained managers and skilled technicians in the labor force. Moreover the country's tarnished image has led to diminished White immigration, leaving little recourse but to rely heavily in the future on Black workers to fill the gap. But education and training needed by Black workers have been seriously neglected under apartheid, and few are ready to assume such responsibilities in spite of recent efforts to upgrade their qualifications and to grant them rights enjoyed by other workers.

Although the business community understands the growing threat to economic growth and to the country's continuing self-sufficiency, its efforts to convince Afrikanerdom have received mixed reactions. The adamant conservatives insist that concessions to international and domestic pressures for change can only lead to uncontrolled revolutionary violence and loss of the White community's long-term political, social, and economic investments. The more pragmatic members of the ruling National Party, who have headed the government since 1978, have recognized the political dilemma facing the White community and Afrikanerdom in particular. Prime Minister P.W. Botha, wary of the growing possibility of abrupt change by Black revolutionary means, has initiated a process of reform along a less dramatic evolutionary course. The modifications of the apartheid system he has proposed—and is slowly implementing—have been designed to gain more acceptance from the Black community and the foreign countries who view South Africa as a pariah nation.

Partial acceptance of Coloureds and Asians in the political life of the country has been proposed, but the concept of separate national homelands continues to be regarded as the primary answer to Black political aspirations. As National Party doctrine has evolved, the term "apartheid" was abandoned in favor of "separate development" in the 1960s and "multinational development" since the early 1970s. Yet the discriminatory features of the system—the wide gap in incomes and in educational, residential, and other social conditions—remain intact. Strikes and violence among Black and Coloured students and workers during 1980 were reminders that the discontent underlying the Soweto riots of 1976 had not been dissipated.

Botha and key members of his cabinet have warned that the republic is faced by a "total threat," consisting of the UN, Black Africa, and the communist world. Accordingly, their response is that of a "total strategy" involving the need to "change or perish." Whether Botha's pragmatism would turn out to be a radical departure from that of his business-as-usual predecessor, John Vorster,

had not been demonstrated as 1980 ended. The success of Botha's efforts will depend ultimately on his ability to outmaneuver the traditional conservatives and to gain the Black community's confidence through demonstrated progress.

There are few indications that the political dilemma facing Afrikanerdom will be easily resolved. All of its members are aware of their unique place in the world. As the noted Africanist Chester A. Crocker wrote in 1980, "in the long history of European migration, they are the only ethnic-cultural group to have formed a distinctly new nation and waged a successful nationalist revolution in their new land." Substantive change will require adroit handling to diminish the specter of threats to Afrikaner cultural survival. But the republic's long-suffering Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians will also expect assurances of equal participation in South Africa's future.

<div align="right">Harold D. Nelson</div>

December 31, 1980

Chapter 1. Historical Setting

Ox wagon, symbol of Boers' Great Trek

MODERN SOCIAL, POLITICAL, and economic institutions in South Africa are direct consequences of clearly discernible historical developments over a period of more than three centuries. The social institutions are the outcome of a series of conflicts that began with the first contacts between the country's disparate peoples. These conflicts have always been framed in racial terms, and the basic issues have been the questions of control of the land, and later, of labor to work the land.

White colonists of European origin and their descendants, with their superior technology and more developed political organizations, strove from the beginning to dominate the country's numerically superior Black Africans. By the mid-eighteenth century, after 100 years in South Africa, most Whites were so convinced of their culture's superiority that nothing could challenge their view that Blacks were destined by God to be permanently relegated to positions inferior to the Whites. Most of the history of South Africa in the twentieth century has been marked by the efforts of the White community to ensure continued supremacy of its interests over those of other groups—Blacks, Coloureds (of mixed race), and Asians (chiefly Indians)—in a rapidly developing industrial economy despite the rapid emergence of independent Black African states and generally hostile world opinion. These efforts to maintain White supremacy have led to the imposition of social and legal restraints under which the non-White majority has chafed in the decades since World War II.

Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century White settlers were chiefly farmers (or pastoralists) and merchants competing for land against a variety of Black groups engaged in subsistence cultivation and herding. The discovery of diamonds and gold in the last decades of the century marked the beginning of a change that was to lead to industrialization and the urbanization of most Whites, Coloureds, and Asians and substantial numbers of Blacks. These changes and the resultant economic interdependence among the races were to pose the crucial questions of social and political relations between Whites and non-Whites that persisted into the fourth quarter of the twentieth century. In general the basic pattern was one of White economic, political, and social domination, but there was a good deal of controversy among Whites over the most effective ways of dealing with Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians in order to maintain that domination.

The introduction of mining and the subsequent growth of industry and urban life also exacerbated the historically strained relations between the two major White groups, the Afrikaners (more commonly called Boers in the nineteenth century, the descendants of the Dutch colonists), and the British settlers. The conflict flared up in

3

the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) in which the British were victorious. They eventually granted self-government to the conquered Boer republics, which culminated in the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910. This was the first step in a long and complex struggle for power over the entire territory between the two White groups. That struggle was broadly framed in ethnic terms, but it was marked by a number of crosscurrents reflecting in part the economic differences between the bulk of Afrikaners and most English speakers.

After World War II the National Party came to power. Based on that very large portion of the Afrikaner population still economically inferior to English-speaking Whites and subject to actual or potential competition in the labor market from non-Whites, the party espoused the ideology of apartheid (literally, separateness). Its implementation was to shore up Afrikaner identity vis-a-vis other Whites and guarantee the economic, social, and political status of Whites—particularly Afrikaners—with respect to Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians.

The institution of apartheid, seen by some Afrikaners as a long-range solution to the racial situation, engendered a number of problems. The growth of the economy in the years after World War II increased the significance of the non-White labor force. The perspectives of Afrikaners (and other Whites) were not accepted by Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians. Government actions to suppress movements intended to change the social and political order, although effective, did not end them and served to focus the disapprobation of the international community on the South African system.

The Pre-European Period

Man and the manlike creatures who may have been his ancestors have inhabited the southern African plateau for millennia. The remains of the predecessors of modern man have been found at several South African sites, including the hominid australopithecine (man-ape), who inhabited southern and eastern Africa in the early Pleistocene well over 1 million years ago. Fragmentary remains suggest the emergence of an intermediate hominid, not quite Homo sapiens, about 500,000 years ago. Much of the research on early man, his products, and his environment has been done by South African specialists.

By the end of the Pleistocene—roughly 10,000 to 20,000 years ago—and probably earlier, all forms were fully Homo sapiens, hunters and gatherers using stone tools. Some lived in the interior and hunted game; others gathered shellfish and other marine products along the coast. Their precise relationship to modern man in South Africa was still not settled in the late 1970s, but there is some evidence that hunters and gatherers of the late Pleistocene and early recent periods were the ancestors of the Khoi (called Hottentots by the White settlers) and the San (known as Bushmen to the Whites).

4

Archaeological discoveries show that people resembling the present-day Khoi and San inhabited southern Africa for thousands of years. In the first century A.D. the Khoi may have had goats and sheep; by the eleventh century they had acquired herds of cattle. At the time the Europeans first encountered them, the Khoi and San possibly numbered between 100,000 and 200,000.

The ancestors of the Bantu (see Glossary) speakers, moving southward from the Congo region, entered the area around the Zambezi River at the beginning of the Christian Era and, as early as A.D. 400, probably established the beginning of the sociopolitical system that gave rise to ancient Zimbabwe in the modern state of the same name. These people carried a knowledge of agriculture and iron-making. At some point before they crossed the Limpopo River (the northeastern boundary of modern South Africa), many of them had also acquired cattle, and it is likely that their search for new pastures led them to move south. They crossed the Limpopo sometime before 500, settling first in the eastern Transvaal (see fig. 2).

No specific link has been established between the earliest Bantu speakers and modern peoples, but it is fairly clear that the ancestors of those Black Africans called Nguni, i.e., Zulu, Xhosa, and Swazi, crossed the Limpopo about 1300 and drove some of the earlier inhabitants south and west while absorbing others. The Nguni occupied all of South Africa south of the Limpopo to the Great Kei River and between the Drakensberg Mountains and the Indian Ocean, apparently driving the Khoi before them. The forward elements of the Nguni reached the Great Fish River by 1500. The journals of Portuguese sailors cast away on the Natal coast as early as 1552 testify to the already dense Bantu-speaking population in Natal at that time. The advance of the Nguni halted between the Great Kei and Great Fish rivers until the mid-eighteenth century. While the Nguni were settling the eastern Cape and Natal, the Sotho people were spreading west and southwest from the eastern Transvaal.

Arrival of the Europeans and Development of Boer Values

The first European contacts with the South African coast resulted from the efforts to find an ocean route to the Indies at the end of the fifteenth century. In 1488 a Portuguese expedition under Bartholomew Diaz rounded the southern tip of Africa for the first time. Diaz' voyage ended near present-day Port Elizabeth before turning back to Europe. It was only on the return voyage that the voyagers discovered the Cape of Good Hope. Nine years later a second expedition, under Vasco da Gama, made the first voyage from Europe to India, landing at Mosselbaai to trade with the Khoi for meat to stock the ships for the long voyage.

Because of the value of the spice trade between Europe and the East, significant numbers of Portuguese ships began to use the route almost immediately. To ease their supply problem, the Portuguese established reprovisioning stations at convenient points but ignored

Source: Adapted from David Birmingham and Shula Marks. "Southern Africa," in
Roland Oliver (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, III* (from c. 1050 to
c. 1600), Cambridge, 1977; John Cope, *South Africa,* New York, 1967; and
Roland Oliver and Brian Fagan, "The Emergence of Bantu Africa," in J.D.
Fage (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, II* (from c. 500 B.C. to A.D.
1050), Cambridge, 1978.

Figure 2. Population Movements from Prehistory to 1700

South Africa in favor of the more hospitable coasts of Angola and
Mozambique. During the sixteenth century a number of Portuguese
ships were wrecked along the South African coast, and their survivors,
some of whom walked to the Portuguese settlement at Lourenço Mar-
ques, provided the earliest account of the lands and peoples of the in-
terior of the territory.

By the end of the sixteenth century Portugal's power had begun to
decline, and English and Dutch ships vied to replace the Portuguese on
the profitable spice trade route. The English began to call sporadically
at the Cape in search of provisions after 1601, but they continued to
prefer Ascension Island in the South Atlantic as their calling station.

Serious Dutch interest in the Cape was awakened after 1647, when a
captain of the Dutch East India Company and his crew were ship-
wrecked there for several months. On their return to the Netherlands
they reported favorably on the Cape's potential as a station for

supplying company ships at the midpoint of their long voyage to the East. In 1651 the company's directors dispatched an expedition under Jan van Riebeeck to establish such a refreshment station. His party of some 100 men and four women landed at Table Bay on April 6, 1652, and it was from this nucleus that South Africa's settlement grew.

Van Riebeeck established friendly relations with the nearest Khoi tribe, whose chief had learned some English from trading with passing ships. The total Khoi and San population then living in the area first touched by Europeans has been estimated at only 25,000, but the great bulk of the Khoi inhabited the richer lands around the Cape of Good Hope and lived as far east as the Transkei and along the Orange River.

The White settlers laid out farms and traded for cattle and sheep to provision company ships. As the Khoi began to realize the permanent nature of European settlement, they observed that the more cattle they traded to Europeans the more grazing land the Europeans demanded. Khoi interest in cattle trading therefore began to decline.

Partially motivated by the continual theft of stock by the Khoi and San hunters, who considered cattle as wild game, the Dutch in 1659 declared war on the Khoi, whom they quickly defeated. The Dutch then took control of desirable grazing lands beyond the Cape Peninsula as their reward for victory. Theft of cattle was to be a recurrent cause (or excuse) for warfare against Black Africans and for seizure of their lands by the settlers throughout South Africa's history.

The Dutch East India Company had not intended its Cape settlement to develop into a colony. The early settlers were all company employees and were expected to produce by their own labor the foodstuffs required to provision passing company ships. The Europeans, however, proved to be insufficient as a labor force. Attempts to recruit Khoi labor did not succeed, and therefore slaves were imported—at first from the western African slave markets including Angola and later from eastern Africa and the Dutch East Indies.

Despite the importation of slaves, the production of foodstuffs remained inadequate, evidently because of the company employees' lack of motivation. For this reason in 1679 the company's directors in the Netherlands became convinced of the need to give land to permanent settlers, who would be motivated by personal profit to raise crops and cattle for sale to the company. A small number of company employees had been allowed to hold land at the Cape beginning in 1657; after 1679 German and Dutch settlers started to come from Europe, lured by offers of free farms of their own.

The number of free farmers increased particularly after 1688, when French Huguenots who had fled into the Netherlands from religious persecution in France accepted offers from the company of free passage to Cape Town. The Huguenots were for the most part skilled farmers and winegrowers whose Calvinist religion was similar

to that of the Dutch, and they quickly assimilated the Dutch language and customs. Many of South Africa's Dutch-speaking leaders during the next three centuries were to bear French names. This increase in population was accompanied by a second war against the Khoi to provide the required farmland.

In 1713 an epidemic of smallpox, brought on a company ship from India, devastated the Khoi. In some areas along the colony's borders whole tribes disappeared, and Khoi resistance to the Dutch advance, feeble from the first, was no longer of any serious consequence. A portion of the remaining Khoi fled from contact with the Europeans and into the less fertile hinterlands. The majority, however, were simply engulfed by the more advanced society that descended upon them and were absorbed into it to become a large part of the ancestry of the Coloured population.

Although organized opposition by the Khoi ceased after that time, the Dutch settlers were to remain in conflict with Black Africans along the edge of the frontiers for another century and a half. These battles between Whites and Blacks were nearly all fought on a very small scale. As early as 1715 the Dutch developed a kind of commando group that was to bear the brunt of such wars on the European side. The commandos, irregular groups of lightly armed frontiersmen, saw their first service in campaigns to exterminate the San and were effective in this kind of warfare. The units were composed of White and sometimes Coloured civilians called out as a military posse on the authority of an appointed local leader. Because the frontier farmers were accustomed to a hard life and were generally expert marksmen, these irregular mounted rifle units were able to serve the Dutch and their Afrikaner descendants effectively against both the Black Africans and the British (see History of the Military Tradition, ch. 5).

The San retaliated against the Dutch encroachment on their hunting grounds by raiding Dutch herds of cattle and sheep. They fought effectively with poisoned arrows and were able to take a considerable toll among the Dutch, who pursued them into their mountain retreats. The San often killed or maimed stock they had stolen rather than let it be recovered by the settlers. Dutch hatred of the San reached the point where they were considered nonhuman and frequently were slaughtered outright. Those who were not killed or did not flee to the north were put to work as serfs on Dutch farms and were absorbed into the developing Coloured population, which sprang from unions among the Dutch, the Khoi, and Black and Asian slaves.

The original free farmers had been given grants of land with the understanding that they would function as virtual vassals of the Dutch East India Company. They were forbidden to trade with the Khoi and were required to sell to the company at fixed prices all the produce that they did not consume. The ban against trade was aimed at ensuring that the company, through its monopoly, would get the best bargain in purchasing cattle for resale to the ships.

8

*Schoongezicht near Stellenbosch, an example of
Cape Dutch homesteads of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. These graceful landmarks
are maintained as national monuments.
Courtesy South African Information Service.*

As the herds grew and the population increased, more and more
land was needed. Beyond the narrow rings of mountains that fringe
the Cape area, the high plateau (veld) was found to be extremely
arid—particularly the Great Karoo region, into which the earliest
cattle farmers had expanded. Much land was required to support the
cattle, and farms over 2,000 hectares were common. Because the
company did not sell land to the frontiersmen but rather leased it in
return for an annual rental fee, there was little encouragement to ex-
pend money and energy on building a permanent homestead. As the
grass or the water on farms was depleted or as the herds or families
increased in number, the hardy pioneers piled their belongings into
their wagons and trekked to a new site with greener or broader
pastures. Thus they came to be called Trekboers, or wandering
farmers, a term that came to be accepted—particularly in its short-
ened form, Boer—as a title of honor by all the frontiersmen and by
others who came after them.

The Trekboers adopted an attitude of hostility toward external
control. For them the only important community was the extended

family under the leadership of the senior married male. At the core of the extended family were the man's wife, his unmarried brothers and sisters, his own sons and daughters and, if his sons were married, their wives and children. Closely associated with the family in the community were its Black African slaves, few in number, and its Khoi servants and their immediate families. The head of the group was its patriarch, a ruler dispensing law and order to its members and particularly to its slaves and other servants.

The Trekboers compared their way of life to that of the Hebrew patriarchs of the Old Testament. A Boer patriarch saw himself—like Abraham—leading his family, followers, and herds through the wilderness to a better land under the guidance of God. The Trekboers carried the Biblical analogy further and equated the forces of evil and darkness with the dark-skinned people who often surrounded and always opposed their advance to greener pastures. The Boer's attitude toward relations with Black Africans that developed during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was to carry over to later generations of Afrikaners.

Europeans made their first contacts with non-Whites who were either slaves or the servile remnants of the Cape Khoi. This initial experience, combined with the Europeans' higher level of technical civilization, their dominant economic and legal position, and the tenets of Afrikaner religion left them with a feeling of superiority to dark-skinned people (see Religious Life, ch. 2). At the same time, however, they developed a fear of the Blacks.

As the Boers made contact with the Bantu speakers, they projected their earlier feelings about dark-skinned races onto the new enemy. In this case the fear was heightened by the real military threat posed by the large numbers and the organization of the Blacks, who were direct competitors with the Boers on the frontier for land and cattle. In fact the advance guard of the Boers lived a life very similar to that of their Black African neighbors. Both depended upon large tracts of land to support the herds upon which their economies were in large part based.

Thus were developed the attitudes that were to dominate South Africa's history. Both sides demanded access to large tracts of land, Whites felt superior to and yet somewhat afraid of the numerically stronger Blacks, and Whites needed to keep Blacks in an inferior position in order to retain the land and the sense of superiority.

The European-Xhosa Clash

The first major Bantu-speaking people met by the Dutch were the Xhosa, the southernmost Nguni. After the founding of the colony at Cape Town it was not unusual for slaves and Europeans accused of crimes to join the Xhosa to escape from slavery or from the harsh penal laws.

Xhosa trade with Cape Colony began in the earliest years of the eighteenth century with irregular traffic in cattle and ivory. The Dutch farmers soon found that cheap trade goods could be exchanged

10

for large amounts of ivory. By 1770 a regular wagon trail had been formed from the Cape to the Great Fish River, an area generally assumed to be the southern frontier of Nguni territory. In addition to ivory the Europeans were also interested in trading for Xhosa cattle, which could be obtained in exchange for a handful of glass beads and iron nails. The cattle brought high prices from ships reprovisioning at the Cape and, although the cattle trade was supposed to be a monopoly of the Cape government, the farmers apparently found ways to evade the restrictions. Cattle, not the ivory trade, were to be of historical importance because the economies of both the rural Boers and the Xhosa societies relied heavily on cattle herding.

Until the second half of the eighteenth century the two groups remained separated by the extensive region between the Gamtoos and Great Fish rivers, except for the Boer trading parties and the limited advance of small Nguni elements. After 1750, however, both groups began to move into the region between the two rivers in search of pastures for the herds of their expanding populations. Initially the area was the scene of confused conflict between variously allied combinations of Boers, Khoi, San, and Xhosa. By the third quarter of the century, however, the continuing conflict began to take shape as the Boers and the Xhosa struggled for control of the land.

Throughout the eighteenth century the company tried to limit the eastward expansion of the Boers. Such expansion increased the chances of conflict with the Blacks and meant higher military expenditures. Moreover the Boers' allegiance to the colonial government seemed to decrease as their distance from the centers of administration increased. Despite the company's efforts, some Boer families had already trekked beyond the Great Fish River into Nguni country by 1770, and eight years later significant numbers of them were settled along the river's western banks. In 1778 the company's Cape Colony governor concluded the first treaty with two minor Xhosa chiefs. The treaty delimited the frontiers between the colony and Xhosa territory, but the Black Africans did not understand that the treaty was intended to limit westward expansion.

Within a year the first serious conflict (the First Kaffir War) was sparked by Dutch efforts to expel Xhosa tribes from the area west of the Great Fish River. The conflict was limited largely to attacks by Boer commandos on Xhosa settlements and Xhosa raids on Boer farms. Both parties sought cattle. Although the battles were often bloody, assault on unarmed parties or the killing of women and children was the exception in the Kaffir wars. The second and third of these confrontations, in 1789 and 1799, were similar to the first one. In each case the authorities tried to turn back the flow of Xhosa who, in search of new pastures, had crossed a border established by colonial authorities without meaningful Xhosa agreement.

In the fourth war, fought in 1812, the government for the first time made extensive use of regular military forces and established

permanent military posts just inside the frontier. After the fifth war, in 1819, a neutral zone was established between the Great Fish and Keiskamma rivers. In order to strengthen the frontier, 4,000 British settlers were given farms along the west bank of the Great Fish River in 1820. Unions between Whites and Coloureds and between Whites and Xhosa occurred along the frontier, and a Cape Coloured settlement was established in the Kat River valley over the opposition of the Boers, who feared that the Coloureds might support the Xhosa.

Missionaries had first entered Xhosa territory in 1799. By 1845 there were at least seven permanent stations of the London Missionary Society and the Scottish Presbyterian Church. The missionaries devised a Xhosa alphabet for translating the Scriptures and opened village schools. In 1841 a seminary was established at Lovedale, and Europeans and Black Africans were trained as teachers for the mission schools.

The missionaries brought the Protestant work ethic to the territory. Even Lovedale's seminary students were required to perform daily manual labor in order to learn to stimulate the spread of modern agricultural techniques and to break down the Xhosa tradition that only women cultivated while men hunted, herded, or fought. The missionaries also created a market for modern goods that could be obtained only through the cultivation of cash crops or employment by Whites for cash wages. By 1828 the demand for laborers on Boer farms was strong enough to force the colonial government to lower the barrier to Xhosa entry into the colony under a system of labor passes.

Entry of the British

Concerned that their independent way of life might be restricted, the Boers began to demand a voice in the colony's government in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Annoyed at the government's failure to take vigorous action against the Bantu-speaking peoples blocking their expansion and seeking to ensure the availability of new land and cheap labor, the Boers established two short-lived republics (at Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet) in 1795, writing clauses into their constitutions allowing the virtual enslavement of all Khoi.

Before the company could take action against the rebels, the government of the Prince of Orange in the Netherlands was replaced by a French-imposed republic that sided with France in the war against Britain. With the assent of the deposed prince, British forces occupied Dutch colonial possessions. From 1795 to 1803 the British assumed control of Cape Colony, ending 143 years of rule by the Dutch East India Company. After a brief return to Dutch control, the Cape passed again into British hands in 1806.

Although the British quickly suppressed the newly proclaimed Boer republics, they took steps to conciliate the rebels by lifting the restrictions on trade, guaranteeing property rights, and allowing the Roman-Dutch legal system to continue in force. The Dutch colonists

had few objections to the imposition of British control in any case. Their ties to the Netherlands had been weakened by their dislike for the Dutch East India Company, and a good portion of the colony's population was by origin French or German rather than Dutch.

New colonial legislation, the Coloured Labour Ordinance of 1809, required that all Coloureds have a fixed place of residence, carry proof of employment, and obtain permits to change residence and jobs or to travel from one district to another. Although intended in part to end vagrancy and to prevent exploitation by requiring registered work contracts, this act heralded South Africa's pass laws that were later to become the most hated burden of the non-White populations.

The Boers' friendship with the British was short-lived. In 1807 the importation of slaves into any part of the British Empire was forbidden, cutting off the supply to South Africa. Growing agitation for the elimination of slavery throughout the empire had been led by the abolitionist movements in Britain. The demand had been aimed primarily at the large slaveholdings in the British West Indies, but the Boers were aware that the British missionary societies in South Africa were siding with the Black Africans and were leading the demands for the improvement of the position of both slaves and other non-White workers.

The Boers were particularly resentful of the new British magistrates' efforts to assure that employers give just treatment to Blacks and became wary of all other moves that they interpreted as equating non-Whites with Whites before the law. The "Black Court" circuit of 1813 heard charges brought by servants and slaves against their masters and, although most charges were not sustained by the court, Boers were offended by the fact that a servant's word was accepted in court at all.

A crucial point in the deterioration of relations was reached in 1815. A Boer farmer, accused of mistreating a Khoi servant, refused to appear in court. A British officer with Khoi troops, who were sent to compel the farmer's attendance, were fired upon, and in the ensuing fight the Boer was killed. A number of his neighbors rose in revolt, and after their arrest five were hanged publicly at Slachter's Nek. The hanging of Whites and the shooting of a White by Khoi police— all over the issue of a Black's charges—became a permanent irritant, and the story became a symbol of British oppression of the Boers.

The Boers continued to be antagonized by the actions of the English-speaking missionaries. Partially as a result of agitation in London by the missionaries' supporters, the Coloured Labour Ordinance of 1809 was repealed by Ordinance 50 of 1828. The new ordinance clarified the right of the Coloureds to own land within the colony and granted them the right to move freely within the colony without the need for passes. The clauses of the vagrancy law that had allowed the Dutch to force Coloureds to work on their farms or else go to jail were also abolished. The abrogation of these clauses was a blow not only to Boer sensitivities but also to their economic

position, as it ended the legal guarantees for the continued availability of cheap Coloured labor. The labor market was such, however, that many Coloured families continued to work for White masters under much the same terms.

The emancipation of all slaves in the British Empire, which was proclaimed by Parliament in 1833, came as a great blow to the Boers. The last of the slaves were freed by December 1838, and their freedom before the law was assured by the Master and Servant Ordinance of 1841, which provided equal treatment for all servants without regard to color. The law, however, permitted a number of criminal penalties that were often strictly enforced against Blacks.

The abolition of slavery brought financial ruin to a number of Cape farmers since most received only a small portion of their slaves' assessed value, but the great majority of Boers had not depended on slaves for their labor. Instead other British actions during the 1830s directly affected them. The Sixth Kaffir War erupted in 1834, and British forces assisted by Khoi troops had forced the Xhosa back across the Great Kei River for the first time. The British governor annexed all the land between the Great Fish and Great Kei rivers, opening a sizable portion of territory to farming by the expanding Boer population (see fig. 3).

The British missionaries, however, protested to London against this seizure of Xhosa land, and the British cabinet forced the governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, to restore the land to the Black Africans. The blow to Boer hopes for new lands for their sons came when they were beginning to feel seriously the cultural and legal impact of British rule. English had become the medium of instruction in the free schools and the language of the courts. British criminal procedure had been superimposed on the earlier Roman-Dutch system, leaving the Boers at a disadvantage in the courts. English and Scottish influences were even beginning to be felt in the most central element of their life: the Dutch Reformed churches. Whatever the attitudes of the missionaries and British officials, however, English-speaking settlers on the frontier often had the same views as the Boers and gave them moral support in their complaints.

The Great Trek

The Boers, reacting to a situation they found increasingly intolerable, decided to leave Cape Colony for a new land of their own where they hoped to be free of British interference. In 1836 the Great Trek began, in which approximately 6,000 Boers—the voortrekkers (pioneers)—from the British colony moved into the lightly populated lands north of the Orange River. Packing all their possessions into covered wagons drawn by oxen, the Boer families and their Khoi (and a few Black) servants migrated from the eastern Cape up the steep passes into the Transvaal plateau.

The plateau areas that the Boers first entered had been nearly depopulated by the intratribal warfare of the previous twenty years, and some of the remaining Black Africans regarded the Boers as

14

possible allies in future battles against the Zulu. The Boers, however, had their own potential allies in the Griquas, a frontier Coloured group who at the time were strung out along the Orange River with a center at Philippolis, close to the Boer migratory route.

In January 1837 a mixed party of Boers and Griquas attacked the headquarters of the Ndebele, an offshoot of the Zulu, and scored a considerable victory against their leader, Mzilikazi. The Boers then established their first major settlement at Winburg in an area ceded to them by an ally, the chief of a small Sotho tribe.

The original settlers under Andries Potgieter and Gerit Marais were joined in June 1837 by another party of Voortrekkers under the leadership of Piet Retief. The combined groups decided to form a loosely federated government in the hope of providing general guidance for all the trek parties, but no real grounds for unity could be found. Although they all wished to escape British rule, agreement stopped there. They disagreed on religious matters, on where to settle, and on leadership. The essential limitation, however, was Boer disdain for government in general. Some historians have considered their flight from the Cape as much an attempt to escape from all governmental authority as from British rule. Regardless, the Boers' nomadic way of life with only small scattered permanent communities made centralized government both difficult to construct and of limited value.

By 1839 the Winburg Trekboers had separated. Retief and his party went to Natal; Potgieter and Marais followed different routes to the north. Potgieter's party crossed the Vaal River and built the town of Potchefstroom, where they remained until 1845; they then migrated across the plateau to descend into the Lowveld, the first Boer settlement in tropical Africa, where they established a new republic with its capital at Lydenburg.

The British government's attitude toward the independence of the Boer settlements was mixed. The Foreign Office and the Cape government were not interested in any claims that would increase their expenditures, particularly for defense. The government in Cape Town, however, already had tenuous links with the Griquas, who had been considered British subjects living outside British territory. In return for small subsidies, the Griquas were expected to prevent incursions by Bantu speakers into the adjacent regions of the colony. In 1843 additional ties to the lands across the Orange River were formed by the Cape government when treat.es were approved with Moshweshwe, king of the Basuto (South Sotho), and the chief of the Pondo.

When fighting broke out between the Boers and the Griquas of Philippolis in 1845, the Cape government provided military support to the Griquas. The British finally proclaimed the Orange River Sovereignty in February 1848, bringing the entire region up to the Vaal River under their control. The Boers and Griquas were to have limited self-government with elected legislative councils under British resident commissioners. A British agent was also appointed to oversee Moshweshwe's activities.

Figure 3. Principal Colonial Frontiers to Mid-1800s

16

Source: Adapted from Irving Kaplan et al., *Area Handbook for South Africa*, Wash-
ington, 1970, pp. 48–49; 53; and J. D. Omer-Cooper, "Colonial South Africa
and Its Frontiers," in John E. Flint (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa*, V
(from c. 1790 to c. 1870), Cambridge, 1976, p. 354.

17

The Winburg Boers rejected British rule and interference in their relations with neighboring Black Africans, particularly the Basuto. They were supported by Andries Pretorius, who brought commandos from the Transvaal, but the British forces were victorious. Nevertheless the British recognized the necessity of coming to terms with the Boers north of the Vaal and in January 1852 signed the Sand River Convention in which they agreed to recognize the independence of the Boer states across the Vaal.

Many Boers living in the Orange River Sovereignty were prepared to retain links with the Cape Colony, but the British remained unwilling to shoulder the financial burden of defending the territory. The Boer community reluctantly decided to establish an independent republic (the Orange Free State), for which a constitution was drawn up at the Bloemfontein Convention in 1854. At the insistence of the new state, the British agreed to end all treatymaking with Black Africans north of the Orange River if such treaties might infringe on the republic's interest. Nevertheless after continued border disputes between Moshweshwe and the republic, the British did proclaim a protectorate over Basutoland at the king's request in 1868 (see Emergence of the Basuto Kingdom, this ch.).

Settlement of Natal

The Voortrekkers under Retief initially made contact with the British traders who had settled at Port Natal (later Durban) in 1833. The traders had advised the Boers to seek a treaty with the Zulu chief, Dingane, for the right to settle the northern half of Natal. At first the Zulu chief agreed to a treaty. But when Retief and his followers returned to sign it in February 1838, Dingane, fearful of the Europeans' growing power and numbers, massacred Retief's party and the men, women, and children who had remained behind at other Boer settlements. Nearly 700 Europeans were killed in the attacks. In December a Boer army under Pretorius avenged the massacres by defeating Dingane at the Battle of Blood River (see The Zulu, this ch.). Because the Boers had sworn an oath before the battle that if God granted them victory they would celebrate the day thereafter, the Day of the Covenant (December 16) later became a South African national holiday.

In 1839 the Boers proclaimed the Republic of Natalia, having its capital at Pietermaritzburg and a government composed of an elected council, or Volksraad, of twenty-four members with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial functions. The British merchants saw the Boers as rivals, however, and urged Parliament to annex the territory. On the basis of earlier claims, Natal was declared to be a part of the Cape Colony in 1844. A portion of the Boers remained in the province, but the majority trekked again into the Transvaal. In 1847 Natal became a separate British colony with limited self-government based on the Cape model.

Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians in the Nineteenth Century

Although there had been some earlier contact between the Whites

and the southwesternmost Blacks (the Cape Nguni), sustained interaction and competition for land began only in the nineteenth century. In the first three decades of that century the Black groups, particularly those who came to constitute the Zulu kingdom, generated new forms of political and military organization that were to have substantial impact on their Black neighbors and on their ways of interacting with Whites. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, despite various Black resistance efforts and accommodation to White authority, British and Boer power had subjugated all Black groups.

The varied Coloured population, largely formed earlier around the Cape, had begun to disperse in the eighteenth century and by the nineteenth century consisted of rural and urban, Christian and Muslim groups distributed through Cape Colony and, in smaller numbers, elsewhere. In the nineteenth century, despite occasional and temporary gains, they were gradually relegated to a subordinate and dependent status. Indians, brought to Natal as indentured workers for the sugar plantations beginning in 1860, came to form an important element in that province, remaining there after completing their period of service and being joined by others who arrived independently as traders.

The Xhosa-Speaking Peoples

The missionary groups working with the Xhosa had made clear to the authorities in London that the Xhosa attacks on White settlers had been motivated by the real need for land to sustain their herds and not, as the colonists generally represented it, by a desire to raid European cattle herds. Despite the imperial government's more realistic attitude, new Xhosa wars occurred in 1846 and 1852. The former Queen Adelaide Province was annexed as British Kaffraria in 1847. The war of 1852 was followed by the recall of the British governor, Sir Harry Smith, whom the imperial government held responsible for provoking the war because of his efforts to weaken the powers of the chiefs. In 1856 an attempt was made to stabilize the new border by settling in British Kaffraria a number of German peasants and veterans of the Crimean War.

In all the Xhosa wars with the Europeans it was organization and central leadership as much as modern firepower that allowed the Europeans to triumph. At the time of their first contact with the expanding colonialists, the Xhosa-speaking groups had no unifying political structure. Throughout the period of conflict no leader arose to provide the Xhosa with the unity and direction that enabled the Zulu and Sotho nations to develop in the same period.

Among those who did exercise influence among the Xhosa were diviners, who sometimes acted as prophets. Their usual practice was to diagnose Xhosa difficulties as the consequence of the prevalence of witches among them and, sometimes, the displeasure of the ancestral spirits. They usually recommended the purge of witches and sacrifice to the spirits. In March 1856 Mhlakaza, a leading Xhosa diviner, had

19

a vision under the influence of his brother's younger daughter, Nongquase, who had seen strange people and cattle in a vision of her own. The substance of their visions, and especially that of Nongquase, resulted in a recommendation and a prophecy in May 1856. The Xhosa should sacrifice their cattle, as they had done before under the direction of other seers, but this time they were to kill and eat all the cattle they possessed. In addition they were no longer to plant crops because, according to the prophecy, on February 18 of the next year their grain storehouses would fill by themselves, great new herds from the cattle of the Europeans would come to fill their pastures, and the Europeans would be cast into the sea by a great wind.

The injunctions of Nongquase were obeyed, and when the miracles failed to occur, an estimated 70,000 people died of starvation. Nongquase's prophecy reflected the impact of European contacts in more than its reference to Boer cattle, for the Xhosa were led to expect the spiritual assistance of the Russians (enemies of Britain), who were believed to have succeeded in their efforts to throw the British back into the sea in the Crimean War that had just ended.

The Zulu

In the early nineteenth century Shaka, a young warrior of the Zulu clan-chiefdom and half-brother of Dingane, established the most powerful Black state in the area. Born in 1787 and a proven warrior at an early age, he became the captain of the troops of Chief Dingiswayo, head of a neighboring chiefdom that dominated his own. He invented and introduced a military formation and improved weaponry that under his leadership made his troops formidable. He expanded his small fighting force, organizing the entire Zulu clan to support his military plans, and quickly overcame the neighboring clans. When Dingiswayo died in 1817 Shaka seized control of his chiefdom and proclaimed the creation of the Zulu nation. By the end of his twelve-year rule he controlled an area larger than that of Britain.

Among the consequences of Shaka's empire building was the dispersion of many Nguni and Sotho groups. Fleeing Shaka's armies, many Blacks (some in large groups, others in small bands) found themselves far from areas in which they had lived for centuries (see fig. 4). Some reacted by organizing themselves into more formidable political entities. In the history of South Africa's Black peoples these events came to be called the *difaqane* (Sotho, the hammering) or *mfecane* (Nguni, the crushing).

Continuing a practice initiated by Dingiswayo, Shaka organized a large and highly effective standing army divided into impis, or regiments, featuring a tightly controlled command structure. He created a system of tribal law and organized the nation's agricultural activities to ensure adequate supplies for the impis, and he expanded mining and smelting to supply metal for weapons. Shaka replaced the traditional throwing spear with a short stabbing spear and a large

Figure 4. Population Movements Generated by the Mfecane, 1820-37

shield, which enabled his warriors to ward off the spears thrown by their enemies and then to engage in hand-to-hand combat using the short spear. All males under age forty served in the impis. No male was allowed to marry until he was over the military age, and sexual intercourse was forbidden to the warriors. Shaka required them to undergo rigorous training, and he enforced rigid discipline.

Shaka made extensive use of spies, signals, and psychological warfare. His reputation for cruelty was such that few of his potential opponents actually engaged him in combat but instead fled, tribe by tribe, to more distant areas of the country, which resulted in the dispersion of Nguni and Sotho throughout southern Africa. His primary military tactic was to attack in a "horned crescent" formation in which one impi, supported by another in reserve, attacked in the center; then two other impis formed flanks, or horns, that advanced and enveloped the enemy's flanks. He continued to strengthen his forces by incorporating conquered enemy units into his own impis. Eventually his military forces may have consisted of as many as 80,000 men, housed in barracks each accommodating 2,000 or 3,000 warriors, scattered throughout his territory.

His military system, organizational ability, and personal leadership enabled the creation of an African nation that had a single language and social system rather than the earlier multitude of separate dialects and clan-chiefdoms or tribes. Effects of the rise of the Zulu nation were felt from the Cape of Good Hope to Lake Tanganyika and disrupted the established order of a fifth of the continent for the better part of a century.

Shaka was murdered by his half-brothers in 1828, and after a short interregnum one of them—Dingane—took over the Zulu throne. Dingane was a weaker figure than Shaka, and his twelve years of rule marked the beginning of the collapse of Shaka's system. This resulted in part from Dingane's inability to come to terms with the advancing White colonists. He was eager to accommodate traders who provided the goods he wanted, but he encountered difficulties in dealing with them because he was poorly served by interpreters and some of his subordinate chiefs and partly because the traders did not always communicate with him. It was probably Dingane's fear of the incursion of so many Whites that led to the massacre of Retief's party and the subsequent defeat of Dingane at the Battle of Blood River. Dingane escaped, but his efforts to reassert his rule over the Zulu were frustrated by his brother Mpande, who had the help of the Boers. Dingane then fled to Swaziland, where he was killed. Mpande's rule continued until 1872 when he was replaced by Cetshwayo, the last of the independent Zulu kings, who ruled until he was defeated by the government of Natal in the Zulu War of 1879.

This conflict began when Cetshwayo refused to accept British resident commissioners. The British army under General Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand with a force of 5,000 Europeans and 8,000 Black Africans to face Cetshwayo's army of 40,000. The Zulu

won a resounding victory at the onset of the campaign at Isandlwana, totally destroying one of the three columns into which Chelmsford had divided his army. Despite heavy losses sustained there and during their unsuccessful attack at Rorke's Drift, the Zulu displayed remarkable military ability in the face of modern weapons at four other battles before being decisively defeated when British columns, supported by artillery, converged on Cetshwayo's capital at Ulundi. Zululand was officially annexed in 1887 and became part of Natal.

Emergence of the Basuto Kingdom

In the first half of the nineteenth century the reactions to the growth of the Zulu under Shaka led to the formation of another important Black African nation, the Basuto. The original Basuto were the southern branch of the Sotho, who had populated the fertile high plateau of the Transvaal after their migration into southern Africa. Under the impact of the Zulu wars the Basuto, led by Moshweshwe, withdrew into the higher reaches of the Drakensberg Mountains, where they settled. They were joined by many refugees from other clans and tribes who were eventually absorbed by the Basuto.

Moshweshwe, an able ruler, had no ambitions for a military conquest. He was, however, a skillful defensive military tactician, and his followers took full advantage of the rugged mountain terrain of their new homeland. A man of great insight, he saw well in advance that the White men were the real threat to tribal independence. To blunt the force of the White advance, he invited Christian missionaries into his territory in 1833 to convert his people in order to avoid presenting the Boers with an excuse to attack his followers as uncivilized heathens. He chose the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society because he regarded the French, who were not politically involved in southern Africa, as the least likely to threaten his independence.

The Basuto king was impressed by the military capabilities of the small bands of Griquas who marauded on the southern and eastern borders of his kingdom. Modeling themselves on the Boer commando military formation, the Griquas made extensive use of horses and firearms, tactics the Basuto adopted permanently.

The Basuto became marksmen and made skillful use of the mobility provided by their mountain ponies. Once the danger from the Zulu had passed, they managed to repel several strong attacks from the Boers of the Orange Free State. Nevertheless Moshweshwe realized that the growing numerical strength of the Whites would eventually enable them to defeat his kingdom. For this reason he applied for protection from Queen Victoria. A British protectorate over the Basuto was established initially in 1848 against Boer objections. Six years later, however, the British acceded to Boer demands and relinquished the protectorate, but only temporarily.

The Tswana

Part of the greater Sotho ethnic division, the Tswana were gradually driven to the western regions of the Transvaal plateau and the

greener fringes of present-day Botswana over a number of centuries. The Tswana found most of the country along and across the upper Limpopo inhabited by small clans of more primitive groups, whom they conquered and absorbed. The westward movement of the Tswana was accelerated in the early nineteenth century as they reacted to the Zulu wars—particularly as Nguni groups, spinning off from the Zulu forces, spread warfare across the Transvaal plain.

The most important of the Zulu offshoots were the Ndebele who, having fled the Zulu under the leadership of Mzilikazi, settled in the western Transvaal for nearly two decades. They ravaged the Tswana, forcing them to flee across the upper Limpopo River, and harassed other Sotho peoples in the northern and western Transvaal in order to build a short-lived empire of their own. In late 1837 after continual losses in battles with Griqua, Boer, and Zulu forces, most of the Ndebele fled into what is now Zimbabwe.

The movement, raiding, and fragmentation of peoples in the 1820s and 1830s were generated largely by the internal dynamics of Black African peoples and were affected only indirectly by the movements of Europeans. The resulting dispersion was responsible in good part for the nineteenth- and twentieth-century distributions of many Bantu-speaking peoples in southern Africa and for the heterogeneous origins of any people speaking a single language.

Development of the Coloured Community

The Coloured community had its origins in the unions of Black African slaves, Khoi, San, Indians, East Indians (Malays), and Europeans in the melting pot of the early Cape Town settlement. The Khoi may have been the most important element numerically. Widely dispersed and without a central political organization, they had been unable to organize successful opposition to the Europeans or to the Bantu speakers. Some were killed in the so-called Hottentot Wars (1658–60 and 1673–77). Others were destroyed by diseases introduced by Whites—notably smallpox, which struck three times in the eighteenth century. Despite violence and disease, the majority of the Khoi were simply engulfed and absorbed by the Europeans, creating a major element in the Coloured community.

The first slaves came from the West African slave markets, but this source was quickly replaced by others in Mozambique and Madagascar. Asian slaves and political exiles from the Dutch East India Company's holdings in India, Ceylon, and the Dutch East Indies (chiefly Muslims) were also introduced, but Black Africans predominated. It is estimated that three-fourths of the children born to slaves in the first forty years after the founding of the colony were fathered by the European slaveowners. The Khoi factor became significant because both Whites and slaves took Khoi women as wives and concubines. The descendants of this mixture constituted the Cape Coloureds and the smaller Coloured subgroups, chief of which were the Cape Malay (who remained Muslims) and the Griqua.

In 1754 there were 5,000 to 6,000 colonists and free men in the

24

Cape Colony and more than 6,200 slaves. Europeans continued to be outnumbered by slaves until long after the slave trade ended. The nature of agriculture in the colony was such that slaveholdings were usually small, particularly on the frontiers.

After the Cape Colony came under permanent British control in the early nineteenth century, the position of both the slaves and the free Coloured populations began to improve. After the importation of slaves was abolished throughout the British Empire in 1807, steps were taken by judicial decision and statute to improve the treatment of the Coloured populations, and Coloured persons were given access to the courts. Laws were also passed limiting the sale of children as slaves and forbidding the breaking up of slave families.

The legal position of the Coloured peoples within the Cape Colony was completely changed by two acts of the government. The first of these was the historic Ordinance 50 of 1828, which provided that free Coloureds and Europeans were equal before the law. The ordinance also provided for improved labor conditions. After the British Parliament abolished slavery throughout the empire in 1833, emancipation of the Cape Colony's slaves was carried out between 1834 and 1838. Despite these two acts, social and economic discrimination against the Coloureds continued. Officially, however, racial equality in the Cape lasted until after the colony was absorbed into the Union of South Africa in 1910.

Even before the two acts, small portions of the slave and Coloured communities had begun to achieve a degree of economic independence. A significant minority of the slaves had become skilled workers. After their emancipation these Coloured workers, who generally resided in Cape Town, were able to establish themselves as an important economic class, dominating many of the craft occupations.

The newly liberated slaves and the vast majority of the Khoi mingled to such a degree that they became virtually indistinguishable in succeeding generations. They adopted the language of their former masters, the Boer farmers, and copied European culture as nearly as they could afford. The vast majority continued to work as unskilled agricultural laborers on the Dutch-owned (and later the British-owned) farms. For those who were able to find employment in the urban center, however, equality brought the opportunity to enjoy at least a part of the colony's rising educational and economic opportunities.

For the better part of a century those Coloured peoples who moved into or were born in the frontier regions of the colony formed a different cultural group from the original Cape Coloureds. Those on the eastern frontier came into contact and in some cases intermarried with the British colonists who established themselves along the Great Fish and Kat rivers after 1820. The groups of Coloureds in the west who moved northward with the extension of the Cape boundaries claimed to be descendants of Khoi mothers and White fathers.

One such group was the Griquas, descendants of a White-Khoi mixture, who had been pushed northeastward from the vicinity of

the Cape to the Orange River in the second decade of the nineteenth century by White settlers. Equipped with horses and guns, they established a small state, partly with the help of representatives of the London Missionary Society. By the 1820s all were Christians and spoke Afrikaans. Because of their military skills, organization, and location on the frontier, the Griqua were frequently involved—independently or allied with others—in battles or skirmishes with Bantu speakers and Boers.

The Coming of the Asians

The first Asians to enter South Africa, other than scattered castaways from ships on the India-Europe run, were Indian slaves brought to Cape Town by the Dutch East India Company to work the Cape farms. The traffic in Indian slaves continued from 1658 to 1767, but they did not survive long as a separate ethnic group. All were largely absorbed into the Cape Coloured community.

The Indians in present-day South Africa are mostly the descendants of indentured laborers brought to the area beginning in 1860 to work in the newly established sugarcane fields of Natal. The labor of the Indians, who were already at work in the canefields of Mauritius, was preferable to the more accessible but less malleable Zulus of Natal. At the request of the colony's government, the British government prevailed upon the Indian states to allow the flow of indentured workers to Natal. From the outset the imperial government sought to assure that Indian subjects worked under fair conditions, setting a minimum salary and a maximum indenture period of five years. At the end of the fifth year the laborers were guaranteed either return passage to their homes or crown land in Natal of equal value and freedom to work and live there.

Between 1860 and 1864 some 6,500 Indians had entered Natal, but the British government halted the traffic in 1865 because of reports of unsatisfactory working conditions. The prohibition remained in effect until 1874. Despite this halt, the demand for labor on the tea, coffee, cotton, and sugarcane plantations continued to grow. Few of the Indians returned to their native land at the end of their periods of service. By 1890 there were more than 33,000 Indians in Natal; over 20,000 of these were free residents who worked as skilled agricultural laborers or who held menial jobs in urban areas. Most had already begun to enter the lower levels of trade, which they were eventually to dominate.

The Natal government sought ways to inhibit population growth by canceling the provision for granting land to the Indians at the end of their indentured service and encouraging their return to India. Nevertheless as many as 100,000 Indians entered Natal between 1891 and 1911, and this migration was not ended until 1913. The Indians remained largely concentrated in Natal because of the exclusionary legislation of the Boer governments in the Transvaal and Orange Free State and the competition of the Coloured community in Cape Colony. In addition to the indentured workers (largely

Hindu), others (called passenger Indians) came as traders in the late 1870s. These people, many of them Muslims, offered considerable competition to White traders.

Growth of the Boer Republics

After the Sand River Convention of 1852, Boer leaders in the Transvaal, who were assured freedom from British interference, assembled at Potchefstroom in 1856. They adopted a unified consti-tution that provided for a president, an executive council, a legis-lature (Volksraad), and a high court to rule the new republic from a capital at Pretoria. But the constitution failed to satisfy many of the leaders. Short-lived separatist republics were organized by the settlers in the Soutpansberg Mountains and at Lydenburg.

Pretorius, who was elected president, was unable to effect unity even in the Transvaal. In the hope of reconciling all the Boer leaders, he accepted an invitation from the Orange Free State in 1859 to become joint president of the Orange Free State as well as the Transvaal. His Transvaal supporters were not pleased, however, and he was forced to resign his earlier post. He remained president of the Orange Free State until 1868. In 1869 Pretorius was again elected president of the Transvaal. Despite his popularity, the republic remained badly divided, having neither the administrative nor the financial resources for viability.

In 1872 Pretorius was replaced by T. F. Burgers, a Dutch Re-formed minister. Burgers was known as a religious liberal, and exist-ing dissension within the republic was exacerbated by a new division between conservative church members (who saw him as a heretic) and his liberal supporters. In order to improve the financial position of the government, Burgers took a number of largely unsuccessful steps to improve the country's economy.

In 1872 gold was discovered in the Transvaal at Lydenburg. The British government, alarmed at the continued signs of instability in the Boer republic and influenced by mining interests eager to exploit the new gold discovery, decided on a plan to annex the Transvaal. A British official, Theophilus Shepstone, was sent to deal with the Boers, and he received the immediate support of President Burgers, who saw annexation by the British as the only possible solution to the republic's continuing financial difficulties.

The majority of the Boer leaders, led by Paul Kruger, preferred political independence to economic viability, and Shepstone was forced to issue a proclamation annexing the republic in 1877 without the hoped-for support of the Transvaal Volksraad. The British took steps to improve the territory's financial position. In 1880, however, the Boers under Kruger, taking advantage of the fact that the British forces were occupied by wars against three Black groups, rose in revolt in what was to become known as the first Anglo-Boer War (1880–81). The British forces were defeated at the Battle of Majuba Hill. Unable to provide more troops, Britain accepted an armistice, granting complete self-government to the Transvaal but retaining

27

ultimate control over relations with foreign states and Black African tribes.

In 1884 the Transvaal laid claim to a substantial section of Zulu-land. The Boers based their claim on a treaty with the Zulu king in which he apparently granted them nearly half of Zululand, including an access route to the sea, in return for Boer help in defeating a rival claimant to the throne. Control of Zulu territory had remained uncertain even after the British had vanquished the Zulu warriors in 1879. The Boer claim prompted the imperial government to establish control in 1884. The British seized the entire coast and the portions of Zululand that the Boers had not yet occupied. In northwestern Zululand the Boers established a separate state called the New Republic, which was absorbed into the Transvaal in 1888. It was in this period of the republics that the term Afrikaner (first used in the eighteenth century) became more widespread and became identified with the use of the Afrikaans language and adherence to a Dutch Reformed church.

Discovery of Diamonds and Gold

In 1867, five years before the discovery of gold at Lydenburg, diamonds were found along the Vaal River above its confluence with the Orange. The most important discoveries lay within a triangle of territory between the two rivers, and mines were quickly opened in the area, the most important at Kimberley. Ownership of the land had already been claimed by Cape Colony, Orange Free State, the Transvaal, and Griqualand West, still recognized by the British as an independent state. No control had been exercised by any of the claimants, however, as the area had little value until the discovery of diamonds.

In 1872 an official of the Natal government was asked to arbitrate the claims to the contested area. He awarded it to the Griquas, whose claim predated the others. As soon as the award was made, Griqualand West was annexed by Cape Colony on the basis of a previous request from the Griqua leaders, although the British agreed later to pay £90,000 compensation to Orange Free State.

The rich production of the new mines provided the basis for the development of Cape Colony. As early as 1871 there were more than 4,000 Whites engaged in the diamond hunt, and Kimberley had become the second largest town in South Africa. The short stretch of railroad running north from Cape Town in 1867 was purchased by the Cape Colony government, and work to extend it to Kimberley began in 1874.

The profitable development of the mines attracted a number of remarkable men to the country, including Cecil Rhodes, who managed to make a fortune in diamonds by the time he was twenty-one years of age. By 1887 he was the head of De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited, the cartel that had gained control of 90 percent of the colony's diamond production. He had also established strong political connections in both Cape Town and London.

Rhodes, motivated by a desire to play a major part in the further development of the British Empire, envisioned the creation of a string of British possessions in southern and eastern Africa linked by a Cape-to-Cairo rail line. As a start, he was anxious to have Britain gain control of the so-called Missionary Road. This route, used since the 1840s by the missionaries who followed in David Livingstone's wake to work among Black Africans of the lands along either side of the Zambezi River, ran north from Kimberley through the Tswana country to the Zambezi. Rhodes realized that British control of the route would also limit the westward expansion of the Transvaal. The route crossed the lands occupied by the tiny Boer republics of Stellaland and Goshen, which had been established by migrants from the Transvaal. By 1884, however, the republics had ceased to exist, and the Transvaal by agreement with the British government had extended its borders westward to include the portion of the former republics up to the Missionary Road.

The territory south of the Molopo River and west of the road was occupied by tribes of the Tswana group. This area was annexed to Cape Colony as Bechuanaland. The next British move was to establish a protectorate over the Tswana territory north of the Molopo in 1886 over Transvaal's objections. Rhodes made immediate use of the new Bechuanaland (present-day Botswana) to have forces under his control enter the Matabele lands beyond the Limpopo River. In 1889 he obtained a charter for his British South Africa Company, which enabled the company as the agent of the British government to establish political control over the large area that was to become Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe). The company retained control over the area until 1923, when it became a crown colony.

Rhodes had been elected prime minister of the Cape Colony in 1889 and used his political position as well as his wealth and personal ties to further his goals. In London he was backed by important British political and financial leaders who supported imperial expansion as well as by those who were opposed to the extension of German activity in southern Africa. German interests in South West Africa (present-day Namibia) dovetailed with the plans of some leaders in the two Boer republics who were interested in links with Germany as a counter to British pressures.

Rhodes managed to maintain good relations with Jan Hofmeyr, the Afrikaner political leader in Cape Colony, who supported the call for an economic federation of the British and Boer states. By 1894, however, it had become obvious to Rhodes that the Transvaal's Kruger was not willing to surrender voluntarily any of the Boer republic's autonomy, particularly since the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 had provided the Transvaal with the basis for future eco...mic stability and independence.

The discovery of the incredibly rich gold deposits led to an influx of White miners from all over the world. These foreigners, or *uitlanders* as they were called by the Boers, constituted 75 percent of the White population of the Transvaal Republic by 1895. But the

Boers retained political control by refusing the franchise to persons with less than seven years' residence. The *uitlanders*, supported by the wealth of the mining companies, demanded a change in the political system so th·· they, representing the majority of the population and nearly all the wealth, would have some control over the administration of the country.

In 1892 the miners formed the National Union in Johannesburg, the center of the mining industry, to campaign for their demands. At Rhodes' instigation the union sent an ultimatum to Kruger demanding conditions that it knew he would not meet. According to Rhodes' plans, the workers on the Witwatersrand were then to revolt against Boer dominance, and a large military force of British South Africa Company police under Rhodes' associate, Leander Starr Jameson, was to enter the Transvaal from Rhodesia. Cape Colony's British governor would then take over control of the republic to end the crisis. In late December 1895 Jameson did march into the republic with a mounted force of 500 men, but the revolt on the Witwatersrand did not occur; he and his forces were captured within a week, and Rhodes' machinations were partly exposed.

Rhodes was forced to resign as prime minister of Cape Colony. The British government denied all knowledge of the plot, but intrigues against the Boer republics continued. In most cases these were stimulated by the British mineowners, who were irked by the policies of the Boer government, which they saw as interfering with the operation of the mines and the development of new claims. In April 1899 foreign miners on the Witwatersrand presented a petition to the British government asking for protection against unfair discrimination by the Kruger government.

The British governor in the Cape, Sir Alfred Milner, met with Kruger to discuss the miners' demands, but Kruger refused to compromise. Negotiations continued into September, each side becoming more intransigent. The British demanded an admission of British suzerainty, and the Boers were incensed by the arrival of reinforcements from overseas and their being stationed on the Transvaal border.

The Anglo-Boer War and Creation of the Union

On October 11, 1899, the Transvaal declared war against Britain, and the Orange Free State, linked to the Transvaal by a defensive alliance, made a similar declaration. At the beginning of the conflict the British had only 25,000 troops in South Africa, divided between the Cape Colony and Natal. The readily available Boer commando forces may have numbered as many as 60,000 men. The Boers were initially victorious, their commandos driving into both the Cape and Natal. But they attempted to reduce the British strong points at Kimberley and Mafeking by siege, and the ensuing delay lost them the advantage they might have achieved had they continued their march toward Cape Town and Durban. The British were allowed

time to bring additional forces from Britain and India as well as colonial forces from Canada and Australia.

Even after the arrival of the British troops, the Boers continued to win a number of important victories against superior forces, making full use of their knowledge of the terrain, excellent mobility, and skill in guerrilla warfare learned from long years of combat with the Black Africans. The Boers, largely without a supply system, lived off the countryside. The British therefore adopted a tactic of leveling farms throughout the republics and forcing the wives and children of the Boers into concentration camps. Afrikaners have remained outraged by the death of some 26,000 of their wives and children from disease in the unsanitary camps.

The hardships encountered by their families, as well as the bleakness of their prospects, led the Boers to seek an end to the war in early 1902. After discussions in March, the Boer leaders voted to accept the terms offered by Lord Kitchener, the British commander. The peace treaty required the surrender of the Boer forces and an acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the British king. In return the British promised to grant internal self-government at an early date and to give major financial assistance to the Boers as compensation for their losses in the war. In addition to the promise of self-government, Britain agreed not to extend the franchise to Blacks but to leave the matter for consideration by the new colonial legislatures. The peace treaty was signed on May 31, 1902.

The British governor, Sir Alfred Milner, was appointed as the high commissioner and governor of the new colonies. He formed a staff of young administrators, commonly referred to as "Milner's kindergarten," to set in motion all the requirements for a new governmental structure. In a short time the gold mines resumed operations, and the war prisoners were returned to their farms. The British spent over £10 million on rehabilitation of Boer farms and other property. All four colonies were combined in a customs union, and the four separate rail networks were administered by a central organization.

Milner was recalled, however, after the fall from power of the Conservative government in London in 1905, and the new cabinet of the Liberal Party, which had opposed the war, set out to regain the friendship of the Boers. The Liberal Party leadership granted responsible government to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State with purely White electorates, leaving not only the Black Africans but also the Coloured and Indian populations permanently without a political voice.

The new governments came into being in March 1907. Two former generals of the Boer army, Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, were the principal political leaders of the Transvaal. The pro-Afrikaner party also won the 1908 elections in the Cape Colony. The three new colony governments all supported the call for a union of South African states, seeking both economic and political strength through unity. A national constitutional convention representing all four colonies

met in 1908 and 1909, chaired by the chief justice of the Cape Colony. A number of former Boer leaders, having been defeated in their efforts for separate statehood, came out strongly for a unitary rather than a federal government in the hope of assuring the dominance of the Boers, who constituted more than half of the White population.

The proposed constitution provided for a high concentration of power in the hands of the national parliament, which was to be largely unhindered by constitutional restraints. Only two clauses in the new constitution were to be protected from alteration by a simple majority vote of the new legislature. The first guaranteed legal equality between the languages of the British and Afrikaner communities. The second clause provided weak protection for the franchise of the Coloureds (and a relatively few Blacks) in the Cape but did not extend the electoral rolls to cover any non-White voters in the other provinces.

The proposed constitution was strongly endorsed by the separate colonies and was enacted by Britain's Parliament in September 1909. The new state came into being as the Union of South Africa, a dominion of the British Empire, on May 31, 1910. The new constitution provided for the future accession of Southern Rhodesia, Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland to the union.

The first elections under the new constitution were held in 1911. The Afrikaner parties of the four provinces had merged to form the South African Party, under Botha and Smuts, and it won the election. Another Boer general, J.B.M. Hertzog, was initially included in the cabinet but broke away in 1912 to help form the National Party.

The Botha-Smuts government represented those who saw the British victory as final and accepted the idea that the new union should be composed of a single united White people with a culture composed of a synthesis of the British and Boer traditions. Hertzog's opposition party feared the swamping of the Afrikaners by the culture of the less numerous but more powerful British. Hertzog therefore supported a "twin-stream" policy, which would protect the weaker Afrikaner culture at least until the two White groups were on an equal footing in political and economic strength. In addition Hertzog felt that the Afrikaners' strong republican traditions should be conciliated by a gradual weakening of South Africa's ties to the imperial government.

Although the parties adopted different attitudes toward the Coloured population of the Cape (which became Cape Province in 1910), both were opposed to further unregulated entry of Blacks into the labor market. The Nationalists also supported the Botha government's Natives Land Act of 1913, limiting the area in which Blacks would be allowed to own land in the future. The delimited zones constituted less than 10 percent of the country's area; although a commission in 1916 recommended that the government significantly enlarge the area, the White voters were not interested in efforts that would expend their tax money to improve the position of the Blacks.

Political Development Among Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians

In the middle of the nineteenth century, at a time when the constitutions of the Boer republics specifically forbade any equality between races—even in the churches—the Cape Colony's constitution granted equality not only in the courts, but also at the polls, without any racial barriers. The British, Afrikaners, Coloureds, and Blacks were all eligible to vote—if they had the necessary property qualifications. The qualifications were rigid enough to exclude the vast majority of the non-Whites, but in time the electorate came to include a small but significant minority of them.

The extension of the franchise led to an increasing interest in politics among non-Whites. In 1882 the Cape Native Education Association was founded, the first modern non-White organization with a political orientation. In 1884 J.T. Jabavu, the area's first Black to complete a secondary school education, began the first Bantu-language newspaper, *Imvo-Zabantsundu (Native Opinion)*, which was concerned with issues that affected Black voters: pass laws, anti-native legislation, and the demand for equal administration of justice in the courts.

In 1887 an election bill was passed in parliament by the combined votes of the Boer and British parties. By raising voters' property qualifications, the bill struck 30,000 Blacks off the rolls, nullifying the rapid increase in their numbers between 1872 and 1887. The Black men's vote had increased enough so that in two of the constituencies they actually constituted a majority. The election bill was aimed at financial rather than educational requirements because Blacks were sufficiently interested in politics that the Whites feared an educational test would only encourage Blacks to learn. The property qualifications were again raised in 1892.

In this period a Black voting pattern was established in Cape Province that was to last until their highly restricted franchise was taken from them in the 1930s. Blacks, not in a position to elect representatives of their own, had a choice between a party supported by English-speaking voters and the Bond, a predominantly Afrikaner party. Because the Bond was openly hostile to them, the Blacks gave their votes to the party of English speakers as the lesser evil. At the same time the Afrikaans-speaking Cape Coloureds, having committed themselves to emulation of the Whites, voted for the Afrikaner-based party, and a portion of them continued to do so until they lost their voting rights in the 1950s.

In 1882 Blacks began to establish separate Black Christian churches, the first steps in what was to become known as the Ethiopian Movement, a creation of purely Black Christian churches with political overtones. The first of these was led by Nemiah Tile, a Tembuland Black African who had been a Methodist minister. His Tembu National Church had strong tribal ties (the Tembu are a Xhosa-speaking tribe), however, and for this reason did not spread; yet, it set the example for the paths that other Black African religious leaders were to follow. By the early 1890s the Ethiopian Movement had

33

grown with inspiration and support from the African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States. Ministers aspiring to be leaders went to the United States to study and returned to Africa filled with the zeal of the Black American religious movements of the late nineteenth century. In addition the church in the United States sent out ministers and advisers to the developing Black African churches. The churches were the first Black mass movements on intertribal lines and were in some respects politically oriented with calls for "shaking off the White man's yoke" (see Religious Life, ch. 2).

In 1893 the White settlers of Natal were granted responsible government but faced a possible challenge to their supremacy. The franchise was not based on race, but in practice only Whites had the vote. Blacks could in theory become voters, but very few qualified. The first act of the new White legislature was to cancel all voting rights of the Indians.

In 1896 Mohandas K. Gandhi took up residence in South Africa and soon became the leader of the Indian opposition. It was, in fact, in South Africa that Gandhi perfected the nonviolent civil disobedience program that was to be his road to victory in India. His first passive resistance campaign began in 1906 when the Transvaal government enacted legislation requiring all Indians to carry passes. Only 500 out of 13,000 Transvaal Indians registered under the pass law. The passive resistance campaigns continued for a number of years under Gandhi's leadership. Measures taken by the Natal government against the Indians became harsher as time went by, particularly after Indian workers in the mines and sugar plantations began to support Gandhi's demands with strikes. Worldwide indignation against the Natal government, however, forced it to retreat. A number of the laws adversely affecting Indians were repealed, but they were still not granted the franchise.

To counter the all-White character of the constitutional convention that was to form the Union, Black leaders called together the National Native Convention in 1909. The convention drew its delegates from various Black groups, including the Cape Native Electoral Association, formed in 1884 to organize the Cape's Black vote; the Natal Native Congress, organized in 1904; and the Transvaal Native Congress, established in 1907. After seeing the draft constitution for the Union of South Africa and considering the implications for Blacks, the National Native Convention sent a delegation to London to protest, particularly against a clause prohibiting non-Whites in the Union parliament. Blacks had also hoped that their views would be presented by Cape liberals at the constitutional convention and that they would win an extension of the Cape native suffrage to the Blacks of the other three provinces. Their hopes were not sustained.

Drawing on experience gained at the 1909 convention, Blacks formed the South African Native National Congress in January 1912. (The word Native was dropped from the title almost immediately.) The congress had as its moving spirits J.L. Dube, a minister,

34

and K.I. Seme, a graduate of Columbia University who had also trained in law in London. The inaugural convention invited the tribal chiefs as well as representatives of the groups that had participated in the 1909 convention. All "kings, princes, paramount chiefs and other persons of royal blood of the Bantu" were to have the right to attend meetings of the association as honorary vice presidents.

The aims of the organization were declared to be the uniting of all smaller organizations into a national body, the uniting of all the different tribes of South Africa to demand equal rights and justice, and the putting forward of the political demands of the Black peoples. The new congress met its first challenge in 1913 when the Union parliament passed the Natives Land Act. The congress sent a deputation to London to protest the act, but they found that the British government was no longer in a position to respond to an appeal.

South Africa in World War I and the Postwar Decade

When World War I broke out in 1914, the South African Party's leaders accepted responsibility for British defense efforts in southern Africa, including seizing the neighboring German colony of South West Africa. Most Afrikaners, however, opposed entrance into the war on Britain's side, and some looked forward to the possibility of dissociating the Union from Britain altogether. Boer commandos, with a strength of some 12,000 men, rebelled when Botha ordered South African forces to invade the German colony. The rebellious forces included former Boer generals who had accepted German offers of support for the reestablishment of the republics. The revolt was poorly planned, however, and the government forces defeated the rebels without difficulty (see History of the Military Tradition, ch. 5).

The rebellion and the government's handling of aspects of it were to provide symbols of British oppression and generated a good deal of Afrikaner feeling against Smuts and Botha. The forces under Botha's command invaded the German territory, completing their conquest by the middle of 1915. South African volunteer forces then played a considerable part in the British campaign against the German troops in Tanganyika. The volunteers included a Cape Coloured corps commanded by British officers. A South African brigade also fought as part of the British forces in France, where they were supported by a Black labor corps.

South Africa became a charter member of the League of Nations in 1919 and was assigned South West Africa to administer as a mandated territory. Prime Minister Botha died in August 1919 and was replaced by General Smuts on his return from Europe.

South Africa was struck by the worldwide inflation of the postwar period, and the resulting industrial troubles were exacerbated by the continuing influx of rural Afrikaners into the labor market. The closing of the frontier and the destruction resulting from the Anglo-Boer War had caused the first influx of unskilled White labor into the industrial labor market. Many Afrikaners, for example, had

been employed as common laborers on the state-owned railroads as early as 1903.

The labor union movement came to South Africa with skilled European artisans in the 1880s, but unions were organized initially only in the Cape Colony. From the first, some Cape unions were multiracial, the Coloured membership often outnumbering that of the Whites. The country's first major strikes occurred in the mines in 1907 and 1914. In both cases the government intervened forcibly on the side of the employers to put down the strikes of White workers, declaring martial law during the 1914 strike and deporting nine union leaders.

The unions had begun to form national organizations after 1902. By the beginning of World War I the South African Industrial Federation had been created, joining together all of the industrial unions. In 1909 the Labour Party was formed to support the unions, of which it was considered the political arm. A group of Marxists split from the Labour Party in 1915 to form the International Socialist League of South Africa, which became the South African Communist Party (SACP) in the early 1920s.

Under the pressure of rising costs in late 1921, the Chamber of Mines—the organization of mineowners on the Witwatersrand—announced a plan to reduce the wages of White workers and to hire Blacks for semiskilled jobs, previously reserved for Whites, at lower wages. Two thousand White workers would lose their jobs. A strike was immediately called by the Mine Workers Union, supported by the South African Industrial Federation. A second organization, the Council of Action, was formed and demanded a nationwide strike of all White workers to support the miners. The council gradually became the voice of all the unions involved in the strike. As relations deteriorated—the strikers on the one side and the Chamber of Mines and the government on the other—the council became more radical in outlook and established stronger ties with the newly formed SACP. The Council of Action's demands were accompanied by the creation of Boer-style commandos among the White workers, a majority of whom were Afrikaner republicans. The socialists and Afrikaners united under the slogan "Workers of the World, Unite and Fight for a White South Africa," and the workers who appealed for the proclamation of a socialist republic by the National Party spent much of their energy on attacks against the Blacks.

The strikes and riots lasted ten weeks. In the end the riots, by then labeled the "Red Revolt," were crushed by government troops, with a total loss of 230 lives. Although the mineowners' decision to employ Blacks was reversed, the salaries of the White workers were cut by 25 percent.

The First Nationalist Government

The Smuts government's handling of the crisis created many enemies for his party, and in the elections of 1924 the South African Party was defeated by a formal coalition of the National and Labour

parties, Hertzog becoming prime minister. The policies of the new Hertzog government were supported by the right wing of the Labour Party under F.H.P. Creswell.

One of the new government's first acts was to propose the creation of a state-owned steel industry, a proposal supported by both government parties. The Labour Party members favored nationalization of large-scale industry; the Nationalists felt that the creation of their own steel industry would end the country's dependence on Britain for its steel needs. The railroads and harbors had already come under central government control as a result of the Second Anglo-Boer War. Parliament passed the Iron and Steel Industry Act, which set up the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR); the steelworks came into production in 1933. The success of ISCOR encouraged the National Party to favor state involvement in future major industrial development projects.

The new state-owned industry and its successors served as symbols of the ending of total domination over the country's economy by the English-speaking portion of the population. In the same period the private economic enterprises of the Afrikaners were beginning to challenge English dominance in a number of other fields. Such developments were encouraged by the activities of the semisecret Afrikaner organization, the Broederbond (see Glossary), which supported all Afrikaner attempts to obtain economic, cultural, and political control of the country.

South Africa's independence from British control was further underlined by other political and economic moves under the Nationalist government. A national flag and a national anthem were adopted, a commercial treaty was negotiated with Germany, and the customs preference for British goods was reduced. In 1931 the British Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster, which assured that the British government could not exert ultimate control over the acts of the Union government and that the British ambassadorial delegation was thenceforth separated from the office of the governor general.

White and Non-White Labor

The Nationalists took steps to improve the position of White labor by passing the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Wage Act of 1925. Although both acts were intended to help only White workers and the Industrial Conciliation Act provisions specifically exempted Blacks from its protection, the acts actually indirectly improved the salary position of some non-Whites. The first Black trade union, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU), had been organized in 1919 primarily as a political organization. The growth of the ICU and the expansion of the Non-European Trade Union Federation (founded in the mid-1920s) and the Coloured unions of Cape Province were facilitated by the new laws. A nationwide organization of White workers, the South African Trade Union Congress, had been organized with the assistance of the

minister of labor in 1924. The congress was reorganized as the Trades and Labour Council in 1931 but at that time included only twenty-one of the country's 139 unions, primarily those composed of skilled workers.

Acts specifically aimed at protecting White workers from Black competition included the Mine and Works Act of 1926, which legally barred Blacks from holding skilled positions in the mines. Further government control of the Black population was provided by the Hostility Law of 1927, which made it illegal for anyone to encourage Black hostility against Whites and by the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930, which allowed the minister of justice on his own initiative to ban an individual from entering any specified part of the country for a period of up to twelve months.

South African participation in World War I had greatly affected the outlook of many Blacks in the country. Thousands were recruited into the Native Labour Corps and sent to Europe. They returned with new ideas, and they did not relish returning to the old life.

In the years after the war the primary objects of Black interest were the numerous and complicated pass laws. They were aimed at directing and controlling every movement of Blacks to ensure that as many as possible remained in the labor pool for the White industry. In 1919 the African National Congress (ANC) led a serious but unsuccessful passive resistance campaign against the pass laws. The protest included the burning of passes, which was to become the recurring symbol of nonviolent Black agitation.

The ICU was to play an important part in Black nationalism throughout the 1920s, surpassing the role of the ANC. Founded by Clements Kadalie, a Nyasalander, the ICU had spread by 1923 beyond the limits of Cape Province into the Transvaal and later the Orange Free State and Natal. It aimed initially to unite with the White trade unions of South Africa. In 1928, however, Kadalie's plea for racial harmony was rejected by the White Trade Union Coordinating Committee, which replied that the White worker feared competition from great masses of Black laborers and their lower standard of living, a fear that induced Whites to demand protection from their union against the rise of Black workers. The ICU received considerable support from the SACP at first, but conflict—both personal and ideological—between the Communists and ICU leaders led to a rupture. In 1927 the ICU required that its officers give up membership in the SACP.

Despite assistance from the British Trade Union Congress, the ICU did not have the leadership and administrative capability to sustain its growth. As it became larger, it fragmented and in 1928 was split by the secession of its most powerful sector, the Natal unions. The ICU continued to exist into the late 1930s but had lost most of its influence.

The 1929 Elections and the Black Specter

The Labour Party, in trouble for some time, split in 1928 on the

issue of supporting the Nationalists, and only the Creswell faction backed the government in the 1929 election. After a bitterly fought contest, the Nationalists won. For the first time racial issues, introduced in such a way as to capitalize on the traditional fears of White voters, divided the White parties. The Nationalists publicized their plans for ensuring permanent *baasskap* (White dominance) and accused Smuts and his South African Party of intending to grant political rights to Blacks. Smuts was specifically accused of planning to extend the nonracial Cape Colony franchise to the other provinces. The Nationalists also alleged that Smuts would follow the recent suggestion of the noted historian Arnold Toynbee that South Africa might one day have to divide its territory between Whites and Blacks. The National Party scornfully rejected the idea of territorial separation of the races.

The National Party's accusations dredged up all the old emotional issues of Boer-Black and Boer-British relations. Boer accusations against the British made in the early nineteenth century became political currency more than a hundred years later. The Nationalist platform undermined support for both the South African Party and the Labour Party. Poor Whites deserted the Labour Party because it had occasionally, though unemphatically, called for improved working conditions for non-Whites. After the 1929 election the Labour Party was never able to regain its former strength.

The African Peoples Organization (APO), formed in the Coloured community in 1902, was an important force at the polls until 1930. The APO did not present candidates of its own in most elections but supported those who seemed the least opposed to Coloured interests, although a small number of Coloured candidates successfully contested elections for seats on the Municipal Council of Cape Town. During the 1920s the Coloured voters constituted nearly one-eighth of the Cape Province electorate and potentially held the balance of power between the Afrikaner-based party and that supported predominantly by English speakers.

In 1930 and 1931, however, the Union parliament diluted the Coloured vote by broadening the White franchise. All property qualifications for White voters were removed, and White women were given the right to vote. The Coloured and Black franchise remained limited to males with relatively high levels of income. Despite this setback—the first time a racial factor had been formally introduced in Cape Province voting rights since 1828—the great majority of Coloureds continued to hope for better treatment from the Whites and did not join opposition movements.

Creation of the United Party

The worldwide depression hit South Africa in 1931, creating severe unemployment and great distress in rural areas. The government was blamed for failing to cushion its impact by waiting too long to abandon the gold standard. Hertzog, fearing that the Nationalists might lose the 1934 elections, sought a coalition government with Smuts,

who was prepared to enter into a common front to bring the country out of the depression. Hertzog's willingness to enter a coalition was also based on the fact that he and many of his followers no longer feared that Afrikaner culture would be overwhelmed by English influences. Smuts, in turn, wanted to end the influence of the right wing of the Afrikaner community on government decisionmaking. The two parties merged in 1934 to form the United Party, but sections of both groups refused to join the new party. An Afrikaner extremist, D. F. Malan, formed the Purified National Party, while the most pro-British of Smuts' former followers formed the Dominion Party. The Purified Nationalists, who were to form the parliamentary opposition for the next fourteen years, were later rejoined by thirty-seven Hertzogites who opposed South Africa's entry into World War II. After 1940 the grouping was known as the Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party).

The strength of the new United Party after the 1934 elections allowed it to pass without difficulty a number of measures that Hertzog's Nationalists had sought since the mid-1920s. In 1936 Hertzog proposed legislation to carry segregation into the election booth with the Representation of Natives Bill, which removed Black voters from the common roll in Cape Province. They were to vote on a separate roll to elect three White members to represent them in the lower house of parliament, the House of Assembly. Blacks were to be represented nationally by four White senators elected by an electoral college. The Natives Representative Council, having purely advisory powers, was also created. It could consider all proposed legislation affecting the Black community, but the government would be under no compulsion to listen to its advice.

A second bill, the Native Land and Trust Bill, authorized an increase in the Native Reserves (land formally allocated for occupation by Blacks), but only to 13 percent from 10 percent of the country's total area. This was to be the permanent home for the Black Africans, who constituted the majority of the population. The right still retained by the Blacks of Cape Province to own land outside the reserves would be abolished.

Black reaction to the two proposals was unanimous and immediate. A new sense of potential power and self-respect had already begun to appear among the younger educated leaders, engendered in part by the brave defense put up by Ethiopians against White (Italian) aggression in 1935 and 1936. In this atmosphere the threat to the Black franchise of the Cape rejuvenated the ANC. The ANC annual convention in 1935 reflected not only a new level of influence and organization among Blacks but also a new interest in the body by the Indians and Coloureds, some of whose leaders attended the meeting for the first time.

As a result a joint organization was formed, the All African Convention, which held a national meeting in December 1935 to demonstrate the strength of opposition to the two bills that were then before the country's parliament. The convention flatly rejected

the idea that the proposed Natives Representative Council could serve as an adequate substitute for the threatened loss of the Cape franchise. Although it welcomed the provisions that increased the size of Black African reserves, it condemned the other provisions as an attempt to force all Blacks into a position of permanent economic dependency.

Parliament ignored the storm of verbal opposition by Blacks and passed the bills in April 1936, although the legislators did drop their efforts to exclude Coloured voters in the same fashion because of the opposition of the more liberal members of parliament. Further legislation in 1937 increased the government's power to bar Blacks from entering urban areas by refusing them permits to seek work in the towns and provided for the forcible return of unemployed urban Blacks to the reserves. It also set up legislation under which municipalities were to be compelled to create separate residential areas by race.

In the 1938 elections the United Party won by a large majority, but the Purified National Party, which again played upon fears of Black advancement, greatly increased its electoral strength. The Purified Nationalists profited from their ties to the Broederbond, which used the 1938 celebration of the centenary of the Great Trek to make impassioned appeals to anti-Black and anti-British sentiments in terms of themes from Afrikaner history.

South African Involvement in World War II

At the outset of World War II the racial and economic ideas of some of the members of the Purified National Party and of the Broederbond led to a degree of affinity for the National Socialist Party of Adolph Hitler's Germany. Afrikaner extremists were attracted by Hitler's claims of the racial superiority of Germanic peoples, his enmity for Britain, and his state socialism designed to provide improved economic opportunities for a racial elite. If the majority of the Afrikaner supporters of the United Party were opposed to South Africa's entry into World War II, the Purified National Party went a step further and clearly desired a German victory, hoping that the fall of Britain would be the opportunity for turning South Africa into an Afrikaner republic.

Hertzog attempted to keep the country neutral, but a parliamentary majority of eighty to sixty-seven supported Smuts and took the country into the war on Britain's side. Roughly 350,000 South Africans (including 200,000 English- and Afrikaans-speaking Whites) served in the armed forces during the war and fought with distinction in Ethiopia, North Africa, and Europe. Moreover the country's industry and agriculture were retooled to meet the needs of Britain for outside assistance and to support the Allied forces operating in North Africa. As a result the country's industry was substantially expanded during the war years (see History of the Military Tradition, ch. 5).

There was considerable agitation against participation in the war.

Many Afrikaners were initially in favor of Germany, and a number of organizations appeared that modeled themselves on or emulated the Nazi organization. The Handhawersbond (literally, Maintainers' League), organized on the "Brown Shirt" model, had a claimed strength of 100,000. The New Order, led by Oswald Pirow, openly supported Germany and was in turn supported by broadcasts reaching South Africa from German propaganda radio stations.

The most important of the pro-German organizations, however, was the Ossewa-Brandwag (Ox-Wagon Guards). It was a nationwide organization with units in every population center in the country. By the time the war began, it had asserted a national socialist ideology and sought the abolition of private enterprise and the establishment of an authoritarian state. Ossewa-Brandwag was heavily involved in anti-British propaganda, including efforts to destroy the morale of Afrikaners serving in the South African military forces. Its members were responsible for most of the significant number of sabotage attempts carried out in the countr· Many of the leaders of Ossewa-Brandwag were interned for mucn of the war, including a future prime minister, John Vorster, and a number of men who were to serve in his cabinet in the 1960s and 1970s.

As the war turned in favor of the Allies, Hitler and his doctrines lost much of their attraction for the Afrikaner extremists. Under Broederbond pressure, the various organizations dissolved to allow their members to attach themselves to the Reunited National Party.

Rise of the National Party and Development of Apartheid

Wartime elections in 1943 again returned the United Party to power with a large majority. The Reunited National Party, or simply the National Party as it had come to be called, began almost immediately to turn its efforts toward the 1948 elections. As early as 1945 the leader of the Nationalists, Malan, had decided to stage an election campaign modeled on that of 1929—to achieve victory at the polls by playing upon White fears of Black encroachment.

The rapid economic development brought about by the war had attracted large numbers of Blacks to the cities where because of the labor shortages they had filled numerous semiskilled and some skilled positions in industry. This rapid increase in Black urbanization was not matched by any appreciable increase in housing or other social services for them. Overcrowding, demoralization, and an increased crime rate resulted. The rise of a generation of Black leaders with more education and a greater degree of freedom from traditional restraints—as well as the influence of statements, beginning with the Atlantic Charter, by Allied leaders on self-determination and popular freedoms—led Blacks to expect an improvement in their position in the postwar era.

The National Party used the changes in the position of the Black community to convince White voters that the limited steps the United Party had taken indicated that the party had fallen under the influence of liberal sentiments arising in Britain and Western Europe

that weakened its position on White dominance. Smuts, a strong supporter of the United Nations (UN), lost support among the electorate when South Africa was attacked in the UN for its racial policies by the government of India. As a result of the charges of racism, the UN had refused to end South West Africa's mandate status so that South Africa could incorporate the territory.

The National Party proclaimed that it offered voters a new policy to ensure continued White dominance. This policy was in line with the theory expounded by H. F. Verwoerd, editor of a leading Nationalist newspaper, and was presented to the party in the report of a special commission headed by P. O. Sauer. It called for the very policy that had been rejected in 1929—separation of the races in South Africa by rigid barriers, including restricting the entry of members of each racial group to particular portions of the country. Segregation in multiracial areas was to be carried into every field. Separation had been legally established only in major matters, such as separate schools. Public opinion and custom rather than law had been relied on to establish and enforce most segregation. But henceforth the law would legally demand separation in everything. The Sauer Report labeled the program "apartheid," an Afrikaans term for separateness.

The National Party's platform stressed the aspect of apartheid that would preserve a market for White labor in which the non-Whites could not compete. The 1948 election catapulted the Nationalists from a small minority party to a commanding position. Its seventy legislative seats, combined with the nine won by its ally, the Afrikaner Party (absorbed by the Nationalists in 1949), gave it an eight-vote parliamentary majority. From 1948 onward governments controlled by the National Party enacted legislation and otherwise attempted to implement the apartheid philosophy as expounded in 1948, having the aim of creating an Afrikaner-dominated state in which all liberal opposition would be effectively silenced. The government curtailed the flow of immigrants and stiffened citizenship requirements because it feared the new arrivals might bring in foreign and liberal influences and possibly create a non-Afrikaner majority in the White community. The token enfranchisement of Indians to elect White parliamentary representatives—already rejected by Indians as inadequate—was repealed.

In 1949, the Nationalists' first full year in office, interracial marriages were declared illegal, and sexual relations between Whites and non-Whites were made punishable by up to seven years in prison. Blacks were deprived of protection under all unemployment insurance laws, and the Natives Representative Council was abolished.

The Population Registration Act of 1950 provided for the classification by race of the entire South African population. The designations, which were based on family history, social acceptance, and appearance, determined an individual's status in all areas of social, economic, and political life (see Apartheid and Its Evolution; Class

43

and Race, ch. 2). Direct personal hardships were caused when classification decisions pertaining to membership in the White and Coloured categories separated spouses from each other and parents from children.

The Group Areas Act, also passed in 1950, replaced regional and local segregation measures with a uniform scheme of racially demarcated residential and business areas in all cities and towns. It provided for the expropriation of property, forced removal, and resettlement of persons who might be in the wrong area.

Under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 communism was defined in such sweeping terms that it empowered the government to declare unlawful any organization or publication it regarded as subversive. It was used to prosecute ANC leaders of the defiance campaign and to ban individuals listed as Communists from membership in any organization or attendance at any public gathering (see The Legal System; Security Laws, ch. 4).

The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 permitted the government to reinstitute the hierarchy of tribal organizations and to appoint and remove chiefs and was intended to return Black African political institutions to a tribal base. Other acts of 1951 and 1952 required Black women to carry passes for the first time and extended government control over the movement of Blacks into urban areas.

In 1951 the government began a six-year battle to amend the constitution in order to remove the Coloured voters of the Cape from the common voting roll. A two-thirds vote of the combined houses of parliament was required, and the government succeeded only after enlarging the Senate and adding more Nationalist members to it.

While the debates on the Coloured vote were continuing, other significant pieces of legislation were passed. These strengthened the hand of the state and provided for the creation of racially segregated public amenities. Among the important acts were the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which removed Black education from the Department of Education, Arts, and Science and placed it in the Department of Native Affairs under new educational directives. Black children were henceforth to receive an education markedly different from that given to White children. The government's plan was carried out despite vigorous and continuing protests by Blacks against what they saw as the degradation of their educational standards. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 encouraged local authorities to segregate public facilities for the different races without obligation to provide substantially equal facilities.

In 1956 the Industrial Conciliation Act authorized the minister of labor to create regulations reserving jobs for members of specified races. Blacks were excluded from such jobs as operating elevators and driving trucks. They were also denied the benefits of collective bargaining and their unions were excluded from participation in the conciliation machinery laid down in the act.

The National Party won the general elections of 1953 and 1958, each time increasing its majority in parliament. Malan retired in

1955 and was replaced by J. G. Strydom, the party's leader in the Transvaal. The United Party had lost more and more of its Afrikaner adherents to the Nationalists because it was continually accused of wanting to improve the position of Blacks at the expense of Whites. The United Party was further weakened by the removal of the 43,000 Coloured voters from the common voting roll in the Cape Province, as most of them had generally supported the party.

To lure back its Afrikaner supporters, the United Party opposed the Nationalist legislation to increase the Black African reserves on the grounds that it would require spending European tax money for the betterment of the Blacks. By 1958 the party also dropped its stand on favoring Coloured voters. Nevertheless it was not able to regain its strength because it lacked a coherent program and dynamic leadership. The Nationalists were able to achieve victory without a plurality in 1948 and 1953 because the electoral districts of South Africa have always been structured to favor rural areas, most of which are dominated by Afrikaners. In the 1958 elections the Nationalists bettered their previous showings at the polls, winning 103 seats to the United Party's fifty-three; yet their share of the popular vote was only 52 percent. The United Party did win all four of the separately elected Coloured seats, but this was a hollow victory, as only about 12 percent of the Coloured electorate bothered to cast their ballots for the White representatives. Nearly all of the younger Coloured voters boycotted the election.

In 1959 the government announced that the Black local governments in the reserves were now strong enough to be considered the representative voice of the Black population and that representation in parliament was therefore redundant. Legislation then abolished the White-held seats representing Blacks in the parliament and in the provincial legislative bodies. The government also took steps to increase the number of White voters by reducing the minimum voting age from twenty-one to eighteen.

Prime Minister Strydom had died in office in 1958 and was replaced by Verwoerd, the foremost proponent of apartheid and an equally strong supporter of demands for the creation of a republic. Accordingly in 1960 parliament passed a bill authorizing a referendum among White voters on the question of independence. In order not to alienate a portion of the electorate, Verwoerd promised that the new republic's constitution would vary as little as possible from that of 1909 and that South Africa would make every effort to remain within the Commonwealth of Nations. The referendum, held in October 1960, resulted in a small majority for a republic. Subsequent legislation altered only those clauses of the constitution that made reference to Britain and substituted an indirectly elected president for the governor general who represented the British crown.

The new republic came into being on May 31, 1961, with C. R. Swart as its first president. Despite earlier agreements, South Africa withdrew its application for continued membership in the Commonwealth in October 1961 when it became clear that other member

countries would demand that South Africa repudiate its racial policies if it wished to continue its membership.

The postrepublic parliamentary elections were held in October 1961, the Nationalists gaining 105 seats to forty-nine for the United Party. Before and during the election, a strong movement developed to support the Progressive Party, initially formed in 1959 by persons who broke away from the United Party. Those who formed it were concerned by what they regarded as deteriorating relations between Whites and Blacks. The party called for the gradual extension of the franchise to educated Blacks and an end to apartheid and racial injustice. Despite considerable financial backing from industrial circles and a well-run campaign, the Progressive Party was soundly defeated in all but one constituency—a wealthy Johannesburg suburb.

Prime Minister Verwoerd did not live to complete the five years of his elected term in parliament. An attempt on his life by a wealthy White farmer in April 1960 wounded Verwoerd, but he recovered. A second attempt, by an insane parliamentary messenger while the prime minister was addressing parliament, succeeded in September 1966. Both attempts were without political motivation. The former minister of justice, Vorster, became prime minister.

Black African Resistance (1940s–50s)

During World War II the African National Congress (ANC) continued its policy of seeking amelioration of Black grievances by approaches to the central government. The ANC tended to be divided between those prepared to work through the Natives Representative Council and those willing to cooperate with elements in the White community and some Coloured groups in more direct but still nonviolent protests. A sizable number of ANC members supported a policy of independent Black African action, preferring separation from other groups, including the South African Communist Party (SACP), and favoring a boycott of all government-sponsored bodies. In 1944 those favoring this more radical policy formed an elitist pressure group within the ANC called the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL). Among its adherents were the emerging Black nationalist leaders Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, and Robert Sobukwe.

In 1946 the government's suppression of a strike in the gold mines, led by the fairly large and effective but short-lived non-White trade unions that had been formed during the favorable labor period of World War II, resulted in the total abandonment of the Natives Representative Council by the Black members. The same year marked a turning point for the Asian organizations. The Natal Indian Congress, which had been in existence since the early 1900s, passed into the control of militant and left-wing Hindu leaders led by Yousuf M. Dadoo, a longtime SACP member, and began to cooperate with Black and Coloured movements. More conservative Indian elements, led largely by Muslim businessmen, formed a new group, the Natal Indian Organization.

In 1949, responding to the new wave of social discrimination ushered in by the Nationalist government, the militant ANCYL persuaded the ANC as a whole to adopt its program of action, which called for an end to petitions and deputations, and endorsed boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience. The ANCYL was inspired by militant Black nationalism and Gandhi's nonviolent techniques.

The change of policy transformed the ANC from a discussion forum to an action group using mass demonstrations and pressure. A convention held in December 1951 formally adopted a resolution to be presented to the government calling for the repeal of the pass laws and the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 (the vagueness of which allowed it to be used more against Black organizations than against communist groups). The resolution also called for an end to the forced displacement of Blacks from urban areas and to the National Party's efforts to place Coloureds on a separate voting roll. In June 1952, after the expected government rejection of their demands, the ANC (and some Indians and Coloureds) began a large-scale passive resistance campaign. More than 8,000 people, chiefly Blacks but including a number of Indians and Coloureds, volunteered to violate the pass and segregation laws and were jailed. As a result of the popular support gained, the organization grew from a small body numbering some 15,000 members to a politically powerful organization of 100,000. Although the defiance campaign was unsuccessful in its efforts to force the government to repeal some of the undesirable legislation, it consolidated Black sentiment, gave training to future leaders, and achieved great international publicity.

In June 1955 the Congress of the People, an association of anti-racist groups—Black, Coloured, and Asian—and White sympathizers adopted the Freedom Charter, demanding a government of all South Africans without racial discrimination. Harassed by the police, 156 members of this congress were later arrested and charged with high treason. After protracted trials they were eventually acquitted, but the government had demonstrated that it regarded political activity aimed at racial equality as subversive.

In 1958 a group within the ANCYL led by Sobukwe walked out of the ANC to found the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). Greatly affected by Ghana's newly acquired independence and by the slogans of Pan-Africanism as espoused by Kwame Nkrumah, the group, composed of the younger Black leaders, urged greater militancy, racial assertiveness, and identification with that philosophy. The Pan-Africanism that the new group professed had always been latent within the ANC and other movements, but it had not become manifest earlier because of the ANC's close ties with a very small number of Whites and a somewhat larger number of Asians who worked for the Black cause. Sobukwe believed that the vast majority of Blacks would follow a purely Black leadership if it could arouse their racial consciousness and was prepared to lead them in the struggle against the racial laws. The PAC believed that the White

regime could be brought to an end by passive disobedience if it could be done on a massive enough scale.

Preempting demonstrations planned by the ANC, the PAC called for a mass disobedience campaign against the pass laws beginning March 21, 1960. It ended the same day with the Sharpeville tragedy, in which sixty-eight Blacks were killed and 180 injured when panicky White policemen turned their guns on a peaceful if noisy crowd of demonstrators who had appeared at the police station seeking to be arrested for failure to carry their passbooks. A general strike called by the ANC paralyzed the country for three weeks. Widespread arrests and detentions followed, and the ANC and PAC were banned.

New security laws were passed between 1961 and 1965 permitting the government to censor the published statements of any banned person. Additional powers were granted to the security police, and severe punishment was imposed for actions falling within a broad definition of sabotage.

Activists of both the ANC and the PAC reacted to the banning of their organizations by forming small underground units. The ANC-related Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) carried out sabotage of public utilities while the PAC group, Poqo (We Alone) aimed at conducting acts of terrorism. According to Umkonto leader Mandela, speaking at his 1964 trial for sabotage, the White government's actions of the previous sixteen years had ended all hope of using peaceful means to improve the situation of the Black majority.

Attempts at sabotage had limited success. A small number of powerlines, bridges, train stations, and radio towers were blown up in the early and mid-1960s, but these acts did little harm to the country's economy. Within a few years the police were easily able to infiltrate and apparently destroy all the organizations dedicated to violent action. Nearly 200 mass political and sabotage trials were held in a three-year period ending in December 1965, and 1,300 persons were sentenced to an average term of seven years in prison. The most important of the trials arose from the arrest of a large group of the major leaders of the banned ANC while they were assembled at a meeting at Rivonia near Johannesburg in July 1963. A number of ANC and PAC leaders were, however, able to escape to other countries, chiefly in Africa, to set up exile headquarters. The imprisoned leaders, particularly Mandela and Sobukwe, and the banned elder of the ANC, Albert Luthuli, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1960 for his preaching of nonviolence, remained important symbols to many Blacks.

Years of Challenge (1968–76)

By 1968 the National Party had been in office for twenty years, fifteen of them without any effective challenge at the polls. As a result of relentless police security measures, non-White opposition had virtually disappeared. Even the few overt acts of sabotage that had occurred in scattered areas in the mid-1960s had been carried out by the African Resistance Movement, a largely White organization. The

Black South African of Cape Town holding his passbook
Courtesy United Nations/Contact

numerous vocal opponents of South Africa's status quo who had a significant voice abroad had almost no impact inside the country. The twenty years of Afrikaner political domination had been accompanied by phenomenal change in the White minority group's financial power and social position. Accompanying the Afrikaners' gains was a greater self-confidence in dealing with the English-speaking element and with foreign critics of South Africa. Afrikaner life, previously dominated by a rural-oriented social structure, was rapidly adjusting to the pressures of urbanization and materialism.

The main challenge to the ruling Nationalists on the twentieth anniversary of Afrikaner domination came from the party's right-wing ideologues. The government's economic policies had been successful in bringing wealth to the country's Whites (with a spillover effect to some non-Whites). The regime also took confidence from the Western world's increasing need for South Africa's strategic mineral wealth and the growing interest of Western investors in the industrial de\ elopment of the country. The failure of UN efforts to bring effective pressure on White-ruled Southern Rhodesia was also a solace to the Afrikaners. Moreover the government's maneuvers toward Black African states not actively hostile to South Africa appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough. The South Africans hoped to offer commercial, technical, and financial relations in return for a moderation of the antagonisms of Black African states.

But its own racial policies made it a friendless figure in international forums, so the government kept a careful watch on the rising African insurgencies in Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola—whose rulers the rest of the world regarded as South Africa's only ideological allies. The country's own Black population seemed too demoralized to plan new political initiatives, but the events occurring just beyond the national borders and the social unrest in South Africa's urban centers heightened the fears of the Whites, further adding to the tensions in the society. The voices of more astute observers, pointing out that greater problems would result in the 1970s unless accommodation was reached with South Africa's Black majority, were ignored and often forcibly silenced.

Verligtes vs. Verkramptes

In the late 1960s an ideological conflict appeared in the ranks of the National Party—and within the other elements of the Afrikaner power structure—that was to have an important impact well into the 1970s. In August 1968 Vorster dismissed three right-wing dissident members of his cabinet, including a key figure, Albert Hertzog, who founded a new party the next year called the Reconstituted National Party (Herstigte Nasionale Party—HNP). A majority of those whose conservative sympathies were with Hertzog remained in the larger party, however, seeking to influence Vorster and other government leaders in their direction.

This split in the Afrikaner movement was commonly labeled a confrontation between the *verligte* (enlightened) and the *verkrampte*

(narrow-minded) wings of the movement although initially it was more tactical than doctrinal. The major question that divided the two groups was whether apartheid was to be defended against any concessions to change or whether the mounting pressures on South Africa required a more flexible and innovative approach so that a society and culture favorable to Afrikaners might be safeguarded. More concrete questions deriving from the central ones were often the focus of debate between the two groups. For example, they differed on the approach to be taken on the question of admitting foreign non-White athletes to sports competitions in South Africa and on the sensitive matter of relations with neighboring Black African states, particularly as this would require the admission of Black diplomatic representatives to South Africa.

The Vorster government attempted a number of gestures to counter mounting hostility abroad, many of them anathema to the *verkramptes*. These included more aggressive efforts to justify Nationalist policies to the Western world, attempts to establish diplomatic relations or dialogue with Black African states, promises to grant full privileges to Black diplomats coming to South Africa, and integration of South African athletic teams competing outside the country.

The HNP's *verkramptes* railed against increased budgets for Black education and health and the opening up of job opportunities for non-Whites in occupations traditionally reserved for Whites—even though the government was motivated by a growing shortage of White labor. Such actions were viewed as signs of liberal encroachment and, hence, were evils to be opposed. For the Afrikaner traditionalists who made up the majority of the supporters in the National Party of the *verkramptes* as well as the HNP, the opposition included not only non-Whites and the hostile countries beyond South Africa but also all local liberal influences, including South Africa's English-speaking Whites, who were regarded as proponents of materialism and permissiveness. The contests between Nationalist and HNP candidates in the 1970 and 1974 general elections were bitterly fought, but the HNP failed to win any seats in the parliament. Although many Afrikaner voters sympathized with the HNP, they were unprepared to support a splintering of the National Party.

Separate Development and the Homelands Idea

Under Verwoerd the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 had designated eight (later ten) national units based on Black cultural and ethnic groupings and pointed the way to the transfer of legislative powers to these units (see Racial Categories and Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). Although it was the framework for evolving homelands government institutions, the approach was viewed with great skepticism by Blacks who saw it as a further step to exclude them from the political life of South Africa and as a pretext for population resettlement. In 1950 the government had appointed the Tomlinson Commission to investigate the socioeconomic role of Blacks and the

51

development of their assigned areas. The commission had reported to the government in 1956 that self-governing territories for the Black African population would not be economically feasible without a massive program aimed at agricultural self-sufficiency and creation of jobs. Little was done, however, to improve the primitive economies of the homelands in spite of the fact that, under Verwoerd's leadership, the objective of independent homelands became a central feature of apartheid or "separate development," as the government had redesignated its racial policy.

The first of the homelands to move toward self-government was Transkei, which had a tradition of partial local authority that could be traced to the late nineteenth century. The Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 delegated certain powers to a legislative assembly, subject to veto by Pretoria. The assembly consisted of sixty regional chiefs and forty-five elected members. Supported by the traditional chiefs and collaborating with Pretoria on the issue of separate development, Kaiser Matanzima was named chief minister. In contrast nearly all of the elective seats in the assembly went to groups opposed to a separate path for Transkei. After Vorster became prime minister of South Africa, the impetus toward self-government for the remaining homelands was intensified. The Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 gave the government the legal basis for the staged evolution of all the homelands from territorial authorities to limited internal self-government, possessing legislative assemblies of partially elected and partially appointed tribal representatives on the Transkei model.

In June 1972 Bophuthatswana became the second homeland to be granted self-governing status. Its legislature was composed of forty-eight chiefs selected by Pretoria and twenty-four members elected by homeland voters. A total of eight homelands had established legislative assemblies by the end of 1972, and in 1974 negotiations over Transkeian independence began. The grant of "independence" to Transkei on October 26, 1976, culminated thirteen years of progressively greater degrees of self-rule and capped the government's program of separate development with its first apparent success. Matanzima obtained significant territorial gains as part of the bargaining with Vorster. Some 420,000 hectares were taken from the other Xhosa homeland (Ciskei) and given to Transkei. (In return Ciskei was promised a like amount of nearby White lands.)

Transkei's announced move influenced Bophuthatswana to plan for a similar status the following year. KwaZulu, Lebowa, Gazankulu, and the other smaller units resisted prodding by the Pretoria government to follow Transkei's lead, fearing the independence would be meaningless in view of their heavily fragmented territories (Lebowa was divided into thirteen units and KwaZulu into forty-four in 1975), the fragility of their economies, and their lack of revenue sources. The possible loss of South African citizenship and residence rights made the issue of independent homelands especially objectionable to Blacks living and working in urban South Africa (see Government and Politics in the Black Homelands, ch. 4).

52

Although South Africa continued to fall far short of making available the economic resources considered essential by the Tomlinson Commission, new programs had been devised by the early 1970s to attract industry and jobs to the homeland borders and later within the homelands themselves through financial and tax incentives offered by the Bantu Investment Corporation (later Corporation for Economic Development). The program could not cope adequately with poverty in the homelands, however, nor could it stem the movement of Black jobseekers to White areas.

In the early 1970s cooperation increased among the homeland leaders, although they remained divided over the issue of whether to accept independence for their territories. Even Chief Matanzima, hitherto considered South Africa's puppet, joined the others in bargaining with the government in Pretoria and in denouncing its policies while demanding additional land and the consolidation of existing areas. In 1973 eight of the homeland leaders met at Umtata in Transkei to explore a federation of the homelands, but nothing came of this owing in part to the coolness of the Tswana leader, Lucas Mangope, and in larger degree to the incompatibility of a Black federation with the goal, voiced most strongly by Zulu chief Gatsha Buthelezi, of a unified multiracial South African state.

By 1972 Buthelezi had become a thorn in Pretoria's side. His calls for a national convention of representatives from all racial categories--White, Coloured, Asian, and Black—to decide the country's future form of government were encouraged by Coloured and Indian leaders. His initiatives were also supported by the Progressive Party, whose platform contained similar goals. His demands that Blacks be consulted by the government before the passage of any laws or regulations affecting them had great appeal for urban Blacks.

Coloured and Indian Political Developments

Since removal of male Coloureds of Cape Province and Natal from the common voting rolls in 1956, Coloureds had been permitted only to vote for four Whites to represent them in the House of Assembly and two in the Cape Provincial Council. Coloured dissatisfaction with this nominal political representation was compounded by a government law banning multiracial parties, which blocked the opposition Progressive Party from campaigning for the Coloured seats.

In an effort to deal with Coloured demands for a more significant political outlet, the government established the Coloured Persons' Representative Council (CPRC) in 1968, delegating to it authority over Coloured education, social welfare, and community affairs. But the council was still subservient to the central government through the minister of Coloured relations. The council consisted of forty elective and twenty appointive seats. Faith in the council as a source of political expression was not enhanced when, upon the victory by the Coloured Labour Party in the first election in 1969,

53

the government named defeated candidates of the more tractable Federal Party to the appointive seats, assuring Pretoria's control of the council. When the Labour Party won enough elective seats in the 1975 election to assure it control in spite of government appointees, the council quickly fell into a deadlock with the national government over the allocation of funds for Coloured affairs and its chairman, Sonny Leon, was replaced by a government appointee (see Politics of the Coloured Community, ch. 4).

Coloured discontent was heightened by the abolition of Coloured representatives from municipal councils in Cape Province and by the forced removal of Coloureds from traditional residential areas in the Cape as the government pursued its implementation of the Group Areas Act. The Theron Commission, appointed to investigate Coloured grievances, recommended in 1976 that the Coloureds be represented in local, provincial, and national decisionmaking and proposed a series of social and economic reforms. Many of the minor measures were accepted, but the major political proposals were rejected by the government.

The issue of political institutions for the smaller Indian population was of more recent date, the government's objective until 1961 having been repatriation to the Indian subcontinent rather than acceptance of Indians as permanent residents. The Group Areas Act was a source of great discontent, involving not only disruption of homes and families but also the expulsion of thousands of Indian shopkeepers from central business areas. In 1974 the advisory South African Indian Council (SAIC) was converted into a body having limited executive powers. Fifteen members were appointed and fifteen were indirectly elected by local Indian groups. Patterned after the CPRC, it had authority over Indian education and welfare but was subordinate to the minister of Indian affairs. The militant Natal Indian Congress refused to participate in the SAIC (see Politics of the Indian Community, ch. 4).

In 1976 the government took a tentative step toward dealing with the demands of the Coloured and Indian communities for a political voice at the national level when Vorster announced a Cabinet Council of Whites, Coloureds, and Indians that would meet on a quarterly basis. The Coloured Labour Party denounced the Cabinet Council as a powerless discussion group and refused to participate. The SAIC decided to give the council a twelve-month trial period.

The Shrinking White Redoubt

During the 1960s pressures continued to mount against South Africa because of its domestic racial policies and its unwillingness to relinquish its control over Namibia (formerly South West Africa). With growing experience in making their voting power effective, the African states succeeded in driving South Africa out of one international agency after another, although it was not until 1974 that the credentials of the South African representative were rejected in the UN General Assembly itself. After taking office Vorster had

assumed a more flexible and sophisticated approach, seeking to reduce South Africa's isolation on the continent by initiating private contacts and making offers of aid to moderate African leaders. He encountered a positive reaction at first, but in the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 the Organization of African Unity made it plain that the apartheid system remained a fundamental barrier to relations between South Africa and Black African states. One achievement was the state visit by President Hastings Banda of Malawi in 1969 during which Banda urged other African states to follow Malawi's lead in establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa. But Banda also rejected separate development and told Black audiences that his visit was aimed at creating cracks in the National Party's race policies.

Since the early 1960s the White electorate's greatest interest in foreign affairs had centered on the maintenance of the buffer zone of White-controlled states—Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, Angola—which separated South Africa from independent states of Black Africa that might support antiapartheid insurgents. Although anticolonial guerrilla forces operating against the Portuguese in Mozambique had grown much stronger during the early 1970s, White South Africans were not prepared for the sudden collapse of Mozambique's buffer zone brought about by the overthrow of the government in Portugal in April 1974. Prime Minister Vorster, however, was sufficiently able to capitalize on his country's extensive economic relationships with Mozambique to preclude immediate threats to South Africa's security coming from that country's new Marxist regime. South Africa was less skillful in its reaction to the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola, mounting an incursion by a South African force in 1975 that was obliged to pull back when it was met by well-equipped Cuban troops near the capital, Luanda (see History of the Military Tradition; Namibia, ch. 5).

Although Vorster provided the economic and military lifeline permitting the White regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia to defy UN sanctions, he viewed the situation as inherently unstable and dangerous to South Africa's own interests. Vorster was in contact with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia on numerous occasions between the late 1960s and 1975 in the search for a settlement that would satisfy both the Blacks and the Whites of Southern Rhodesia and the neighboring states burdened by the rising violence and the costs to them of guerrilla warfare.

Vorster reacted differently to the clamor in the UN for South African withdrawal from Namibia and the guerrilla campaign, intensified in the early 1970s, of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) on the northern boundary of Namibia. Condemning the Marxist-oriented rhetoric of SWAPO's leader, Sam Nujoma, Vorster increased the South African military forces stationed on the long border with Angola and authorized raids against SWAPO bases inside Angola. Rejecting proposals for UN supervised elections that could bring SWAPO to power, South Africa sponsored

55

the Turnhalle talks at Windhoek, the capital of Namibia, beginning in 1975 among the various ethnic and racial groups in Namibia on an independence constitution. It seemed clear, however, that an internal solution that ignored SWAPO's support among the Ovambo, the largest ethnic group, would not gain international recognition, nor would it bring an end to the guerrilla warfare (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4).

Polarization of White Politics

The National Party entered the general election of 1974 in a strong position in the midst of a renewed economic boom. Its fears of the right-wing extremists were dissipated by victories over the HNP in bitter by-election campaigns and by weakened United Party opposition caused by internal division. The National Party won with ease. The HNP, which had attacked Vorster's policies of dialogue with Black Africa and integrated sports at the international level, was still without a single seat in parliament. Encouraged, the cautious Vorster followed a somewhat more innovative course, proceeding with Transkei independence and the Turnhalle conference in Namibia and easing a few of the restrictions that were commonly referred to as petty apartheid (see Apartheid and Its Evolution, ch. 2). Most of the Afrikaners whose sympathies lay with the HNP remained within the National Party fold. Vorster continued to balance his cabinet by retaining *verkramptes* and in 1976 added Andries Treurnicht, the chief exponent of *verkrampte* ideas, to the government as deputy minister of Bantu education.

The United Party, in trying to maintain a bond of common interest between both its English-speaking and its Afrikaner supporters, had alienated its liberal faction over such issues as its acceptance of the homelands. After the Progressive and Liberal parties had split off in the 1950s, the United Party managed to conceal its divisions through the 1974 elections. The Progressives, having held only one seat, were surprised by winning six additional seats, presumably with the aid of liberal voters who had abandoned hope in the revival of the United Party. The Transvaal wing of the United Party broke away in 1975 to form the Reform Party, which existed for only a short time before amalgamating with the Progressives. In 1976 the opposition parties attempted to agree on a set of common principles—power-sharing among the races, elimination of race discrimination, and consultations among all groups on a future constitution. The result was the final breakup of the United Party and the coalescence of the liberal opposition forces into a better defined alternative to National Party policies based on acceptance of all of South Africa's race groups in the political process.

Although the high economic growth rates of the mid-1960s subsided somewhat after Vorster became prime minister, the continued modernization and diversification of the economy helped to consolidate the grip of the National Party. Encouraged by the apparent return to political stability, foreign investment continued to flow in,

assisting the balance of payments and introducing more sophisticated processes to South African industry. Large-scale public investments were undertaken to expand electric power production, to develop new ore-loading ports, and to reduce dependency on imported oil by building additional oil-from-coal complexes. The historic role of gold as a source of economic growth was supplemented by the increasing of exports and the refining of other minerals of which South Africa became one of the world's leading suppliers. These efforts to develop a modern industrial sector, including arms production, diminished the threat from economic boycotts and weapons embargoes.

English-speaking business leaders continued to predominate in industry and in the large mining-based conglomerates although Afrikaners were playing an increasing role in business and finance. The interests of both groups tended to merge, their concerns centering on a stable political climate, greater buying power among Blacks, and opportunities to employ Blacks in skilled and semiskilled jobs that were increasingly difficult to fill with Whites. Black wages rose in the early 1970s to narrow slightly the great discrepancy with White wages, and the Vorster government adopted some measures to alleviate Black economic conditions, but the government did not appear to welcome appeals from the business community for liberalizing its racial policies. Restrictions on Blacks entering urban areas meant that the manufacturing and mining sectors were largely dependent on short-term contract laborers, perpetuating the dualistic economic system and the deeply discriminatory features of South African society.

Black Consciousness and Renewed Racial Unrest

The destruction of the ANC and the PAC in the early and mid-1960s and the imprisonment or flight into exile of their leaders had left the Black community bereft of political leadership. A younger generation of leaders from the ranks of Black students began to fill this vacuum in the late 1960s. Its philosophy stressed Black self-reliance and called for Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians to seek an identity free from White influences. The first national platform for the movement was created with the breaking away of the non-White university campuses from the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS)—a liberal, largely English-speaking organization under frequent attack by the government. The students of one Asian and three Black colleges and later the Coloured university as well, formed the South African Student Organization (SASO), which played a significant political role in the 1970s. The Black consciousness movement in SASO and other bodies appealed to all non-Whites, calling for them to be proud of their own heritages, to become self-aware, and not to depend on paternalistic White leadership—whether racist or liberal—for solutions to their problems.

Steve Biko, the head of SASO, and other leaders traveled throughout the country expounding the idea of Black consciousness and

encouraging the formation of Black self-help projects and Black organizations in many fields. An umbrella political organization, the Black People's Convention (BPC), was created. SASO's attacks on Black education led to class boycotts and the closing of the Black University of the North in 1972. The strike became a major national issue in early June after a small peaceful demonstration on the steps of Cape Town's cathedral by White students supporting SASO was attacked by police who broke into the church and arrested the rector. Strikes then spread across the country on White and Black campuses, supported by church leaders and others angered by the prime minister's praise of the police action and his assertions that the White students were foreign-supported agitators with failing grades. More than 600 students were eventually arrested in the protests, but only two were convicted of a crime.

Strikes and student unrest in 1974 were ignited by SASO and BPC rallies celebrating the victory of the Marxist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—FRELIMO) and the end of Portuguese rule in Mozambique. The government retaliated by banning Biko and other Black consciousness leaders and eventually prosecuting them under the Terrorism Act. The attack on SASO followed by one month the banning of NUSAS leaders when that organization, identifying with Black student demands, held protest demonstrations. NUSAS was declared dangerous to state security and prohibited from receiving funds from abroad. Although the clergy formed a more sensitive target, the government tried to suppress the Christian Institute's criticisms of the government's social policies by a similar declaration and prohibition (see The Churches, Race Relations, and the Political Order, ch. 2).

The early 1970s were also a period of renewed ferment among Black industrial workers. The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), which had been linked with the ANC, virtually disappeared after the arrests, bannings, and detentions of its officials between 1960 and 1966. In 1972 and 1973, however, Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians—spurred by growing wage differentials between Whites and the other races, White labor shortages, Black consciousness, and the example of a strike by the Ovambo in Namibia—engaged in strikes from one end of the country to the other, and many of them were successful in gaining substantially increased wages and benefits for the strikers. An idea of the growth of labor unrest may be gained from the fact that in 1971 slightly under 100,000 workers struck during the first two months of the year alone. During this period most of the approximately twenty-five Black unions were formed, some as a result of efforts by the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA)—the most liberal of the White-led labor federations—to take under its aegis not only Coloured and Asian unions but also unregistered Black unions whose strategy was to gain the support of registered unions. Other Black unions resisted TUCSA efforts to incorporate them and sought instead to organize purely Black union federations (see Labor, ch. 3).

The Soweto Riots

During the mid-1970s Buthelezi and the Blacks opposing him continued to argue over the issue of whether improved conditions for Blacks could be negotiated from the base of a homeland, and both factions sought to gain support from the large urban Black community. Surveys showed that only 40 percent of Transkeians in the sprawling urban township of Soweto supported so-called independence for their homeland, and 60 percent of the township's Zulus regarded themselves as South Africans rather than citizens of KwaZulu. As the White government stiffened its suppression of Black consciousness forces, unrest among urban Blacks was fueled by such events as independence in Mozambique and Angola, the uncertainties brought about by the status of Transkei, and successful industrial strikes against White employers. The government grudgingly conceded changes in a few measures of petty apartheid. The growing demands for basic change in South Africa, however, were met by intensified security measures. In Soweto, particularly, many felt it would require only a small spark for the volatile atmosphere to explode.

That spark was supplied in 1976 when the deputy minister of Bantu education, Treurnicht, insisted that the urban school systems enforce a 1955 directive specifying that half of all courses above the primary level be taught in Afrikaans, i.e., if mathematics and history were taught in English, science and social studies would use Afrikaans as the medium of instruction. The order was deeply resented by Blacks, primarily because it meant that their children would face the burden of learning first in their home language and later in two languages that were not native to them. Many also regarded it as a sinister effort to restrict Black education, to force Blacks to learn the language of their oppressors, and to lessen their contact with the outside world. Inevitably it was most strongly resented by the young students involved. Soweto students had been protesting, demonstrating, and boycotting classes for five weeks when on June 16, 1976, a small group of them threw stones at a riot police patrol during an argument. The police responded with gunfire. Riots ensued throughout Soweto and after three days spread to other Black townships in the Johannesburg and Pretoria areas, the western Cape (primarily Cape Town), and the eastern Cape (mainly Port Elizabeth). Similar violence also flared sporadically for several months in Durban.

During renewed rioting in Soweto in early August and mid-September, the newly created Soweto Student Representative Council, formed with guidance from SASO members, sought to flex the urban Black's labor muscle by demonstrating an ability to cripple the country's economy. On these occasions, by urging and by force, the students prevented Soweto workers from going to their jobs in Johannesburg for up to three days, bringing many industries to a standstill. Their elders formed the Black Parents Organization primarily to support them, but police action prevented any sort of permanent organizational structure.

The Cillie Commission, a one-man government investigation by a Transvaal judge into the disturbances, later announced that a total of 575 people had been killed; 3,907 had been injured; and thousands had been arrested. Damage to government and private property was incalculable but was almost entirely confined to Black and Coloured townships. White areas were untouched by violence, and the military was not called upon. The harshness of police tactics, including indiscriminate firing at schoolchildren, was reported in the local and foreign press. The commission, however, rejected a finding of willful assault by the police although acknowledging that they were poorly equipped for dealing with riots.

The Cillie Commission found that the catalyst for the disturbances was the Black education system and the study of Afrikaans in the schools—factors that developed into a grievance against Whites in general and Afrikaners in particular. The report indicated great resentment among non-Whites regarding the entire apartheid system, treatment by White officials, influx controls, the homelands policy, and especially in the case of Coloureds, forced removals from their homes. Thus while the Soweto episode demonstrated the ability of the security forces to contain civil protest, it also reflected the Black majority's total rejection of the institutions that kept its members in a state of permanent political and social subjugation.

* * *

A useful introduction to the extraordinarily complex history of political, military, economic, and social relations among the races and the segments of each racial category (especially the Whites) is T.R.H. Davenport's *South Africa: A Modern History*. The four published volumes of *The Cambridge History of Africa* deal with South Africa (and adjacent areas) from c. 500 B.C. to c. A.D. 1870 in chapters by Clark (Volume 2) and Oliver and Fagan (Volume 2); by Birmingham and Marks (Volume 3); by Marks and Gray (Volume 4); and by Omer-Cooper (two essays in Volume 5). The chapters in this series have the particular value of putting South African history in regional perspective. The two volumes of *The Oxford History of South Africa* (Volume I: South Africa to 1870 and Volume II: South Africa 1870-1966), both edited by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, contain a series of essays by various authors dealing with specific issues in the period covered—for example, Wilson's chapter entitled "The Nguni People," and Thompson's "Cooperation and Conflict: the High Veld" in Volume I. In Volume II are chapters on economic development by D. Hobart Houghton and on the development of urbanization by David Welsh. Both the Cambridge and Oxford histories give more attention to developments and internal dynamics in Black groups than have earlier histories. Both contain extensive bibliographies, as does the Davenport volume. Two essays

by the Afrikaner historian Hermann Giliomee provide an interesting perspective on the ruling White ethnic group: "The Growth of Afrikaner Identity" and "The Afrikaner Economic Advance." (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment

Stylized view of metropolitan Johannesburg's skyline

CONSIDERATIONS OF RELATIONS between the races—officially defined as White, Black, Coloured, and Asian—and of the allocation in racial terms of access to economic, social, and political status and resources pervade every aspect of South African life from the right to vote to participation in sports. Race relations and their connection with socioeconomic class were dominant issues in South African life long before the National Party, based on the Afrikaans-speaking group among the Whites, came to power in 1948 and instituted the policies and structure of apartheid (literally, separateness). That structure clearly underlined White minority domination in every aspect of South African society. Domination was coupled with separation of the races, which became both a goal in itself and a means to an end—that of minimizing the possibility of physical threat and the certainty of demographic threat, particularly from the Blacks. At the same time the availability of a good part of the Black majority and the Coloured and Asian minorities as a labor force had to be maintained.

The White minority was becoming an even smaller one—nearly 20 percent of the population in 1960 but not quite 16 percent in 1980. In that interval the other minorities—Coloureds and Asians—gained in relation to the Whites but, like them, lost ground to the Blacks, who constituted a little more than 68 percent of the population in 1960 and well over 72 percent in 1980. Whites, seeking to maintain their dominance in the face of a growing Black majority, sought initially to exclude as many Blacks from the areas reserved for Whites as was consistent with the needs of the White economy and to control those Blacks that remained. Their chief tools for this purpose were influx control and the pass system on the one hand and the group areas program (the latter embodied in the Group Areas Act) on the other. Influx control was devised to limit the numbers of Blacks permitted in the White areas (including the Black townships to which they were relegated by the Group Areas Act) whether as semipermanent residents or legal migrant workers. The pass system, requiring all Blacks to carry a passbook that documented their legal status, allowed the police (or other officials) to determine whether Blacks were where they were permitted to be. If not, they could be expelled ("endorsed out" in South African terminology).

In the late 1950s the term apartheid was officially replaced by that of "separate development" and subsequently by "multinational development." These changes constituted an effort to carry separation even further. By basing these ideas on a theory of essential cultural differences between peoples, the South African government also sought to justify its practice in the face of external criticism. In effect the basic pattern was little changed. The most important development was founded on the long-standing notion, only occasionally

questioned in the twentieth century, that Blacks—whatever their place of residence or birth—belonged in what have come to be called the homelands, usually fragmented areas constituting a small part of the territories they occupied at the time Whites appeared. The difference was that these homelands were to become states and were to be the locus of citizenship for all Blacks, allocated to them in terms of governmental definitions of Black ethnicity (or nationality). Associated with the strictest possible separation and the idea of cultural differences were separate systems of education and health care financially supported at levels very different from those catering to Whites.

During the period that the ideas and structures of separate development were forming, the South African economy was expanding— a process that introduced the requirement for more skilled workers. At the same time Blacks (and Asians and Coloureds) refused to be satisfied with their lot. Moreover the Afrikaners who had instituted the system (and its later variations)—in part in the course of their struggle to achieve economic, social, and political parity with English speakers—had substantially reached their goals. Certainly they were politically dominant. In these circumstances they were prepared to be more flexible in their assessment of the situation, and some changes in the rigid separation of the races had been put into effect by the mid- and late 1970s. Nevertheless, the modifications instituted and under consideration in 1980 would leave most of the existing system still in place, perhaps less costly to operate and less irritating in some respects to Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians, but with few alterations in the structure of race and class. One consequence—if enough of the Blacks legally resident in the urban centers accepted it—would be an intensification of the existing division between urban Blacks and those in the homelands. Blacks who were permitted to stay in the cities would become a relatively privileged stratum, conceivably prepared to remain politically quiescent in return for the benefits they received. There was no indication, however, that urban Blacks were ready to settle for what they were apparently being offered.

Physical Setting

The Republic of South Africa is the southernmost country of continental Africa (see fig. 1). Its western limits are formed by the Atlantic Ocean and its southern and eastern extremities by the Indian Ocean. It shares inland frontiers with Namibia (formerly South West Africa), Botswana, Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia), Mozambique, and Swaziland. South Africa's territorial landmass completely surrounds the small independent state of Lesotho.

Covering an area of 1,229,262 square kilometers, the country measures nearly 1,600 kilometers in its longest east-west axis and over 1,120 kilometers from north to south. Extraterritorial holdings included in the total consist of the Walvis Bay enclave on the coast of Namibia and two small islands—Prince Edward and Marion— southeast of the African mainland.

The major topographical features are a broad and lofty interior

plateau, a steep semicircular escarpment that surrounds the plateau, and a narrow belt of coastal lowlands on the west, south, and east. Terrain features range from temperate and subtropical farmland, grassland plains, and verdant valleys to craggy mountain peaks, semiarid scrubland, and sparsely inhabited desert. Approximately 70 percent of the land consists of mountains and semidesert, and no more than 15 percent of the country is cultivable. The agriculturally inferior land, however, harbors one of the world's richest and most varied stores of mineral wealth (see Mining, ch. 3).

Boundaries and Internal Subdivisions

Most of the country's borders are defined by natural features. The northern boundaries range across the African continent's southern tip for almost 4,700 kilometers. Except for the 495-kilometer border with Mozambique and a 320-kilometer stretch along Namibia's southeastern sector, the inland frontier is formed by the course of the Limpopo River in the east and the Orange River in the west. All internal borders are either demarcated or delimited and are undisputed. The western, southern, and eastern extremities are marked by about 4,300 kilometers of coastline formed by the Atlantic and Indian oceans. In the far south the coastline forms the truncated apex of an inverted triangle with Cape Agulhas as its most southerly point.

A number of small landforms off the republic's southwestern coast include Dassen, Robben, and Bird islands. All are uninhabited except for Robben Island, which serves as the site of the country's maximum security prison (see The Penal System, ch. 5). In 1947 South Africa formally annexed two small islands—Prince Edward and Marion—which lie in the Indian Ocean approximately 1,920 kilometers southeast of Cape Town. Other extraterritorial holdings include the small enclave of Walvis Bay on the western coast of Namibia about 1,200 kilometers northwest of Cape Town. The enclave's area of 1,128 square kilometers was annexed by the Cape Colony in 1878 and incorporated in the Union of South Africa in 1910. The harbor at Walvis Bay is protected by a nine-kilometer-long peninsula known as Pelican Point and provides modern shipping facilities for mineral exports and for a fish processing industry (see Fishing, ch. 3). The enclave is connected to South Africa by a paved highway, a railroad, and an airline through the Namibian capital of Windhoek, and by sea transport routes.

From independence in 1910 until 1961 the country was known as the Union of South Africa, a constituent part of the Commonwealth of Nations. It comprised the former British colonies of Cape of Good Hope (commonly called the Cape Colony and later Cape Province), Natal, Transvaal, and Orange River Colony, which became the four administrative provinces of the Union at independence. At that time the latter province became known as Orange Free State, a designation derived from the period of the Boer republics. When the Union became a republic in 1961, the names of constituent provinces

67

remained unchanged. The Walvis Bay enclave on the coast of Namibia was long technically part of Cape Province; after being administered briefly from Windhoek, it was returned to Cape Province in 1978.

The country's provincial boundaries are guaranteed by the South African constitution and cannot be altered except by express petition to parliament by the individual provinces concerned. Local administrative units and authorities that have jurisdiction over them vary from province to province. In all cases, however, local administrative authorities are subject to the control of their parent provincial councils (see Provincial Government, ch. 4).

Long-standing official policies on apartheid have imposed a number of anomalies that ostensibly affect both the size of South Africa's total land area and its predominantly Black population (see Separate Development and the Homelands Idea, ch. 1; Apartheid and Its Evolution, this ch.). The apartheid system came to require that each racial group of the South African population must have its own homeland within which it would be allowed to develop its own culture.

Whether termed "separate" or "multinational" development, apartheid came to reflect the government's adoption in 1955 of a plan for developing separate Black African areas, including the long-established Native Reserves. The plan, prepared by the Tomlinson Commission (appointed by the government in 1950 to investigate Black socioeconomic development), called for establishment of autonomous regions for Blacks, originally referred to as Bantustans. In 1959 the Bantu Self-Government Act divided the Black community into eight different national units—an ethnolinguistic delineation that eventually was expanded to ten units (see Black Africans, this ch.). According to the government's plan, each unit would be governed in time by its own elected authorities (with supervision by the government in Pretoria) and would be encouraged to develop its own economic and social existence apart from the other groups of the multiracial community. Limited self-government thus was prescribed as the first step to ultimate independence for each of the ten Black African homelands (see fig. 5).

In 1963 the first of these homelands, Transkei, achieved self-governing status and in 1976 was declared an "independent republic" by the South African government. Similar declarations attributed sovereignty to Bophuthatswana in 1977 and Venda in 1979. Since 1978 the government in Pretoria has referred to the Black homelands in its official publications as "South Africa's black states." Inasmuch as no other country in the world has recognized the separate nature of the homelands—or the sovereignty of three of them—all are considered by the international community as remaining part of the Republic of South Africa. Consequently statistics on land area and the Black population published in South Africa, which exclude data on the homelands the government deems

Figure 5. *Black Homelands, 1980*

independent, are smaller than those generated by the United Nations (UN) and other foreign sources.

Natural Regions

The country's general physiography consists of a broad, centrally depressed plateau edged by a prominent escarpment overlooking marginal slopes that descend to the western, southern, and eastern coasts. The mountainous edges of the plateau extend in a sweeping arc from the country's northeastern tip to its southwestern extremity. Collectively these ridges are known as the Great Escarpment. These elements form the basis of the division of the country into its chief geographic regions (see fig. 6). They are also fundamental to regional variations in climate, natural vegetation, soil composition, and the country's wealth of natural resources.

The Plateau

Inland from the crest of the Great Escarpment the country consists generally of extensive rolling plains, dropping gradually to an altitude of about 900 meters in the center of the plateau. Within the plateau variations in topography have differentiated a number of generally distinctive subregions. The largest of these is the plateau and dolerite-capped hills of the Highveld, extending from southern Transvaal, encompassing all of the Orange Free State, and stretching southward through northern Cape Provinc. The term "veld" is an Afrikaans word meaning grassland. In the Highveld, grassland is the dominant vegetation feature, and the undulating land surface lies mostly between 1,200 and 1,800 meters above sea level. Its northern limit is formed by the Witwatersrand ridge on which Johannesburg stands at 1,800 meters.

The Witwatersrand (literally, ridge of white waters), known colloquially as the Rand (also the term for South Africa's monetary unit), is a ridge of auriferous rock about 100 kilometers long and thirty-seven kilometers wide in southern Transvaal that is a watershed for a number of northern streams. The area was the site of the first gold discovery in 1886 and subsequently was found to contain the world's largest proven deposits of this valuable mineral.

North of the Witwatersrand lies an area known to South Africans as the Transvaal Middleveld or Bushveld Basin. Bushveld refers to a type of dry savanna, characterized by open grassland with scattered trees and bushes. The elevation, much lower than that of the Highveld, averages between 600 and 900 meters. It is a central basin surrounded by a series of broken mountain ranges from 1,500 to 1,800 meters high. North of the Bushveld Basin the land rises again to the Waterberg Plateau and the Pietersburg Plain, an upland about the same altitude as the Highveld. Beyond the northern margin of this upland, the topography falls steadily to the valley of the eastward-flowing Limpopo River.

The plateau slopes gently westward from the Highveld and becomes increasingly arid. Generally known as the Cape Middleveld, this area embraces the lower basin of the Orange River west of

Kimberley and much of the semiarid tableland of west-central Cape Province. South of the Orange River low gradients and the erratic flow of the stream's tributaries have produced vast depressions or pans, which are characteristic of the area. North of the Cape Middleveld the plateau becomes a sandy plain about 900 meters in altitude known as the Kalahari Basin. The area is a semiarid southern extension of the great Kalahari Desert that lies north of South Africa's west-central frontier.

The Great Escarpment

Probably the most fundamental physiographic feature is the continuous series of mountain ridges that rims the interior plateau, separating it from the marginal areas. The Great Escarpment runs almost unbroken from the Zambezi River in Zimbabwe around the southern edge of the African continent and arcs northward, following the western edge of the landmass through Namibia and into Angola. In South Africa the escarpment lies from fifty-five to 240 kilometers behind the coastline and has a variety of local names. In the east and southeast it is known as the Drakensberg Mountains. Traced westward through Cape Province, it is known variously as the Stormberg, Sneeuberg, Nuweveld Reeks, and Roggeveldberge.

The crestlines in the southwestern and the western sections vary from 900 to 2,100 meters. The highest ridges in the escarpment are formed by the Drakensberg Mountains in and surrounding Lesotho, where rugged peaks of from 3,000 to 3,300 meters above sea level overlook the coastal belt of Natal. Generally the scarp crest rises above 1,500 meters, and there is a drop of 600 meters or more from crest to foot.

Marginal Areas

Erosion has left a sloping, often dissected, tract of land between the escarpment and the coast. Its character varies according to the type of rocks and geological structure across which it has been formed. From the northern Transvaal area southward through Natal and the Transkei, the marginal areas descending toward the coast from the Great Escarpment consist of an inner range of foothills or coastal slopes. In this eastern marginal area, or Lowveld, the fall from the plateau edge to the coastline generally occurs in three descending surfaces, which results in a stepped terrain. The first surface has an altitude of about 1,200 meters; the second lies between 600 and 1,200 meters; and the coastal zone descends from 600 meters to sea level. Across these steps the chief rivers have cut valleys and canyons to depths as great as 1,200 meters.

In the southern and southwestern Cape Province the Cape Range mountains dominate the marginal area. Between them and the Great Escarpment lies the semiarid Great Karoo. This basin has been carved by southward-flowing rivers that plunge through the mountains in deep gorges before they reach the Indian Ocean. The altitude of the Great Karoo plains is between 450 and 750 meters.

The Cape Range mountains run north to south in the southwestern

Figure 6. Terrain, Drainage, and Geographic Regions

1.0

1.1

1.25

2.8 2.5

3.2 2.2

3.6

4.0 2.0

1.8

1.4 1.6

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

ZIMBABWE

BOTSWANA

LIMPOPO VALLEY

Limpopo River

MOZAMBIQUE

Limpopo River

Molopo River

Transvaal

BUSHVELD

Olifants River

Pretoria

Johannesburg

Witwatersrand

Vaal River

SWAZILAND

Vaal River

LOWVELD

V E L D

Orange
Free State

H I G H

Kimberley

Bloemfontein

River

LESOTHO

Durban

Orange   *River*

brak

Indian

Ocean

East London

Port Elizabeth

International boundary

Province boundary

National capital

| 0 | 50 | 100 | 150 Miles |

| 0 | 50 | 100 | 150 Kilometers |

region and east to west in the southern area, meeting at right angles northeast of Cape Town. Northward they include the Sederberge, Bokkeveldberge, and Great Winterhoek mountains with elevations to nearly 2,100 meters. To the east there are two prominent ranges— the Langeberg and the Swartberge. The Langeberg stretches for almost 480 kilometers toward Port Elizabeth and is separated from the Swartberge by the valley of the Little Karoo. The highest point in the Langeberg Mountains is nearly 2,300 meters.

Between the Atlantic coast and the western edge of the Great Escarpment, there is a narrow belt of desert, a southward extension of the Namib Desert of Namibia. Except in this area and along the Indian Ocean in northeast Natal, the coastal plains bordering the seashores are very narrow or entirely absent.

Climate

The country has a wide variety of climatic conditions. The tropical belt of high atmospheric pressure that circles the globe between 25° and 30° south latitude dominates the South African landmass. This belt is continuous over both land and sea during the winter months but gives way in summer to low-pressure systems that occur over the land surface. The interplay of wind systems, the extensive variations in terrain, and the peripheral ocean currents have a combined effect on the country's climatic patterns.

In most regions summer occurs from November through April, and winter from June through August. With few exceptions the climate is moderate—warm, sunny days and cool nights. The mean annual temperature varies from about 16.5° C in the southernmost areas to 16° C further north in Pretoria and Johannesburg.

The southwestern Cape area has a Mediterranean climate, but northeastern Transvaal and eastern Natal are subtropical in character. The western coastal region of the southern Namib, much of the northern Cape Middleveld, and parts of the Karoo have a typical desert climate. Summers in the central Highveld vary from warm to hot, and winters range from mild to cold. Along the southern and eastern coastal stretches the climate ranges from warm to hot, and humidity is generally high.

Temperature varies as much or more with elevation as with latitude (see fig. 7). Coastal temperatures are affected by the prevailing ocean currents. The Atlantic Ocean's cool Benguela Current moderates the temperature in the west, and the warm waters of the Indian Ocean raise temperatures in the east. Temperature ranges are greatest in the interior and least on the western coast. The highest recorded temperature of 49° C occurred in the Orange River valley of the southern Namib and in the eastern Transvaal Lowveld region of the north. The lowest temperature recorded was −15° C in the eastern Transvaal at an altitude of 1,700 meters.

In the north the highest temperatures occur in November after the onset of the rainy season. On the coasts the maximum temperatures are registered in January and February and the minimum in late

74

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1979, p. 13.

Figure 7. Mean Annual Surface Temperatures

July or August. Summers of six months duration are the general pattern on the south coast and lengthen as one progresses northward. In the same latitude the summer is longer over the eastern Highveld than over the western interior.

Frost is common from the middle of May to the middle of September on the higher elevations, in the valleys of the Hi,. and occasionally in other high-terrain areas. Snow falls at times the higher mountain ranges, and the cold winds that accompany it have sometimes caused the deaths of humans and livestock.

Rainfall plays a more important role than any other climatic factor. In most of the country it is largely seasonal in nature and greatly affected by topography (see figs. 8, 9). Annual rainfall of over 1000 millimeters is rare in South Africa. Approximately 90 percent of the entire country receives less than 750 millimeters annually. About half of the republic can be classed as semiarid or arid, a fact that has made South Africa increasingly aware of the limited nature of its water resources for agricultural and industrial development. About 85 percent of the country receives rainfall only during the summer months. In the remaining zones of seasonal moisture, rains fall only during the winter.

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1979, p. 11.

Figure 8. Mean Annual Rainfall Patterns

Rain is very heavy at times. Downpours of more than 300 millimeters in twenty-four hours have occurred, and the hardest rainfall recorded resulted in nearly fifty millimeters within a span of fifteen minutes. Because of this characteristic, the land is often subject to severe flash flooding, accompanied by extensive soil erosion and damage to roads and bridges. Hailstones, which occur mainly in November, sometimes destroy property and crops.

Rainfall reliability varies. It is more likely to be regular in those areas where it is heaviest and least reliable in the drier sections. There are few regions, however, that never experience droughts. The interior Cape Middleveld and parts of the western Highveld appear to be the most prone to prolonged rainfall shortages. In the summer rainfall zone, where temperatures are highest at times of precipitation, evaporation losses are often severe and lead to further depletion of critical water supplies.

Terrain and Drainage

Among the country's natural features are lofty mountains,

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1979, p. 11.

Figure 9. Seasonal Rainfall Regions

subtropical beaches, grassy upland plains, rolling hills, fertile valleys, and vast arid expanses, where plant life appears only after a rain. The Kalahari Desert reaches into the northern Cape, and steppe conditions extend beyond the limit of the sand. Although there are hundreds of square kilometers of flat, agriculturally useful grassland and cultivated fields, nearly 70 percent of the land consists of mountains and semidesert.

Apart from the coastal strip in Natal, the soil generally is thin and deficient in organic content and other necessary nutrients. Overgrazing, poor range management, insufficient rainfall, and soil erosion have marked the countryside from the eastern Transvaal to the western part of Cape Province. For several decades the government has devoted extensive funds and conservation efforts to arrest and repair the damage to the republic's land resources (see Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure, ch. 3).

The topography creates two basic drainage patterns. The large interior plateau surface is drained by the northern Limpopo and the

77

central Orange River systems and the latter's major tributary, the Vaal (see fig. 6). In contrast the marginal zones below the Great Escarpment are drained by numerous smaller intermittent streams, each running independently to the sea. None of the rivers are very large, and their flow is extremely variable. A riverbed may be dry one day and torrential the next and almost as quickly subside again. River valleys generally are not suitable for large-scale irrigation, and valley floodplains are small or nonexistent. None of the rivers are navigable, except in small boats for short distances.

Population

South Africa's population is characterized by its racial, linguistic, and cultural heterogeneity—a fact that has pervaded every aspect of national life and a condition that has affected all of the country's societal institutions. In accordance with the philosophy of apartheid, the government in Pretoria has established its own criteria for separating the population into four officially recognized racial categories: Whites, Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians (see Racial Categories and Ethnic Groups, this ch.). These racial determinations, which have been made mandatory by the Population Registration Act, serve as the basic criteria for what the government terms "multinational development."

The first full census was not taken until 1911—a task generated by the census act that followed the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. Subsequent enumerations occurred at irregular intervals until passage of the Group Areas Act of 1950, when census taking at the beginning of each new decade became official. These later enumerations have been conducted in accordance with the Statistics Act, which was revised most recently in 1976.

According to the Statistics Act, all South Africans are responsible for registering vital statistics such as births, deaths, marriages, and divorces. But given the complexity of the laws governing the residential status of the different racial elements of the population, many Blacks have tended not to register this information. Moreover in large urban areas the economic implications militating against accurate completion of census forms have resulted in a continuing underenumeration of Blacks. Since the 1970 census the government's omission of Blacks presumed to be living in the so-called independent states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda has substantially reduced the number of Blacks officially acknowledged to be residents of South Africa.

According to preliminary results of the 1980 census, the Nationalist government declared South Africa's total population to be 23,771,970. Given the sophistication of the census procedures involved, the component figures for Whites, Coloureds, and Asians were assumed to be highly accurate. The statistics for Blacks, however, were skeptically received by the local press and were rejected by foreign demographers, who reflected the refusal of all states to recognize the sovereignty of the three Black "states" and thus

regarded the inhabitants as part of the South African population. Firm information on the number of Blacks involved in this discrepancy was not available in 1980, but reasonably accurate government statistics permitted an estimate totaling about 4,639,000. Adding this figure to the 1980 census data has provided a mid-1980 total population estimate of about 28,411,000 (see table 2, Appendix).

When analyzed in terms of all components, South Africa's population possessed the characteristics usually attributed to less developed countries. About 42 percent of all inhabitants were under the age of fifteen, and 4.2 percent were sixty-five or older. The median age was calculated at about nineteen. This pattern, however, was attributable to the preponderant proportion of the total population constituted by non-White components. The White segment revealed characteristics more closely associated with developed, industrialized countries. Its age structure showed more older and fewer younger people than any of the non-White categories (see fig. 10). Its rate of natural increase was well below that of the non-White components.

The total population's annual rate of growth has been determined by the government to be 2.2 percent—a figure somewhat in excess of the 1.81 percent annual rate estimated by the UN for the entire world's population. But the South African figure averages the diverse growth rates of the four racial groups. According to the preliminary analysis of 1980 census results, the Black population was increasing at an annual rate of 2.5 percent compared with annual rates of 2.2 percent for Coloureds, 2.4 percent for Asians, and 1.7 percent for Whites. Information obtained from the South African Institute of Race Relations indicated that the growth rate of Blacks living in the homeland areas was believed to be in excess of 2.7 percent annually. Projections based on these growth rates indicate that South Africa's population will increase to about 47.8 million by the year 2000.

The government in Pretoria has attempted to demonstrate in its presentation of 1980 census data that the program of "multinational development" is working. The official figures indicate that in the ten-year interval since the 1970 census the populations of three Black homelands have increased by 59 percent—from natural growth and resettlement from White areas—while the number of Blacks in areas designated for occupation by Whites has increased by only 13 percent. All ten homeland areas set aside for Black occupation constitute from 12.7 to 13.8 percent of South Africa's total land area. The Blacks who are officially supposed to be affiliated with these areas of mostly inferior economic potential represent 72.5 percent of the country's population.

Statistics for the years in which complete census data are available reveal interesting patterns of population growth in terms of the four official racial componants (see fig. 11). In general terms the proportion of Whites in the total population has decreased sharply on a consistent basis while that of Blacks has continued to increase even more rapidly. The percentages of Coloureds and Asians have increased

MALE / FEMALE

Whites
70
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

Coloureds
70
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

Asians
70
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

Blacks
70
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

% 30 25 20 15 10 5   Age   5 10 15 20 25 30 %

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1979, p. 31.

Figure 10. Population Age Structure, 1978

Figure 11. History of Population Growth and Future Projections by Racial Components, 1904-2000

less rapidly, but if government projections prove correct, there will be about as many Coloureds as Whites by the year 2000.

In 1979 South Africa had an average population density of only eighteen persons per square kilometer. This average, however, offered a deceptive picture of the regional and rural-urban distribution pattern. Most of the inhabitants lived in the eastern half of the country where densities in some areas were as high as 1,875 persons per square kilometer (see fig. 12). The western part of the republic was sparsely settled except for one medium-to-high density pocket around Cape Town.

Climatic conditions have been responsible in large part for the diverse distribution pattern. In many areas in the comparatively arid western half, population densities were less than one person per square kilometer. But another main determinant of population densities has been the location of important exploitable mineral resources in the eastern part of the country, around which heavy population concentrations have built up and have continued to increase. In addition all but one of the large ports and most of the homelands reserved for the Black population are situated in the eastern sector.

The results of the 1970 census revealed patterns of population distribution by race that were thought generally to have persisted during the subsequent decade (see fig. 13). Few areas of South Africa had no Blacks, but their position as the predominant racial group was most marked in the eastern half of the country. Natal Province—mainly the vicinity around Durban—was the home of

81

Figure 12. Population Distribution, 1979

more than 80 percent of the republic's Asian population. Of the Coloureds, 87 percent lived in Cape Province. The White population, like the Blacks, lived throughout the country, but the largest concentrations were in the urban industrial region of Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) in the Highveld and areas in and around major cities along the southern and eastern coasts. Transvaal Province had the largest concentration—50.6 percent—of the total White population, and most were in the PWV complex. Other large concentrations of Whites were in Cape Province around Cape Town, the urban complex of Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage, and in the fertile valleys of the Cape ranges. A similar pattern was prevalent in the urban complex of Durban-Pinetown in Natal Province and along the rail line from Durban to Johannesburg.

Since the mid-1930s when industrial and commercial expansion began to enhance economic opportunities, South Africa's population has experienced a continuing process of urbanization. Initially the domain of the Whites, the towns and cities subsequently have attracted growing numbers from other racial groups (see table 3, Appendix). By 1959 more than 50 percent of the people lived in an urban environment, and this proportion was expected to increase to

about 80 percent by the year 2000. This phenomenon has stemmed chiefly from the development of industry—especially secondary industry—in urban areas and the declining opportunities for remunerative work in rural areas as the country's primary economic focus has shifted from agriculture.

In keeping with the pattern of rapid urbanization, a continuing shift of the total population has occurred from south to north. The sharpest increases in population density have occurred in Transvaal and Natal where mining and other industrial developments have predominated. These shifts have been greatest among the White and Black elements of the population. In the case of Whites, who began an exodus from rural areas with the rise in modern industrial development, the trend in urbanization has been most pronounced. In 1979 it was estimated that the country had no more than 75,000 White farmers. According to the preliminary results of the 1980 census, the number of Whites in Transvaal and Natal provinces had increased by 24 and 26 percent respectively. At the same time the growth rate of the Black population in Transvaal Province—21 percent since 1970—was greater than in any other area.

In the late 1970s about 80 percent of the total urban population was concentrated in four large urban complexes that comprised only 4 percent of the country's total land area. These were the industrial and commercial areas of the PWV, Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg, Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage, and the Cape Peninsula (see fig. 14). Somewhat smaller population concentrations were located in the area of Bloemfontein and the goldfields in Orange Free State and in the area of East London on the southeastern coast of Cape Province.

South Africa has many cities and towns with populations exceeding 20,000, but only four qualified in 1970 as urban centers with populations of more than half a million: Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and Pretoria (see table 4, Appendix). Complexes such as the industrial areas of West Rand and East Rand also have risen as urban agglomerations with growing populations. Soweto (South-Western Townships), near Johannesburg, has been the largest of the urban centers permitting Black residence in White areas and had an estimated population of 864,000, according to the 1980 census—an increase of 262,000 (or 43 percent) over the 1970 census figure. As with other enumerations of the Black population, however, the census figures for Soweto were generally believed to reflect a vast undercount. Most nongovernment sources estimated the true population in 1980 to be between 1 million and 1.5 million.

Given the policies inherent in the apartheid philosophy, the status of South Africa's large urban Black population has remained a major unresolved issue (see Apartheid and Its Evolution, this ch.). According to population projections appearing in a mid-1980 study by the South African research organization, Syncom, the Black population was expected to total 37 million by the year 2000. Seventy-five percent of this number was expected to be living in urban areas, and

Source: Adapted from South Africa, Department of Statistics, *Population Census 1970*, Pretoria, 1975.

Figure 13. Population Distribution by Racial Components, 1970

Figure 14. Major Urban Population Concentrations by Race, 1977

the study suggested that "a very large number of these Blacks might settle in present metropolitan areas. Considering this influx, one could agree that next to nuclear warfare and massive hunger, urbanization is the third biggest threat." The urbanization study forecast that in view of these growth projections the government "must see and talk about forty new cities—twenty the size of Johannesburg, seven new Sowetos, and so on." The concomitant requirements for teachers, medical personnel, town planners, administrators, and other professionals—in addition to housing and support services—were of staggering proportions. The report concluded that urbanization on such a scale could not be supported by the government, "given the tremendous backlogs in education, skills, and infrastructure."

Several months later the government published a 109-page document called the Black Community Development Act that was to be presented to parliament in early 1981. According to the government, the legislation would lead to "significant easing of restrictions on Blacks now living in urban areas."

Racial Categories and Ethnic Groups

The four officially recognized racial categories—Whites, Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians—are used to define the rights, privileges, and relations of the individuals assigned to each category. By far the largest category—more than 72 percent of the total population in 1980—comprised the Blacks. Whites, Coloureds, and Asians

Metropolitan Johannesburg, South Africa's largest city
Courtesy South African Information Service

followed, in that order (see Population, this ch.). The earlier official term for Blacks was Bantu (see Glossary), a name for the languages spoken by them. Most rejected the designation, however, and preferred to be called Africans. By the mid-1970s some Black Africans were using the term "Black," and the government accepted it for its own purposes. Some politically active Coloureds and Asians also called themselves Blacks in preference to the government's "non-Whites." "Coloured" refers to persons of mixed ancestry. Official sources use the term "Asian" to refer to the population category largely made up of persons whose ultimate origins lie in the Indian subcontinent. In the late 1970s, however, the term "Indian" occurred in the titles of certain administrative departments and other institutions and was widely used by South Africans (including Indians) and by most observers. The term Asian occurred only occasionally in most contexts.

The membership of each of the racial categories is internally differentiated—in some cases markedly so—by language, culture, religion, and social and economic conditions. These differences have played an important role in the politics and social life of South Africa. In the case of the Blacks the government has officially distinguished several ethnic groups as part of its policy of apartheid

87

and its later variants (see Black Africans; Apartheid and Its Evolution, this ch.).

Language and Language Use

The dominant mother tongues of the Whites—Afrikaans and English—are the official languages of South Africa. Afrikaans, a locally developed descendant of Dutch and a fully independent tongue, is also the home language of roughly 80 percent of the Coloured population, and English is similarly used by a substantial number of Asians. Official statistics show only Bantu tongues as home languages for Blacks. But there are indications that English is the primary language of some educated Blacks, and Afrikaans serves this purpose for a few. Typically, however, Blacks speak, as a home language, a dialect of one of the ten tongues belonging to the Southeastern Bantu segment of the widespread Bantu languages. Of these, Zulu, Xhosa, South Sotho, North Sotho, Tswana, Venda, and Tsonga have been used as educational and literary languages. A number of languages of the Indian subcontinent were primary tongues for a little less than three-quarters of the Indian population, although English has become increasingly important among the younger segments of that group.

A great many South Africans can communicate to some extent in a language other than their native tongue. Far fewer acquire mastery of another language to the point at which they can use it idiomatically in all situations, formal and informal. Typically, Whites learn either Afrikaans or English as a second language in school, and those in public life may have considerable command over the second language, but that learning is not reinforced for those whose lives are spent in largely English-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking environments.

Blacks in urban areas, particularly with substantial formal education, are acquainted in varying degrees with English. Less educated Blacks, including industrial, domestic, and farm laborers who have worked for or with Afrikaners, are likely to be more at home with Afrikaans. Many urban Blacks and those in rural areas of mixed composition are also familiar with a second Bantu language. Increasingly, Coloured persons living in largely English-speaking urban areas (Cape Town and Johannesburg) have been using English as a second language, and in the case of those with substantial education and socioeconomic status, English was becoming the home language. Asians typically use English in public situations.

Fanakalo, a pidgin tongue characterized by a very simplified syntax (English in outline) and a vocabulary based predominantly on Zulu—although roughly a quarter of the words are English and a smaller percentage Afrikaans—came to be widely used in the mines for communication between Blacks of different origins and between Blacks and Whites. Because Fanakalo has significant limitations and, in the view of many Blacks, is a tongue implying a master-servant relationship, its use has declined.

Whites

Persons of diverse origin in two ethnolinguistic categories—Afrikaans speakers (Afrikaners) and English speakers—constituted the great bulk of the White population. By virtue of their historical experience and what they have made of it, Afrikaans-speaking Whites were the more cohesive group (see Afrikaners; English Speakers, this ch.).

On the basis of the language spoken at home (the criterion used by official sources), Afrikaans speakers made up nearly 57 percent and English speakers a little more than 37 percent of the White population in 1970. These proportions have prevailed since roughly 1936 when data of this kind were first collected, and they are not likely to have changed substantially as of 1980. The remainder of the White population in 1970 (less than 7 percent) consisted of persons claiming both Afrikaans and English as home languages (1 percent), speakers of German (1.4 percent), of Portuguese (1.1 percent), of Dutch (0.6 percent), and of other languages such as French, Italian, and Greek (1.8 percent). Among the additions to the Whites since 1970 are numbers of Portuguese who left Mozambique and Angola after their independence in 1974 and some English speakers and perhaps some Afrikaans speakers immigrating from Zimbabwe.

Afrikaners

Only a little more than a third of the ancestors of the Afrikaners were of Dutch origin; more than one-third (and only slightly fewer than the Dutch) were German. Perhaps one-sixth were French Huguenots who arrived early and were rapidly assimilated by the Dutch. Afrikaner forebears include persons of British origin and non-Europeans, the latter probably comprehending indigenous persons and Malays. The heterogeneity of Afrikaner ancestry notwithstanding, the Dutch (and the assimilated Huguenots) set their stamp on the local White culture of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. That culture, however, has been modified by three centuries of African experience.

In the years preceding and immediately following the Anglo-Boer War, differences of economic base and mode of life in addition to those of language and religion distinguished the Afrikaners from the English-speaking population. At the turn of the century, for example, less than 10 percent of all Afrikaners lived in cities, towns, and villages (in 1906 only 6 percent actually lived in urban areas). At that time English speakers were already largely urban. The push of rural poverty and the pull of mining and industrial development led to rapid Afrikaner urbanization, but until at least the 1930s most Afrikaners who came to the cities were unskilled laborers. Poor Whites—invariably Afrikaans speakers—were not uncommon, and most other Afrikaners were not well-off in comparison to English-speaking Whites.

Their economic situation, their sense of insecurity vis-à-vis English speakers, and the feeling that they were oppressed by British

imperialism and capitalism and its agents made Afrikaners a receptive audience for "ethnic mobilizers," in historian Hermann Giliomee's phrase. In the nineteenth century and later, Dutch Reformed Church *dominees* (pastors) and others had begun the work of developing an Afrikaner identity, focusing on language and the link between their conception of Protestant Christianity and the Afrikaner people (see The Churches, Race Relations, and the Political Order, this ch.).

Sustained effort to organize Afrikaners to assert themselves culturally, politically, and economically did not really get under way until Afrikaners found themselves competing with English speakers in the towns and cities and struggling to establish a standard of living clearly superior to that of the Blacks—a standard to which they considered their race and civilizational status entitled them. Disputes on political and cultural matters continued within the community but did not significantly inhibit the growth of Afrikaner solidarity and the institution of a variety of actions and programs that served to enhance the economic and social status of Afrikaners generally. These programs were implemented, and the status of Afrikaners was enhanced even more firmly when the National Party, in effect the political arm of the Afrikaner community, took power in 1948.

In the first half of the twentieth century and to some extent beyond it, one of the elements in the Afrikaners' view of themselves was the notion that all were essentially equal and that the community rose and fell as a group. But the increasing urbanization of Afrikaners—by 1980 nearly 90 percent were urban—and the success of their programs had led to increasing economic, social, and educational differentiation among them. This was reflected to some extent in much more varied modes of life and different perspectives on a host of political and social issues. It has been suggested that the Afrikaner sense of solidarity has diminished, but it has remained greater than that of the much less cohesive category of English speakers (see Class and Race, this ch.; White Party Politics, ch. 4).

English Speakers

The category of English speakers has been socially, economically, and religiously heterogeneous and largely urban since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which saw the immigration of great numbers of persons in response to the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa. Nearly 60 percent of the ancestors of English speakers originated in Britain (English, Scots, and Welsh) and not quite 10 percent in Ireland. But the initial urban character and occupational and educational heterogeneity of English speakers led to an earlier emphasis among them on differences of class and status and on associated variations in outlook in contrast to the stress on ethnic solidarity characteristic of the Afrikaners.

The Netherlands, Germany, and France each furnished from 10 to 15 percent of the ancestry of English speakers. Other Europeans

also entered into the amalgam as did ancestors from other parts of the world. Classified as English speakers in official sources are those whose ancestors originated in Russia and Lithuania. It is probable that most were Jews who tend to consider themselves—and are considered—a special group (see Other Whites, this ch.).

English speakers have not turned their sense of ethnicity into a political movement. Their linguistic and cultural background is important to most of them in several ways, but the intensity or salience of their self-identification as English speakers and their attitudes towards Afrikaners and towards other races varies with such factors as socioeconomic status, education, and age. Only a small proportion of English speakers are what sociologist Lawrence Schlemmer has called anglophiles. Most see themselves primarily as English-speaking South Africans, as South Africans, or to a lesser extent as White South Africans. It has been suggested that many English speakers (particularly those of Anglo-Saxon or Celtic background) have coped with their status as a relatively well-off but politically powerless minority among Whites by stressing material success and the realization of private rather than community or public values.

Other Whites

Both the Afrikaner and English-speaking populations have among them a number of persons who claim that some of their ancestors stemmed from the other group, and 52 percent of a sample of English speakers queried in the mid-1970s had close Afrikaans-speaking relatives. Intermarriage goes back at least to 1820 (when the first sizable group arrived from Britain) and has continued largely between persons in the lower and lower middle socioeconomic strata of both language groups. Reflecting this process, the 1970 census found that 1 percent of the Whites used Afrikaans and English in the home. A historical perspective suggests, however, that sooner or later the descendants of such unions opt for identification with either Afrikaners or English speakers; homes using both languages are not the basis for a growing category of Whites indifferent to existing ethnic distinctions. Nevertheless persons coming from English-speaking homes but with Afrikaans-speaking close kin are likely to see themselves as having an outlook and culture specifically South African rather than English.

Roughly 3 percent of the White population (about 8 percent of its English-speaking component) was Jewish in 1970, more than half living on the Witwatersrand (most in Johannesburg) and many of the rest in Cape Town. The first Jewish arrivals came from England and northwestern Europe, and some migrated from Germany in the 1930s and 1940s despite law and practice designed to minimize the number of Jewish immigrants at that time. But the great bulk are of East European descent.

Some Jews are shopkeepers and small businessmen, but substantial numbers are professionals (lawyers, physicians, and academics), and others are engaged in financial and commercial enterprises of

larger scale. Some of the professionals have been prominent in anti-apartheid politics and in liberal political groups opposing the National Party, but most members of the Jewish community have tended to be circumspect in their public utterances, in part because of their self-interest as Whites, in part because social and political anti-Semitism has flared periodically. The Jewish Board of Deputies, aware of the group's vulnerability, has never formally condemned apartheid. In mid-1980, however, the Board of Deputies went on record calling for significant changes and according to the *Rand Daily Mail* urged the Jewish community to cooperate in securing "the ultimate removal of all unjust discriminatory practices based on race, creed, or color."

Sooner or later most persons of northwestern European origin are assimilated into one or the other of the two major language-based ethnic categories. In a few cases, such a community remains isolated in a rural area and retains its language. Less quickly assimilated are southern Europeans. Specifically the increase in numbers of Portuguese owing to the arrival of many from Angola and Mozambique beginning in 1974 is likely to prolong their existence as a separate White community. There is little detailed information about them, but many are said to be shopkeepers.

Black Africans

The government views every Black African as a member of one of a limited number of ethnolinguistic categories (see table 5, Appendix). Most Whites and many Blacks use the ambiguous term "tribe" for these categories, but the government and academics reserve the term for sections within the categories. In conformity with the doctrines of apartheid, official sources have sometimes referred to the categories as nations and more rarely as ethnic groups and allocated one or more homelands to each of them (see Boundaries and Internal Subdivisions, this ch; Apartheid and Its Evolution, this ch.; Government and Politics in the Black Homelands, ch. 4). As of 1980 all Black Africans born in South Africa were considered permanent residents of these homelands whether or not they had ever seen them. All Blacks assigned to homelands that had been formally granted independence (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda as of 1979) were considered citizens thereof and not of South Africa regardless of their place of birth or residence.

Neither the earlier history of the varied people who constitute officially established ethnolinguistic categories, nor their experience in the South African economy and society suggests the permanence and cohesion that is officially attributed to them. Almost all persons in any category speak (in the home) a dialect of the language associated with that category. Moreover, to the extent that they live and act in terms of so-called traditional culture, they share elements of that culture. But the use of such a language and the sharing of cultural elements do not necessarily imply ethnic loyalty and unity in all contexts, particularly political ones. Moreover language differences

have not been significant barriers to the communications of those Blacks who have common interests, having lived most of their lives in Soweto, for example, or worked in the same environment. Nevertheless many Blacks in urban areas maintain contacts with kin in the homelands and see themselves as linked to chiefs and other authorities there. But such attachments are likely to be a function of the closeness of the urban center to the homeland, the recency of the particular Black person's arrival on the urban scene, and a sense of insecurity in urban areas (see Ethnicity among Blacks, this ch.).

The linguistic and cultural situation of the Bantu-speaking peoples as the Whites found them in the nineteenth century reflected one point in the long and sometimes turbulent history of movement and mixture of the ancestors of the components that make up the official categories. These ancestors were m   .   in various directions—some as small-scale groups, others o   into larger polities—before the Europeans arrived in f   Cape in the seventeenth century. Dispersion and movement   characteristic of a mode of life based on cattle, occasional ra   and adaptation to an environment often inhospitable to the subsistence agriculture that most of them practiced. Various groups had achieved a degree of stability when the *difaqane* (see Glossary) took place in the first decades of the nineteenth century, redispersing and remixing elements of almost every group (see Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians in the Nineteenth Century, ch. 1).

The establishment of British rule—not fully achieved until the last quarter of the nineteenth century—and formation of the Boer republics fixed the physical limits of Black groups in the areas where they happened to be at the time British or Boer power could be brought to bear on them. The setting of physical boundaries was followed by categorization and the fixing of ethnic boundaries for the convenience of European rulers, a practice common everywhere in colonial Africa. Categorization was further refined in the twentieth century, partly on the basis of ethnological research, but the categories were significantly determined by administrative convenience. The notion that Black Africans ought to belong to fixed groups was consistent with the view, held by virtually all White governments from the beginning, that Blacks were inherently rural and tribal and had no permanent home in the urban centers.

Whatever the limitations of the official categories, they provide a first approximation to a description of the Black African peoples. The Southeastern Bantu languages spoken by South African Blacks may be divided into four sets of related or single languages. In general the persons speaking closely related languages shared important elements of culture and historical experience up to the point at which they were differentially affected by nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments.

The four language subdivisions of significance are Nguni, Sotho (sometimes Sotho-Tswana), Venda, and Tsonga. A special case are the Ndebele people (originally Nguni speaking, but heavily influenced

by the Sotho). The official groupings of Nguni-speaking peoples—nearly two-thirds of indigenous Blacks—are Zulu, Xhosa, and Swazi. The three recognized categories among the Sotho—between 25 and 30 percent—are the North Sotho, the South Sotho, and the Tswana (sometimes called Western Sotho). In some sources the North Sotho may be referred to as Sepedi (after their chief component, the Pedi) and the South Sotho as the Seshoeshoe (after the founder of the South Sotho kingdom). The remaining language subdivisions have fewer speakers, and internal subdivisions are not recognized for statistical purposes or for assignment to homelands. These are the Tsonga (sometimes referred to as the Shangaan or the Tsonga-Shangaan)—between 3 and 4 percent—and the Venda and the Ndebele, each a little more than 2 percent of the total.

Each category includes groups—often called tribes—that may be distinguished from others in the same category on the basis of origin, linguistic and/or cultural variation, or former independent political status. These units—and their chiefs—were administratively ignored until the doctrine of apartheid led to the conception of a "natural order" in Black groups. Chiefs were considered part of that natural order and their roles reinstituted. In the homelands, whether or not they have been formally granted a degree of self-rule or independence, distinctions based on traditional chiefdoms may therefore furnish the basis for local administrative divisions.

The Nguni: Zulu, Xhosa, and Swazi

The Blacks in each of the recognized groups speaking Nguni languages broadly share elements of culture; some of these elements are characteristic of the Nguni as a whole, some of the particular group. The ways of life and the outlooks of the persons in each category are not uniform, however. This condition reflects their varied experience of urban life and other aspects of existence in twentieth century South Africa as well as local differences in their pre-European patterns. Such local differences are a consequence of their varied origins, their responses to change engendered by empire building and warfare, and their adaptations to local ecological variations.

Before the nineteenth century the Nguni-speaking peoples were characterized by dispersed settlement patterns (as opposed to the nucleated settlements of the Sotho-speaking peoples) and a mixture of subsistence cultivation and cattle keeping, supplemented by hunting. Until the establishment of the Zulu empire under Shaka and the emergence of the kingdom of the Swazi, the fundamental mode of political organization was the small chiefdom, the core of which was a patrilineal clan (see Glossary) consisting in turn of patrilineages. One of the lineages supplied a clan chief who was also the ruler of the chiefdom. Typically such a chiefdom included persons of other clans, sometimes outnumbering the core (ruling) clan. Larger chiefdoms sometimes exercised limited control over smaller ones. But such hegemony did not often last for more than a generation, and

the establishment of a permanent hierarchy and administrative control encompassing a number of subchiefdoms or other subordinate units was not a feature of Nguni political life in earlier times.

The Zulu originally constituted one such chiefdom, and at the time of Shaka's emergence into adulthood were dominated by the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo, an important chief preceeding Shaka in the Zulu area. When the latter were defeated by yet another chiefdom, Shaka was able to dominate the Mthethwa and began the process of building his empire. In the course of doing so, he made some major institutional changes, including the establishment of regiments of warriors that cut across the formerly localized modes of military organization (see The Zulu, ch. 1).

Despite the empire's fragmentation in the last quarter of the nineteenth century after defeat by the British, a degree of self-awareness has persisted among the descendants of those who lived under the rule of Shaka and his successors. Not all of the groups now called Zulu were part of the empire, however, and some who were had resisted Shaka and his heirs strenuously.

In addition to the differences that reflect their experiences of the empire period and varied exposure to the modern economy and urban life, Zulu have been differently affected by education and missionary activity. Some are highly educated in the formal Western mode, but levels of education vary considerably. Many are Christians (of several denominations), but the intensity of their commitment to doctrinal Christianity varies, and many are not Christian at all (see Religious Life, this ch.).

Zulu solidarity may have been enhanced by the leadership of the intellectually powerful and popular Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of the self-governing territory of KwaZulu and leader of a political and cultural movement—the National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha ye Nkululeko ye Siswe—Inkatha). Membership in Inkatha is based largely on the Zulu, although it is explicitly not restricted to them (see Government and Politics in the Black Homelands, ch. 4).

The Xhosa—perhaps more accurately, the Cape Nguni—are even more heterogenous in origin than the Zulu. The ancestors of some groups (the Xhosa proper) were present in the Eastern Cape by the fifteenth century. But some came from Natal later, and other groups arrived in the Eastern Cape as a result of the upheaval attendant on Zulu empire building in the nineteenth century. One such section, the Mfengu, consisted of an assortment of individuals and small groups who under the pressure of White rule have developed a degree of cohesion despite their initial fragmented state (see The Xhosa-Speaking Peoples, ch. 1). Unlike the Zulu and the Swazi, the Xhosa groups did not develop large-scale centralized polities, although one section, the Mpondo, did lead a loose federation of groups.

Xhosa-speaking groups were the first to make contact with Whites, including Christian missionaries. Partly as a consequence of

early and sustained contact, the Xhosa produced some of the first Black professionals (ministers, writers, physicians, and lawyers). But not all Xhosa responded to the pressures and opportunities of White contact by seeking a Western education or adopting Western modes of life. The Mfengu and others did, but many reacted by clinging explicitly to traditional ways even if they participated (as they had to) in aspects of the modern economy. The contrasts between the two modes of adaptation were signaled by Xhosa recognition of two categories: school people (referring to mission schools) and red people (referring to the red blankets worn traditionally). That distinction seemed to have diminished in importance by the last quarter of the twentieth century, however.

The Swazi too began as independent clan-based chiefdoms. In the late eighteenth century, fearful of Dingiswayo, one of these chiefdoms, under Ngwane I, established its hegemony over a number of Nguni and Sotho groups in what is now the independent state of Swaziland and thereafter maintained a more or less peaceful relationship with Shaka and his successors. In the course of the establishment of the boundaries between the High Commission Territory of Swaziland and the Union of South Africa, substantial numbers of Swazi found themselves in South Africa. For a time they paid allegiance to the Swazi king, but under modern conditions that allegiance seems to have waned.

The Sotho: North Sotho, South Sotho, and Tswana

Like the Nguni, the Sotho-speaking peoples relied on mixtures of subsistence cultivation and cattle keeping in the pre-European era. They were organized into chiefdoms of varying but rarely large size, each ruled by a royal group. Although the Sotho were marked by a patrilineal bias in their domestic groups and in patterns of inheritance and succession, descent was not the basis for the formation of politically significant groups such as the Nguni clans. Membership in the chiefdoms and in the wards that made them up was a function of residence rather than kinship. Commoners might be the headmen of wards, but some of the most important of the wards were controlled by members of the royal family.

A distinctive feature of the Sotho settlement pattern—most marked among the Tswana—was the large nucleated village; in the case of some Tswana chiefdoms these became towns of many thousand inhabitants. Each settlement was divided into wards and to the large concentrations of population were attached small, outlying hamlets. Fields for cultivation did not surround each household or cluster of related households as among the Nguni but lay outside the nucleated settlement. The hamlets were still farther out and, although inhabited by a small group of permanent residents, served as bases for cattle herding and were seasonally visited by the young men who were assigned that task. It has been suggested that the chief reason for concentrated settlements on the Highveld in which most Sotho lived was defense against raids of other African groups

96

and that the sites chosen for building the villages and towns were those most easily defended. But it is also likely that concentrated settlement around the chief's residence made it easier for him to exercise control. Two factors have led to a diminution of community size: the end of warfare and the loss of land to Whites. The land necessary to support a large settlement, especially one heavily dependent on cattle, was no longer available after the turn of the century. Exacerbating the loss of land to Whites was the growth of the Sotho population. For most Sotho the chief adaptation to the shortage of land was migrant labor.

The North Sotho comprise a number of groups of which the largest by far is the Pedi whose members take their name from a group that appeared in the northern Transvaal in the seventeenth century and established its rule over the people who were already there, some Sotho speaking, others of diverse origin. The Pedi kingdom, essentially a federation of groups under a paramount chief, resembled that of the Sotho generally but was of much larger scale than most Sotho chiefdoms. The Pedi confronted the voortrekkers (see Glossary) in the nineteenth century, and their relations with the Boers varied from periods of peaceful accommodation to open warfare. Among the consequences of their encounters were divisions among the Pedi that continue to have some relevance to their unity in the twentieth century.

Among the other North Sotho groups are the Lobedu, who are of some interest because they were ruled by a rain queen whose putative magical powers led Sotho and Nguni chiefs and kings to treat her with some deference. The Lobedu queen still exists, but her influence, even among her own people, has diminished in modern times. The ruling dynasty seems to have been of Shona (a Zimbabwean people) origin, but the group as a whole speaks a north Sotho language and has been classified with them for official purposes.

Well over 1 million South Sotho are domiciled in Lesotho, but nearly 2 million are inhabitants of South Africa, many of them in the major cities and in the Orange Free State. Like other Sotho, the South Sotho consisted of a number of small territorially organized states until the effects of the *difaqane* and the gradual encroachment of the Europeans led to the establishment of a larger state in mountainous Lesotho by one of their chiefs, Moshweshwe (see Emergence of the Basuto Kingdom, ch. 1). The political significance of the present independent state of Lesotho for South Sotho peoples living in South Africa is not clear. In any case Lesotho has insufficient space and virtually no resources to support a population larger than it has, and many of its own people are migrant workers in South Africa.

There are more Tswana in South Africa than there are in Botswana, the neighboring independent state largely peopled by them. In general Tswana chiefdoms were independent and relatively small scale but several of them—the Ngwato of Botswana in particular—incorporated previously independent chiefdoms into a federation. Bophuthatswana, the highly fragmented and dispersed homeland

97

assigned to the South African Tswana by the Nationalist govern-
ment, was formally granted its independence in 1978, but roughly
half the people lived outside it at the time. Even more lived outside
it before the government used various techniques to force Tswana
into an area that had never served as a home for them or their an-
cestors. Even those who lived in the homeland were heavily reliant
on work as migrant laborers in nearby towns in the White areas.

The Tsonga (Tsonga-Shangaan)

The Tsonga originated in Mozambique where they lived as cul-
tivators and traders, acting as middlemen between African groups
and, perhaps as early as the fifteenth century, between Africans and
Portuguese. Organized into clans, they lacked even that form of
chieftainship characteristic of the early Nguni. Many sections of the
Tsonga, particularly those in southernmost Mozambique, were
directly affected by the events set in motion by Shaka's activities.
Soshangane, a Nguni chief seeking to escape Shaka's domination but
carrying with him some of the latter's military techniques, went to
Mozambique with a small band and established his domination over
many of the Tsonga. Some Tsonga fled, however, and they and
other groups from further north eventually entered the northeastern
Transvaal where they lived in small, scattered communities among
North Sotho, Tswana, and Venda. Still later, the descendants of
Soshangane and his Nguni associates and those Tsonga who had
been heavily influenced by them returned to South Africa, hence the
reference to some South African Tsonga as Shangaan (and the oc-
casional reference to all Tsonga as Shangaan).

In part because Gazankulu, the homeland assigned to the Tsonga,
is so small and in part because the ancestors of many South African
Tsonga lived nowhere near Gazankulu but settled instead among
several other peoples, less than half of all the Tsonga live in the
homeland. Moreover their long history of fragmentation and the dif-
ferential adaptation of various sections of them to other peoples and
to urban 'ife suggest that they are less likely than other groups to con-
form to the model of a people called for by the government's doctrine.

The Venda, living in the far northeast corner of the Transvaal
along the border with Zimbabwe, speak a language that has a gram-
mar similar to that of the Karanga, a section of the Shona people of
South Africa's northern neighbor. Much of the vocabulary, however,
is Sotho. Unlike most other Black Africans, the official homeland of
the Venda (formally independent in 1979) is the domicile of a sub-
stantial majority of the people assigned to it, in part because of its re-
moteness from job opportunities in South African centers of industry.

Like most other South African groups, the Venda were divided
into a number of chiefdoms ruled by members of a limited number
of royal dynasties. As among the Sotho and Nguni, smaller and
weaker chiefdoms were vassal states serving larger and stronger ones
but were not incorporated into the latter and administered as part of
them. For a time one of the Venda chiefdoms dominated the others,

98

and its chief was paramount and able to demand tribute from the others. But the thoroughgoing control characteristic of the Zulu Empire under Shaka did not occur.

The Ndebele

The Ndebele, sometimes called the Transvaal Ndebele to distinguish them from those of Zimbabwe, are Nguni in origin, but they had moved to the Transvaal long before Shaka's conquests sent other Nguni offshoots—among them the Zimbabwe Ndebele—to the north and east. Settling among Sotho peoples, different sections of the Ndebele have been variably influenced by Sotho language and culture. Two basic segments—the Northern and the Southern Ndebele—are commonly distinguished. The Southern Ndebele, perhaps three quarters of the group's total in Transvaal, have in general retained their Nguni language and many of their traditional ways; they were assigned to a separate homeland in 1978, but it had not yet been geographically defined in late 1980. The Northern Ndebele are largely North Sotho speaking and have been officially assigned to the North Sotho homeland of Lebowa.

The Coloureds

Those persons commonly defined as Coloured are descendants of early unions among Khoi, San, Whites (usually of Dutch origin), Blacks often brought to the Western Cape as slaves, and East Indians (Malays). The four subcategories that comprehend those persons or groups traditionally recognized as Coloured are the Cape Coloured, the Cape Malays, the Griquas, and Other Coloured. The last includes those not defined in the other three subcategories. The largest of these is the Cape Coloured, most of whom still live in the province in which they originated. They are largely urban, and include traders, skilled craftsmen, and unskilled workers, but substantial numbers work on White-owned farms in Cape Province. There are Cape Coloured in the other three provinces. But only in the Transvaal did they exceed 150,000 in the 1970 census, and more than 80 percent of these were urban, living in Johannesburg, the Witwatersrand, and around Pretoria. The smaller group in Natal is also heavily urbanized.

Among the Cape Coloured are the rural inhabitants of the Coloured reserves (area allocated de facto to rural Coloureds), White-owned farms, and towns in the Western Cape. Beginning before the middle of the nineteenth century, descendants of Afrikaner-Khoi unions carrying Dutch names pioneered Coloured settlement in the northwestern Cape area and elsewhere as they sought to isolate themselves from White domination. In most cases they accepted the guidance and authority of European missionaries. In order to establish themselves in Little Namaqualand in the Western Cape, they drove out indigenous herders and hunters (Khoi and San) or accepted them as a lower class in the same community. The Coloured segment of the Little Namaqualand communities quite conscious of its mixed descent and Afrikaans speech, considered itself superior to the indigenous peoples and to those mixed elements that

99

spoke a Khoi language and continued to intermarry with Khoi.

The Cape Malays constitute a smaller group—estimated at under 150,000 in the late 1970s—who are distinguished by a larger Malay biological component than the Cape Coloured population, but they are characterized primarily by their continued adherence to Islam. Virtually all live in Cape Town.

The Griquas are descendants of a White-Khoi mixture that had been pushed north and east from the vicinity of the Cape to the Orange River in the second decade of the nineteenth century by expanding White settlers. Eventually they found themselves in the newly formed Orange Free State established by the Boers, and they were gradually deprived of their land or sold it. Finally they returned to Cape Province, this time to the Transkei region. By the twentieth century many had been absorbed into the general Cape Coloured population.

Until the late 1960s the Coloured were, with some exceptions, oriented to the Whites socially, culturally, and politically. Most are Christians and speak a European language—usually Afrikaans. However, when the political and other rights accorded Coloureds in Cape and Natal provinces were taken away in the course of the systematic implementation of apartheid, some Coloured political activists began to orient themselves towards alliance with Blacks (see Politics of the Coloured Community, ch. 4). The extent to which social relations between ordinary Coloureds and Blacks have been altered is problematic.

Asians

Of the nearly 800,000 Asians in South Africa in 1980, all but 10,000 to 15,000 have their origins in the Indian subcontinent, chiefly in India. Chinese constituted the only other component of any size—perhaps 10,000 persons. Indians speak roughly half a dozen Indian languages at home, the most important of which are Tamil and Hindi. In the mid-1970s, however, it was estimated that the most important single language among them, particularly in the younger families, was English.

Most Indians are descendants of persons initially brought to Natal as indentured sugar plantation workers; a second group, the passenger Indians (so-called because they paid their own passage to Africa) who were oriented to urban life and trade, also came to Natal whence some dispersed to other areas. Immigration from India ended by law in 1913, and virtually all Indians in present-day South Africa were born there. Whatever their origins or their earlier activity in South Africa, roughly 90 percent of all Indians are urban, and a little less than 85 percent live in Natal. Late in the nineteenth century, in part at the insistence of English traders, they were excluded from the Orange Free State. Formal exclusion has continued, and none have lived there since that time.

Regional origins (reflected in part in language difference) and religion have been of variable significance in the cohesion of the

Indian community. Earlier the major division lay between two classes—the passenger Indians and those whose origins lay in indentured service. The differences were reinforced by the fact that the passenger Indians originally had citizenship rights and were not bound by the labor laws affecting indentured Indians and their descendants. Moreover passenger Indians originated largely in north and central India and were lighter in skin color than most of the indentured Indians who had come from India's southern regions. The differences were underlined by the fact that substantial numbers of passenger Indians were Muslims in contrast to the chiefly Hindu composition of the indentured group.

Although communication between passenger and other Indians was established in the early twentieth century, the distinctions between them continued to be of considerable significance until the second half of the twentieth century. These differences have since diminished in important respects, in part because many Indians stemming from forebears in the indentured category have risen occupationally and educationally.

Region (and even village) of origin and religion remained important in matters of marriage and ritual as well as in other social and cultural contexts. In general the religious communities are endogamous, and within each religious category regional or village origin may account for variations in custom and ritual that in turn affect marriage choice and other close relationships. In some cases, however, regional or language differences are overridden. For example, Urdu speakers of Muslim faith intermarry regardless of region of origin but are not likely to marry Muslims of Gujarati speech. South Indian Hindus intermarry despite differences in language and region. The Indian caste system (or analogous patterns among Muslims) may be of significance among some regional groups. But it has not been pervasive in the community in general, particularly among descendants of indentured Indians, and the elaborate caste organizations characteristic of the system in India are essentially lacking in South Africa.

More than two-thirds of all Indians are Hindus, about one-fifth are Muslims, and about 8 percent are Christians. Very small numbers are Parsis, Jains, or Buddhists. Parsis, despite their small numbers, are of some importance in the community because they tend to cluster at the higher end of the education and occupation ladder.

Of greater importance as an obstacle to Indian solidarity is the wide variation in income and wealth among Indians. A small number are very wealthy, either because of their success as merchants or in some cases as professionals. Other professionals are in the higher reaches of the middle stratum, which encompasses a wide span of incomes and a larger proportion of the Indian population than of the Black or Coloured peoples. The great bulk of Indians, however, live in households whose incomes are derived from very small-scale trading, low-level clerical occupations, or blue-collar

work. Until the 1970s very few Indian women worked to earn part of a household's income, but there were signs of change by the mid-1970s. At the same time these differences of wealth and occupation may divide Indians, those in the higher reaches of the economic and educational hierarchy are more likely to ignore regional and religious barriers to social relations, although these are not altogether irrelevant even to such persons.

Even if professional status does not bring as much income as some commercial activity, it is much valued in the Indian community, and higher education is encouraged. The proportion of Indians in the professions and in higher education is greater than that in the Coloured and Black populations (see Education, this ch.).

Despite the poverty of many Indians and stresses imposed by the implementation of apartheid, the cohesiveness of the extended family persists, even if the nuclear family components of such a family are scattered in several households as many of them are. The restraints exercised and the support offered by such extended families and by their community have contributed to the comparatively low rates of ordinary crime, alcoholism, and other activities usually taken as symptoms of disorganization and alienation.

Apartheid and Its Evolution

Custom and law underscored White dominance long before the Afrikaner-based National Party came to power in 1948, and most Whites, whatever their origin, supported the historically established pattern. Until the late 1940s, however, there were gaps in the structure of rules—written and unwritten—that limited the rights and opportunities of Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians and that specified the nature of relations between Whites and others. For example, many kinds of social intercourse were permitted; the rights of assembly, of publishing, and of joining political groups were protected, and integrated education was not prohibited.

In 1948 the National Party began a systematic effort, supported by most Afrikaners and actively opposed by few Whites, to organize the relations, rights, and privileges of the races (as defined) and to entrench them in law and administrative regulation (see Rise of the National Party and Development of Apartheid, ch. 1). Laws already in effect were more strongly enforced, and elaborate bureaucratic and police machinery was developed to implement the system. To the ideology and the policies associated with it the National Party gave the name apartheid. Initially no attempt was made to put into effect all the implications of the ideology which would have meant a major reordering of the economy and the society. In the early 1950s, however, the enactment of specific pieces of legislation began to spell out in some detail the relations of the races and to institute their separation in a more consistent fashion than had hitherto been the case.

At that stage both ideology and policy emphasized *baasskap* apartheid, that is, separation coupled with White domination and

102

Indian workers at Johannesburg's Standard Telephone and Cables Plant. Industrial work is often segregated by both race and sex. Courtesy Africa News Service.

based on or justified by the assumption of White biological and cultural superiority. Separation went as far as possible without extraordinary costs to the White economy or inconvenience to Whites. Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians were to be kept geographically, socially, culturally, and politically separate from each other and from Whites and subordinate to them but were to be available as a necessary labor force. In this period (from the late 1940s to the late 1950s) apartheid in practice had the effect of retaining social and economic benefits for Whites while, in political scientist Robert Price's words, insulating "the White population from potential uprisings by the Black majority and creating physical conditions that would allow for the effective repression of such uprisings should they occur."

By the late 1950s a changing international and internal environment forced the Nationalist government to consider a more radical implementation of apartheid. The term gave way to the phrase "separate development," which implied both a change in policy and in ideology. In the case of ideology, the formal justification of the government's purpose became not the inferiority of Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians but their cultural differences from Whites and from each other. The effect of this change on the way in which most Whites perceived others is doubtful. Nevertheless the idea resonated for some Afrikaners because of their own long-term concern for

103

preserving and developing their own ethnic identity (see The Churches, Race Relations, and the Political Order, this ch.).

In the years that followed, most of the patterns and purposes already established were not fundamentally changed. The laws enacted in the 1950s were refined and additions were made. For example, in 1968 the Prohibition of Political Interference Act in effect forbade political cooperation by persons of different races. The major change was the gradual implementation of the idea of separate homelands for defined sections of the Black African population. The basic materials for the policy had been in place for decades, however. So-called Native Reserves (constituting the major part of what were to be called the homelands) had long been allocated to specific Black ethno-linguistic categories. Moreover preapartheid legislation had also assumed that Blacks owed, or should owe, their loyalty to traditional authorities or their equivalents (as determined by White authorities).

Until separate development began to be a serious issue, South African governments had not emphasized ethnolinguistic divisions among Blacks, although they had taken them into account for some purposes. Two factors—one ideological, one practical—led to a change. The first of these may be linked to the Afrikaner view of the world in which their own ethnic separateness from other Whites as well as Blacks was significant for their identity and survival. The second was the political advantage of treating the Blacks not as a unitary group but as a set of discrete entities. Most politically active Blacks had come to define themselves as Africans, however, and opposed separate development on the grounds of its divisiveness as well as because it excluded them from participation in a polity, society, and economy that they saw as potentially if not actually theirs.

The government pressed ahead nevertheless, stimulated rather than hindered by the opposition and by such incidents as Sharpeville (see Black African Resistance [1940s–50s], ch. 1). Separate development (and the establishment of the homelands) was a strategy for dealing with the potential of subversion of the existing order by a numerically overwhelming Black population. By the early 1970s legislation had established a framework for the continuing devolution of self-government to the homelands and had made explicit the view of the South African government that citizenship for Blacks lay in specific homelands as soon as they were granted independence. By 1979 three such entities were "independent" from the official South African perspective, although none was recognized by other states (see Government and Politics in the Black Homelands, ch. 4).

More than half the Black population lived outside the homelands in 1973 (the proportion varying from one homeland to another). Officially that percentage had been diminished by 1980 (precise data were not available) through a series of actions by the South African government. Two techniques have been used to exclude as many Blacks as possible from legal residence in "White" South Africa. The first, employed long before the Nationalist government came to power, was based on Section 10 of the Natives (Urban

104

Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945, as amended, and was bolstered and thoroughly enforced by the government after 1948. As summarized by Muriel Horrell in *Laws Affecting Race Relations,*

> Section 10 provided that no [Black] may remain for more than 72 hours in an urban or proclaimed area unless he or she has resided there continuously since birth; has worked there continuously for one employer for not less than 10 years; or has resided there lawfully and continuously for not less than 15 years; and has thereafter continued to reside there and is not employed outside; and has not while in the area been sentenced to a fine exceeding R100 [for value of the rand—R—see Glossary] or to imprisonment for a period exceeding six months; is the wife, unmarried daughter, or son under the age of 18 years, of a [Black] in one of the categories mentioned above and ordinarily resides with him; has been granted special permission to be in the area.

In the late 1970s it was estimated that of more than 8 million Blacks in the towns and cities, only 1.9 million had Section 10 rights.

Section 10, coupled with the mechanisms of influx control (including the pass system), permitted the expulsion ("endorsing out," in local terminology) of Blacks from the cities and from other areas in an effort to hold the line against permanent Black migration to urban areas and, when feasible economically, to reduce the numbers already there. A great many Blacks have been endorsed out, but it is not clear that the absolute numbers in the so-called White areas have diminished, given the natural growth of Blacks legally there and the persistent attempts of Blacks, lacking economic opportunity in the homelands, to remain in or return to the cities. Certainly the official estimates of Blacks in urban areas, particularly the large ones such as Soweto, substantially understate the numbers actually present.

The second technique for excluding Blacks from the total estimated in the White areas has been to attach Black urban zones on the edge of cities to adjacent or nearby homelands. Invariably the Blacks living in such zones have been oriented to urban life and are dependent on the White-controlled urban centers for a livelihood just as the centers are dependent on Blacks for labor and as consumers. Thus one of the major Black areas attached to Durban has been added to KwaZulu and a similar area near Pretoria has been made part of Bophuthatswana, although its people are in all significant respects linked more closely to the city than to the homeland.

During the period that the idea of separate development was being elaborated and the homelands established in law and in fact, aspects of apartheid in the White areas continued to be widely enforced. The Group Areas Act was applied not only to Blacks but to Coloured and Asian populations as well, particularly in their centers of concentration—Cape Town in the case of the Coloureds and Durban in the case of the Asians. Each of these groups tended to reside in the heart of the city and to have developed an economic and community life associated with their neighborhoods. Moving them entailed, for the government, an investment in new and often better housing, but for the people it meant a disruption of a well-established way of life. As in the case of Blacks and their homelands,

105

the movement of Coloureds and Asians was a decision made for them.

In addition to Blacks endorsed out of Black townships to the homelands, long-established Black communities in the White urban areas and on or in the midst of White farms were forcibly relocated. It has been estimated that nearly 260,000 Blacks were removed from their farms between 1948 and 1976 and that nearly 1 million tenants and squatters and their families were relocated between 1960 and 1970. Resettlement of roughly 1 million more was contemplated under a consolidation act formulated in 1975. Of these people some were sent to homeland towns or villages already constructed, but far more were dispatched to sites which at best had water available.

By the mid-1970s a number of Whites in the higher echelons of government and the economy began to see the costs to the South African economy of some features of apartheid as too high. Moreover the Nationalist government's hopes that separate development would be conducive to greater internal security and to a diminution of international condemnation had not been realized. The Natal strike of 1973 and the Soweto riots of 1976—and their violent suppression—indicated continuing problems of security for the dominant Whites and reawakened international support for Blacks (and other non-Whites) and condemnation of the regime. Some in the Nationalist government therefore began to consider changes in the system.

An assessment of the changes instituted or contemplated in the late 1970s and early 1980s requires that distinctions be drawn among various elements in the system in terms of their relevance for continuing White dominance. Sociologist Pierre van den Berghe, writing in the mid-1960s, offered a threefold classification of the forms of separateness (in his language, segregation). The first, microsegregation, referred to separate public and private facilities and amenities in those areas and situations of work or play that might lead to the presence of the races in the same place, in short a rigorous application of the color bar. Mesosegregation referred to the establishment of racially homogeneous residential areas, the primary instrument of which has been the Group Areas Act. Macrosegregation referred to the allocation of Blacks to the homelands (then popularly called Bantustans). When van den Berghe wrote, microsegregation and mesosegregation were well established; macrosegregation, then barely begun, was well under way by the late 1970s.

In addition to these efforts to effect spatial separation of the races, there were other elements in the system—some preceded the National Party's rise to power—that were essential to both spatial separation and, as the party then perceived it, to White (or in some cases, Afrikaner) control of the polity and the economy. Thus the pass system, although preceding the formal institution of apartheid, was considered necessary to the control of Blacks in the White areas and to the carrying out of the homelands idea. From one perspective, the prohibition of Black unions was not so much a result of the antipathy of owners and managers for unions as a fear of the political potential of African unions and a catering to White workers

A portion of township of Soweto, which is thought to house between 1 million and 1.5 million Blacks who work in nearby Johannesburg
Courtesy Jean R. Tartter

who for long constituted a major bulwark of the National Party.

From the perspective of a pragmatic Nationalist government, the least rewarding and essential components of the apartheid system were those comprehended under microsegregation, roughly the equivalent of what others have called petty apartheid. Petty apartheid consists of those acts or prohibitions much noted by outsiders as the substance and symbol of South African racism. Moreover it contributed less to control than to the exacerbation of Black, Coloured, and Asian animosity toward Whites. Some steps were therefore taken to revoke or change aspects of it, e.g., in the field of sports where it is maximally visible. But the process is a slow one because of the uncertainty of the reaction of White (particularly Afrikaner) supporters of the ruling party to such changes. There are indications, however, that many Afrikaners (and other Whites) are prepared to accept changes in social arrangements that have had great symbolic significance for them. Much of microsegregation underlined the difference of the races and was important to the Afrikaners' arduously developed sense of identity. To the extent that their political dominance and improved economic situation diminish the need for symbolic affirmation of their status, Afrikaners may be willing to forego elements of petty apartheid.

107

In its essentials mesosegregation persisted, although adaptations either made or bruited in the late 1970s and 1980 suggested concessions to the continued presence of Blacks in the Whi reas. Among the changes partly instituted or discussed was a softening in particular cases of the implications of the Group Areas Act, which had long been rigidly enforced. Thus the removal of several Black and Coloured urban residential areas located in White areas was postponed or abandoned. Also under discussion were improvements in the amenities and facilities in Black townships, reportedly under way in 1980, and the lifting of certain restrictions on Black entrepreneurs. Spouses and children of persons with legally recognized (Section 10) rights to be in the cities were permitted to join them, a right hitherto denied. Ninety-nine-year leaseholds in the cities were made available in 1978 to Blacks eligible to be there, an acknowledgement of the permanence of Blacks in the White areas. One hundred such leaseholds had been registered by early 1980, and another 395 were being processed.

On October 31, 1980, draft legislation intended to deal further with the situation of Blacks outside the homelands was made public by the Nationalist government. It was expected that the legislation would be submitted to parliament early in 1981. The chief element in the legislative package was the Black Community Development Act. Among other features, it provided that descendants of persons already legally resident in Black townships would have a legal right to live there. Further, a legal resident could move from one to another such township in search of work, provided that he or she could find housing as well as work—a substantial obstacle given the extreme shortage of housing for Blacks. In the course of the search, a person could stay in an urban area other than his or her place of residence for up to thirty days in contrast to the prevailing seventy-two-hour limit.

Improvements in the conditions of Blacks living in the towns and cities were predicated on the exclusion of those not entitled to do so under South African law, whether in force or contemplated. Crucial to that exclusion were the pass laws and influx control. These measures, however, had their own material and symbolic costs. In 1977 South African sociologist Michael Savage conservatively estimated the annual cost to the government (in the mid 1970s) of enforcing all aspects of the pass laws and influx control at nearly R113 million. Moreover enforcement of the pass laws—even for those Africans who pass the screening process—has been a constant irritant and has drawn strong international disapprobation. A few high government officials have publicly indicated disapproval of the pass laws, and a commission of inquiry (the Riekert Commission) was appointed to look into other less costly ways of dealing with the presence of "illegal" Blacks in the cities. By 1979 only one of its recommendations had been instituted: the emphasis was shifted to the prosecution of employers, and heavier fines were imposed for failure to register workers. Although employers were permitted to amend the status of

*Typical Black residence in KwaZulu homeland occupied
largely by families who have been moved out of White areas
Courtesy Africa News Service*

*Black squatter settlement at Winterveldt
in Bophuthatswana near Pretoria
Courtesy Jean R. Tartter*

"illegal" Blacks already on their rolls, many found it less trouble-some to let these employees go. For the illegal employees themselves, registration conveyed the opportunity to work legally but did not confer long-term rights to be in the city under Section 10 of the retitled Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act inasmuch as a work contract was good for only one year and required renewal after the employee had returned to his homeland.

On the same day in 1980 that draft legislation lifting certain restrictions on urban Blacks was announced, Minister of Coopera-tion and Development Piet Koornhof also said that legislation would soon eliminate the reference books that all Blacks in White areas must carry. That did not, however, entail the abrogation of the essential feature of the pass laws. Identity cards similar to those car-ried by Whites were to be issued to Blacks, and the law requiring them to prove their right to be in a White area to any policeman would remain in force.

A number of observers have remarked that more flexible policies or ameliorative exceptions to existing policies are made by high-ranking officials but are carried out by persons in the lower levels of the bureaucracy or the police. These low-level officials have ac-quired a reputation for rigid enforcement of existing law and resistance to change or to exceptions.

As American political scientist Robert M. Price has pointed out, the amelioration of conditions in Black urban areas and the mitiga-tion of some of the characteristics of the pass laws and influx control still leave in place the basic principle of the Group Areas Act and of Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. The sub-stance and basic processes of enforcement of mesosegregation have not been changed. The reaction of critics of the government (includ-ing Blacks and White liberals) to proposed legislation underscores this assessment. They grant that the situation of legally resident ur-ban Blacks will be improved, but they argue (in the words of Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu) that "these are just a few crumbs for urban Blacks. We reject the division of Blacks into the urban favored and the rural not-so-favored. . . ." These critics also ques-tion the government's estimate that 95 percent of Blacks in urban areas in 1980 would be covered by the new legislation, noting the generally acknowledged fact that there is a very large illegal popula-tion in Soweto and elsewhere. The draft legislation proposes signifi-cant increases in the penalties for Whites and Blacks who permit illegal Blacks to live in their households.

Analysts such as Price, writing before the 1980 legislation had been proposed but after initial steps had been taken in the late 1970s, have noted that those who would benefit from the changes were persons who already had Section 10 rights and whose status as members of a privileged stratum would be enhanced. These analysts and critics, responding to the proposals of late 1980, have inter-preted the government's move as divisive—one intended to develop an urban Black class whose interests would be far different from

110

(and very possibly in conflict with) those of migrant workers and others whose legal base would be in the homelands.

In addition to physical separation, other means of control over the Black population have been exercised. In the 1950s a series of laws segregated labor unions by race, and works committees became the sole recognized way in which the interests of Black workers could be represented. Unregistered, i.e., officially unrecognized unions emerged, many of which joined to form the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). SACTU, however, was a politically militant group, and its leaders were frequently arrested or detained under the Suppression of Communism Act (see Rise of the National Party and Development of Apartheid, ch. 1; Black African Resistance [1940s–50s], ch. 1; The Laws of Apartheid, ch. 4). By the mid-1960s SACTU was moribund.

A few Black unions continued to exist, but Black labor was relatively quiescent until the early and mid-1970s. At that time a combination of grievances—some economic, others having to do with working and living conditions—led to a rash of strikes and to the organization of a number of unions. The strikes were in many ways successful despite government attempts at suppression. Moreover they continued into the late 1970s as did the growth of unions despite their lack of recognition.

By the late 1970s the government was ready to reconsider its position. Distrusted by the workers, the works committees (and the liaison committees established somewhat later) had not been effectual in maintaining industrial peace, and repressive tactics had their limits, both because of the numbers of workers involved and because they were given moral (and in some cases) practical support by American and European unions. Moreover South African and multinational firms were not at this point adamantly opposed to unions, in part because registered Black unions might be more effective in negotiating settlements and dealing with grievances. Some multinationals, perhaps concerned to dampen the criticism directed at them in their home countries for their involvement in the South African economy, had already begun to deal with Black unions in the face of government disapproval.

Given this situation, the South African government in 1979 authorized the registration of Black unions. A year later the outcome was by no means certain. The law governing registration and deregistration was such that some Black union leaders were reluctant to accede to it. The power to deregister was in the hands of the government, and registration was to be provisional. Further, registration entailed government access to union financial records and approval of union constitutions. Initially migrant and commuting workers from the homelands—important to the strength of many unions—were excluded from the union (those from Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana still were in late 1980). Protests led the government to accord such workers the right to join unions by special provision, but that may be withheld by government decision.

In addition to the objections of a number of existing Black unions to the conditions of registration, these unions are confronted with the problem of so-called parallel unions. In such cases unions for Blacks are formed under the aegis of existing White or Coloured unions and, in the view of Black unionists and some observers, essentially receive direction from them. As of late 1980 the only Black unions registered were those affiliated with White ones. It has been argued that the government prefers such arrangements because independent Black unions tend to be more militant. Moreover the concerns of independent unions—in part because of the expectations of their members—are likely to spill over to social and political grievances. Nevertheless some firms were apparently prepared to deal with Black unions—registered or not—because they may be more representative of the workers in the industry.

Class and Race

As in any society marked by a history of competition and armed conflict for land between peoples of disparate races and cultures and by the insistence of one people, the Whites (Boer and Briton alike), that others be available as a labor force, a close link between race and class developed in the South African social order. The distribution of power, wealth, and status in racial terms began early and was sustained by the interests that were generated by later developments.

Although contact between different peoples led to the beginnings of a race-based class structure, it left the races—particularly Blacks and Whites—in largely separate if hostile societies. When most Whites and virtually all Blacks were cultivators or herders, economic interdependence was rudimentary. With the development of mining and, not long after, of industry, economic integration of the races (and of Afrikaners and English speakers) became essential. A labor force of skilled and unskilled workers was required and urbanization followed. All were increasingly involved in the same economy and society, and Whites used their power to retain or enhance their economic and social status vis-à-vis the other groups. Depending on their situation in the economy and in White society, Whites differed over the methods of balancing the benefits and costs of continued White domination. But few were prepared to ignore race in the allocation of economic resources, social status, and political power. In t .is perspective, apartheid and its later modifications are techniques for dealing with the changing conditions, internal and external, under which White dominance is to prevail. Its peculiar features reflect the fact that Afrikaners were seeking not only to maintain White dominance but to establish their own strength and identity against an economically dominant rival within the White group.

Although access to the rewards of the society was closely tied to race and Whites were clearly on top in all respects, the relations of other races to Whites and to each other with respect to status—essentially a subjective matter—were not so clearly delineated.

112

*Strikers at Durban's Frame Textile Mills
move toward waiting riot police
Courtesy Omar Badsha/Africa News Service*

Moreover there were in each racial category differences with respect to power, status, and income, and ethnic differences of variable importance played a part in the organization of social and political life.

Inequality and Difference

Wealth, income, and political power are concentrated in the hands of the Whites. The ranges of variation with respect to income in each racial category overlap, but the distribution within each category differs markedly. By law, political power and authority are vested in Whites. Clearly not all Whites carry the same political weight, but they have at a minimum the right to vote and, provided that their views are not outside the range acceptable at any time, to seek to exert their influence in other ways (see White Party Politics, ch. 4).

The difference in income between Whites on the one hand and Asians, Coloureds, and particularly Blacks on the other has been very great over the years, although there has been a slight narrowing of the gap since the early 1970s. No single available set of statistics adequately describes the differential access to economic resources of Whites and others, but the data on per capita income by race cited by Hermann Giliomee in his "The Afrikaner Economic Advance" provides a picture of the difference's order of magnitude. In 1976 the annual per capita incomes of the four components were: Whites, R3150; Asians, R737; Coloureds, R623; and Blacks, R304. That rank order has prevailed at least since the end of World War II.

The most significant change since that time has been the closing of the gap between the major ethnic components of the White population. In 1946 the per capita income of Afrikaners was less than half that of English speakers. Only ten years earlier substantial numbers of Afrikaners had been considered poor Whites, and few if any played a part in the higher reaches of private enterprise. That was to come after World War II. By 1976 the per capita income of Afrikaners was nearly 71 percent that of English speakers. The process of Afrikaner urbanization had continued, leaving on the land chiefly the most successful Afrikaner farmers. In 1936 more than 41 percent of Afrikaners were engaged in agricultural occupations. By 1977 only a little more than 8 percent were so engaged.

Initially most Afrikaners worked at unskilled or semiskilled jobs in the urban areas. Between 1936 and 1946 the proportions of Afrikaners in agriculture and blue-collar jobs were reversed: from 41 percent in agriculture in 1936 to roughly 30 percent in 1946; from 31 percent in manual occupations in 1936 to nearly 41 percent in 1946. By 1977 the proportion of Afrikaners in blue-collar work had fallen to under 27 percent. Most were in skilled or supervisory jobs and often were protected from the competition of Blacks and others by statutory and customary job reservation measures.

The decrease in the proportions of agricultural and manual workers was accompanied by an increase in white-collar workers, from 27.5 percent of the Afrikaner work force in 1936 to more than 65 percent in 1977. Many of these white-collar positions were at lower levels, but Afrikaners moved into much higher posts as well, a consequence in part of the emphasis placed on higher liberal and technical education for Afrikaners by the National Party when it came to power in 1948. A good deal of support was given to Afrikaans-medium universities, including the founding of medical and engineering schools. Giliomee has estimated that "Afrikaners probably trebled their participation" in the liberal professions from 1939 to 1964. Afrikaners also moved into important ownership and managerial roles in the private sector, and some of the leading Afrikaners in these roles match their English-speaking counterparts in the scope of their entrepreneurial activities and the economic power they wield. Nevertheless English speakers rather than Afrikaners have dominated the private sector even if the gap has much diminished. Afrikaners, however, have dominated the government and far outnumber English speakers at all levels of a large bureaucracy. There is the usual range of variation in the income of civil servants and in their standing in the Afrikaner community, and they do not all have the same interests or form a monolithic bloc in White politics. Still, given the diminished proportions of farmers and blue-collar workers among Afrikaners (formerly the basic constituencies of the National Party), the political voice of bureaucrats—whether as voters or pressure groups—has been enhanced.

With some exceptions English speakers are engaged in private enterprise and in law, medicine, and like professions. There are

English speakers in manual occupations and at the lower white-collar levels, but as the discrepancy of nearly 30 percent in per capita income between English speakers and Afrikaners in 1976 suggests, English speakers tend to be on higher rungs of the economic ladder.

The ethnic distinctions between Afrikaner and English speaker—long emotionally and politically charged—have not been wholly overridden by similarities of income, occupation, and lifestyle. Although some observers have reported a convergence of the two groups in many respects, it is not yet possible to speak of wholly cohesive classes to which ethnic differences are irrelevant. There are variations in attitudes, but the available studies do not show a clear picture. For example, some analysts suggest that more Afrikaners than English speakers are prepared to accept in their social circles persons of a similar stratum from the other ethnic category. Other research indicates that middle and upper income English speakers are more status conscious than Afrikaners and consider themselves closer to well-off Afrikaners than to English speakers of lower income and status. Both approaches seem to point to the growing importance of socioeconomic status in contrast to ethnic identification, but the proportions in each ethnolinguistic category prepared to abandon ethnicity as a criterion of social closeness were still small as of the late 1970s.

At the highest reaches of both groups there is a degree of cooperation and interdependence, a function of the perceived needs of those who wield great economic and political power. Although lacking direct political power and differing with the National Party on certain issues, English speakers at the heights of the economy contrive to make their interests known. Even if their views are not accepted, they are taken into account if only because these English speakers control enterprises crucial to South Africa's material interests. One technique for such communication is the placing of Afrikaners on the boards of directors of firms which are largely controlled by English speakers. Afrikaners, whether in private or state enterprise, may in turn make use of the English expertise or international connections. Beyond this, Afrikaner and English (including Jewish) capital was increasingly combined in joint ventures in the 1970s. Heribert Adam quotes the *Financial Mail* in 1978: "Never has it been more difficult to stamp a tribal tag on a rand note."

Such cooperation in the economic domain has been possible because of the emergence of a set of Afrikaner entrepreneurs capable of holding their own at the highest levels of that domain. Although Nationalist dominance in the political sphere has been of some help in the development of Afrikaner private enterprise, those who have been successful in the private sector have often been more oriented to the technical problems of their firms than to Nationalist ideology.

Even at this level, however, it is not clear that common economic power and status have led to the formation of a status group that wholly ignores language and other differences between Afrikaners and English speakers. The marks of a cohesive stratum such as

intermarriage, common membership in voluntary associations, and common sociability are not pervasive.

Between 1946 and 1976, when the differences between English speakers and Afrikaners were diminishing substantially, those between Whites and other groups decreased much less. In 1946 the per capita income of Whites was more than twelve times that of Blacks, more than six times that of Coloureds, and more than five times that of Asians. By 1976 it had narrowed to more than ten times that of Blacks, a little more than five times that of Coloureds, and more than four times that of Asians. The closing of the gap has continued since 1976 but at a very slow rate. Moreover it is not likely to speed up, particularly with respect to Blacks—even with the best of intentions—given the slow process of restructuring that group's educational system. Whether the best of intentions will prevail is another matter. Those in the higher reaches of the economy seemed in the middle and late 1970s to accept increased labor costs in anticipation of economic growth, but it is not clear that such labor costs would be absorbed beyond a certain point, especially if economic growth slowed substantially. Moreover Whites of the middle and working classes—even those who are willing to see much of petty apartheid come to an end—are reluctant to see changes that seem to them to threaten their standard of living and status.

Among the bulwarks of White economic and social status, protecting those in the lower and lower middle strata, have been job reservation and the long-standing unwritten iron law (in Savage's phrase) that persons of other races should not be in positions of authority over Whites. Job reservation—the restriction of certain jobs to Whites—has been sanctioned in part by law and in part by fear of government disapproval or by arrangements with White unions. Statutory job reservation was initially instituted at a time of unemployment among Whites and was furthered by the National Party, then heavily reliant on an Afrikaner working-class base.

As the economy has developed, the needs of White workers became less pressing and the demand for skilled Black workers more so, leading to a rapid lessening of the number of positions statutorily closed to all but Whites. Only two such job reservations were on the books in 1979, the chief of which was in mining. In that year the White Miners Union (its members largely Afrikaners) struck to forestall the implementation of the recommendations of the Wiehahn Report calling for the abolition of the principle of such legal restrictions. As South African economist Francis Wilson points out, neither the Chamber of Mines nor the government supported the White workers. Nevertheless the reservation of certain jobs in the mining industry persisted in 1980. The Underground Officials Association had agreed to its gradual phasing out if that organization could enroll the Black and Coloured employees who moved into the jobs, in effect asking the government to permit a mixed union. But the White Miner's Union, essentially an Afrikaner body, asserted that it would resist change, in part because the jobs in question might

116

A suburban home in an upper income area of Pretoria
reserved for Whites
Courtesy Jean R. Tartter

entail the exercise of authority by Blacks and Coloureds over Whites. Despite the decreasing importance of job reservation by law, it persisted in custom. As Wilson suggests, "from both the Wiehahn Report and the government response, it was clear that the aim was to remove the legal rigidities in the color bar, but the continuing existence of the color bar, flexibly administered, remains unchallenged."

The demands of the economy, as perceived by those who control it and by the government, clearly have required more flexible administration. One of the limits to such flexibility is the status system. The location of the color bar on the economic ladder may be raised, but dispensing with it to the point that color becomes irrelevant to status and authority is not likely in the near future.

Less clear cut than the relation of race to wealth and power has been its link to social status. The Whites in power may assign high status to themselves and lower status to others, but it has been problematic whether those allocated lower status accept the legitimacy of such an assignment and recognize the right of the powerful to higher status. Whatever their rationale—biological or cultural— Whites have assumed they are entitled to high status. They have assigned intermediate status to Coloureds and Asians and have placed Blacks at the bottom of the hierarchy. In their relations with

117

Whites, all other groups confronted by White political dominance have usually acquiesced in the system insofar as that requires deference to Whites in most situations of interaction on the job, in the marketplace, or in encounters in other contexts. The extent to which they have accepted the assumptions of the system and therefore recognize the legitimacy of higher White status is another matter.

Also uncertain in the early 1980s are the ways in which Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians see each other. Some Asians and Coloureds have come to see themselves as in the same boat as Blacks and have rejected the term non-Whites as a negative definition, choosing instead to adopt the term "Black" to cover themselves as well as the Black Africans. How common this view is among most Asians and Coloureds—and how ready most Black Africans are to accept this definition of the situation—is much less clear. By and large the position seems to be restricted to students and some of the well-educated in each group. In any case this perspective is a consequence of a particular assessment of the political situation and speaks to it. It does not necessarily refer to a prospective social homogenization of the Black, Asian, and Coloured populations.

There are indications that most Asians have seen themselves as different, not sharing the same status hierarchy as Whites, Coloureds, and Blacks. It has been remarked that the Indian population is linguistically, regionally, and religiously fragmented in such a way that social life (including marriage, religious ritual, and voluntary organizations) tend with some exceptions to take place within closed groups (see Asians, this ch.). The inclusion of non-Indians in Indian social life is even less likely, although there have been special occasions when leading figures in the Black and Coloured populations have been invited to Indian events. Except for those Indians oriented to the idea of the common blackness of the oppressed, Indians have tended to welcome the participation of Whites rather than Blacks and Coloureds in their social occasions.

Coloureds have historically identified themselves with Whites, particularly with Afrikaners. As the latter have come to be seen as responsible for the loss of rights formerly held by Coloureds—as oppressors—some of them have turned to English as a home language and to churches other than the Dutch Reformed churches dominated by Afrikaners. The loss of rights that set them apart from Blacks particularly and to a lesser extent from Asians may have radicalized some Coloureds and generated a reassessment of their position vis-à-vis Blacks and Asians, but that it has done so for most is questionable. Among other things, the implementation of apartheid has limited Coloured access to some resources, but it has also protected many of them from Black and Asian competition. Thus some positions in Cape Province where most Coloureds live have been reserved for them against Blacks by law or custom, and many in the Coloured middle class—especially businessmen—have resented the incursion of Asian businessmen into Coloured areas.

118

From the point of view of many Blacks, relations with the inter-
mediate groups have not been satisfactory. Just as Coloureds have
seen Blacks as potential competitors, Blacks have often seen Col-
oureds as usurpers of their opportunities. Moreover, whatever
changes have taken place in Coloured perspectives in the 1960s and
1970s, Blacks experienced Coloureds earlier as darker Afrikaners,
that is, as reflecting Afrikaner attitudes towards Blacks. In Natal
where Indians are concentrated, many Zulu have experienced them
on the other side of the counter: small businessmen scrambling for a
living, more alien and even less responsive than Whites. The Zulu
have sometimes found a scapegoat for these frustrations in Indians
who have occasionally been victims of Black hostility during riots
and demonstrations. But many Indians are wage workers—often at
the same low level as Blacks—and by the 1970s they supported
Blacks in various strikes and protests. Such support was generated
because their own interests were directly affected and, some have
claimed, out of sympathy with Black Africans. Similarly Indian
university students have supported Black university students in some
protest actions. Whether Blacks perceive Indian support and in-
volvement as signaling a change in Indian attitudes and therefore
warranting a reciprocal change in Black perspectives remained to be
seen.

Under the system of apartheid, what some have dubbed a caste-
like barrier between Whites and the other racial categories was
hardened and made nearly impermeable by law. To a lesser extent
such lines have also been drawn between the other racial categories.
Relations in the economic domain—whether on the job or in the
marketplace continued, but others were made extraordinarily diffi-
cult. Until the full apparatus of separation was instituted, however,
it was possible for individuals of the different races to interact in
spheres other than the economic—whether in voluntary associa-
tions, in the arts, in politics, or as students in the universities. Such
relations involved only small numbers in each category, and except
in rare cases even these were influenced by the structure and culture
of inequality. For most people before and after the formal establish-
ment of the doctrine of apartheid, social relations were permeated
with inequality—whether in the terminology of address or in the
possibilities of access to various amenities. That Blacks, Coloureds,
or Asians could afford such amenities or were interested in them was
irrelevant. The exceptions to this pattern, again affecting relatively
few persons of any racial category, were some churches and other
voluntary associations of a cultural or educational character that
have insisted on holding interracial meetings. Such meetings and
personal relationships between persons of different races have taken
place in a context of legal separation and of governmental and often
White social disapproval. By the 1970s some Blacks evinced disap-
proval of others who consorted with Whites. Another reflection of
the long history of inequality was the reported lack of ease of or-
dinary Blacks when confronted with Whites who adopted a more or

119

less egalitarian stance. During this period there seems to have been a change in the behavior of educated Whites, including Afrikaners, toward Blacks—an alteration marked by less brusque and peremptory treatment. But the basic assumption of White superiority persisted.

Except for interactions among some intellectuals and students and in some churches, sports provides the context in which social relations involving individuals of two or more racial groups increasingly occur. Despite the persistence of a number of obstacles to interracial sports—that is, events in which mixed teams as well as teams of different races compete before mixed audiences, some barriers have fallen, and mixed events have taken place with increasing frequency at all levels beginning in the early 1970s. The chief motivating factor has been to end South Africa's isolation in international sports. Sociability among all members of mixed teams is not frequent and is inhibited in any case by Group Areas and Liquor Act restrictions. Nevertheless this is one case where the competitive structure of the activity itself forces inequality based on race into the background.

Available information does not permit a detailed presentation and comparison of the intraracial distribution of income and wealth, but it appears that a large proportion of the categories other than Whites have incomes below that of most Whites. In the case of the Blacks and to a lesser extent the Coloureds this reflects either reliance in whole or in part on small-scale if not subsistence agriculture and participation in the labor force as unskilled or at best semiskilled workers. In the case of Blacks (and perhaps of Coloureds) even skilled workers earn less than two-thirds of the wages of their counterparts in the White working force. Asians have a larger proportion of persons with middle incomes than either Blacks or Coloureds—a function of a higher level of education, among other things, that gives Asians opportunities in a wide variety of white-collar jobs ranging from ordinary office work to computer specialties. Nevertheless there are among Asians substantial numbers of blue-collar wage workers at low levels and small-scale shopkeepers whose incomes are quite low. In each of the non-White categories, persons with incomes that would put them in the lower middle range among Whites consider themselves—and are considered by their own people—to be well-off. This is particularly true of Blacks.

Among Blacks, Asians, and Coloureds there are persons with very high incomes and substantial accumulated wealth. In the case of Blacks these are likely to be businessmen, a few of whom are said to be millionaires or nearly so. The wealthiest Asians are also likely to be in business, although there is a much higher proportion of professionals (lawyers, physicians, and dentists) among Asians than among Blacks and Coloureds. It was not uncommon in 1980 for wealthy Asians to have sons in the professions. The meaning of this for the continuity of the family in business is not clear. Coloureds are less likely to be businessmen on a large scale, although some Coloured merchants are well-off. To be a businessman in these racial

categories, whether or not well-off, indicates that the individual is a merchant or a provider of services. There are some Indians who own manufacturing firms (chiefly in Natal) and an occasional Black entrepreneur operates a fairly large-scale plant, e.g., for the manufacture of furniture. But by law such plants had to be in the homelands. No matter how wealthy, non-Whites with perhaps rare exceptions did not participate in the ownership and management of the enterprises commanding the economy.

The great majority of Black businessmen operate small retail shops or provide other services on a small scale in the Black townships attached to White urban areas. Those who have amassed wealth have also been restricted to providing services of varying kinds, although there was some talk of permitting Black manufacturing enterprise in the townships in the late 1970s. Typically, wealthy Black businessmen also provided a variety of retail and other services. They ranged from car dealers to funeral directors and included persons in the insurance business and owners of entertainment facilities. In the middle range were others, not quite so successful, who engaged in similar enterprises or in construction work.

Less significant proportionately among high- and middle-income Blacks than among Asians were persons in the professions and white-collar technicians or administrative personnel. This was attributable to de facto job reservation and the weaknesses of the education available to Blacks (see Education, this ch.).

To what extent the proportion of Blacks with high or middle incomes is likely to expand in the 1980s is difficult to determine. A number of changes in the restrictions under which Black businesses operate have been proposed or in some cases formally instituted. Among them is the availability of ninety-nine-year leases for businesses and an enlargement of the physical limits of Black business premises. The possibility of Black and White partnerships and White help for the training and financing of Black businessmen was also raised in 1979. At the same time the opening of Black townships to White, Asian, and Coloured businesses was suggested. The proposal was resisted by Black merchants as unfairly competitive given the resources of White retail chains and the bars to Black enterprises outside the townships except by subterfuge, e.g., having an office in Johannesburg in the name of a White accountant. The range of proposals and possib. ities left the basic structure largely intact, and their impact on the role and numbers of Black businessmen was uncertain.

Whatever their wealth, Black businessmen and professionals in the urban areas had to live in the Black townships, small sections of which were set aside for homes of substantial proportions despite the legal prohibition on Black ownership of land and the unavailability (until 1978) of long-term leases. These people apparently have high status in the eyes of the other residents of urban areas. In the case of businessmen such status results not only from their material well-being but also because they are in some sense their own bosses.

The prestige of higher education connected with the professions—still relatively rare—confers high status on those who have it. At the same time ordinary urban Blacks came to be culturally alienated from the educated members whose outlook was so different from that of their fellow townspeople. In some respects a larger division developed between most urban Blacks and those educated through the secondary level. The latter seem to have been particularly prone to behavior perceived to be imitative of Whites and appear to have been subject to some derision because of that behavior. The Black consciousness movement and the increased political consciousness of urban Blacks after the Soweto riots appear to have had some effect on educated Blacks' attitudes toward the less educated, and there may be less division among them than formerly.

In urban areas the greatest difference lies between the relatively permanent resident with Section 10 rights—regardless of the socio-economic situation—and the migrant. The latter perforce considers himself temporary, lives in housing for single persons rather than with his family, is usually poorly educated and even illiterate, and is at best semiskilled. Many of those with Section 10 rights are little better off with respect to income than most migrants. But they live with their families, are often second (and even third) generation urbanites, and are oriented to permanent residence in the cities. The instituted and proposed improvements in the status of legal residents will differentiate them even more sharply from migrants and illegal residents.

The politically active Blacks are aware of the potential for increasing the already existing differences between legal residents and migrants and spoke out against these implications of the changes in the late 1970s and during 1980. The position of the rank and file among legal residents in the townships was not clear, but most businessmen tended—publicly at least—to align themselves with the critics. Indeed in some respects they have been more critical of the system of apartheid than poorer Blacks because they consider themselves entirely capable of succeeding in any milieu if freed of the shackles of discrimination.

Ethnicity among Blacks

The extent of ethnic parochialism among Blacks varies with their social situation and with respect to different dimensions of social interaction. The social situation comprehends the attributes of individuals (their class, educational level, sex, age, and status in the townships as legal residents, migrants, or illegals) and the conditions under which they live (in an ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous Black urban township, in rural areas, or in the homelands). The dimensions of social interaction refers in general to the degree of intimacy involved (intermarriage, commensalism, friendship, political cooperation, and the like). The stress on the significance of each of these dimensions may change over time. Thus many Blacks are likely to say that they would prefer to marry someone of their

122

Soweto residents gaze through fence that
separates them from the White community
Courtesy United Nations/Pendl

own ethnic group, but that does not preclude friendship with a person of another category. In particular, changing conditions have affected the saliency of political considerations. Virtually all the available studies of ethnicity among Blacks have occurred while they were relatively quiescent politically. The Black consciousness movement that emerged in 1969 has stressed a common blackness overriding all other factors. The effects of the movement have not been examined in detail, although there are certainly indications that the young, who are most affected by it, repudiate the idea of ethnic affiliation as "tribalism" and self-defeating.

Given the location of the cities in relation to what were formerly called native or Bantu reserves (and in recent years homelands), the Black population in most urban centers tends to be relatively homogeneous. Thus Cape Town Blacks are largely Xhosa speaking, and those in Durban are mainly Zulu. In such Black communities differences of a sectional nature occur between subgroups of the more inclusive ethnolinguistic categories, for example, between Xhosa proper and Mfengu. The most important cleavage in homogeneous communities in the first half of the twentieth century, however, was between those who had committed themselves to education and a Western style of

life and those who clung to a more traditional form. By the third quarter of the twentieth century under the impact of the enforcement of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act's Section 10, the significant distinction in the urban areas—homogeneous or not—became that between Blacks with Section 10 rights and those without them. The differences between those oriented to some form of modernity and those turned to tradition became blurred. Income and education and therefore socioeconomic status became the crucial distinguishing mark.

Unlike most Black townships, Soweto (actually consisting of twenty-two townships) and other Black zones in the Johannesburg-Witwatersrand area were ethnically heterogeneous (see table 6, Appendix). Anthropologist Philip Mayer studied the relationship of class and ethnicity from the point of view of Section 10 residents of Soweto from 1965 to 1973. His study strongly suggests that "where Whites tend to lean on the idea of multiple Black ethnicities, which is supportive to White domination, it appears that most urban Blacks would for most purposes place their ethnicity second to class or status considerations, or they would substitute a single Black ethnicity."

The White emphasis on multiple Black ethnicity led the Department of Bantu Affairs to make ethnic segregation in the Soweto townships compulsory in 1955. They did not attempt to zone the townships in terms of the eight ethnic groupings then recognized but divided them by language groups—Nguni, Sotho, and others. By that time, however, at least half the townships were already ethnically mixed. Since then housing has been allotted on the basis of language grouping, but that applies to the head of the household and may not lead to the ethnolinguistic homogeneity envisaged by the authorities. It has been estimated that despite the expressed preference of many Blacks for intraethnic marriage, roughly one-third to one-half the recorded marriages in Soweto were mixed. The efforts of the authorities to segregate Blacks by language groups extended to the schools. Although more successfully carried out, this segregation engendered resentment and solidarity among the students rather than fragmentation. Such resentment has also been expressed by their elders with respect to mandatory residential segregation by language group. Even Blacks who may express a preference for neighbors who speak their own language (a view more common among women who do not work outside the home and consequently spend much time in the neighborhood) oppose it.

There are a number of contexts in which ethnic homogeneity occurs, although it may be a consequence of the situation rather than of preference. In neighborhoods that are zoned by language group, local sports clubs (mainly soccer teams) are likely to be homogeneous. But local athletes do not go out of their way to maintain ethnic homogeneity, and the ethnic barrier is easily breached. It is certainly ignored at the levels above the purely local one. Some church groups, particularly the so-called separatist churches of the Zionist

variety characterized by a synthesis of Christian and indigeneous elements of belief and ritual, are likely to be ethnically homogeneous. Main-line churches in Soweto—Methodist, Anglican, and Roman Catholic—almost invariably are not (see Religious Life, this ch.).

In Soweto the people likely to cluster with others who speak the same language are Blacks most recently from a rural background or those lacking education of any kind. Often they are migrants or are illegally in the township, although some long-time legal residents are included. The emphasis is not so much on ethnicity as on locality, however. Associating in an alien situation with what have been called "homeboys" (persons of the same section or, preferably, the same local community in the place of origin) has been common among newcomers but becomes less so with greater experience in the town.

It is entirely possible for well-educated Blacks to say that ethnicity means nothing to them or even to deride it and still spend much of their leisure time with persons who speak the same mother tongue. The possibility of easy camaraderie with speakers of the same language is conducive to this pattern but does not necessarily imply politically relevant ethnicity, and efforts by other Blacks to turn ethnicity into a political issue are likely to be resented by the educated.

The existence of the homelands near urban areas has promoted ethnicity as a lever for some who stand to benefit immediately by an ethnic emphasis. Thus when an ethnically mixed area was declared Tswana, the Tswana claimed preference in residential, job, and trading opportunities—a claim disputed by other Blacks on the grounds of both self-interest and ideology. In Durban some of the best educated Zulu showed more reluctance (in response to a questionnaire) to welcome non-Zulu as neighbors or to engage in contact with them than were less educated Zulu. Sociologist Brian du Toit has interpreted this reaction as suggesting that well-educated Zulu are interested in minimizing competition from the well-educated of other groups in the Zulu area, i.e., the homeland and its environs.

There were indications that by the mid-1970s educated Blacks (here comprising persons with a secondary education or more) were less prone than they had been formerly to deprecate traditional forms. Some, as a gesture stressing their Africanness, were prepared to be sympathetic to traditional practices. Such Blacks, however, dislike the use of these practices if they are perceived as divisive and may derogate groups such as the Venda and Shangaan-Tsonga who seem to cling to traditional forms because of ethnic parochialism.

Religious Life

The religious affiliations of South Africans are associated with their ethnic backgrounds and their social outlooks, but the linkage is neither simple nor uniform. Moreover the intensity of participation varies a good deal, although relatively few claim no religious affiliation at all. For some the affiliation is formal and routine, for others an important if not altogether dominant element of their world view. Given the South African situation, issues connected with race

and ethnic relations in one way or another enter into the life of religious groups. These issues range from questions of support for (or opposition to) segregation in organization, membership, and attendance at services to disputes over the moral implications of the entire social system. Some churches have formally or informally taken a position on these matters, but there have often been differences within church groups, some clergy and laity adopting a stance other than that of the majority.

The formal affiliation of the overwhelming majority of the South African population is with Protestant churches, but there is a considerable range among these with respect to modes of organization, doctrine, and ritual. The largest single Protestant denomination, but divided by race, is the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK—the Dutch Reformed Church; almost always referred to by its Afrikaans name). Clearly the dominant church among Afrikaners, the NGK is also attended by a substantial proportion of Coloureds and numbers of Blacks (see table 7, Appendix). In many cases a denomination may constitute a minority of a racial category (particularly of Blacks), but that category accounts for a majority or plurality of the denomination. Thus Methodists are only a substantial minority among Blacks, but the latter make up more than three-quarters of all Methodists.

The religious affiliation of the two largest segments of the Black population are comprehended within the census categories of separatist (independent) churches and other local indigenous religions. Independent churches of the same kind may be organizationally united or cooperative, but by and large they consist of autonomous units. Indigenous religions, associated as they are with specific groups, vary considerably in detail and are by definition institutionally separate.

Christianity and Its Variations

The Dutch Reformed churches, particularly the NGK, are the usual reference point for descriptions of religion in South Africa because they are the churches of the politically dominant and still ethnically self-conscious Afrikaners, because they have generally given their support to the social and political policies of the Nationalist government, and because their theology (in principle Calvinist) sets them apart in varying degrees from other Protestant churches and from Roman Catholicism. Presbyterians also have their historical basis in Calvinism, but their working theology and their role in South Africa differs from that of the Dutch Reformed groups.

The Dutch Reformed churches have by no means been uniform in their theology, nor have they sustained the same social outlook over the centuries. Theological disputes, differences in outlook, and the physical isola ion of elements of the Afrikaner population in the nineteenth century led to the establishment of two churches—the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk and the Gereformeerde Kerk van Suid-Afrika—separate from the original and still dominant NGK.

126

The two smaller churches seem to have lost membership to the NGK over the years.

The basic organization of the Dutch Reformed churches is presbyterial. Each congregation has some latitude in its operations, but policy and discipline are handled by regional synods (nine for the White churches) and by a general synod responsible for policy for the denomination as a whole. The Black and Coloured churches of the NGK have separate synods. The position of the NGK on separation in the church as well as on the issues connected with apartheid have been matters of dispute within the White segment of the denomination as well as between that segment and the Black and Coloured branches of the NGK (see The Churches, Race Relations, and the Political Order, this ch.).

Broadly, Calvinist doctrine asserts that God is eternal, infinite, perfectly wise and just, and the creator of all things. He has planned and willed all that exists or occurs, including the fate of each individual. Some—the elect—he has chosen to save. Those predestined for salvation can know that they are among the elect if they have faith and obey God's teachings, but they do so not because they choose to but because they have been chosen. If they do good works, it is because they have been saved, not in order to gain salvation. All that has been foreordained cannot be changed. Some Afrikaner Calvinists have extended the doctrine of predestination to encompass the idea that God has chosen particular peoples (in this case, the Afrikaners) for specific tasks and fates. This does not, however, imply that all Afrikaners are among the elect.

In the Calvinist view the doctrinal bases of Dutch Reformed religion (the Canons of Dort) flow directly from the Old and New testaments, which are the final authority in all religious matters. Other churches that also claim reliance on the Bible have, however, derived somewhat different requirements from these sources. In particular, most other denominations leave more room for the free will of the person in the search for salvation and provide for various acts and mechanisms that allow for the remission or forgiveness of sins.

There is little information on the extent to which members of any denomination fully believe in and are influenced by the official doctrines of the group. It has been generally agreed that church membership and participation have been more significant for the rank-and-file members of the Dutch Reformed churches than of some others, particularly among the Whites. But as Afrikaners have become increasingly urbanized and educationally and occupationally differentiated, church participation has become more routinized. It was still important for status, but religious precepts were less so as guides to behavior and world view.

Christianity among Blacks has a history of a little more than 150 years, missionary work having been carried on by a wide range of groups representing churches based in many European countries and North America. A few Blacks had been converted by the Dutch

Reformed churches in the nineteenth century when these churches still had a policy of including persons of all races in the same congregation. But the NGK and other Afrikaner churches did not attempt extensive missionary work until 1950 after the principle of apartheid had been established and endorsed by the church. The other denominations catering to Whites did not in general carry out missionary work among Blacks. That was left to missionary groups of the same denomination but stemming from outside South Africa. There are still links between African churches and European or American ones, but in most cases there is now a direct connection between all churches of a given denomination in the form of an overarching South African entity—even when South African law, the views of some White members, and geographical separation make de facto integration of particular churches difficult. This is obviously the case with the Roman Catholic Church and applies to the Methodists, most of whom belong to the Methodist Church of South Africa and to the Anglicans, all but a small number of whom are members of the Church of the Province of South Africa.

By the last quarter of the nineteenth century many of the Protestant missions were confronted by the first of the separatist movements in which Africans sought independence from White control. In most cases these independent churches continued to adhere to the basic doctrine and practice of the mission church. The chief difference was that they were run by Black clergy and laity. The newly independent churches were subject to a process of fission, often splitting as they grew. By the turn of the century these generally included the term African or Ethiopian in their names, and this variant of Black-led churches has been called the Ethiopian type by students of the phenomenon.

Another category of churches is called Zionist. The name "Zionist" derives from the initial missionary influence of the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion, an American group. The Apostolic Faith Mission also contributed to the doctrine and practice of these churches, which stressed divine healing, adult baptism by immersion, Christ's Second Coming, and baptism in the Holy Spirit. By the second decade of the twentieth century, Black leaders began to form independent churches, a process that has continued. Unlike the Ethiopian churches, Zionist churches are characterized by a mixture of Pentecostal and traditional African elements. There are, however, Black independent Pentecostal churches that follow the form and content of Pentecostal churches without the indigenous features.

Although the categories Ethiopian and Zionist provide a grasp of the features of many of the 2,500 to 3,000 Black independent churches, they do not exhaust the variations and overlapping of aspects of such churches. For example, some have a strong messianic component, and they vary in the extent to which they accept elements of specifically African practice (whether traditional or not).

128

In the view of some analysts, the independent churches have offered Africans opportunities for leadership and participation when such chances were lacking elsewhere in South African life. Some also saw them as having political implications, but they have not had direct political significance for some time, if they ever did. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, other more secular organizations became the channels for African political aspirations. Denominations with internal ties and White memberships have been more likely to be outspoken on political issues than have the independent churches.

The numerically most significant denomination among the Coloured population is the NGK, not surprising given the Dutch component in the origins of these people and the fact that most speak Afrikaans in the home. Even so the NGK—and the other reformed churches in very small numbers—accounted for only 29 percent of the Coloureds in 1970, and nearly half were rural in a population roughly three-quarters urban. The two next largest groups, Anglicans and Roman Catholics, together comprehending a quarter of the Coloured population, were largely urban. Although they, like other denominations, were to be found in every occupational and educational category, the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches, outspokenly opposed to apartheid, seemed to be particularly attractive to the educated and English-speaking Coloureds. The apostolic and Pentecostal churches, marked by a concern for the experience of personal salvation and characterized by the emotional participation of their congregations, comprised chiefly working-class members.

The Churches, Race Relations, and the Political Order

Two perspectives bearing on social and political matters may be found among White adherents of Christian churches. Each of these may also be reflected in positions taken by a denomination as a whole or by its leaders. One identifies a religious entity with a specific ethnic group; the other sees such an entity as a community characterized by obligations deriving from its religious outlook that override the local interests or concerns of a particular (in this case the White) segment of the membership. The first view, characteristic of many members of the Dutch Reformed churches and in varying degrees of the denominations themselves, sees the church as a defining element of the Afrikaner community and equates the destiny of one with the other. There are some churches and some members of every church who see the demands of the religious position they hold as transcending or irrelevant to mundane matters. In this view the task of the churches is the preaching of the gospel and that of their members is to seek salvation. In the South African context this has the effect of a church accepting, if not actively supporting, White dominance in the social and political orders.

A distinction may be drawn between the position of a denomination (or its leading figures) on social matters and the range of attitudes and behavior of its clerical and lay members. By the mid-1970s—and

in many cases much earlier—the major denominations except the Dutch Reformed churches had adopted a stance opposed to apartheid in its entirety or to many manifestations of it. The lengths to which these churches have gone to integrate their own services and facilities, sometimes in defiance of the law, varied, however. Moreover not all of the clergy and laity of these denominations have accepted their church's public position, and in some cases they have organized opposition to it.

In general the strongest antiapartheid position has been taken by the Roman Catholic Church. Since 1976 the church has insisted among other things on admitting children to its schools regardless of race. It had apparently succeeded in having its position accepted by the Natal and Cape provincial authorities but had been refused by the relevant authorities in Transvaal, possibly to the embarrassment of the national government which had nothing to gain from such a dispute over a handful of pupils. As of 1979 the Roman Catholic Church asserted that it would close its schools rather than keep them open as segregated institutions. Not all Catholics enthusiastically supported church policy, and one organization—the South African Catholic Defence League—strongly opposed it, condemned integration of schools, and urged that the church desist from protest in the secular arena and concentrate instead on propagating the faith.

Although White leaders of the Anglican Church (Church of the Province of South Africa) have spoken out in opposition to apartheid generally and on specific issues, there has been considerable disagreement as to tactics and on the desirable degree of direct involvement in politics. Thus the archbishop of Cape Town and head of the South African church in 1979 rejected "apparently unconditional support for, and identification of the church with, particular political movements, or governments for that matter." He seems to have been responding to Anglican support for some of the more radical and potentially violent opponents of the South African regime. On the other hand, two White Anglican priests asserted that the church was supporting the status quo and insisted that it "offer a concrete model of identification with Blacks in South Africa." Despite these and other differences among the White clergy of the Anglican Church, they were probably in general more liberal than many of their parishioners.

Although all major denominations in South Africa except the NGK have more Black than White members, the Methodists are particularly marked in this way, and the resolutions and actions of the annual conference of the Methodist Church are sometimes strongly influenced by some of its Black clergy. For example, in 1978 the annual conference adopted a resolution, clearly controversial, to examine ways in which Methodist chaplains could serve both the South African military and antiregime guerrillas. In 1979 the resolution had not been applied, and ways of applying it had not been determined.

Although not restricted to Methodists, the Christian League of

Southern Africa, opposed to the liberal social and political positions taken by Methodists and other churches, was headed in the late 1970s by a Methodist clergyman. There was some evidence that the organization received financial support from the government's Department of Information (defunct in 1979), but whether this was so or not, the organization probably reflected at least a minority of White clerical and lay Protestants (other than Dutch Reformed) who strongly supported the government's philosophy. To be distinguished from these were White Protestants who were not prepared in their public attitudes or daily behavior to support opposition to the apartheid system and were concerned chiefly to maintain their status and style of life. In general there has been a strong tendency among English-speaking Whites, who have made up the bulk of the White adherents of the major denominations other than the NGK, to be reticent in politically sensitive activities of their churches.

Many of the Protestant churches (but not the Dutch Reformed ones, except for the small Indian section of the NGK) have been members of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), whose head in the late 1970s and 1980 was an Anglican bishop, Desmond Tutu. A Black South African, Bishop Tutu took strong positions against the existing system, but he was in general supported by others in his own church and by those representing their churches in the SACC. According to the *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1979*, the annual conference of the SACC resolved to "offer moral encouragement to those who contravened race laws in order to commit themselves to interracial fellowship. It also resolved that it believed that churches should withdraw from cooperation with the State as far as possible. . . . In accordance with these resolutions the SACC's Justice and Reconciliation Division was instructed to examine the 'strategies of resistance' which should be adopted."

The SACC's positions (and those of their spokesmen, which sometimes went further) were criticized by some government officials and by the more conservative Afrikaans newspapers. By mid-1980, however, a delegation of SACC leaders including Bishop Tutu was able to meet with Prime Minister P. W. Botha and other Nationalist government leaders, an encounter described by Tutu as "the most encouraging meeting with the government in thirty years." The apparently conciliatory nature of the meeting reflected the Botha government's efforts to mitigate the most blatant aspects of the system in order to eliminate some of the bases for external criticism and the political and economic costs of the system (see Apartheid and Its Evolution, this ch.). But to the extent that the changes envisioned leave the basic system of White dominance intact, it is unlikely that the SACC's opposition to it will diminish. In any case, despite the meeting earlier in the year, Bishop Tutu persisted in his criticism of government policy and practice.

Of some interest but uncertain importance has been the position taken by some of the faculty and graduate students at Potchefstroom

University, long a center of the strongly Afrikaner-oriented Movement for Christian National Education and locus of a theological school for the smallest and theologically most conservative of the Dutch Reformed churches—the Gereformeerde Kerk. In the Koinonia Declaration, issued just before the 1977 election, the group, although accepting the concept of separate development, asked for the consolidation of "the homelands based on economic viability and governability." It also called for equal economic opportunities for Blacks outside the homelands, for an end to all barriers to "free dealings between people of different races and population groups, and for the participation of Blacks and other non-Whites in political decisions." Moreover the declaration was highly critical of the techniques (bannings, censorship, and the like) employed by the government against opposition. From time to time, critical voices of this kind have arisen in the Dutch Reformed churches but have had relatively little long-range effect. The signers of the declaration and those who have subsequently sought to support it in substance, the Afrikaner Calvinist Movement (Afrikaanse Calvinistiese Beweging—ACB), have their origins in a small church and are likely to be considered outsiders by most Afrikaners.

A good deal of attention has been given to the notion that a clear link exists between the theology of the Dutch Reformed churches—especially the NGK—and their views on social and political matters. It has been argued that the Calvinism of the NGK contributed to (if not generated) the conception of the Afrikaners as a chosen group, and that Calvinist doctrine is in some sense responsible for Afrikaner views not only of other races but also of other White ethnic groups and of themselves. The work of historical sociologist T. Dunbar Moodie and historian Irving Hexham has in different ways raised questions as to the validity of these widely reiterated views. The Dutch Reformed churches are generally Calvinist in doctrine, but the intensity of that Calvinism has varied historically. There have been important disputes over its meaning and nuance.

Whatever the intricacies and ambiguities of the relationship of Dutch Reformed doctrine to the NGK's historical views on politics—and despite some real conflicts over the meaning and social implications of Calvinism—an ideology of Afrikaner identity and ultimate triumph has developed. In it the perceived will and intentions of God and the notion of an Afrikaner Christianity have been important elements. The complete formulation of the ideology took some time and did not fully emerge until after the Anglo-Boer War, the experience of which contributed to its development. But explicit exposition of the ideas and emotions that entered into it can be traced to the last quarter of the nineteenth century and perhaps earlier.

Underlying Afrikaner ideology has been a world view and a rationale that Moodie calls the Afrikaner civil religion. Like many other religions, it has a sacred history, a theology, and a body of ritual. The theology has undergone change over the years and has been subject to dispute within the Afrikaner community, but it has

been important to the emergence and justification of the struggle for Afrikaner identity and domination. Its significance had diminished by the last quarter of the twentieth century because the goals to which it aspired have been achieved and because Afrikaners have become much differentiated in their status and outlook. Nevertheless the civil religion continues to have an effect on the way Afrikaners, especially the more conservative ones, see the world. Like many such systems it is available in times of stress as a bulwark against unpalatable change. Moreover it tends to constrain the language and argument of the more pragmatic members of the Afrikaner community who are prepared to accept change or see the necessity for it.

The crucial part of the sacred history is the period between the coming of the British in the early nineteenth century and the death of Jopie Fourie before a firing squad in 1914. Fourie had been one of those who rebelled against South Africa's entrance into World War I on the side of the British so soon after the Anglo-Boer War. The central aspects of that history are the Great Trek, the establishment of Boer republicanism, the Anglo-Boer War, and British persecution of the Boers, including the hanging of Boer rebels at Slachter's Nek. As Moodie summarizes the documents relevant to the construction of the sacred history, oppressed for twenty years by the British, the Afrikaners (Voortrekkers) left Cape Province for the north and freedom. On their way they were set upon by Black Africans and pursued by the British, but God delivered them out of the hands of their enemies. Their trials and tribulations were many, but in the end they triumphed and established their republics. The republican period was short-lived, however, as the discovery of gold and diamonds brought British imperialism to the north. In defense of their rights (as they understood them) the Afrikaners resisted, igniting the Anglo-Boer War, in which they were defeated by the overwhelming power and ruthlessness of the British.

The interpretation of this history and the specification of its implications constitute the theology of the civil religion. Central to that theology is the Afrikaner's concept of God. He is "sovereign and intensely active, busy at every turning point in the affairs of nations and men." God has chosen the Afrikaner people for a special destiny, and in this view the suffering of the people—whether at the hands of the British or the Zulu—is a testing of his chosen people and a sign of God's favor. In that testing the Afrikaner nation was truly forged. After the suffering comes deliverance.

The formation of the Boer republics was a first and temporary deliverance. After the Anglo-Boer War a second rescue was to be expected and achieved by the Afrikaners as a nation. This conception of the course of Afrikaner history as directed by God may be seen as undergirding the struggles of the Afrikaner people to survive—and to guarantee that survival by achieving political dominance in South Africa.

The ritual of the Afrikaner civil religion focuses on special places

and special occasions recalling the crucial events in the sacred history. There are many, but the two most important places have been the Vrouemonument (Women's Monument) near Bloemfontein and the Voortrekker Monument on a hill near Pretoria. The Vrouemonument is dedicated to the "memory of the 26,370 women and children who died in the concentration camps and to the other women and children who perished as a result of the War of 1899–1902." Generally it underlines the role of women in the sacred history of the Afrikaners. Their faith, purity, and moral fortitude sustained the Afrikaners in their perilous journey. The Voortrekker Monument commemorates the salient episodes and characters of the Great Trek in a set of statues, friezes, and bas-reliefs.

One of these episodes is the covenant of Blood River. Immediately preceding the battle of Blood River on December 16, 1838, in which they defeated the Zulu, Afrikaners swore to celebrate the day "to the glory of the Lord" if he granted the Voortrekkers victory. The Day of the Covenant (Geloftedag) is celebrated not only at the Voortrekker Monument but in all Afrikaner communities. Moodie quotes a 1945 editorial from an Afrikaner newspaper on the meaning of the day: "The Day of the Covenant is indeed the day of inspiration for the People. It is the day upon which the heartstrings of the People are tuned in harmony with the great Divine Plan here on the southern point of Africa."

The ideological aspect of the Afrikaner civil religion (that part of it prescribing specific actions and goals) was embodied in the movement that came to be called Christian Nationalism. Initially the movement emphasized the necessity for the continuation of Dutch Reformed Christianity in the face of the anglicization that seemed to threaten after the Anglo-Boer War. The Dutch Reformed churches (NGK) had come to see the survival of its form of Christianity as dependent upon the persistence of Afrikaners and of Afrikaans culture and language. Education stressing Dutch Reformed views, Afrikaans culture, and the link between God and the Afrikaners as a unique people was the centerpiece of the movement. Ultimately, particularly under the stimulus of the Broederbond (see Glossary), the survival of the *volk* (people) and their culture and religion were seen to depend on the existence of "a truly Afrikaans government for South Africa."

The special character of Afrikaans language, culture, and people meant difference from other Whites and of course from other races. In the latter case, Blacks and Asians were seen not only as different but inferior. (The status of the Coloured, then largely Dutch Reformed and Afrikaans speaking, was always a matter of ambivalence for many Afrikaners.) Given these assumptions or implications, Afrikaners had to be politically dominant and separate or their uniqueness would be contaminated and eventually lost. Specifically different (and inferior) people were to be educated in ways and with respect to content appropriate to them (see Education, this ch.).

In the course of the development of the Afrikaner civil religion

134

Vortrekker Monument in Pretoria commemorating
achievements of Boer frontier farmers
during the Great Trek of 1835–38
Courtesy South African Information Service

and Christian Nationalism, the NGK came to perceive itself as a
volksker (people's church) whose existence and meaning were
closely linked to the survival of the Afrikaner community. Dutch
Reformed religion in South Africa became a bulwark of the
Afrikaner drive for dominance rather than an independent source of
the religious and moral evaluation of the social and political order.
This is not to say that some NGK *dominees* and members of the laity
did not criticize the workings of the system, but the basic structure
was accepted. It was entirely possible for the NGK in the mid-1970s
to urge its members and the state to guard against racial discrimina-
tion but in the late 1970s to resist the repeal of the Mixed Marriages
Act and the request of Black and Coloured NGK clergy to integrate
the denomination.

Research in the 1970s suggested that those who were most closely
involved in the NGK tended to be the most conservative with respect
to their views of a social order based on separation of the races and
White domination. To the extent that such persons are likely to
make their voices felt through the church, the NGK has been a brake
on rather than an accelerator of change in the system. Some analysts

135

have suggested, however, that in the long run the NGK will follow the lead of the Nationalist government, even if the latter embraces a pragmatic rather than an ideological perspective on the social order.

There have been members of the clergy who have taken a highly critical position vis-à-vis the social and political system, but they have been essentially isolated. The most prominent of these has been Beyers Naude, who was instrumental in forming the Christian Institute of Southern Africa. Unlike the SACC, the Christian Institute had individuals rather than churches as members, thus giving a base to Dutch Reformed dissidents and permitting Roman Catholic priests to participate (the SACC is a Protestant group). By 1977, however, the Christian Institute's positions had led the Department of Justice to declare it an unlawful organization and to ban its leaders, including Naude. The outspoken Naude left the NGK and became a member of a Black Dutch Reformed church.

Beginning in the mid-1970s the Black, Coloured, and small Indian branches of the NGK have called for the unity of the churches in the denomination and have insisted that the NGK take a stand against apartheid. By 1980, convinced that the NGK had not moved and would not do so, clergy in the three churches had informally organized themselves into the Broederkring (Brothers' Circle) to provide a base for their activity and presumably for an ultimately unified church. Some among them were expressly in favor of cutting the ties between the NGK and the Black churches. The chief obstacle to such a break appeared to be a material one: the NGK as the parent church provided financial support to the others.

Indigenous Religions

The indigenous religious systems of South Africa's Black peoples emerged in the context of social systems that in 1980 persisted only in relatively fragmented and much changed forms. Traditional patterns of belief and ritual therefore no longer have the social structural supports and linkages that formerly characterized them. Only parts of those patterns, different in emphasis, are significant today. For example, some rituals directed to certain spirits may have involved lineages; others required the performance of chiefs in their priestly roles. For a number of reasons (among them urbanization and migratory labor), lineages are less cohesive, and chiefs—even if the positions exist—no longer have the same status. The rituals have either fallen into disuse or have taken on some other form, and a different kind of group may be the relevant congregation. Despite these changes, many aspects of these systems persist among rural peoples, and some affect the beliefs and practices of Christians, whether rural or urban.

Traditionally an indigenous religious system was specific to each section (tribe) of an officially recognized ethnolinguistic category. The differences in details of religious belief and practice from tribe to tribe within each category were sometimes minor (as among the groups constituting the Zulu), but sometimes more significant (as

among the historically more varied groups making up the Xhosa-speaking category). Taken together the peoples in the Nguni ethnolinguistic categories (Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi) differed in more important ways from the Sotho-speaking categories (North and South Sotho, Tswana) and from the Venda and Tsonga-Shangaan. These differences notwithstanding, there was a notable overall similarity in the significant spirits of all of the Southern Bantu-speaking peoples, in the powers these spirits were thought to have, and in the ways they were approached.

All the indigenous systems were concerned primarily with this world and with the effects of the spirits on the welfare of the living. Rituals were (and are) oriented to seeking the help or forebearance of the spirits in the search for the good life or to placating them if they were deemed responsible for the misfortune, e.g., illness, drought. There was a belief in an afterlife; rewards and punishments, however, occurred not in the hereafter but in the here and now. Closely associated with this notion of the role of the spirits was a view of the world leaving no room for chance. A specific person suffered affliction because a spirit was offended by an act (or failure to act) or because a witch or sorcerer was at work. An individual succeeded in some enterprise because of appropriate steps taken to deflect the malevolence of spirits or sorcerers or to gain the support of relevant spirits.

All indigenous religions recognized at least three orders or categories or spirits—a creator god (sometimes the same as or sometimes distinguishable from a "sky" god believed responsible for the natural phenomena), the ancestral spirits, and local and nature spirits. Such systems also included the conception that men and women could in different ways affect the welfare of others through inherent or acquired power (through witchcraft or sorcery). The most significant of the spirits were those of the ancestors.

The creator god was usually remote, did not control or even involve himself in human affairs, and was rarely the object of ritual in his role as creator. In some groups the creator god was thought to be responsible for such dramatic manifestations of nature as storms and floods. In other groups a "sky" god (or a different manifestation of the creator god) was the source of both harmful and helpful natural phenomena. Rituals directed to the god, even in this form, were infrequent, although some observers have noted prayerful utterances to him by individuals. Among the influences of Christianity—even on the people who remain primarily adherents of indigenous forms—was growing saliency of the creator god in their belief systems.

Nature spirits were highly localized and varied from group to group, tending to be associated with features of the landscape (rivers, caves, mountains, and the like). Occasionally such spirits were identified with the ancestors (as among the Mpondo, a Xhosa-speaking group) or with people thought to have inhabited the land long before its present occupants (as among some Tswana groups). More often they had no such link and functioned, in anthropologist

W.D. Hammond-Tooke's words, "to provide explanations for aspects of the environment which, for various reasons, instill an emotion of awe and a sense of the uncanny."

The core of indigenous South African religions consisted of the beliefs and rituals connected with the spirits of the ancestors and that core was linked to the structure of the social order. On the one hand, social groupings of specific kinds were coterminous with or otherwise determined the congregations that were involved in particular rituals. On the other hand, relations within and between social groups or between individuals in socially determined relations (spouses, brothers, etc.) generated the kinds of problems and tensions that were manifested in afflictions sometimes attributable to the ancestral spirits.

When explicitly asked or in the course of generalizing about the ancestors, people have traditionally spoken of them as benevolent and concerned with the welfare of the descendants. Nevertheless the frequency with which the wrath of the ancestors was held responsible for illness and other afflictions suggests that although not necessarily malevolent, they tended to be, in Hammond-Tooke's words, "capricious, jealous and easily offended." Failure to feed them (a complaint characteristic of Nguni ancestors), to remember them by the performance of regular ritual, and to conform to the requirements of custom incurred their anger. Ancestors made their wishes known to their descendants either through illness or dreams; sometimes they took the form of animals and the sudden appearance of one in or near a residential area raised questions as to the reason for its presence. However the ancestors manifested themselves, the meaning of the manifestation was often uncertain, and a diviner often was called upon to determine the nature of the complaint and sometimes to specify the remedy.

There was a good deal of variation from one group to another as to the ancestors specifically invoked at any ritual. Broadly, among the Nguni where the lineage was of considerable genealogical depth and of general social, political, and economic importance, the ancestors of the lineage as a whole (or a particular segment of it) were called upon, although specific ancestors might be named. Among the Sotho where the lineage is very shallow or nonexistent, particular ancestors were invoked. In these largely patrilineal societies, the relevant ancestors were usually males traced through males. Among the Tsonga, Venda, and Lobedu (a group sometimes classified with the North Sotho but different in a number of respects), ancestors traced through the mother of the person on whose behalf the ritual was being performed were also thought to be relevant to his or her welfare. Often women were considered to be subject to the influence of two sets of ancestors, those of her husband's lineage and those of the patrilineal group from which she stemmed.

Of several possible classifications of rituals and occasions, those formulated by anthropologist Monica Wilson and employed by

Hammond-Tooke provide a useful perspective. One class consists of kinship rituals, the other of communal rituals.

Rituals of kinship are those in which the congregation is a patrilineage or a family group (a set of related nuclear and polygynous families). In these rituals the spirits of the ancestors of the congregation (or of specific members) are called upon. There are no specialized priests. The person officiating is usually the senior male in the kin group. Rituals of kinship are either regular or contingent. Regular rituals are those carried out on well-established occasions and are virtually all connected with stages (changes of status) in the life cycle of individuals—birth, initiation, marriage, and death. On these occasions emphasis is placed on the solidarity and harmony of the kin group, living and dead. A diviner, called upon to explain some misfortune (usually illness), may well offer the failure to carry out such a ritual as the reason for the ancestor's wrath.

Contingent rituals are those carried out to expiate an act offensive to the ancestors. Almost invariably such ritual occur only when a diviner, consulted because a member of the kin group has suffered an illness or some other misfortune, attributes the misfortune to an ancestral spirit.

Typically a ritual (whether regular or contingent) includes invocation, prayer, and an offering, whether in the form of a libation of beer and grain, a sacrificed animal, or both. The congregation usually joins the ancestors in partaking of the offering, in effect a form of communion between the dead and their living descendants. Ritual killings may also be made by way of thanks to the ancestors for a successful venture (a long trip or a safe return from a period as a migratory laborer).

Traditionally communal rituals were those performed to guarantee the welfare of the chiefdom (or tribe) as a whole and were usually carried out by the chief, often with the assistance of certain specialists, e.g., rainmakers. The rituals were concerned with such matters as the bringing of rain, the prevention of lightning and hail, and enhancement of fertility of the land, and the festival of the first fruits (celebration of the harvest).

Among most Nguni-speaking groups and the Shangaan-Tsonga, the festival of the first fruits (which according to Hammond-Tooke was organized to underline the order of genealogical and political seniority in the chiefdom) was closely followed by or combined with rituals intended to strengthen the chief and his army. For obvious reasons, the latter rituals have fallen by the wayside.

In general, communal rituals were directed toward the royal ancestors who were, however, expected to act on behalf of the chiefdom as a whole. In a few cases, such as among the Venda and the Pedi, the creator god or his agent were believed responsible for the rain, and the ritual was directed to him.

As part of their attempt to explain and deal with events in the natural world and between human beings, indigenous systems also invoked the ideas of witchcraft and sorcery, both involving the actions

139

of human beings. The assumptions underlying the difficulties attributed to ancestral spirits were that, whatever their vagaries, these spirits acted primarily because their descendants had failed in some way. In short, the sufferer (or one for whom he or she was responsible) was guilty of some sort of transgression. Underlying the attribution of suffering to witchcraft or sorcery was the assumption that the perpetrator, not the sufferer, was to blame.

The terms witchcraft and sorcery refer to two different kinds of persons and powers. The distinction is found in most South African groups although it is not usually marked linguistically—a general term comprehends both. Briefly, a witch is one who harms another by exercising a psychic force; a sorcerer uses drugs, herbs, and the manipulation of material things deriving from or connected with the victim. Generally the capacity for witchcraft is inherited. In all groups it may be attributed to women and men, although actual accusations are more frequently directed against women. Sorcerers are generally men who acquire the requisite medicines from diviners or herbalists. No psychic power is required, although in some groups the tendency to practice sorcery and some of the skills involved are believed to be passed from father to son.

Among a few peoples the powers of witchcraft are thought to be employed unconsciously. In most cases, however, the witch is thought to act consciously and malevolently. She exercises her powers at night, either by having her spirit leave her body or through familiars (specific kinds of animals or mythical beings) who do her bidding. Often female witches are thought to act against members of the kin group into which she has married (or against other women married into the group). Sorcery is in all cases an explicit act and like witchcraft is considered antisocial but is directed by men against those they consider their enemies, typically but not always outside the kin group.

Given a world view that assumed the possibility of harm from several sources, ways of dealing with misfortune were incorporated into the system, preferably by warding it off, otherwise by seeking its cause and cure. Preventing the wrath of the ancestors or, better yet, gaining their benevolent support demanded the performance of regular rituals of kinship when they were called for and also the carrying out of one's responsibilities to living kin. Life's exigencies (particularly in modern times when members of the kin group may be scattered), however, may preclude meeting one's obligations, in which case rituals of expiation are performed if the diviner's diagnosis calls for them. To ward off the harm that may be caused by the often capricious behavior of local (or nature) spirits, the services of an herbalist may be engaged. One purchases from the herbalist items considered effective in preventing economic disaster, such as damage to crops by hail or losses by theft, and places them in the appropriate places near the homestead or in a cultivated plot.

The herbalist is also the source for amulets, philters, and potions intended to further the intentions of the purchaser. One seeking

success as a lover, as a party in a court case (to soften the heart of the judge), and the like acquires a remedy from an herbalist. The use of such potions is widespread not only among rural adherents to the indigenous religious system but also among many urban Christians. An herbalist is not thought to have mystical powers but to have a body of knowledge of varying scope. Some have substantial reputations and a wide repertory of remedies; others are limited to a narrow range of items restricted in their use to a few situations. In urban circumstances the provision of such remedies has become a straightforward commercial venture in which not only Blacks but also some Asians engage.

The failure to achieve one's ends (for example, as a lover) may simply mean that the remedy used was either ineffective or that the potion chosen by an opponent, e.g., in an athletic contest, was more effective. It is not necessary to assume that someone has acted in an evil way. In some cases, however, where measures for the preservation of health have failed, it may be assumed that a witch or a sorcerer has had the power to overcome them. It is at that point that a diviner is called in.

The diviner has remained the most important religious specialist in indigenous systems. Communal and kinship rituals are carried out by persons who assume the role of priest as a consequence of another status (that of chief or lineage senior). Rainmakers are specialists but are called upon relatively infrequently. Most diviners are called to the role and, if they acquire any kind of reputation, work at their calling fairly often. Among the Nguni, diviners and herbalists are usually different persons. In Sotho groups the two roles are often combined in the same person.

Diviners may be classified by their mode of recruitment, their techniques, or their specialties. Among the Nguni (and through Nguni influence, among some Sotho and Tsonga) a diviner—usually a women—is called by undergoing a specific kind of illness, which is interpreted (by a diviner) as indicative of the calling. Apprenticeship follows—for as long as two years. The most important technique acquired is that of dancing in such a way as to induce a trance. The trance permits communication with the diviner's ancestral spirits who are believed to be the source of her diagnosis. Also among the Nguni (and the more typical form among the Sotho) are to be found other kinds of diviners who are likely to make a more conscious decision to learn the craft and who rely on the reading of such things as dice and knuckle bones to diagnose the source of a client's problems. Typically such diviners hold a session in which not only the client but also kinfolk and perhaps neighbors are present. The diviner makes inquiries about the symptoms and some of the circumstances of the illness or other misfortune and uses her audience's response to her interpretations of the thrown dice (or other material aid) to develop her diagnosis. In effect a diviner considered successful is one who is shrewd enough to interpret the client's situation in light of the tensions and conflicts he or she discerns.

Education

Probably no societal institutions in South Africa reflect the apartheid philosophy more clearly than those in the field of education. Unlike the patterns found in other countries, South Africa has four separate and distinct education systems, each one serving members of the population's four official racial categories. Each system is essentially complete in itself and comprises primary schools; academic, vocational, and technical secondary schools; teacher training institutions; and institutions of higher education. Regarded by the National Party as a vital element of the country's established social order, the separate systems have been carefully designed and nurtured to serve as a training ground for perpetual social control.

Administrative control of the four systems is vested in three different governmental agencies. The provincial governments play the major role in primary and secondary education for Whites and in White teacher training. The central government's Department of National Education concerns itself with higher education and advanced technical training for Whites and determines general education policy for Whites throughout the system. Roughly half the cost of primary and secondary education is financed by the provinces, and the central government provides the rest of the required funds.

The Black education system is administered by the Department of Education and Training in Pretoria, which controls the policies of all Black schools except those that exist in Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda. In the latter three jurisdictions the education systems are administered locally but in coordination with the department in Pretoria, which provides assistance as required.

The education of Coloureds and Asians is in the hands of the central government's Department of Internal and Constitutional Affairs. The department controls education for students in their respective racial categories from the primary level through higher education. Although educational separation of the two groups is maintained generally, there are exceptions—notably in areas of Cape and Transvaal provinces—where Asian students often are permitted to attend Coloured schools as a matter of practical expediency.

To understand how this complicated situation came about, it is necessary to examine briefly the historical development of the South African educational tradition. Organized schools were established early in the history of Cape Colony, largely as the result of the early Dutch Reformed Church's requirement that communicants be able to read the Bible. By the 1700s there were a number of elementary schools run by parish clerks, and farmers also engaged traveling tutors (*meesters*) to conduct schools for their children. Education was limited to the fundamentals of reading, writing, and arithmetic, and little interest in learning existed beyond that level.

A detailed program for a system of elementary, secondary, and teacher training schools developed in 1805 but was interrupted by the British takeover in 1806. The British, in an effort to spread the use of English, extended the school system to the country areas. The

142

two dozen schools that operated in rural districts by 1827, however, failed to meet the needs of the largely Afrikaner people, partly because English was the language of instruction and partly because material in the British-produced textbooks had little relevance to country life in southern Africa. School attendance subsequently declined, and in 1843 the government began giving financial assistance to rural schools attended by Afrikaans-speaking children in an effort to increase their proficiency in English. By the end of the nineteenth century Afrikaans had largely been eliminated as the language medium in schools in larger towns and in secondary education, but its use persisted in the rural classrooms.

Efforts to educate Black Africans were undertaken by European missionaries in the early 1800s. Missionary stations were established in the Eastern Cape where they taught the Xhosa to read and write, mainly in English. Other stations in the area of Natal carried out similar programs among the Nguni speakers. In 1841 a seminary was founded in the Eastern Cape to train Black African teachers. Financial assistance was given these schools by the government, which considered their educational work as a valuable tool in efforts to pacify the indigenous African areas.

The mission schools in Cape Colony and Natal originally had no color bar, and White, Coloured, and Black children often attended the same public schools, particularly in the lower primary grades. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, separate schools gradually developed for White students, whereas mission schools provided education for Coloured children. In the Orange Free State and Transvaal, separate education for White and Black pupils existed from the start, although Coloured children of lighter skin tones could be found attending White schools. By 1910, the year of union, it was general practice in all four provinces for White and non-White children to attend different schools. Those for White pupils were financed and administered by the provinces, whereas the rest were operated by the missions with state aid.

In the late nineteenth century, the language medium used in the schools became a subject of considerable controversy for the White population. In the urban areas Whites were largely English speakers, and instruction was predominantly in English. Moreover, after the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), many teachers were brought to South Africa from Britain. Few of them learned Afrikaans, and Afrikaans-speaking children were mostly taught in English. Many Afrikaners demanded instruction in their mother tongue but, often for financial reasons, the state was unable to introduce bilingualism in the schools or set up separate unilingual ones.

By 1940, however, Transvaal and Orange Free State, which were dominated by Afrikaners, had made use of the mother tongue compulsory in primary schools. The medium to be used in secondary schools was left to a decision by parents based on local conditions, but this policy was changed after the political victory of the National Party in 1948. A strong advocate of unilingual schools, the

Nationalist government made mother-tongue instruction compulsory in primary and secondary schools in Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Cape provinces, where provincial officials decided the mother tongue of the student. A similar policy was applied in Natal Province, but parents retained the right to decide which language would be used by the schools. Regardless of the medium chosen, the country's second official language was taught essentially as a foreign language in all schools, and upon completion of secondary school all students were expected to be proficient in both Afrikaans and English.

Underlying the Nationalists' insistence on mother-tongue instruction was the education philosophy known as Christian National Education (CNE), which was unofficially implemented as education policy. According to CNE's principal thesis, all peoples have their own distinctive culture, which education was expected to strengthen. As applied to the education of Afrikaner children, the term "Christian" meant an outlook on life and the world founded on the Holy Scripture and the articles of faith of the various Afrikaans churches. The term "National" was defined as love of one's own things, including country, language, history, and culture. All school subjects—religion, geography, history, science, and other topics—were to be taught in the spirit of and in line with these concepts.

CNE maintained that the Black education system should be based on the principles of trusteeship and segregation, and that it should not be placed on the level of the White system. According to CNE advocates, education should help Blacks develop their own interpretation and acceptance of Christian and national values. It should lead to a self-supporting Black community capable of providing for itself in all ways. The mother tongue should also be the basis for educational instruction, but the country's two official languages should be learned as the means to cultural advancement. Teaching and teacher training would be carried out by Blacks—but under the control and guidance of the state. In this process, however, Black education would not be at the expense of White education.

Under CNE the control of education in primary and secondary schools belonged to the parents and was formalized through organized bodies such as school boards. These bodies nominated the teachers and supervised their teaching. The spirit and trend of education were overseen by the churches, although academic standards and a good portion of the financing of education were considered the responsibility of the state. School boards existed in all provinces except Natal. Most of the small towns in Cape Province, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal had Afrikaans-medium schools. In these towns the local Afrikaans church predikant (pastor) was usually the school board chairman, and the concepts of CNE were an overriding force. In the view of some observers, the emphasis on CNE tended to isolate students in such schools from the mainstream of modern Western thought.

A version of CNE was advocated at the end of the Anglo-Boer War by the Afrikaans churches in an effort to raise the morale of the

defeated Afrikaners. It was then primarily a demand for separate state-aided church schools where Afrikaner children could be taught Calvinist doctrine and instruction carried out in Afrikaans. The effort was unsuccessful, and agitation for CNE gradually subsided as the churches grew increasingly influential on school committees. The idea of CNE was revived during the conflict over language-medium use in the 1940s, by the most conservative of the Afrikaans churches, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk.

When the more extensive and stronger CNE program was made public in 1948, protests from various educational groups and the general public were widely voiced. Afrikaner teachers' associations, however, supported the program, as did the Afrikaans press, although many prominent individual Afrikaners expressed opposition. Since then the National Party has disavowed on occasion that CNE is official party policy, but CNE principles were adopted in Orange Free State and Transvaal and had considerable influence in parts of Cape Province. Natal, however, consistently refused to accept CNE.

From 1910 until the mid-1960s education of both Coloureds and Asians was under the control of provincial departments of education. But administration then passed to the central government, as education of Blacks had in 1953. Handled by different departments within the bureaucratic structure, the systems lacked sufficient coordination, although national syllabi had been introduced in an attempt to standardize the scope of education for the non-White pupils. Coordination of syllabi and curricula within the White system was even less coordinated, owing to the variations that occurred within the four provinces before 1967. Most White schools sought to equip students at primary through secondary levels with academic training that would prepare them for ultimate entry into a university. Little attention was given to the needs of those who would enter the job market before reaching the system's tertiary stage.

Parliament's passage of the National Education Policy Act of 1967 sought to correct the deficiencies in the White system. The act established certain guiding principles for education in White primary and secondary schools, and many of the same provisions were incorporated in similar legislation governing the operation of non-White schools. Primarily the 1967 act specified that education was to have both a Christian and a broad national character, although the religious beliefs of parents and pupils with regard to religious instruction and ceremonies were to be respected. The act's inclusion of the terms "Christian" and "national character" aroused public concern at the time the legislation was under consideration because of their earlier use in the CNE program that had drawn protests by English-speaking Whites in 1948. The minister of national education, however, gave assurance to the House of Assembly in 1967 that the government had no intention of imposing CNE.

The act stipulated that education was to be free, including books and stationery for full-time students in state and provincially controlled schools, if their parents were citizens of—or lived in—South

145

Africa. Either English or Afrikaans was to be used as the medium of instruction, depending on the students' mother tongue (later referred to as the home language). Gradual adjustment was to be permitted if existing practices were at variance with this provision. Compulsory education requirements, school age limits, syllabi, curricula, and examination standards were made uniform throughout the four provinces. The act provided for uniformity of teachers' conditions of service and salary scales and stipulated that planning would take into consideration the views and recommendations of officially recognized teachers' associations.

As a result of the 1967 act and similar legislation governing the structure of education for non-Whites, South African primary and secondary schools subsequently have followed a four-phase program that requires twelve years for completion. The structure is identical in the case of the White and Asian systems, but there are variations in the number of years devoted to the four phases in the Black and Coloured systems (see fig. 15).

The ultimate goal established in all four systems is to prepare students to attain the Matriculation Certificate, which can be acquired only after completion of the senior secondary phase. To matriculate students must fulfill certain curriculum requirements as well as obtain a passing score in a written examination. All students, regardless of racial category, take the same examination, and success qualifies the individual for entrance into some form of higher education, a technikon (advanced technical school), or simply the assurance of a better job with a livable wage. Students who do not complete the requirements for matriculation may receive the Senior Certificate, which indicates completion of the senior secondary phase. In Black and Coloured schools students who do not go beyond primary school or the junior phase of secondary school may receive appropriate certificates attesting to successful completion of those levels.

During the 1970s roughly 90 percent of all White students at primary and secondary levels attended schools operated by the provincial departments of education, and the rest were enrolled in private institutions. School attendance is compulsory for Whites between the ages of seven and sixteen or until they have matriculated or have received a Senior Certificate at the end of Standard 10. In keeping with compulsory education, all government-sponsored education for White students through secondary school is free, including textbooks and paper. Education is also compulsory and free for Coloureds aged seven to sixteen who have not passed Standard 8 and for all Asians between the ages of seven and fifteen. It has long been the government's aim to ensure that all Black children receive at least four years of education (through the lower primary phase), but attainment of this goal has not been easy for most Black families who until mid-1979 had to pay fees for their children's education. Although the fees were modest by national standards, many families were unable to afford the cost, and as a result many Black children

146

(A) STRUCTURE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION

(B) STRUCTURE OF SECONDARY AND PRIMARY EDUCATION

		White and Asian	Coloured [5]	Black
12	Standard 10	Senior Secondary Phase	Senior Secondary Phase	Senior Secondary Phase
11	Standard 9	Senior Secondary Phase	Senior Secondary Phase	Senior Secondary Phase
10	Standard 8	Junior Secondary Phase	Junior Secondary Phase	Junior Secondary Phase
9	Standard 7	Junior Secondary Phase	Junior Secondary Phase	Junior Secondary Phase
8	Standard 6	Junior Secondary Phase	Junior Secondary Phase	Junior Secondary Phase
7	Standard 5	Junior Secondary Phase	Senior Primary Phase	Higher Primary Phase
6	Standard 4	Senior Primary Phase	Senior Primary Phase	Higher Primary Phase
5	Standard 3	Senior Primary Phase	Senior Primary Phase	Higher Primary Phase
4	Standard 2	Senior Primary Phase	Senior Primary Phase	Lower Primary Phase
3	Standard 1	Junior Primary Phase	Senior Primary Phase	Lower Primary Phase
2	Substandard B	Junior Primary Phase	Junior Primary Phase	Lower Primary Phase
1	Substandard A	Junior Primary Phase	Junior Primary Phase	Lower Primary Phase

[1] M Master's level and postgraduate diplomas

[2] Hons Honors level and postgraduate diplomas There are honors degrees following only a few four-year bachelor's degrees, such as the Honors Bachelor of Engineering at the University of Stellenbosch

[3] Advanced level technical schools

[4] Entrance to correspondence colleges, technical institutes, technical colleges and some types of nursing and teacher training courses can occur either at or before the end of completion of Standard 8.

[5] Published sources do not agree on the divisions in Coloured education

Source: Adapted from David J. Cranmer and Valerie A. Woolston, *Southern Africa*, Washington, 1980, pp. 6–7.

Figure 15. Structure of South African Education Systems, 1980

dropped out before completing Standard 2. The Education and Training Act of 1979 rescinded the fee-paying requirement. As with White students, most of the young people in the other racial categories attend schools administered by provincial education departments or by agencies of the central government. Blacks living in the homelands that have achieved self-governing or independent status receive some education there.

In 1979 roughly 5.3 million students of all racial categories attended a total of 16,025 primary and secondary schools and were taught by nearly 148,000 teachers (see table 8, Appendix). A system

of differentiated education had been introduced in all schoc¹ ·¹
1972 in an effort to stem complaints that schools were only ◦ ..-
cerned with preparing students for university enrollment. Under
differentiated education a variety of courses are offered students
who are more interested in specialized vocational training than in
higher education.

The government's insistence on the use of the mother tongue as
the language of instruction through Standard 10 has resulted in
some separation of White schools into those that serve the Afrikaner
communities and those that serve children of the English speakers.
Nonetheless both official languages must be mastered to a usable
degree by all White students. The mother tongue requirement in
Black schools is enforced only through Standard 2, after which
pupils are instructed in the official language of the parents' choos-
ing. Most choose English as the medium of instruction. Pretoria's
earlier insistence on the dual use of English and Afrikaans in Black
secondary schools was dropped after the Soweto riots of 1976, a
period of antiapartheid demonstrations triggered by imposition of
the Afrikaans requirement (see The Soweto Riots, ch. 1).

Even with gradual improvements in the non-White systems dur-
ing the late 1970s, foreign observers and a growing number of White
South African educators have continued to be critical of the
disparities in the four systems routinely categorizing them as
"separate but unequal." Factors that are written about frequently
include the chronic shortage of classrooms for the increasing non-
White school population, the shortage of qualified teachers, the lack
of equipment and other facilities to permit adequate instruction on a
modern scale, the racially based disparities in teachers' salaries, and
the lower per capita expenditures devoted to Black education. But
the most common criticism has been leveled at the Nationalist
government's refusal to integrate the four education systems and
thus make the best use of facilities and funds available to meet na-
tional needs. Throughout the 1970s the White population continued
to decline in numbers while the Black component increased even
more rapidly. In these circumstances the segregated White schools
are often underutilized while vast numbers of non-Whites are
denied an education for want of classrooms. Many Blacks, Asians,
and Coloureds are subjected to half days of instruction as teachers
attempt to serve large school populations through double sessions,
often referred to as the platoon system.

Funding of the four separate systems has imposed a great financial
burden on the various levels of government, and disparities continue
to exist. In fiscal year (FY) 1977–78, for example, the per capita
expenditure for educating a Black student in primary or secondary
school (R54) was roughly one-tenth of the R551 spent on a White
student (see table 9, Appendix). In 1980 the Department of Educa-
tion and Training's budget of R240 million for improvements in
Black schools was heralded as a great step forward, and the govern-
ment pointed out that the budgets for FY 1978–79 and FY 1979–80

represented increases of 26 and 32 percent, respectively. But when measured against Pretoria's admission that at least R70 million would be needed just to eliminate double-session teaching and that an additional R50 million was needed for other new schools, the latest increase was obviously insufficient for the task.

According to the Department of Education and Training's public relations office, public works projects have been scheduled for the building of thirty-three new Black secondary schools by the end of 1985, and major increases in vocational and technical education for Blacks are also being undertaken. Despite these planned improvements, many South Africans remain skeptical that the effort may have started too late. According to an April 1980 issue of *Financial Mail*, a respected Johannesburg business periodic , "the important point is not the percentage increase in educational spending—which is in any event from a low base—but whether the quantum is sufficient in the first place to educate the existing African [Black] population and meet the employment needs of commerce and industry."

According to data on Black education published by Dr. Franz Auerbach, a noted White South African educator, only 55 percent of all Blacks between the ages of seven and nineteen were in school in 1970 compared with 95 percent of Whites of the same age span. During the same period 34 percent of all Whites of high school age were attending secondary schools as opposed to 4.6 percent of the Blacks. Although the secondary school attendance rate for Blacks rose to 14 percent in 1980, that number was obviously too low in a country with a growing need for increased numbers of technically skilled workers. In 1979 about 23,000 Blacks matriculated, and another 50,000 were expected to do so in 1980. But such numbers are hardly sufficient to have much effect on the shortage of skilled workers (758,000 by 1990, as estimated by manpower researchers at the Chamber of Mines). As the need for skilled workers grows, South African educators and industrialists foresee that more and more Blacks will be expected to fill these specialized jobs—particularly because the demand is rising faster than is the growth of the White population.

In light of this threat to continued industrial well-being, Auerbach and other South African educators and businessmen have tried to impress the Nationalist government with the need to abandon its insistence on segregated education and to take appropriate actions to alleviate the threatened worker shortage. For them and many other observers, improvement of the Black system of education represents the basic step in the process. As Auerbach has pointed out, about 40 percent of the pupils who enrolled in primary school from 1972 to 1975 dropped out before reaching Standard 2, largely for reasons of poverty. The loss of these 250,000 pupils, in Auerbach's words, "deprives South Africa of a huge number of potential skilled workers."

Apparently recognizing the insufficiencies of its education systems when balanced against national needs, the government of Prime Minister P. W. Botha announced in late 1980 that compulsory—and

149

free—education for the country's 8 million Black children would be introduced in 1981. According to the plan, this radical change would be phased in over a period of several years, and the initial effort would be undertaken in the Black townships of Saulsville, Atteridgeville, and Mamelodi in the vicinity of Pretoria and in similar locations near Krugersdorp, Potchefstroom, and Orkney in the Transvaal industrial complex. Recognizing that compulsory education for Blacks will be expensive, the government has started a program that the private research company, Syncom, estimates will cost over R4 billion by the year 2000. But the financial burden of maintaining four separate education systems has never been easily accommodated.

Although most of the country's education problems are centered in the primary and secondary schools, apartheid's permeation of the universities has exacerbated the issue of separate education in South Africa. University education was first formally authorized with the founding of the University of the Cape of Good Hope in 1873. At that time this institution was primarily an examining body, and actual university-level education was conducted at colleges located in Cape Town and Stellenbosch. From this beginning the higher education system had expanded by 1980 into ten residential universities—almost exclusively restricted to White students—one nonresidential institution offering degrees to all racial groups through correspondence courses, four universities for Blacks, one for Coloureds, and one for Asians. Enrollment statistics leave little doubt that in South Africa higher education is clearly the domain of the White community (see table 10, Appendix).

Until 1953, when the Bantu Education Act transferred control of Black schools to the central government, it was possible for Black students who met university entrance requirements to enroll in any White institution of higher learning. Although the numbers were small, enrollments were sufficient to provide the Black community with its own professional personnel and political leaders. After 1953 most qualified Blacks were obliged to attend the institutions set aside for their separate use, even though they offered limited curricula. Since then non-Whites with high qualifications have been admitted in limited numbers to the White universities but only if the courses they require are not available at institutions reserved for their own races. Among those with the largest non-White enrollments are the University of Cape Town, the University of the Witwatersrand, and the University of Natal. Most non-Whites, however, take advantage of the nonresidential University of South Africa's correspondence courses. But the decision to enroll in this institution deprives students of the valuable experience to be gained from academic intercourse in a classroom atmosphere and offers little substitute for the learning that arises from work in laboratories and seminars.

In the higher education system that existed before 1953, many of Africa's future leaders received their education in Black South African institutions such as the University of Fort Hare at Alice in

150

the Ciskei homeland. Among these alumni are Malawi's President Hastings Banda, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, and Botswana's late president, Seretse Khama. Since 1953, however, few Blacks in other African countries have sought entry to South African universities, largely because of the deterioration in educational quality and the reduction in available courses of study. The results of these changes were evident in the fact that in 1980 the Black township of Soweto with its estimated 1.5 million population had only eight Black physicians, two Black dentists, and no residents who were qualified by education and training in the other commonly needed professions.

Health

Except for the anomalies in education, there has been no greater paradox in South Africa than in the disparities long evident in the state of health of its diverse peoples. On the one hand most Whites live longer than those of the other three population categories because of better diet, easier access to modern medical facilities, and higher standards of living. They also benefit from a health care system that, particularly in urban areas, rivals those of the most advanced countries of the world. On the other hand the vast majority of the people—mainly the Blacks and others of low income—are victims of an above-average incidence of largely preventable diseases, endemic malnutrition, high rates of infant mortality, and inadequate health services.

These inequities have long been the subject of disapprobation by the international community and even some members of the country's own medical profession. In a March 1979 document the UN's Department of Political and Security Council Affairs charged that "apartheid has generated a dual pathology of poverty and violence which prevents South Africa from achieving an optimal level of health" for its entire population. In addition, "forced population removals, migrant labour, lack of freedom of expression, and the daily threat of Government harrassment have led to high rates of mental illness and stress-related chronic diseases." For several decades statistical data have revealed only those facts that have indicated growing improvements within the system. In the absence of certain data the government in Pretoria has been quick to point out that all inhabitants are required to register births and deaths and to notify proper authorities when they contract any of a long list of reportable diseases. The Department of Health explains the absence of such information regarding Blacks as a general failure to comply with the regulations. Foreign medical authorities counter with the charge that Pretoria has chosen to ignore enforcement of the regulations in order to avoid compilations of less than favorable statistics.

As information published by the government exemplifies, extensive modern medical services of high quality exist in all cities and larger towns, and government-sponsored health clinics operate in most rural areas. The urban facilities offer health services equal to

151

those available anywhere, and the government provides funds and assistance to its program of public health service for those inhabitants who cannot afford private care. Many private organizations and individuals are also actively engaged in combating disease and ill health among all elements of the population. Major contributions are made by the municipalities, church organizations, missionary societies, the mining industry, and a wide range of private welfare bodies. Most of the effort has been based on the philosophy of curative medical care, but concern for more emphasis on preventive services had arisen in the late 1970s and was receiving more attention.

Much of the prevalent ill health, particularly among the lower income groups, has been attributable to poor dietary habits and to unsanitary conditions. In towns and cities housing inhabited by these people is often overcrowded, and many of the non-White townships do not have adequate water and sewage disposal systems. Although the best medical care is available only to those who can afford to pay for it, efforts have been made, particularly since the mid-1970s, to improve health conditions among the low-income groups. Public health services, however, have suffered from underfunding and have been overburdened by the vast numbers of poorer people seeking medical attention. The battle against ill health has also been plagued by the inability of many illiterate Blacks to understand the preventive health campaigns mounted by the government. Because much of this effort has relied on the auspices of the school system, Blacks who cannot attend school are denied the information designed to promote good health practices. As a result many Blacks still rely on traditional medical practitioners, who operate in the context of beliefs in witchcraft and sorcery.

Vital statistics available from both government publications and the World Health Organization (WHO) tend to indicate that the Nationalist government has been highly successful in its attempts to achieve separate development. Over the decades of the 1960s and 1970s crude death rates for the White and Asian populations have remained low and fairly constant (9 percent or less). With the control of many infectious diseases, the rates for Coloureds and Blacks have declined gradually from earlier ones that were twice and three times, respectively, that attributed to Whites. Nonetheless the average life expectancy of White males in the late 1970s was 64.5 years compared with fifty-two years for Black males. Infant mortality rates (deaths per 1,000 live births) were estimated at eighteen for Whites, over 200 for Blacks, 115 for Coloureds, and thirty-two for Asians.

For the White population, sufficiency of nutritious food has seldom presented health problems. But for vast segments of the non-White categories proper food and nutrition have been less than adequate because of lower incomes and continued reliance on traditional but often improper dietary habits. Nutritional deficiencies among non-Whites have been responsible for a high incidence of kwashiorkor, pellagra, rickets, scabies, and gastroenteritis. Kwashiorkor, resulting

from protein deficiency in nursing mothers and young children, retards the development of many thousands annually. Particularly prevalent among Black children between one and five years of age, the disease claims the lives of vast numbers each year. The government has attempted to combat malnutrition primarily by distributing skimmed milk powder, protein-vitamin-mineral concentrate (PVM), and literature on economical food purchasing and infant feeding. In many areas the introduction of school lunches has been of some benefit—but only for those children able to attend school.

Complete data on the incidence of common diseases in South Africa are unavailable because official statistics do not exist for the entire population. The UN has pointed out that the list of reportable diseases—particularly those that have long been preventable but which persist among non-Whites—has been shortened periodically by the health authorities in Pretoria in order to divert adverse criticism. Nonetheless the prevalence of certain diseases continues to be reported in medical literature in the country and abroad. Among the most common illnesses among non-Whites are various forms of dysentery and parasitic diseases, tuberculosis, pneumonia, and disorders caused by malnutrition. The incidence of typhoid fever, measles, and diphtheria also remain relatively high among Blacks despite immunization programs aimed at reducing threats to the work force and the spread of the diseases among the White population. Venereal diseases, particularly syphilis and gonorrhea, are prevalent among the Black migratory workers who have been separated from their families and who came into contact with prostitutes.

For many years the most prevalent reportable disease among non-Whites has been tuberculosis. History reveals that the earliest White settlers brought the first case of the disease with them, and the infection spread among their close associates and servants. With the discovery of gold and diamonds, miners from Europe reintroduced the disease and infected large numbers of Blacks employed in the mines. The low living standards of the Black workers contributed to the spread of tuberculosis, and in 1955 it reached epidemic proportions. Government health efforts have gradually diminished this trend, but in the late 1970s incidence rates remained higher than any other disease. The second highest rate of reportable disease among non-Whites was malaria. The incidence had diminished from earlier levels as a result of spraying techniques, but over 6,000 cases were reported in 1978, largely in northeastern Transvaal Province.

In contrast with the pattern of disease and illness prevalent among the lower income non-White groups, health problems within the White component of the population more closely resemble those commonly found in more affluent developed countries. Chief of the medical problems are cardiovascular disease, strokes, and neoplasms (tumors). In the late 1970s the UN reported that cardiovascular diseases accounted for more than 46 percent of all White male deaths, a figure vastly higher than those reported among the non-White groups.

153

Control and administration of medical and public health services are the responsibility of the central government's Department of Health, the four provincial councils, and more than 800 municipal and local authorities. The department in Pretoria is the leading element in the country's efforts to promote health and control infectious and communicable diseases. It provides advice and funds to assist in the services furnished by provincial administrations, local authorities, missions, and voluntary organizations. Additional health services are provided working employees by the mining companies and other industrial concerns.

During the 1970s South Africa had available for curative medical treatment more than 750 hospitals of general and specialized categories. But the quality of medical services provided by these institutions, access to the medical profession, and remuneration of health personnel showed marked variations as a result of the government's persistent apartheid policies. The most recent estimates (1975) showed a physician-to-population ratio of 1:400 for Whites and 1:40,000 for Blacks. The ratios among Coloureds and Asians were comparable to those among the White population. In terms of hospital services for the same period the bed-to-population ratio for Whites was 1:96 and 1:186 for Blacks. The occupancy rate among Whites was 64 percent while that of Blacks was estimated at 95 percent. Of the nearly 100,000 beds available to the Black population, over 70,000 were in hospitals in White areas. The rest were in the homelands, where 37 percent of the Black population lived—a factor that, according to the UN, spoke eloquently of the medical disparities common under apartheid. Similar statistics marked the picture of mental health care.

According to a survey appearing in a 1980 edition of the *South African Medical Journal*, the earlier ratios of doctors to patients have come to have little meaning, considering that 81 percent of the country's registered physicians (most of whom are general practitioners) live and practice in urban areas. This pattern has been the result of a progressive gravitation to cities and large towns since 1948. Some of the homelands' medical staffs showed even greater anomalies. QwaQwa, for example, had only two doctors. Although several universities admit Blacks as medical students, the number of enrollees is extremely small, largely because of the financial cost and the fact that few Blacks receive adequate preparatory training in secondary school and as university undergraduates. Many of those who do succeed in attaining medical degrees emigrate after graduation.

Most of the country's large general hospitals, including the teaching institutions of the medical schools, operate as facilities of the provinces in which they are located. All are situated in the cities and larger towns throughout the country, and together they form a vast medical network that covers all areas of the country except the Black homelands. Approximately 100 hospitals and clinics, developed on the basis of former mission facilities in Black areas, provided medical services in the ten homelands in 1980. Most were staffed by

White doctors. In earlier times most Blacks were treated in segregated clinics or in the larger hospitals in White areas. But beginning in 1973 the government in Pretoria began transferring responsibility for Black health care to homelands that had achieved self-governing status or had been granted independence according to the multinational development scheme. As of 1979 seven homelands had received such transfers. But large numbers of Blacks still were admitted to segregated wards in large hospitals in White areas, depending on their place of residence and the nature of their medical problems.

Despite the government's general reluctance to provide current comprehensive data on the state of health and medical services, a conference on the economics of health care in southern Africa in October 1978 provided meaningful insights into the problems involved. At the conference organized by the Southern African Labor and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) of the University of Cape Town, medical delegates from South Africa and a large number of foreign countries identified the republic's sociopolitical-economic structure as the major cause of inequalities that exist in the health services provided different racial groups in rural and urban areas. Conference reports attributed the unacceptably high rate of morbidity to South Africa's long-term neglect of preventive medicine, the maldistribution of doctors and health services, the inappropriate nature of medical and health care institutions, the weak development of ancillary health services, and apartheid's permeation of the entire structure of health care. Moreover, the delegates agreed that inadequacies in the system among non-White elements of the population—particularly Blacks—was largely attributable to these peoples' almost total lack of political and economic influence.

Nonetheless the central government's information service and *Scientific Progress*, a journal published on behalf of the prime minister's Scientific Advisory Council, have been unanimous in claiming that satisfactory medical services are available to most South Africans. Such sources point out that the country is not a welfare state and that most people in need of medical attention pay for the cost of such services. They are quick to add that health care for the indigent is covered by government revenues and that the maximum cost of medical attention is far greater for Whites than for Blacks using the same facility. In a March 1979 document the UN's Centre Against Apartheid countered these claims with the following statement:

> Although the South African Government frequently asserts that Africans [Blacks] are well-off because their health services receive more Government subsidies, reality appears to be very different. The Government provides Africans health services but not in sufficient quantities. Many Africans cannot be accommodated by these subsidized services and do not have the funds to demand other types of health care. They have less health insurance than Whites, and they are less able to pay for adequate medical care. Thus, apartheid has produced major financial barriers to access to health care for Black South Africa.

Writing in the authoritative *South African Journal of Science* in 1980, two physiology professors at the University of the Witwatersrand also were highly critical of the government's reports on health. "As *Scientific Progress* is circulated internationally," they advised, "the publication has a special obligation to be both circumspect and credible."

* * *

The Bantu-speaking Peoples of Southern Africa, edited by W.D. Hammond-Tooke, provides an introduction to various aspects, e.g., social and political structure, economy, and religion of the societies and cultures of South Africa's many Black peoples, with an emphasis on traditional systems. Philip Mayer, Ellen Hellman, Martin West, and Brian du Toit have written about the social situation of urban Blacks, but little has been published on research done after the early 1970s. West, among others, has dealt with religion among urban Blacks.

The articles in *English-Speaking South Africa Today: Proceedings of the National Conference July 1974*, edited by André de Villiers, furnish fairly detailed descriptions and analyses of matters ranging from the demography to the social and political attitudes of English-speaking Whites. *Ethnic Power Mobilized*, which has separate chapters written by sociologist Heribert Adam and historian Hermann Giliomee, examines the social, political, and economic development and the present status of the Afrikaner segment of White South Africa. Provocative and controversial in its implications is T. Dunbar Moodie's *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion*. Lawrence Schlemmer has written a good deal on the attitudes of Afrikaners and English speakers toward each other and toward Blacks. He has also published analyses of Black attitudes and Black political movements.

Most studies of race relations in South Africa focus on the political, legal, and economic causes and consequences of these relations. A sampling of the wide range of description and interpretation may be found in such volumes as *Change in Contemporary South Africa*, edited by Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler, and *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*, edited by Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg. In the latter work, Price's "Apartheid and White Supremacy: The Meaning of Government-led Reform in the South African Context" provides a close examination of recent developments.

For those who wish to know more about the complexities of the education systems, several studies are useful. Neville L. and Barbara L. Robertson's *Education in South Africa* reflects the diversities of the various systems, although some changes have occurred since its publication. Equally helpful is *New Perspectives in South African Education* by Abraham L. Behr. Descriptions of the systems' structure and

operations can be found in *Southern Africa* by David J. Cranmer and Valerie A. Woolston and in *South Africa 1979*, the republic's official yearbook.

No current understanding of the ongoing developments in all aspects of race relations, including education and the field of health, would be possible without the excellent annual, *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, published by the South African Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg. Some of the institute's special publications such as *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa 1948-1976* (compiled by Muriel Horrell) are basic reference works. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 3. The Economy

South African miners

THE ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY to which the state and political parties in the White area were committed at the start of the 1980s was basically growth-oriented free enterprise capitalism. The leaders of the Asian and Coloured populations and of the Black homelands were similarly committed to the free enterprise system. Capitalist motivations were the dominant force behind the free-wheeling entrepreneurs who developed South Africa's mines from the late 1800s and continued to mold the actions of the businessmen who subsequently promoted manufacturing and commerce. In the first four decades after the formation of the Union of South Africa, government and essentially British-dominated business were united in the promotion of economic development through the private sector as the best course for the country, although the development of electric power and of the iron and steel industry were early entrusted to state corporations, but largely because of the shortage of private capital. The assumption of governmental power by the Afrikaner National Party in 1948 was followed by establishment over time of a number of state-controlled enterprises. These were primarily undertakings considered by Pretoria to be basic to economic development—or of strategic value—but also beyond the capabilities of the private sector. Paralleling this development was the rise of strong Afrikaner businesses, influential in government circles, that came to have a community of interest with the British business sector. In the mid-1970s the gradual encroachment of state corporations into areas of private business operations was curbed by government restrictions on their expansion into new activities outside originally established fields. In 1980 the existence of these corporations did not appear to lessen the state's commitment to an economic system based fundamentally on private enterprise.

South Africa had a superabundance of minerals—several of worldwide strategic importance. Agricultural production usually more than met domestic requirements, and there was a highly diversified manufacturing sector. Development of industry and services had reached the stage where the World Bank (see Glossary) classified South Africa as a middle-income country. Within the country, however, income distribution was highly unequal. A dualistic society existed—massive Black rural poverty alongside urban prosperity (in which urban Blacks participated minimally). This situation was largely the result of the efforts of the Nationalist government to enforce its ideology of separate development, commonly known as apartheid. After 1948 a steady distortion of normal market forces had occurred as the government introduced its political objectives into the management of the economy. The mobility of the country's largest labor force—the Black workers—was severely restricted, and its members were of necessity forced to accept very low wages.

161

Discriminatory legislation based on race has affected the mobility of capital, the development of enterprises, and internal trade. All of these have retarded economic growth. For ideological reasons also an attempt was made to establish separate economies for the Black homelands with little regard for the basic economic interrelationship of the homelands and the White area; admission of the failure of this scheme came only in 1980.

In retrospect, the country's great natural and human resources, dynamic entrepreneurship, and the induction of substantial foreign risk investment capital have resulted in marked economic achievements, despite the serious handicaps imposed by the government's apartheid policies. But in the view of many foreign and South African business leaders of all ethnic backgrounds, economists, and more liberal South African politicians continuation of those policies can lead to a slowing of economic growth, consequent rising unemployment, and eventually to disastrous political responses. Some government recognition of the need for change was evident by 1980 in its acceptance of relaxations on Black labor mobility, official approval for Black unions, and in efforts to develop a more viable substitute for the separate homeland economy concept. These have been welcomed as initial steps. But to foreign economic observers and informed South Africans, only a fundamental change that completely discards the idea of separate development and allows equal access to all South Africans to the principal and supportive structures of the country's free enterprise economy offers a promise of continued economic advancement.

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

In terms of the number of individuals involved, agriculture in 1980 was the country's most important economic activity. In the modern sector (basically the White area), agriculture shared the position of largest employer with manufacturing. In the Black homelands a very large part of the economically active population engaged in subsistence agricultural pursuits as a main activity (see The Homelands, this ch.). But in terms of its contribution to gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), agriculture's role had declined. In 1979 it accounted for about 7 percent of total GDP compared with almost 18 percent in 1950. Nonetheless agricultural production during the thirty intervening years had increased in volume by 300 percent. Expansion of the cultivated area played an important part in this increase, but much of the growth also resulted from the adoption of new and improved agricultural techniques, including extensive mechanization.

Of major importance in agricultural output have been the highly variable climatic conditions that characterize most of the continent's southern part (see Climate, ch. 2). Marked fluctuations in crop production occur as a result, but the modern sector's domestic output has been sufficient to provide surpluses for export; in 1980 South Africa was among the world's main exporters of maize (corn), sugar,

wool, and citrus and deciduous fruits. At times of severe drought imports of lesser crops have been made, but most agricultural imports were products (including coffee, tea, cocoa, and rice) whose cultivation was limited or precluded by climatic factors and suitable terrain. An estimated 90 percent or more of the total agricultural output was produced by the market-oriented farms of the White area. Only very small commercial undertakings were found in the Black homelands, where predominantly subsistence agriculture regularly failed to meet the basic food needs of their populations.

A conspicuous feature of the agricultural sector was the state's broad intervention in marketing. This originated largely in efforts during the Great Depression of the 1930s to relieve the extreme hardship of the country's White farmers that was resulting from very low producer prices. Legislation enacted between 1930 and 1935 established controls over a number of agricultural products that included the maintenance of domestic farm prices above foreign levels. Agricultural prices improved in the mid-1930s but failed to keep pace with increases for industrial goods, and farm incomes declined relatively. In a further step to aid the White rural population, a new far-reaching measure, the Marketing Act of 1937 (consolidated in 1968), was passed. The act provided for the introduction and modification of controls by marketing boards through proclamation. Twenty-one boards were functioning in 1980, which controlled between 75 and 80 percent of agricultural production in terms of gross value. Roughly 10 percent more was covered by specific legislation. The remaining 14 to 15 percent, mainly encompassing fresh fruit and vegetables, was uncontrolled.

In 1980 a number of the controlled products had to be sold by the producer to the boards or their agents at prices set by the boards. Included was maize, which was then marketed by the board at a lower price. The principal intent was to keep the cost of this main staple of the Black population as low as possible (while still providing what was considered a reasonable return to the producer). A second group of agricultural products had to be delivered to the board, which made an initial advance payment on delivery. The final settlement was determined at the end of the selling season on the overall receipts from pooled sales. A number of other products in the controlled marketing scheme could be sold freely in the open market. The boards intervened to maintain price levels in periods of excess supply by buying up surpluses, which were usually exported. The overall National Marketing Council coordinated policies, but foreign and South African observers have noted that the large number of boards made this a difficult task. Producers were dominant on all boards, and reportedly board actions often tended to further parochial rather than national interests. Moreover, implementation of the marketing programs had diverted a considerable number of economically active individuals from productive to bureaucratic pursuits, and arrogation of much of the decisionmaking process in marketing by the boards had a negative effect on development.

Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure

Inadequate rainfall and scarcity of surface water make large parts of South Africa unsuitable for crop cultivation. Approximately 14.5 million hectares, or roughly 12 percent of the total land area of 122.1 million hectares, are generally considered usable for dry farming. Of the arable total in 1980, an estimated 2.2 million hectares (about 15 percent) were in the Black homelands, where they constitute about 14 percent of the overall homelands area. However, only about 10.6 million hectares (including the homelands) were under actual cultivation throughout South Africa. Forest and woodland growth are also limited by climatic conditions. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) only about 4.6 million hectares, or less than 4 percent of the total land area, can potentially support natural forests and woodlands. The area actually under forest and woodland in the late 1970s totaled about 4.2 million hectares (see Forestry, this ch.). From an agricultural standpoint, most of the country is suited best for livestock raising (see fig. 16). Natural pastures cover an estimated 82 million to 83 million hectares, or more than two-thirds of the total land area. These pastures vary greatly in potential, however, and more than three-quarters have a grazing capacity that requires from eight to seventeen hectares to support adequately one mature animal.

Variations in topography and differences in rainfall, evaporation rates, vegetation cover, and parent materials have produced a wide variety of soils. Among the best are the red and yellow loams that cover extensive areas of the Transvaal and Orange Free State and part of Natal. Where precipitation is adequate, these soils are used principally to grow maize. Large areas of black and red clayey soils are found in the same region and also in eastern Cape Province. They are somewhat difficult to cultivate but are used extensively for growing grains where the rainfall meets crop requirements, and elsewhere they are used for pasture.

Generally west of these soil regions are large areas of poorer soils. These include, in parts of Orange Free State, eastern Cape, and Transkei, red and grey surface soils that differ substantially in character from the underlying soil. Such soils are highly vulnerable to erosion when cultivated, and in Transkei and adjacent areas extensive use has resulted in widespread gully erosion, the most severe anywhere in South Africa. Much of the western half of the country is covered by shallow topsoils that vary in texture according to the underlying parent rock. Associated with normally low rainfall, they generally are of little value other than for pasture, except in the winter rainfall region of western Cape Province where a main use is for growing wheat. The Kalahari region of the northwest is overlain by shifting sand. Sandy soils of extremely low fertility also line the western shore of the Atlantic Ocean and parts of the southern coastline.

The government's policy of separate development for the different racial groups has introduced a basic restriction on the free acquisition

Figure 16. Intensive cultivation / Cereals / Mixed farming / Cattle grazing predominant / Sheep grazing

Figure 16. Major Agro-Economic Regions

of rights of occupancy or ownership of land. By law individuals nor-
mally resident within the country's boundaries enjoy such rights
only in specified areas designated for the individual's particular
racial group. Local land legislation of a racial nature considerably
antedates formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. For exam-
ple, an Orange Free State law of 1891 completely prohibited Asians
from occupying or owning land anywhere in the state. The first ma-
jor restrictive legislation at the national level occurred in 1913 when
the Natives Land Act barred Blacks from further acquisition of rural
land outside the Black reserves established by the act. This provision
was not fully enforceable throughout the union, however, until 1936
when the right of Blacks to buy land in Cape Province was abolished.

In 1923 the Natives (Urban Areas) Act addressed Black land rights
in urban centers, to which many Blacks attracted by industrial em-
ployment opportunities had migrated after World War I. The act
and subsequent amendments restricted Blacks to designated "loca-
tions" on the outer edge of the White settlements. But Blacks were
able to buy land adjacent to the locations (except in Orange Free
State and some towns of the Transvaal) until 1937 when new legisla-
tion forced the disposal of all such holdings. Moreover, from that

165

time Blacks no longer could own land in the locations or townships but could occupy land there only under lease from the local authority.

The rise to power in 1948 of the National Party, a long-time advocate of institutionalized racial separation, was followed in 1950 by major land legislation, the Group Areas Act (later amended on several occasions and consolidated in the Group Areas Act of 1966, which remained in force in 1980). A principal provision of the act was that each racial group's right to occupancy or ownership of land was limited to separately designated racial areas. The act also called for the removal of individuals and families from nonauthorized areas to those "proclaimed" for their racial group. Under the law Black land rights were limited to roughly the area of the present-day homelands, which in 1980 encompassed some 16 million hectares or about 13 percent of South Africa. The remaining 87 percent of the country was designated for the White, Asian, and Coloured populations, the latter two groups restricted to proclaimed enclaves within a vastly larger White area.

Within the White, Coloured, and Asian areas land tenure practices correspond in general to those in the Western democracies involving a cadastral survey and proper registration of title. In the homelands most land is held under traditional systems that vary somewhat with each ethnolinguistic group. The individual has an inalienable right to land—a right not vested in a particular plot but in his membership in a clan or kinship group. Land is held in trust by the chief, who allocates it to married men. The land rights thus acquired by the individual remain his as long as the land is cultivated and can usually be transmitted to heirs. All members have grazing rights on the group's common grazing land. This system was well adapted to shifting agriculture when adequate land was available. Restriction of the Black ethnic groups to the area of the homelands, however, has led to a progressive reduction of the amount of land allocable to individuals, as the population has increased to the point where individual holdings in many cases cannot meet subsistence requirements.

There are a few exceptions to the usual pattern of traditional Black land tenure. In parts of the Ciskei, individual title to arable land had been given to Blacks by the Cape Province government in 1894 on the basis of land surveys. Similarly, parts of the Transkei and Natal also have some individual tenure of arable land. In the mid-1950s the Tomlinson Commission, which had been appointed by the government in 1950 to investigate Black socioeconomic development and had studied the reserves, recommended that individual freehold title be granted to Blacks in the reserves wherever the local residents desired it. The proposal was rejected by the government in the belief that it would undermine the Blacks' social structure. Development of modern market-oriented agriculture in the present-day homelands presumes the establishment of title deeds to land. In 1980, however, important factors continued to militate against any rapid change. In the Transkei, for instance, the political power of

various chiefs in the National Assembly stems largely from the right to distribute land. Chiefs are also prominent in the legislative bodies of other homelands. Additionally, for many Black farmers the inalienable right to a plot of land guarantees at least some means of subsistence for the household.

Although land ownership continued to be prohibited in the Black townships, home ownership was allowed after 1955 on thirty-year leaseholds. This privilege was discontinued in 1968 for new home ownership but was again restored at the beginning of 1976. In the two-year period to the end of 1977 some 4,200 applications for thirty-year leases were approved throughout South Africa. Information available for Soweto indicated over 10,300 houses owned on thirty-year leaseholds, including those secured before 1968. In mid-1978 new legislation gave the privilege of ninety-nine-year leaseholds to urban Blacks who qualified for residence in the townships. Sale of the leasehold to another qualified Black was permitted, and if a Black were to be disqualified and lose occupancy rights, he still retained the leasehold and the right to transfer it.

Crops

A diversified climate and topography permit the cultivation of a wide range of crops from temperate to tropical in character (see table 11, Appendix). Important temperate crops include the major cereals—maize, sorghum, and wheat—field crops such as potatoes, beans, and oilseeds, a variety of deciduous fruits, cotton, and tobacco. Among economically valuable subtropical crops are sugarcane and citrus. Tropical crops include bananas, pineapples, and several other fruits, mainly of domestic economic significance, although pineapples were also an important export item.

Maize is the country's most important cereal. It has become the staple food of the Black population, a significant earner of foreign exchange—South Africa was among the world's largest maize exporters—and is the major feedstuff for livestock. Most of the maize is grown commercially in the summer rainfall region of the White area under dry farming conditions. Production is concentrated in an area encompassing roughly the southern half of the Transvaal, the adjacent northern and eastern parts of Orange Free State, and the midlands of Natal. Maize has been cultivated since early colonial times, but expansion was slow until the 1950s when the introduction of hybrid seed and mechanization, accompanied by a subsequent gradual increase in the land under cultivation, resulted in a significant increase in production. By the mid-1950s the harvested crop totaled close to 3.5 million tons annually from about 3.4 million hectares. The area had grown to some 4.4 million hectares in the early 1960s and remained relatively constant thereafter through 1980. During the 1960s maize output in most years was about 5 million tons or more. From the early 1970s, however, increased mechanization of all aspects of maize cultivation, better cultivation practices, and a rise in the use of fertilizers brought a

dramatic increase in production, and a harvest that averaged between 8 million and 9 million tons annually in normal years. Abrupt changes in output occasionally occur because of rainfall fluctuations; for example, the harvest in 1974 was under 4 million tons largely because of poor weather conditions. The following year, when conditions were relatively ideal, a record production of 10.6 million tons was reported. Information on subsistence maize production in the Black homelands was extremely meager. In years of relatively good weather in the early 1970s more than 1 million hectares were estimated to have been planted to maize. Very rough production estimates placed output at about 380,000 to 400,000 tons (see The Homelands, this ch.).

Sorghum is native to southern Africa and was already in use as a food and for brewing in prehistoric times. It is grown commercially by White farmers in the same general region as maize but usually in areas where rainfall conditions are less suitable for maize. Weather conditions greatly affect the area planted in any one year, and the crop yield varied in the 1970s from 222,000 tons in crop year 1972–73 (a drought year) to 682,000 tons the next year when growing conditions were unusually good. Production for 1978–79 has been estimated at 362,000 tons from 208,000 hectares planted. A substantial portion of the market crop is processed into malt. Some is also used for animal feed, and surpluses are usually exported. Sorghum remains an important secondary crop in the Black homelands, where its main use is for brewing beer. It has been largely replaced by maize as the ʼaple food. Reliable estimates of production in the homelands were not available in late 1980.

The cultivation of wheat began in South Africa soon after the arrival of the first White colonists. Traditionally it was grown in the winter rainfall area of southern Cape Province. During the twentieth century improvement in cultivation techniques and the development of new wheat strains permitted growth in the summer rainfall region and, although Cape Province remains a major producer of winter wheat, the principal producing area at the beginning of the 1980s was Orange Free State; a substantial quantity of wheat was also grown in the Transvaal. Average annual production of about 435,000 tons from 1935 to 1950 almost met domestic requirements. The rapid urbanization that followed World War II, however, was accompanied by greatly increased demand for wheat products, and South Africa became a regular importer of wheat until crop year 1969–70 when production, totaling about 1.3 million tons, exceeded internal needs. In normal years in the 1970s the harvest averaged around 1.7 million tons, and in the exceptionally good crop year 1976–77 reached over 2.2 million tons; production in 1979–80 was over 2 million tons. Annual domestic requirements in the late 1970s were about 1.65 to 1.75 million tons.

The growing of deciduous fruits, mainly apples, pears, peaches, and grapes, is an important part of the agricultural economy. Production has been largely centered in the winter rainfall region where

cold winters and dry summers provide climatic conditions required for proper development. Cultivation has also spread to Orange Free State and the Transvaal, although in the late 1970s almost 90 percent of total production still came from Cape Province. In addition to meeting local demand for fresh and canned fruit, the industry has also built up a large export trade. Fresh fruit matures in the off-season for the northern hemisphere, and a market is usually readily available in Europe, especially Britain, although development of more sophisticated storage methods has cut into this trade. Canned fruit, which had a reputation for quality, continued to have a ready market, and in the late 1970s roughly 9 million twenty-four can cartons were exported annually.

Table grapes are grown in several parts of the country, but wine grapes, which account for almost 90 percent of the total, are concentrated in southwestern Cape Province. The first wine was pressed in 1659, but the development of the wine industry dates from the late 1680s and the arrival of Huguenot settlers, who included skilled winemakers. The production of wine has doubled since the mid-1950s, when it was over 300 million liters, to an estimated 624 million liters in 1979. About half was table wine and half fortified wines. In the late 1970s production was largely for domestic consumption, and only about 10 percent was exported. Production, quality, and price problems led to the early formation of a wine producers cooperative (in 1918) that in 1980 controlled production and the domestic supply and was the sole exporter. The domestic marketing of wine, however, was handled by private dealers.

South Africa is normally self-sufficient in the production of oilseeds, potatoes, and dry beans, and is usually able also to export varying quantities. Shortage of vegetable oils during World War II led to government promotion of groundnut (peanut) cultivation, and the country has become one of the world's main producers. The chief growing areas in 1980 were the Transvaal, Orange Free State, and northern Cape Province. The annual crop fluctuates greatly because of weather factors, although price expectations also influence the area planted. The other main oilseed is sunflower, whose cultivation began also after World War II. It is grown over a wide region in the Transvaal and in Orange Free State, roughly in the same areas as maize. The crop is more drought resistant than maize and is frequently planted as an alternative to maize when conditions are unfavorable for the latter. Potatoes are grown widely, and new potatoes are available at all times of the year because of the country's different climatic growing periods. Consumption of potatoes by the Black population reportedly had increased considerably since the 1960s. South Africa also meets much of the neighboring countries' requirements for potatoes.

Citrus, which together with other exotic fruits was brought to South Africa in the mid-1600s, is grown under irrigation in southwestern and eastern Cape Province, the Transvaal, and Natal. The Transvaal accounted for over three-fifths of the total production

1.0

4.5
5.0
5.6

2.8

2.5

3.2

2.2

3.6

1.1

4.0

2.0

1.8

1.25

1.4

1.6

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

reported for South Africa (which also included the output of Swaziland—about 6 to 8 percent of the oranges and a third of the grapefruit). In the late 1970s bearing trees numbered more than 12 million of which about 90 percent were orange, 7 percent grape-fruit, and 3 percent lemon. Marketing, handled by the South African Citrus Marketing Board, was entirely oriented toward export, and the local population and processors had access ordinarily only to fruit not suitable for export. In the late 1970s total production aver-aged about 725,000 tons a year (excluding 1977 when adverse weather conditions resulted in a substantial drop). Exports of fresh fruit were about 450,000 tons annually, of which a third went to Britain and most of the rest to other countries of the European Economic Community (EEC—also known as the Common Market). About a quarter of the crop was processed domestically, mostly into juice for local consumption.

Sugarcane was introduced into Natal in the late 1840s, and in 1980 about 90 percent of the crop was grown in the coastal zone and frost-free midlands of that province. The remainder was raised under irrigation in the Lowveld of eastern Natal and eastern Trans-vaal. The development of the sugar industry not only had a major impact on the economy but also provided the rationale for the im-portation between 1860 and 1913 of a larger number of indentured field workers from India. Many took up permanent residence, and from these early immigrants most of the present-day Indian (Asian) population is descended. In the early 1960s about 1 million tons of sugar was produced annually from some 100,000 hectares planted with cane. At the time domestic requirements were under 700,000 tons, making possible substantial exports. An industry expansion program, begun in the mid-1960s and aimed largely at the export market, almost doubled the area of cultivation by the end of the decade and increased sugar production from 1 million to 1.6 million tons a year. The area under sugarcane grew only moderately in the 1970s, but improved crop yield had raised annual sugar output to over 2 million tons by 1977. Domestic use reached 1 million tons in 1975 and grew to 1.2 million tons in 1979.

Irrigation

The uneven distribution of rainfall and surface water supplies, together with the constant possibility of droughts, has emphasized the advantages of crop irrigation. Early White settlers developed ir-rigation works in southwestern and southern Cape Province, and the practice was extended as farmers moved to the interior. Initial con-trol over water resources, used principally for agriculture, was legis-lated by the Irrigation and Water Conservation Act of 1912. This act was replaced in 1956 in order to give the state stronger controls over all water use because of the growing demands by industry and urban centers.

Large-scale government involvement in irrigation began in the depression years of the 1930s through public works planned largely

to help White farmers. In the late 1970s an estimated 900,000 hectares, somewhat less than a tenth of the country's cultivated area, had irrigation. Roughly 430,000 hectares were state and local authority projects, and the remaining 470,000 hectares of "unmeasured irrigated land" were private undertakings. About 70 percent of irrigation on state and local authority projects was gravity engineered, and the remainder was provided by sprinkler systems; the ratio for the unmeasured land systems was not available. In 1980 the government had under way a major long-term multipurpose project designed eventually to irrigate some 230,000 hectares in the Orange River valley and the basins of the Great Fish and Sundays rivers. The first phase encompassing 68,000 hectares had been partly implemented by 1980. The overall project involved construction of the world's longest continuous water tunnel, which opened in 1975 to permit transfer of water from the Orange River to the Great Fish River basin. A canal linking the latter to part of the Sundays River basin opened in mid-1978.

Livestock

South Africa's large area of natural pastures, unsuited for crop cultivation because of low rainfall, provided a favorable environment from the very start of White colonization for development of a livestock industry. For well over a century and a half indigenous cattle, sheep, and goats formed the basis of the early herds, although a few merino sheep and European cattle were introduced in the late 1700s. In the 1820s arriving British settlers brought beef cattle and English breeds of sheep, anu during the 1800s the domestic Afrikaner breed of cattle was developed by the voortrekkers (see Glossary). From these various stocks and later imports of breeding animals emerged the extensive high quality flocks and herds of the present-day commercial livestock sector. The economically important Angora goat, the source of mohair, was also introduced beginning in the late 1830s. The highly valuable Karakul sheep arrived, however, only in 1916 from South West Africa (later Namibia) where it had been introduced in 1907.

Sheep are raised over a large part of the country, but the most important area for wool production is the Great Karoo. The Highveld of eastern Cape Province, Orange Free State, and the Transvaal also account for a substantial quantity. In 1978 sheep in the White area were estimated at 32 million, of which 26.6 million were raised for wool (78 percent Merino, 7.5 percent Karakul, and 14.5 percent other breeds). The remaining 5.4 million animals were raised for meat; many sheep were also dual purpose animals used both for wool and meat. Until 1970 wooled sheep alone had totaled well above 30 million, but their numbers declined thereafter largely as the result of a government subsidized stock reduction program aimed at restoring the overgrazed Highveld; low prices for wool in the early 1970s also played some part.

South Africa is the world's fourth largest producer of wool;

171

production was close to 100 million kilograms annually in the 1970s. All wool was sold at auction through the South African Wool Board at one of the four principal ports: Cape Town, East London, Durban, or Port Elizabeth. The domestic manufacture of woolen goods has increased since World War II, but over 90 percent of the wool clipped still was exported in the late 1970s. Traditionally wool was the country's most valuable agricultural export, but since the mid-1970s it has ranked either second or third behind maize and sugar. In 1937 South Africa together with Australia and New Zealand formed the International Wool Secretariat with headquarters in London. This body promotes the use of pure new wool products under the *Woolmark* quality symbol.

Karakul sheep and Angora goats were both important earners of foreign exchange, but receipts varied greatly depending on price fluctuations. The sheep were raised throughout northwestern Cape Province, an area of low and generally unpredictable rainfall. In years of low precipitation ewe lambs were slaughtered with the result that the number of animals varied greatly. In 1978 they totaled close to 2 million compared with 1.7 million in 1970 and over 2.2 million in 1973. Angora goats were bred mostly in a limited area of eastern Cape Province. South Africa was among the world's three largest producers of mohair, together with Turkey and Texas in the United States.

Well over 90 percent of the cattle were raised in the eastern part of the country with the largest numbers found in Natal, the Bushveld and Lowveld of the Transvaal, eastern Cape Province, and the maize-growing areas of Orange Free State and the Transvaal. In 1980 the most important beef cattle remained the domestic Afrikaner breed, but substantial numbers of European breeds, including the Hereford, Shorthorn, and Aberdeen Angus, were also raised. A new locally developed strain, the Bonsmara, a cross between the Afrikaner and Shorthorn, is especially suited to conditions in the northern Transvaal. Cattle on White farms totaled close to 9.1 million in the late 1970s. About 3.5 million add⋅ ⋅⋅⋅⋅ cattle were estimated to be in the Black homelands. Before ⋅⋅ Var II considerable quantities of beef and mutton were exportea. ⋅ince the war a gradual improvement in the standard of living of the various populations in the White area has resulted in South Africa's becoming a net importer of meat. Imports, however, were comparatively small and consisted mainly of beef and live cattle from neighboring Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

Dairy farming is carried on throughout the country but is more intensive in areas around the major population centers and in areas of higher rainfall. In the late 1970s milk production totaled about 2.2 billion liters a year of which somewhat less than half was consumed fresh; the remainder was used for butter, condensed milk, powdered milk, and cheese. Generally production satisfied local demand, but in periods of drought some dairy supplies had to be imported, as was the case in 1979. The dairy herd numbered about 950,000 head.

Forestry

South Africa is naturally deficient in forests. Damage and destruction from human activities presumably occurred during prehistoric times, but there are no indications that forests were ever much more extensive than in 1980. Using the broad definition of forest as an area of vegetation dominated by trees of any size, the country's existing forests, including plantations, occupy at most about 4.2 million hectares, or roughly 3.5 percent of the land area. Natural, high (timber) forests total no more than 300,000 hectares. Consisting predominantly of broadleaf evergreen hardwoods, these forests are located in patches—the largest is centered in Knysna in Cape Province—in the high rainfall areas along and behind the southern and southeastern coast, and in the mountains of northeastern Transvaal. Throughout the period of South African colonial development, the high forests were of major economic significance as the principal source of timber. They continued to have considerable economic value into the 1930s, but subsequent heavy exploitation has left them with little marketable timber.

The country's principal type of natural forest, more correctly classified as woodland, is found in the savanna parkland areas, mainly in the lower, drier parts of the Transvaal and Natal. Such forests cover roughly 2.8 million hectares, or 2.3 percent of the country's total area. Deciduous hardwood trees of relatively small size prevail, and acacia species predominate. Most of the mature trees have been removed from the more accessible woodlands, and natural replacement is a lengthy process because of normally slow growth rates. These forests are economically important to local populations as a source of fuel and posts but of minor value for timber.

Until World War I the possibility of a future shortage of domestic timber aroused little concern although South Africa's limited resources were gradually being consumed. Imported timber was cheap and easy to obtain, and it was not until supply difficulties arose during the war that serious thought was given to planned afforestation. The government developed a long-range program that by 1923 had attained a target of about 6,100 hectares of new plantings annually. Private sector interest was also stimulated about this time by the phenomenally high prices obtained for timber from the few plantations already in operation. Government activity was concerned principally with propagating exotic coniferous species to produce sawtimber, whereas private operations concentrated on the fast-growing eucalyptus (mainly for use as mine props) and on the Australian acacias (wattles) whose bark was a major source of tannin for the leather industry.

After World War II the government embarked on a program to make South Africa self-sufficient in timber production. Private plantations had proved commercially profitable, and both the government and private enterprise increased their afforestation activities substantially; private interests also expanded into softwoods.

173

By the end of March 1978 the country's afforested area totaled almost 1.1 million hectares about equally divided between softwood and hardwood species. Private operators owned over 71 percent of the plantations. In the mid-1970s it was estimated that about 50,000 hectares would have to be planted annually if national self-sufficiency in timber were to be maintained to the year 2000. The recession in the economy from 1976 to 1978 brought an oversupply of domestic timber and raised questions about the projected goal. Plantings in the late 1970s were under 30,000 hectares a year.

In the late 1970s the forest industry produced between 9.5 million and 10 million cubic meters of timber and timber products annually. Sawtimber constituted somewhat over 30 percent; pulpwood about 40 percent; mining timbers some 25 percent; and telephone, power transmission, fence and other poles roughly 3.5 percent. A small quantity of timber was also used in the domestic production of matches. The output of existing plantations was expected to reach 14 million cubic meters a year during the 1980s as plantations attained their maximum productions. In mid-1977 approximately 260 concerns processed timber of which more than 240 were private operations. More than half of all processors were located in the Transvaal.

Fishing

South Africa's coastline and that of Namibia, which is included in the country's fishing operations, extends for more than 5,000 kilometers along the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The seas off the west coast are among the world's most prolific in marine life, the result of the northward movement along the coast of the nutrient-rich Benguela Current. It is from this area that South Africa harvests about four-fifths of its marine catch.

The fishing industry first reached a volume of 1 million tons a year in the early 1960s. Intensive exploitation occurred during that decade, and a record catch of more than 2 million tons was taken in 1968 when South Africa ranked seventh among fishing nations. Over 1.9 million tons were caught in 1969, but the volume dropped precipitously thereafter as more and more countries, affected by increasing international restrictions on fishing in the northern hemisphere, began large-scale operations in the area off South Africa and Namibia. Overfishing occurred, and in 1976 South Africa's catch was only 982,245 tons; the country dropped to fifteenth place in volume of marine products taken. In early 1977 a quota for hake, the main food fish, was agreed on by the principal nations fishing off the South African coast. South Africa also announced that it intended to establish a fishing zone of 200 nautical miles along its entire coastline, replacing the existing twelve-mile zone. This was effected in November 1977.

The principal fishing centers are the Walvis Bay enclave and Lüderitz in Namibia and the South African ports of Port Nolloth, Lamberts Bay, St. Helena Bay, Saldanha Bay, Cape Town, Hout Bay, Gansbaai, Mossel Bay, and Durban. Both purse seine and

trawl fishing are of major significance. In 1977 the fishing fleet included 187 purse seiners and 178 trawlers. A number of factory freezer-trawlers, each averaging about 1,000 gross tons, were in the fleet. Additionally there were 380 vessels engaged in taking rock lobsters and some 4,000 small motorized craft also engaged in fishing.

Well over a thousand varieties of fish are found in the waters off South Africa and Namibia. Pilchard, anchovies, maasbanker, mackerel, and a number of other species taken by purse seining formed the largest catch by volume (792,000 tons in 1978). Pilchard was the mainstay of the canning industry, whereas other fish were mostly processed into fish meal and oil. In 1979 South Africa ranked seventh in fish meal and eighth in fish oil production. The main fishing areas for these varieties were between St. Helena Bay and Walvis Bay. Trawlers operated mainly off Lüderitz and Cape Town and on the Agulhas Bank. About three-quarters of their catch was Cape hake. Hake and several other varieties, which were sold principally in frozen form, constituted the major source of fish for the domestic market. In 1978 commercial trawl fishers caught some 192,800 tons that had an estimated worth about four times that of the purse-seine catch. The third element of major economic importance in the fishing industry was rock lobster (actually a crawfish) taken mainly between Cape Town and Walvis Bay. In 1978 about 6,460 tons of the Cape variety and 1,860 tons of the South Coast variety were caught. About four-fifths of the lobster catch was exported, chiefly to the United States and Europe, and in the late 1970s increasingly to Japan.

Through the mid-1950s South Africa participated in whaling operations in the Antarctic. From 1957 on, however, operations were confined to waters off southern Africa from two land-based stations. After 1967 only the Union Whaling Company of Durban, reportedly the world's largest land-based company, remained active. Gradual cuts in the international quota for whales reduced South Africa's allotment to about 500 by the mid-1970s (compared with 3,000 ten years earlier) and made continued operations uneconomical. The company ceased all activities in late 1976.

Mining

Foreign demand for South Africa's vast array of minerals together with growing domestic requirements have continued to sustain mining's position as a major mainstay of the economy (see table 12, Appendix). Mining's share of GDP (at current prices) averaged 12 percent between 1972 and 1977, rose to 15 percent in 1978, and was 18 percent in 1979. Gold, a dominant factor in the country's economic life since the discoveries on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s, maintained its role as the foremost foreign exchange earner among minerals (about 55 percent of the total in the late 1970s compared to about 66 percent between 1970 and 1975). Gold's position of primacy, however, was not the result of production increases—output actually declined during the 1970s—but of the upward surge

175

of world prices during the decade. After 1975 chrome, manganese, coal, and iron ore became increasingly important. In the case of coal and iron ore, the opening of new specialized port facilities was an important factor in a phenomenal growth in production and export earnings.

Mining was particularly important as a major employer of Black labor. However, until the mid-1970s the industry's impact on the domestic labor market and the economy had been greatly diluted by the importation of a large part of its Black work force from outside South Africa and the repatriation of most money earnings. In 1974 miners recruited from Malawi were suddenly withdrawn after the crash of a plane carrying homeward-bound workers, and beginning in 1976 the number of workers from Mozambique declined substantially. In the late 1970s recruitment in both countries had revived but at considerably reduced rates compared to the early 1970s. The increased openings for mining labor, improving wages, and the effect of the South African recession from about 1976 to 1978 led many South African Blacks to seek jobs in the mines. As a result the domestically recruited work force increased significantly from over 20 percent of the labor employed by the members of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa in the early 1970s to more than 50 percent in the late 1970s.

Mining operations were almost entirely in the hands of private entrepreneurs, and major control was centered in a few large multi-faceted corporations. The state had the right to conduct mining activities, and mining rights for precious metals and energy minerals (including uranium, thorium and oil) were vested in the state except on land held in freehold. Except for one operation related to diamond mining that was established in the late 1920s, government policy has been to entrust development of the country's mineral resources to the private sector. Prospecting and mining rights could be acquired equally by South African citizens and by foreigners, and an attractive return on capital was permitted. Much of the early development in mining was financed by foreign investment, but subsequent expansion was effected to a large extent out of profits and from domestic sources. Domestic skills and technology have also developed, and foreign technical assistance no longer was as vital as in the earlier period.

Gold and Platinum Group Metals

Although gold had been found in eastern Transvaal in 1868, the present-day gold mining industry had its start in the discovery of the goldbearing reefs of the Witwatersrand basin near Johannesburg in 1886 (see fig. 17). From this discovery developed the West, Central, and East Rand goldfields. Subsequent geologic work and prospecting traced the reefs to other parts of the basin and led to the eventual development of four additional areas: the Far West Witwatersrand, Klerksdorp, and Orange Free State fields located on a semicircular line to the west and southwest of Johannesburg and the Evander

Black miners working in Vaal Reef Gold Mine
170 kilometers southwest of Johannesburg
Courtesy United Nations/Contact

field to the southeast of the original find. These fields lie in what is known as the Golden Arc, a region with an overall length of 480 kilometers that extends through the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

From 1886 to 1979 South Africa produced some 36,000 tons of gold, close to one-third of the estimated amount ever produced. The country's annual production of less than eleven tons in 1900 had risen to over 150 tons in 1905 and twice that amount in the late 1920s. An all time high of 1,000 tons was reached in 1970. Thereafter output declined to 700 tons in 1977 and remained at roughly that level through the end of the decade. In large part the lower production rate was related to the industry's taking advantage of rising prices for gold to process lower grade ores that earlier had been uneconomical. The United States Bureau of Mines has estimated that South Africa's known gold ore reserves have a gold content of around 18,000 tons. South African estimates have been somewhat more conservative at about 16,500 tons.

Over seventy gold mines were in operation in the late 1970s of which thirty-eight were major undertakings. Two new mines opened in 1979 and others were planned. Although modern technology has

177

Figure 17. Distribution of Mineral Resources

increased the value of mechanical equipment, gold mining—once production begins—is labor intensive. The mining companies very early began recruiting unskilled Black labor from outside South Africa, principally as a way to increase the labor supply and stabilize wage rates. In the 1970s, however, improved wages and conditions of employment in the gold mines in particular appear to have attracted a large amount of unskilled labor from within South Africa. In 1978 over 63 percent of the Black labor force in the gold mines was recruited from the domestic market compared with about a third in the late 1960s.

Platinum was first discovered in economic quantities in the mid-1920s near Lydenburg in the eastern Transvaal. Continued exploration traced the ore-bearing reef for scores of kilometers, and further major discoveries were made near Potgietersrus and Rustenburg. Eventually it was found that the Bushveld Igneous Complex underlying the Transvaal Middleveld had the world's largest known reserves of the platinum group metals. In addition to platinum, these also include palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium, and osmium. At the beginning of the 1980s South Africa was the world's largest producer of platinum. It also held a very favorable market position because the high platinum content of its ores compared with those of the Soviet Union and Canada, the other main producers. Platinum continues to be used for jewelry, but since the mid-1900s has become much more important in industrial processes. In the 1970s it attained added significance as a vital element in catalytic converters that were used for the control of automobile exhaust emissions.

Diamonds

Major diamond-bearing pipes were discovered near Kimberley in 1869 and 1870. In 1902 a second major diamond area was found near Pretoria; the world's largest gem diamond (as of 1980)—the Cullinan—was obtained from this area in 1905. Large occurrences of diamonds have also been uncovered in other parts of the country, including major alluvial deposits along the coast of western Cape Province. South Africa is the world's third largest producer of diamonds after Zaïre and the Soviet Union and is the largest producer of gem stones. Production of gem and industrial diamonds ranged from 7 million carats in 1970 to over 7.7 million carats in 1978. About four-fifths of the country's diamond operations are controlled by De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited, a South African company organized by Cecil J. Rhodes in 1888. The company also had control of most diamond sales on the world wholesale market through the Central Selling Organization, which by agreement handled the major portion of the output of South Africa and various other diamond producers; marketing cooperation with the Soviet Union had also been reported.

Coal and Uranium

South Africa has very large reserves of the energy minerals coal and uranium, which are adequate not only for domestic requirements

Western Deep Levels Gold Mine, West Rand
Courtesy South African Information Service

well into the future but also for regular export. In the late 1970s coal deposits contained an estimated 81 billion tons (32 billion tons proved) lying within 300 meters of the surface; half of the amount was at a depth of 100 meters. Coal seams ranged usually between one and eight meters in thickness, and most were relatively horizontal and easily mined. The largest deposits were in the Transvaal, which was estimated to have nearly 90 percent of the known coal resources. Other major producing areas were in northern Orange Free State and northern Natal. Most coal was bituminous, some of it of coking quality. Anthracite deposits, estimated at about 845 million tons, were located mainly in Natal.

Coal production of about 53 million tons in 1970 almost doubled during the decade to over 100 million tons in 1979. Growth in output was particularly stimulated from the mid-1970s by increased domestic demand—especially from expanding thermal power generating facilities—and by rapidly rising coal exports. The latter were facilitated by the new coal handling and ship loading installations at Richards Bay harbor that went into operation in early 1976 (see Ports and Shipping, this ch.). Until that time exports had been under 3 million tons a year, although a demand for South African coal had developed rapidly after the start of the world oil crisis in the mid-1970s when countries lacking oil deposits moved toward greater use of coal. In 1976 coal exports reached 6 million tons and had risen to over 23 million tons by 1979.

Uranium is associated with gold ores in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. The mineral was ignored in processing the ores until after World War II when the United States, Britain, and Canada through the Combined Development Agency—established during the war to procure raw materials for their joint atomic energy program—sought increased supplies of uranium for the American weapons program. Agreement was reached with South Africa in late 1950-early 1951 to develop production in that country, and the first uranium oxide extraction plant opened there in 1952. By 1955 output had risen to about 3,300 tons. Production was subsequently expanded and reached a peak of 5,840 tons of uranium oxide in 1960. Output declined thereafter as the United States developed additional sources of supply and discontinued purchases from South Africa. A production low of about 2,500 tons occurred in 1975, but developing nuclear power facilities abroad led to increased output that reached almost 4,782 tons of uranium oxide in 1979. The South African Atomic Energy Board estimated that production of about 11,000 tons a year would be possible by the mid-1980s, but stated that the level of output would depend on demand. Almost all processing and marketing of the country's uranium is carried out by the Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa which is owned by a group of corporations whose gold mines produce uranium.

Other Minerals

In 1980 South Africa's ferrous mineral reserves included the world's largest known deposits of chromium ores and almost half of the reserves of vanadium and manganese. There were also large amounts of iron. Chrome ores, the source of chromium essential in the production of high-grade stainless steel, were estimated at about 3.1 billion tons, or roughly four-fifths of known world reserves. Found mostly in the Bushveld Igneous Complex in the Transvaal, they were exported unprocessed in substantial quantity, but a domestic ferrochrome industry had also developed and was expanding rapidly. The country was the world's largest producer of vanadium ores, which are important in making special steels. Deposits, mainly in the Bushveld Igneous Complex, constituted close to half of the world's total. Manganese, used principally by the iron and steel industry, was found chiefly in Cape Province and the Transvaal. Reserves were estimated at over 12 billion tons, or approximately 78 percent of world deposits. Iron ores were found in various parts of the country. Reserves lying within thirty meters of the surface were estimated at 9.5 billion tons. The most important producing source in 1980 was the Sishen Mine in northern Cape Province. Ores from this mine were exported through the port of Saldanha Bay via an 861-kilometer rail line constructed especially for that purpose that opened in 1976.

Important nonferrous metals included antimony, copper, and titanium. The world's largest antimony mine was located in the northwestern part of the Transvaal. Copper has been mined since

Premier Diamond Mine near Pretoria.
Already 805 kilometers wide, the size of
this vast man-made hole continues to
grow as the precious stones are unearthed.
Courtesy South African Information Service

1852. Copper ores were found in northwestern Cape Province and in
parts of the Transvaal. The output of copper accounted roughly for
about 3 percent of the world total; in 1977 South Africa ranked
tenth among producing countries. Large reserves of titanium
ores—titanium metal is important to the aircraft and missile
industries—included titaniferous magnetite found in the Bushveld
Igneous Complex. These ores were difficult to process, but extensive
occurrences of other titanium minerals were found in the sand dunes
along the coast of Natal. Processing facilities for the latter were con-
structed at Richards Bay in the late 1970s, and mining and initial
production got under way in 1978; by 1980 Richards Bay was one of
the world's principal producers of titanium minerals. Less signifi-
cant metals included nickel (produced as a by-product of platinum);
zinc, of which South Africa had about 8 percent of the world's ore
reserves; lead (produced also as a by-product); tin (extremely small
known ore reserves); and zircon minerals, which were also being

183

extracted from beach sands at Richards Bay. There were no significant deposits of bauxite.

A wide range of nonmetallic minerals were mined mostly for the domestic market. Asbestos and fluorspar, however, were both significant export earners and also important in the context of world reserves and total production. In the late 1970s South Africa accounted for about 8 percent of the world's asbestos output. Its reserves were about 5 percent of the world total. Reserves of fluorspar—a mineral of importance in steelmaking, the aluminum industry, and the production of chemicals—constituted 35 percent of the known world total. In the late 1970s South Africa was the third largest producer after Mexico and the Soviet Union. There were also large deposits of andalusite and other aluminum silicate minerals used to make high grade refractory products (34 percent of world reserves) and vermiculite (30 percent of Western deposits and second largest producer after the United States). Several billion tons of low grade phosphate, a mineral used in the production of phosphoric acid, had been identified. The country became a major exporter of phosphoric acid in 1977 after opening two large plants—one in northeastern Transvaal, the other at Richards Bay. Salt deposits had not been discovered by 1980, and the domestic output came entirely from solar evaporation.

Manufacturing

At the beginning of the 1980s South Africa's manufacturing industry met a very substantial part of the country's requirements for consumer goods, intermediate products, and production equipment, although in certain areas imports were still essential. Expansion and development of the sector were phenomenal during and after World War II, when manufacturing became the major force in the structural transformation of the economy from basically a supplier of raw materials to a significant industrial power. The exploitation of minerals beginning in the late 1800s had resulted in some small-scale manufacturing enterprises that served the mining sector. The generally low level of urbanization, lack of capital for plant construction, and imports of consumer goods paid for with gold discouraged development. It was only with the appearance of shortages during World War I that consumer goods manufacturing began to expand.

Government emphasis on manufacturing as a way to create jobs emerged in the 1920s as concern developed for the growing number of impoverished, unemployed rural Whites who were migrating to the urban centers. Manufacturing was also seen as a means to take up the employment slack anticipated in mining as gold ores became depleted. In 1925 protective tariffs were instituted, and measurable growth—although primarily in consumer goods production—occurred until the Great Depression of the early 1930s. It was during the 1920s that the so-called civilized (in essence White) labor policy was introduced, the forerunner of legislation that reserved certain jobs for Whites. Devaluation of the South African pound (see Glossary) in 1933 stimulated gold mining and a parallel growth of

184

manufacturing. By the start of World War II the manufacturing sector was much more broadly based, and entrepreneurs and managers were capable of handling more sophisticated production processes. During the war relatively rapid expansion occurred to replace unavailable imports as well as to supply some of the military requirements of the Allies. The growth of manufacturing after the depression had brought large numbers of laborers—especially Blacks and Coloureds—into the factories. During and after World War II growth was largely made possible only by an increasing use of such laborers in semiskilled and skilled jobs. During World War II manufacturing's contribution to GDP overtook that of mining, and manufacturing became the leading sector thereafter, its share of GDP rising from 17 percent in 1946 to a high of 25 percent in 1976. Manufacturing accounted for an average of 23 percent of GDP between 1975 and 1979 and dominated all other sectors of the economy (see table 13, Appendix).

Manufacturing was predominantly in the private sector, but direct government involvement was substantial in the fields of iron and steel, petroleum, transport equipment (excluding motor vehicles), and to a lesser degree in several others. Unsuccessful efforts in the early 1920s by private interests to establish a large-scale iron and steelworks utilizing domestic materials led to development of the industry by the state. Private participation in this venture still had been sought through the sale of shares, but this was unproductive. The new South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR)—established by legislation in 1928—eventually became an almost entirely government-owned public corporation. In the late 1970s ISCOR produced about 70 percent of all domestic steel. Government entry into the petroleum field was based on strategic considerations from which the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (SASOL) emerged in 1950. By 1980 the corporation was the world's foremost oil-from-coal producer (see Petroleum and Natural Gas, this ch.). SASOL shares were held by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), set up in 1940 as a quasi-public institution to furnish funds in areas where private investment was lagging or where government priorities were not being met. IDC also held the ownership of the Phosphate Development Corporation (FOSCOR) and had substantial interests in several other major industrial enterprises. Complaints have been voiced in South Africa against the government corporations' tendencies to expand beyond their basic directives. Concern has also been voiced over the possibility for misallocation of resources in development resulting from the favored position of the public sector in the capital market, especially at times of reduced foreign investment inflows.

Available data indicated that manufacturing, based on production volume, grew at an annual average rate of 6 percent between 1963 and 1975. The number of enterprises increased from 11,944 to 15,352, and employment from 831,860 workers to 1,254,100. In 1975 Blacks constituted 56.2 percent of the manufacturing work

185

force, Whites 21.7 percent, Coloureds 16.5 percent, and Asians 5.7 percent. The economic recession of 1976-78 slowed growth, but production began rising again in late 1977 and continued thereafter; rate of growth in 1979 was estimated at 4 percent. By 1980 the government policy of apartheid had become a major obstacle to development of manufacturing's full market potential. The domestic market continued to be centered in the economically better off White and Asian populations. Although Black purchasing power had risen considerably during the 1970s, the wage and job discrimination features of apartheid had seriously retarded wider development of the Black consumer market. These factors also held back growth of a market among the smaller, but still substantial Coloured population. Externally the reaction to apartheid had effectively shut off South African manufactures from (or reduced sales in) their natural markets in the rest of Africa and had had a negative impact on sales in other parts of the world.

Most of the main branches of manufacturing were well developed, although in certain areas of chemicals, machinery, and plastics substantial imports were still required. Facilities for shipbuilding were of a limited nature and were lacking for the production of commercial aircraft and certain military weapon systems, although the local armament industry satisfied requirements for a broad category of arms (see The Indigenous System, ch. 5). Probably the most underdeveloped subsector was the computer and electronics industry. The government was offering special incentives to encourage private sector development. But in 1980, despite reported important advances, South Africa remained highly dependent on foreign sources to meet its requirements for sophisticated computers, electronic equipment, and servicing.

The largest subsector (based on estimated value of sales) was processed foods. It was also the largest employer, having a reported total of 161,400 workers in 1977. The country's textile industry produced wool, cotton, and synthetic fibers and goods. However, the raw materials for synthetic fibers had to be imported. About 75 percent or more of the textiles output was used by the domestic clothing industry. The latter, largely centered in Cape Town where the first factory was established in 1907, was highly labor intensive and a major source of employment for the Coloured population. The single most important manufacturing activity at the beginning of the 1980s was, however, the making of iron, steel, and ferroalloys, which was dominated by state-owned ISCOR. Production of crude steel was almost 8.9 million tons in 1979, ranking South Africa thirteenth among the world's noncommunist countries. Self-sufficiency had been attained in the mid-1970s, except in certain special steels, and steel was exported regularly during the late 1970s.

Stimulated by shortages in World War II and subsequently by domestic industrial and mining expansion, South Africa has developed a diversified—and largely self-sufficient—heavy engineering sector capable of designing and manufacturing a variety of heavy

Aerial view of Cape Town showing
Table Mountain in the background
Courtesy South African Information Service

equipment as well as meeting the country's requirements for structural steel forms. Self-sufficiency has largely been attained in the production of railroad rolling stock. Passenger, freight, tank, coal, refrigerator, and other rail cars are built from local materials; however, electric and diesel-electric locomotives in the late 1970s included about 60 percent imported parts. Progress in shipbuilding has been rather limited. Since 1967 the government has provided subsidies to the industry, and a number of cargo and container vessels—the largest of 9,380 deadweight tons—have been built. But shipbuilding remained a struggling industry at the beginning of 1980, its operations almost entirely confined to small craft construction—tug boats, fishing vessels, and the like—for the local market.

187

The chemical industry began in 1896 with the manufacture of explosives for the mining industry. In 1980 production of explosives within South Africa was controlled by the giant African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI), the world's largest privately owned explosives manufacturer. Principal shareholders were De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited and the British Imperial Chemical Industries. From its early beginning the chemical industry has expanded to include fertilizers, insecticides, pharmaceuticals, plastics, man-made fibers, synthetic rubber, and a wide variety of basic industrial chemicals. In 1980 South Africa was largely self-sufficient in chemicals, and imports were relatively small. The government was promoting further development of import-substitution, but in some cases domestic production appeared uneconomical (e.g., about 40 percent of all plastic raw materials continued to be secured abroad because of cost factors).

South Africa is self-sufficient in the production of motor cars and commercial vehicles. Motor vehicle assembly was started by Ford Motors South Africa at Port Elizabeth in 1924, and General Motors South Africa opened an assembly plant in the same city in 1926. All components were imported, and despite import controls during World War II the local content of passenger cars increased very slightly; as late as 1960 domestic parts constituted no more than one-eighth by weight of the finished vehicle. In 1962 the government began a phased program to raise the domestic materials proportion that required two-thirds of a passenger vehicle by weight to be of local content by 1976. The weight requirement has resulted in the use of heavier parts made in South Africa; imported parts actually constituted from 40 to 50 percent of a car's value. Subsequent government efforts have been based on incentives involving excise duties that translate higher local content into manufacturer cost advantages.

The industry long suffered from an excessive number of assemblers and manufacturers whose customers were in effect only the affluent White and Asian markets. Mergers and takeovers had reduced the total in mid-1980 to twelve firms, producing American, British, French, German, Italian, and Japanese vehicles, who competed for a market that averaged under normal economic conditions around 300,000 passenger cars and commercial vehicles a year. Sales to Blacks were small; the total number of motor vehicles of all vintages owned by Blacks in the mid-1970s was under 210,000. South African sources indicated that the White car market was largely saturated—there were about 415 cars per 1,000 Whites in 1978. It appeared that the motor vehicle firms were holding on mainly in the hope that economic conditions for Blacks—who owned 10.8 vehicles per 1,000—would improve sufficiently to open up what could be Africa's largest motor vehicle market.

Energy Sources

As of 1980 proved commercially exploitable deposits of petroleum and natural gas had not been found in South Africa, and the severe

188

limits on water caused by climatic factors had established the country's hydroelectric potential at probably no more than 1 percent of total energy requirements. But there were relatively vast reserves of two major sources of energy: coal and uranium. At least 75 percent of the primary energy supply was provided by coal used directly, converted to petroleum fuels, or used increasingly to produce electricity. The remaining energy needs were satisfied by imported oil. This proportion differed markedly from other industrialized economies where petroleum and petroleum products usually accounted for close to half of energy needs. In 1980 nuclear energy did not yet play a role in meeting the country's overall energy requirements, but construction was under way on the first South African nuclear power plant.

Electric Power

Production of electricity began in the early 1880s, about three years after commercial power generation started in the United States. Generally uncoordinated development by private power companies, municipalities, towns, and mining operations occurred thereafter through the early 1900s. A national policy on power development and control was legislated in the Electricity Act of 1922 (later updated in 1958). A major feature of the 1922 act was the establishment of the governmental electric utility enterprise, the Elctricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), which was charged, among other duties, with the development of an abundant supply of electricity to be provided at cost wherever it would serve to advance the country's economy. By the late 1940s ESCOM had largely absorbed the private power companies and had over 1,000 megawatts of generating capacity that furnished more than 70 percent of the national requirement for electricity.

Technological advances in high-voltage, long-distance power transmission in the 1960s led to a major shift from construction of new thermal plants near demand centers, many of which required the transportation of coal for great distances, to the siting of new mammoth power stations at the coalfields. These plants fed electricity into a centrally controlled national high-voltage power grid, most of which had been constructed by 1973. By 1979 ESCOM had almost 16,000 megawatts of generating capacity and provided well over 93 percent of the electricity consumed in South Africa. The remainder was furnished by municipal, mining, and industrial generation. ESCOM also supplied power to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Coal-fired units in the nineteen power plants operating in 1979 constituted 94.5 percent of total capacity and accounted for about 86 percent of ESCOM-supplied power. The steadily rising demand for electricity was expected to require a doubling of ESCOM's generating capacity by the end of the 1980s. Work was under way on two plants situated at Transvaal coalfields, each of 3,600 megawatts, whose final generating units were to be in operation before the mid-1980s. Three additional plants of similar

189

capacity, two in the Transvaal and one in Orange Free State, were in various stages of procurement and construction; the first units were to start producing power in late 1985 or in 1986.

Hydroelectric stations accounted for only 3.4 percent of total generating capacity consisting of 540 megawatts installed in plants at two dams on the Orange River. ESCOM also had an arrangement with Mozambique whereby it was guaranteed 1,384 megawatts of capacity at the Cabora Bassa Dam in that country. In 1979 power from the domestic facilities and Cabora Bassa accounted for about 12 percent of the total electricity supplied to South Africa by ESCOM. Additionally in 1 we ESCOM, in conjunction with the Department of Water Affair , had under construction a combined water-storage and hydroelectric facility of 1,000 megawatts in the Drakensberg Mountains. The project involved, in addition to power generation that was to start in 1981, the transfer of water from the Tugela River to the Vaal River. The latter was the principal source of water for the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging mining-industrial complex.

Electricity consumption information was available only for sales by ESCOM. Between 1974 and 1979 total sales had increased from 52.6 billion kilowatt hours to 80.6 billion. During this five-year period bulk sales to municipal authorities for distribution to houses for use in street lighting and for other local purposes accounted for an average of about 30 percent of total sales. ESCOM's own distribution for domestic and street lighting use amounted to under 2 percent. The purchase of electricity by the manufacturing and mining industries rose steadily during the period. But growth in use by the former was greater, and proportionately manufacturing's share of total purchases increased from about 31 percent to over 34 percent, whereas mining's share declined relatively from over 32 percent to under 30 percent. South African Railways used the remaining 5 to 6 percent for traction on electrified lines.

In 1980 the entire White population, in effect, had access to electric power, some furnished by local diesel generators. Many in the Asian and Coloured groups also had electricity. Information on access for the Black population was meager. Although some towns and areas around them in the homelands had electricity, large rural areas and semiurban agglomerations had no power at all. The situation in the Black townships in the White area varied, but no township had been completely electrified as of 1980. In Soweto, the country's largest Black township, slightly more than 25 percent of the houses had electric power in 1979. In late 1980, however, financing for extension of the distribution system in Soweto was being discussed, and there were reports that electrification would be expanded in other townships as well.

Petroleum and Natural Gas

The existence of oil and gas has been reported periodically from various parts of South Africa at least since the 1860s. Organized

efforts at exploitation began in 1889 and continued off and on until World War II, but none of the deposits proved of more than minor commercial significance. The possibility for important discoveries remained though, and in 1940 South Africa's Geological Survey was directed to undertake further investigations. In 1942 the sole right to recover domestic petroleum was assumed by the government, and in 1944 a government drilling program was started. The results, as well as some continuing private endeavors, were again inconclusive. In 1965 a new large-scale government effort to find oil was initiated with the establishment of the Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (SOEKOR), a state-financed enterprise that was directed to carry out exploration on its own, assist private prospectors, and coordinate the overall search. Exploration on land generally proved fruitless, and during the 1970s the focus was shifted to offshore areas of the continental shelf, where a number of large international oil firms had carried out some prospecting under lease agreements. Through 1980 SOEKOR had made a number of offshore natural gas finds, of which only one appeared viable. This exception was a major discovery reported off the mouth of the Orange River in late 1979 that had not been further tested by the end of 1980. Oil discoveries by all prospectors during this entire time were unencouraging. Despite the general lack of success, however, SOEKOR had expanded its operations and had leased a third offshore drilling rig in 1980.

Parallel with earlier exploration for petroleum, interest developed in the possible production of oil from coal. Anglo Transvaal Consolidated Investment, a private firm that had conducted research in this field, was granted a license in 1949 under the provisions of the Liquid Fuel and Oil Act of 1947, which was enacted to encourage development. The company was unable to raise the necessary capital, and in 1950 the government-financed (by IDC) SASOL was established. The company's first plant, SASOL 1, was constructed about 80 kilometers south of Johannesburg in Orange Free State, adjacent to a large coalfield and near the Vaal River. (Large quantities of water were necessary for the process.) Operations, which involved gasification of coal and subsequent catalytic liquefaction to turn out a wide range of petroleum products and basic chemical by-products, began in 1955. By the end of the year gasoline from the plant was available to the public. In the late 1970s the plant produced some 4,500 to 5,000 barrels of oil per day, estimated to be close to 2 percent of the domestic requirement. In 1978 foreign sources estimated domestic use at about 240,000 barrels per day, of which over 70 percent was consumed by the transport sector. In addition about 77,000 barrels per day were estimated to be provided to neighboring countries, including Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), and some 70,000 barrels per day were being stockpiled. Oil used by refineries for fuel and for power generation totaled another estimated 33,000 barrels per day.

In December 1974 the government announced plans to build a second, much larger oil-from-coal plant, SASOL II. The new plant,

191

having an estimated output at full operation of about 45,000 barrels per day, has been situated some 130 kilometers from Johannesburg in a region of extensive coal reserves and adequate water supplies in eastern Transvaal. Full operation is planned for 1982—initial production of unrefined petroleum was already under way in 1980. SASOL II will produce mainly motor fuels and light oil. In February 1979 plans to build SASOL III near SASOL II, roughly along the latter's lines, were also announced. The main output again was to be liquid fuels, but provisions were also being made to produce alcohols and various chemicals. Once in full operation the three SASOL plants would meet, according to a government claim made in early 1979, about 47 percent of domestic gasoline and diesel fuel requirements (based on 1978 consumption patterns). About two-thirds of the financing for SASOL II was furnished by the State Oil Fund, whose resources come mainly from a surcharge on domestic sales of petroleum products. An additional one-eighth of the cost was provided through budgetary appropriations, and the remaining one-fifth was secured abroad in the form of export credits. Full details of the financing of SASOL III were not available in late 1980; however, a substantial sum was raised by the parent company in the summer of 1979 through a large first-time sale of stock to the private sector.

Foreign interests long have dominated the oil refining and distributing industry. In 1980 subsidiaries of multinational oil companies owned three of the country's four major refineries. They were the jointly owned Shell and British Petroleum/South African Petroleum Refineries installation at Durban, which had an estimated capacity of over 212,000 barrels per day in the late 1970s; a second refinery at Durban, owned by Mobil Refining Company South Africa, having an estimated capacity of 100,000 barrels per day; and the 58,000 barrels-per-day plant of Caltex Oil of South Africa at Cape Town. SASOL had a majority interest (52.5 percent) in the fourth plant, National Petroleum Refiners of South Africa (NATREF), at Sasolburg, south of Johannesburg, which had a capacity of 75,000 barrels per day. Together the four plants furnished about 95 percent of the country's requirement for refined petroleum products. About 85 percent of the market for oil products was controlled by British Petroleum, Caltex, Mobil, Shell, and Total-South Africa. The latter, which also operated NATREF, was largely French-owned but had some South African interests. SASOL, TRFK Beleggings, a small South African controlled distributing firm, and two foreign-owned companies accounted for the rest of the market.

Through 1973 most of the country's petroleum imports came from Arab producers in the Middle East and Iran (which held shares in NATREF). In November 1973 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called for an embargo on oil shipments to southern Africa including South Africa. The Arab states agreed, but Iran refused, largely because of the friendly relations that had developed between the two countries during World War II when the exiled Iranian

*General view of Sasol 1, South Africa's first
oil-from-coal plant, south of Johannesburg
Courtesy South African Information Service*

193

sovereign, Reza Shah Pahlavi, lived in South Africa. Subsequently, until late 1978 when Iranian disorders cut production, Iran supplied an estimated 90 percent of South Africa's some 400,000-barrels-per-day of foreign oil needed to meet overall demands, including exports and stockpiling. After the shah was deposed in early 1979 supplies from Iran were completely stopped, and through 1980 South Africa's needs for foreign oil appear to have been satisfied through purchases on the spot market at considerably inflated prices.

In the mid-1960s as a measure to lessen dependence on foreign oil supplies, consideration had been given to the construction of several additional plants similar to SASOL 1. At the time, however, the ready accessibility of petroleum at reasonable prices and other economic factors led to the decision to establish in effect a strategic oil reserve. Initially large storage tanks were used, but later worked-out coal mines were utilized. These were reportedly located in the Transvaal and in the late 1970s held, by conservative estimates, eighteen months to two years supply of recoverable crude oil; other estimates calculated the reserve would last up to four years, and effective rationing would in any case extend the use period considerably. In mid-1979 the government placed severe restrictions on publication of any information on oil supplies and reserves. The chairman of SASOL noted about the same time that the strategic reserve had not been touched despite the Iranian oil cutoff, and there seemed every likelihood that stockpiling was continuing.

Nuclear Power

ESCOM was also engaged in a program to provide electricity through nuclear power generation. A nuclear power station was begun in 1976 at Koeberg, thirty kilometers north of Cape Town. The French-built plant will have two reactors of 922 megawatts each, the first scheduled to go into operation in late 1982 and the second in 1983. South Africa anticipated securing the initial nuclear fuel for the plant from the United States, but in late 1980 a United States embargo was in effect on shipment of the fuel until South Africa signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and opened its nuclear facilities to inspection. In 1978 the South African Uranium Enrichment Corporation began enlarging a pilot uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba near Pretoria that uses a South African-developed process. In late 1980 the corporation announced that by mid-decade the plant would have a fifty-ton capacity, about the quantity needed annually to fuel the Koeberg nuclear installation. However, facilities for fabricating the reactor's fuel rods did not exist in South Africa in late 1980.

Transportation

The distribution patterns of the country's mineral and agricultural resources and of its major ports have resulted in widely separated areas of development and widely scattered cities and towns. Connecting these in 1980 were a highly developed network

194

of national trunk and provincial roads and state-owned rail, air, road transport, and harbor services. These services were supplemented by private road haulage and air cargo and passenger operations of generally local character (see figs. 18, 19). Major petroleum pipelines also transported refined petroleum products from Durban to the Johannesburg area with drawoff points at several intervening towns. An additional pipeline carrying crude oil ran from Durban to Richards Bay and on to the NATREF refinery in the Witwatersrand.

Railroads

Railroads link all main population centers and economic regions. South Africa's transportation system must move large quantities of bulk goods—coal, minerals, livestock—over long distances, and historically government policy has favored the railroads. Consequently the rail system is the most important element of the transportation sector in contrast to the usual domination of road transport in most advanced countries. All of the country's railroads are operated by the South African Railways and Harbours Administration (SAR&H), an organization of the Department of Transport. The present-day system was formed from the earlier provincially controlled railroads after the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910. Complete merger was effected in 1916.

Construction of a railroad that ran inland from Cape Town was started by private interests in 1859. It had progressed a distance of ninety-two kilometers to Wellington by 1863 but stagnated thereafter until the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley at the end of the decade. Private financing proved unable to continue the line to the diamond mining area, and in 1873 the government of Cape Province took it over. Work was renewed the following year and the rail line finally reached Kimberley in 1885. Discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand about the same time led to extension of the line toward the new source of traffic. But President Paul Kruger of the South African Republic (present-day Transvaal), concerned over the possibility of becoming dependent on British financial interests, refused to allow the railroad to cross the state border. A second line aimed at the Witwatersrand, also British controlled, which had started inland from Natal in the late 1870s, was similarly stopped (see Discovery of Diamonds and Gold, ch. 1). Kruger subsequently reached an agreement with Portugal for construction of a line from Pretoria to Lourenço Marques on the Mozambique coast (roughly equidistant with Durban to the Witwatersrand). Permission was then given for completion of the lines from Cape Town and Natal as well as for a third line that had started from Port Elizabeth.

The first through train from Cape Town reached Johannesburg in 1892 and the first from Port Elizabeth in January 1893. Arrival of the latter also opened the route to the port of East London; an inland line from East London had connected with the Port Elizabeth railroad in Orange Free State in 1892. In 1894 the Lourenço Marques line

Figure 18. Major Roads

Botswana • Mafeking • Pretoria • Johannesburg • Kimberley • Bloemfontein • Lesotho • Swaziland • Mozambique • Zimbabwe • Richards Bay • Durban • East London • Port Elizabeth • Indian Ocean

Figure 19. Railroads, Major Airports, and Principal Harbors

opened, and through service from Durban began in 1895. By then the railroads comprised some 5,700 route kilometers and, although the total was only about a quarter of that in 1980, the basic trunk-line structure of the present-day rail system had been established. Most of the construction since then has consisted of connecting links and branch lines with the exception of the line to Namibia, which was built in 1915. After the surrender of German South West Africa to South African forces in mid-1915, the new line was tied to the railroads in that territory. In 1922 the territory's entire rail system was absorbed directly into the South African railroad network, of which it remained an integral part in 1980.

At the end of March 1978 South Africa's railroads totaled 22,644 route kilometers of 1.067 meter track. Additionally there were 705 route kilometers of .610 meter narrow-gauge track accommodating minor branch lines. The country's first railroads were initially laid using the British standard gauge track of 1.435 meters (4 feet 8 1/2 inches). Economic considerations involving the steep grades to the interior plateau then led to advocacy of a narrow gauge of .762 meters (2 feet 6 inches). Ensuing argument resulted in a compromise of 1.067 meters (3 feet 6 inches), a gauge that subsequently was widely adopted throughout southern Africa. In 1980 it permitted direct interchange of rolling stock between the rail systems of Zaïre, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique—and potentially the Benguela Railway in Angola and the Chinese-built TAZARA line in Tanzania.

Electric and diesel traction have become the major locomotive power; but steam engines remained an important part of the locomotive complement in 1980. Electric service was introduced in Natal in 1926 and in the Cape Town area in 1928 but began in other parts of the country mainly in the 1950s. About half the system's route distance, including much of the trunk system, has been electrified, as have all suburban commuter services in the major urban centers. The latter carried between 500 million and 600 million passengers annually in the late 1970s. Diesel engines were first used for main-line service in 1958. The dieselization program was reexamined after the start of the world oil crisis in 1973 and especially after Iran cut off oil shipments to South Africa in early 1979. A decision was reached to retain operating steam locomotives in use as long as possible but not to replace any existing diesel traction. But the electrification program, which is based on power produced by domestic coal, has continued, and it was anticipated that by the mid-1980s electric traction would predominate in the transport of freight.

Roads and Road Transport

Except for the lightly populated northwestern sector, South Africa is crisscrossed by a dense system of modern all-weather roads totaling over 185,000 kilometers. Of these, about 43,400 kilometers were paved and the remainder had gravel and earth surfaces. These

roads were the responsibility of the National Transport Commission (NTC) and the provincial authorities. In addition there were about 78,000 kilometers of streets and roads within towns, cities, and metropolitan areas that were the responsibility of local authorities. Some 47,000 kilometers of the latter were paved.

The building of modern roads started around 1920 when the first motor vehicle arrived in South Africa. Under the National Roads Act of 1935 the central government took on the responsibility for developing and supporting an integrated national road system. A countrywide, national trunk-road net, principally formed of existing provincial roads, was delineated by the National Road Board (succeeded in 1948 by the NTC). A greatly revised National Roads Act in 1971 returned almost the entire national road system to provincial responsibility. By then there were roughly 9,500 kilometers of unlimited access roads, 3,800 kilometers of limited access highways, and 1,250 kilometers of special roads. At the national level NTC took over the development of a 2,000-kilometer freeway system (essentially superhighways). This program apparently was well under way in 1980, but detailed information on its actual status and further plans was unavailable.

In 1980 practically all long-haul movement of goods and freight by road was in the hands of the road transport service of SAR&H. This service was started in 1912 as a feeder system to tie rural areas and the Black reserves (present-day homelands) into the railroad net. In 1930 SAR&H services were given near monopoly rights by the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, which seriously restricted the road transportation of goods by private carriers. Protected by this legislation as the economy expanded, SAR&H enlarged its road services, and in 1980 carried on not only the original feeder activities but also engaged in a variety of specialized road transport operations (refrigerated vans, tank trucks, and the like). The Road Transportation Act of 1977, which replaced the 1930 law, was despite some relaxations very similar in scope and intent to its predecessor. In 1980 private firms could obtain authorization for deliveries and pickups within a radius of eighty kilometers from their places of business, depending mainly on the availability of suitable existing transport facilities. Other private truckers might secure a certificate that allowed operations within local areas. For certain special goods, both groups might obtain an authorization for longer hauls. As a result of these long-standing restrictions, the private trucking industry consisted almost entirely of small operations totaling about 13,000 enterprises—an estimated two-thirds were one-man operations—having roughly 40,000 vehicles in all.

Bus services within the major urban areas were operated mostly by the local authorities and were provided for segregated use by different racial groups. However, private motorcars were the White population's most important means of transportation within and between urban centers. Commuter bus services from the Black, Asian, and Coloured townships were furnished by private firms.

The road transport service of SAR&H operated racially segregated local and long-distance bus services that complemented the train services. In some places where rail service has become uneconomical, SAR&H has replaced the trains with buses. Much of the bus service within the homelands and to the border areas is operated by the Corporation for Economic Development (CED) or the individual homeland development corporation.

Civil Aviation

The major domestic air carrier is South African Airways (SAA), which also provides extensive international and regional services. In 1980 SAA was the largest national airline on the African continent; in 1979 it carried more than 3.6 million passengers (a million more than the second largest national carrier) and almost 62,000 tons of freight (over 40 percent more than the next airline). SAA was actually the air arm of SAR&H, which established SAA in 1934 after acquisition of the privately operated Union Airways. The following year SAA absorbed South West African Airways. In 1940, during World War II, SAA was converted to a military unit but resumed civil transport operations in 1944. By 1980 SAA was operating close to 500 domestic flights a week that served nine urban centers in South Africa and two cities in Namibia (see fig. 19). These centers were connected to about fifty smaller towns throughout the country by some fifteen independent private carriers, whose equipment ranged from single-engine, four-seater planes to twin-engine turboprops. In 1980 SAA had about forty aircraft in its domestic, regional, and international passenger and cargo services. Most were Boeing jets that included short-, medium-, and long-range models. There were also a number of A-300 Airbuses and several Hawker Siddeley airliners.

SAA operated international services to major cities in western and southern Europe; New York, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires in the Western Hemisphere; Israel in the Middle East; Hong Kong and Taiwan in the Far East; and Australia. Regional services were operated mostly through pool arrangements that provided flights to and from Botswana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zaïre, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the French Overseas Department of Reunion.

SAA's services to Europe were hampered by the refusal by most members of the OAU to allow overflight of their countries. The overflight ban forced SAA to skirt the western edge of Africa thereby adding time to the flights and increasing the fuel requirements. By 1980 growing fuel costs had made service to Rome and Athens uneconomical. A number of OAU states had granted SAA landing rights. At the end of 1980 they included Cape Verde, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Zaïre, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. In addition to flights offered by SAA, fifteen foreign airlines provided international services to and from South Africa.

The country has three international airports: Jan Smuts near Johannesburg, officially opened in 1953 and in 1980 the country's principal international airport; Louis Botha Airport at Durban; and D. F. Malan Airport at Cape Town. The airport at Windhoek in Namibia was also classified as an international facility. These airports together with eight others at the urban centers served by SAA were state owned. In all, some 330 airports and airfields, including small authorized landing strips, were in operation, of which about 160 belonged to local government authorities. Since 1954 the central government has fostered the development of civil aviation through subsidies for pilot training and the provision of gliders and parachutes to licensed flying organizations. In the late 1970s about 3,000 private and company planes were in operation, all foreign made; no civilian aircraft were being produced in South Africa as of 1980.

Ports and Shipping

Four of the country's six major ports—Durban on the east coast, East London and Port Elizabeth on the south, and Cape Town (Table Bay) on the southwest coast—were established in colonial times. The other two—Richards Bay and Saldanha Bay—were constructed during the 1970s. The six ports are administered by SAR&H, which furnishes all harbor services except stevedoring. SAR&H also operates the port grain elevators at Cape Town, East London, and Durban and the precooling plants at those sites and at Port Elizabeth. South Africa has a number of smaller ports; none are of great significance, but Mossel Bay located halfway between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth has value as an oil port. The harbor at Walvis Bay on the west coast of Namibia annually handled a million tons or more of cargo during the 1960s and early 1970s and furnished modern shipping facilities for a thriving fishing industry. The great decline in the fish catch from the mid-1970s, however, had reduced port activities drastically by 1980.

The older ports all have highly mechanized cargo-handling facilities, modern in-transit-cargo storage space, and ship servicing and repair facilities. Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth have also been provided with full container-handling facilities. Durban, based on total cargo handled (about 35 million tons a year in the late 1970s), was the largest port in Africa. It was the main entry point for South Africa's oil imports and had an offshore terminal that accommodated tankers up to 225,000 deadweight tons. Its other facilities included a large grain elevator, bulk-loading equipment for coal and ores, and a sugar terminal having a capacity of 440,000 tons. Cape Town, through which the greater part of fruit exports pass, had one of the world's largest modern precooling plants. It also had one of the largest dry docks in the world. Port Elizabeth, established by arriving British settlers in 1820, possessed only open anchorage until construction of an enclosed harbor in the 1920s. A major feature added in the 1960s—a bulk ore-loading facility—resulted in a substantial boost in cargo shipped. The smallest of the older main

ports in volume of cargo was East London at the mouth of the Buffalo River. Harbor services included a large grain elevator and a precooling plant for citrus and deciduous fruits.

The new harbor at Richards Bay on the east coast, some 193 kilometers north of Durban, was begun in 1971 mainly to provide facilities for large ore ships and eventually oil tankers and was opened in 1976. The port, eight times the size of Durban's, initially could handle ships up to 150,000 deadweight tons but will be able to accommodate vessels of 250,000 deadweight tons after additional dredging. The major export was coal, of which over 20 million tons were shipped in 1979; facilities for clean cargo have also been constructed. A principal import in 1980 was alumina for the production of primary aluminum at the Aluminium Corporation of South Africa (ALUSAF) company plant in the nearby Richards Bay industrial area.

Saldanha Bay, one of the world's finest natural harbors, is the largest port on the African west coast. It served as a small harbor for fishing and whaling operations until the early 1970s, when ISCOR decided to develop it as an export facility for ores, mostly iron from ISCOR's Sishen iron mine in northern Cape Province. The project included construction of an 861-kilometer rail line (completed in 1976) from Sishen to the port. In 1980 the facility had a jetty capable of receiving ships of 250,000 deadweight tons and an ore-storing area of thirty-five hectares. ISCOR had planned additional development, but the prospects of the harbor's developing rapidly into a general commercial port led to transfer of control to SAR&H in 1976. In 1977 SAR&H took over all further port projects.

Most of the country's oceangoing shipping is operated by South African Marine Corporation Limited (Safmarine), established in 1946 and the oldest domestic oceangoing shipping company. In 1980 Safmarine operated a fleet of over forty ships, including a number on charter from other lines, to all parts of the world. Included were container and cargo vessels; refrigerated ships that handled most of South Africa's fresh fruit exports; bulk carriers for sugar, grain, and ore; and supertankers. Several other South African companies operated coastal services, some of which included ports in neighboring countries. The largest such operation was that of the Unicorn Group based in Durban, which was formed in 1966 by the merger of three domestic coastal shipping companies. By 1980 the Group had enlarged to include five companies.

The South African ships' register contained 968 ships at the end of fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1979 totaling 791,956 gross register tons. Twenty-six vessels, accounting for 70 percent of registered tonnage, operated to foreign countries, and forty-three others (6 percent of registered tonnage) furnished coastal services. The remainder consisted mostly of fishing craft, harbor boats, research vessels, and pleasure craft.

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments

South Africa's foreign trade statistics included the trade total for

the South African Customs Area—Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland—and Namibia. Detailed information was published for most trade, but a major exception was trade with other African countries for which only the export and import totals were provided. Additionally, exports of gold bullion and imports of oil and arms were excluded from trade figures.

In late 1980 the South African Trade Organization reported that exports during the year had been made to 130 countries. Annual data for the period 1975–79 showed that 80 percent of South African exports by value had gone regularly to twenty-two states of the Western world (including Japan) that were classified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as industrialized countries (see table 14, Appendix). The European Economic Community (EEC—also known as the Common Market) was the largest buyer, accounting between 1975 and 1977 for 46 to 48 percent of South African exports and for 40 to 41 percent in 1978 and 1979. The decline was occasioned largely by a shift in the export market for diamonds during this time from Britain to Switzerland. Through 1977 Britain had taken close to half of the EEC total annually, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was the second largest EEC purchaser. The United States and Japan were the other largest buyers. Minerals and base metals constituted the greatest part of overall exports. Their share was growing as the decade ended, aided by the increasing volume of coal and iron ore shipped through the new ports of Richards Bay and Saldanha Bay. As world prices rose in the late 1970s the export value of precious stones and gold coins advanced to second place, and agricultural products dropped to third position (see table 15, Appendix).

Machinery, transport equipment, and spare parts were the leading import categories during 1975–79 (see table 16, Appendix). The EEC was the principal supplier providing approximately one-half of South African imports. The United States and Japan together furnished an additional 30 percent (see table 17, Appendix). Major bilateral trading partners were the United States, Britain, and West Germany, who variously occupied the top three supplier positions; Japan was fourth. Switzerland attained the top rank as buyer of South African exports in 1979, principally because of diamond and gold coin purchases but continued to supply a relatively small share of South African imports.

Trade with the rest of Africa, the natural market for South Africa's agricultural products and manufactured goods, was carried on, with a few exceptions, very much on a sub-rosa basis, the result of the long-standing OAU ban on trade with South Africa because of the government's apartheid policies. Only a few southern and central African states relatively dependent on South African goods and services reported on this trade. The overall dimension was apparent only in the South African-published totals. Exports averaged close to US$600 million annually in the 1975–79 period (in 1980 they rose to an estimated well over US$1 billion), and imports averaged above

205

US$340 million between 1975 and 1977, dropping thereafter to a low of US$223 million in 1979. Malawi was the only continental Black African country other than Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland that traded freely with South Africa, ignoring the OAU ban. Malawian imports from South Africa grew substantially during the five years, from about 25 percent of its total imports in 1975 to well over 40 percent in 1979. Malawi furnished South Africa with a large number of contract laborers annually and sold about 5 percent of its total exports to that country. In late 1978 Malawi was the recipient of a South African loan for agricultural development equivalent at the time to about US$1.6 million. The island states of Mauritius and Seychelles and the French Overseas Department of Reunion also conducted open trade with South Africa. Imports by Mauritius increased during 1975–79 to over 12 percent of total imports and in the case of Seychelles to over 14 percent. Imports by Reunion ran about 5 percent of total imports in the late 1970s. Exports in all cases were relatively small or negligible.

Pragmatic considerations have forced Mozambique, Zaïre, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (since independence in early 1980) to carry on trade with South Africa. The latter three countries rely on South Africa for imports of food, consumer goods, oil, and raw materials. In the case of Zaïre and Zambia transport routes through South Africa have remained vital for the export of copper, the chief foreign exchange earner of the two countries. Mozambique's economy has been heavily dependent on its southern neighbor for foreign exchange earnings. Through 1975–79 Mozambique provided a large number of workers for South African mines and, after the start of commercial production at its Cabora Bassa hydroelectric generating facility in mid-1979, began exporting electricity on a regular basis to South Africa. Earnings also came from the large quantity of South African mineral and other commodity exports shipped over the rail line from the Transvaal to Maputo, as well as from the smaller shipments of petroleum products, spare parts, and the like imported through Mozambique for South Africa. In 1980 SAR&H personnel furnished technical help, aided with repairs to the section of the line in Mozambique, and were active in the operation of the port at Maputo. Mozambique's import of goods and supplies from South Africa ranged from 12 to 20 percent of total imports annually between 1975 and 1979.

That South Africa traded rather widely throughout Black Africa outside the south central region appeared quite certain, but available supportive information came largely from newspaper reports. All public acknowledgment was shunned by the South African agencies involved and their trading partners. This trade was apparently conducted utilizing such transport services as SAFAIR, a South African charter air cargo carrier service, and by chartered vessels. Some of the trade seemed relatively open, but other cases included double-invoicing and measures to prevent disclosure of the point of origin. In 1979 it was estimated that perhaps fifteen or more

countries were engaging in this secretive trade, but no estimate of the total value appeared possible. South African sources claimed that forty African states in all bought from South Africa in 1980.

South Africa's balance of payments, the summary in money terms of the country's economic transactions with the rest of the world, has been characterized regularly by an appreciable deficit in net merchandise and service transactions. Offsetting this deficit in varying degrees has been the net gold output and to a much smaller extent net transfer payments, which have usually been favorable. In the decade ending in 1976, however, the offset was not sufficient to prevent an annual deficit in the current account, the summary statement of current international transactions (see table 18, Appendix). The situation was altered markedly in the late 1970s, however, by the phenomenal rise in world gold prices. Although the net merchandise balance remained in deficit, higher gold values and a great increase in other exports led to a growing surplus in the current account balance from 1977 through 1980.

Deficits that occurred in the current account were usually covered by capital inflows, primarily in the private sector for investment purposes (see Foreign Investment, this ch.). Political uncertainties, however, at times have led to a drop in the investment inflow and to large net outflows, mainly of short-term capital, as after the Sharpeville tragedy in 1960 and the serious rioting in Soweto in 1976. Large, abnormal capital outflows also occurred in the late 1970s for purely economic reasons, which included a sharp drop in domestic interest rates that encouraged a shift from higher cost foreign financing of import trade credits to the domestic market and to repayment of foreign loans by the public and private sectors. As a result the large current account surpluses in 1978 and 1979 were not translated into a major buildup of gross gold and other foreign reserve holdings, but in effect were utilized largely to reduce foreign obligations. When compared with the size of the current account surpluses, the additions in net gold and other foreign exchange holdings from balance-of-payment transactions were relatively small. The great increase in such holdings during 1978 and 1979 (from R788 million at the end of 1977 to R4,282 million in 1979) (for value of the rand—R—see Glossary) was almost entirely the result of gold valuation adjustments.

Foreign Investment

Foreign capital first became a factor in South Africa's modern economic era in the late 1800s, when the first British investments were made in the mining industry. The major impact on economic growth began, however, in the years immediately after World War II, when almost 40 percent of South Africa's gross domestic investment was accounted for by net capital inflows chiefly from West European and United States industrial sources. This capital influx was a major catalyst in the development of manufacturing and provided much of the impetus for the country's economic takeoff during

those first postwar years. In the following three decades to 1980, achievement of a high rate of growth by the economy remained dependent on foreign investment, especially in view of the limited generation of surpluses by the country's current international transactions (goods and services, gold, and net transfers). The improved situation in the current account in the late 1970s did not greatly alter conditions. Foreign capital remained particularly important for the expansion of facilities that fabricated production machinery, transport equipment, computers, and electric and telecommunications gear. The growing need for all these items continued to require large expenditures abroad in 1980.

Foreign investment has included not only continued new financing but also what is believed to be a very large amount of profits reinvested by foreign-controlled firms. The economy has benefited from the provision of highly developed technology that accompanied much foreign financing. This technology has been transmitted freely and without the restrictions frequently placed on transfers to other countries. One estimate has attributed about 40 percent of the growth of South Africa's GDP between the late 1950s and early 1970s to the effect of introduced technology.

At the end of 1978 the outstanding total of South Africa's foreign liabilities—funds furnished by foreign sources for all categories of economic activity—amounted to slightly less than R22.9 billion (equivalent at the time to about US$26.3 billion). This total equaled about 57 percent of the 1978 GDP in current prices, was three times the size of that year's merchandise export earnings, and was twice the total of export earnings plus net gold output. Two-thirds of total investment was in the private sector, and of this share more than 60 percent was so-called direct investment, that is, in enterprises in which foreigners had a controlling interest.

Between 1973 and 1978 total foreign investment more than doubled (see table 19, Appendix). Through 1976 the rate of overall growth (public and private sectors, direct and nondirect investment) was over 20 percent and reached a high of 29 percent in 1975. The rate dropped sharply in 1977 to 7.6 percent and to 7.3 percent in 1978. Among the factors that appeared to have played a part in the decline were investor concern after the political disturbances in Soweto in 1976, the economic slowdown in South Africa during this time, and excessive liquidity in the banking sector that led to substantial net capital outflows in repayments. The high rate of growth through 1976 was due in considerable part to the nondirect investment funds secured by the government and the government corporations for projects, including construction of several new thermal power plants (by ESCOM), the nuclear power plant at Koeberg, additional oil-from-coal facilities (SASOL II), expansion by ISCOR of steel-producing capacity, and the development of Richards Bay. Private direct investment declined during the 1970s as a percentage of total foreign capital invested, and in 1977 the annual rate of growth reached a low of 6.3 percent compared with 19 percent in

*Gold bullion in the South African Reserve Bank, Pretoria.
Each bar, weighing 12.5 kilograms, was valued at the
equivalent of US$258,125.00 on December 31, 1980.
Courtesy South African Information Service*

1974. Total, private direct investment increased substantially in
1978, however, registering a growth of 11.3 percent.

In a major step to attract foreign investment the government in
February 1979 introduced the financial rand designed to permit
nonresidents to import investment capital on concessional terms. Its
value was to be determined strictly by market forces in contrast to
the regular, or commercial, rand that was pegged to the United
States dollar and floated within limits set by the South African Re-
serve Bank. The financial rand had sold at a discount through 1980,
an important feature since dividends from investments could be re-
mitted at the higher commercial rand rate, although the capital had
been invested at the financial rand rate. This contrasted with earlier
regulations that forced investment to be made in the commercial
rand but allowed repatriation only at a discount. Some indication of
the impact of the measure was apparent in reported approvals for

209

direct investments totaling more than US$600 million during the first year of the financial rand.

Detailed authoritative information on the sources of foreign investment in South Africa was unavailable in late 1980. A relatively large number of countries have provided investment capital, of which the greatest proportion has been British, American, and West German. In 1978 British investments were estimated to be equivalent to about US$8.4 billion. Some 500 companies were involved principally in manufacturing but also—to a lesser extent—in mining and commerce. United States direct investment—by an estimated 300 firms—was about US$2 billion, of which well over 40 percent was in manufacturing, 20 percent in petroleum processing and distributing, and 10 percent in the mining industry. United States indirect investment, largely in mining company shares, was estimated at another US$2.3 billion. West German investments reached the equivalent of US$2.3 billion in 1978. About 350 companies were directly engaged or operated enterprises jointly, mainly in the automotive, chemical, and engineering fields. Several other members of the EEC were also important suppliers of investment funds including France, Belgium, and Italy.

According to the South African Reserve Bank, at the end of 1978 EEC countries accounted for 56 percent of South Africa's total foreign investment, the rest of Europe another 10 percent, and the Western Hemisphere (principally the United States and Canada) close to 24 percent, with small amounts accounted for by financing from other areas (see table 20, Appendix). In the field of bank loans furnished to South Africa, information for the period 1972–78 compiled for the United Nations (UN) showed that 382 banks, whose parent banks were located in twenty-two countries, made loans totaling almost US$5.5 billion. Most of the money came from lending institutions having their main headquarters in West Germany, the United States, Britain, France, and Switzerland.

Labor

Although economic development in South Africa has become increasingly dependent on Black labor, government legislation to prevent permanent Black settlement within areas reserved for Whites has in essence treated all Black laborers in those areas as members of a "temporary" work force. In 1980 this work force consisted of Blacks with residential rights in the Black urban townships, workers commuting from homes in nearby homeland areas, migrant workers from more distant homeland areas, and migrants from foreign countries. By law only White, Asian, and Coloured workers comprised the permanent work force of the White area, which also encompassed the group areas of the Asians and Coloureds. But the long-term continuity of Black service with White employers and the ever-growing need of the latter for a stable labor force had led the government to recognize the permanence of urban-domiciled Blacks (see Apartheid and Its Evolution, ch. 2). In the late 1970s about

210

*Long lines of Blacks waiting for work permits
outside a government labor bureau in Durban.
The scene is common throughout South Africa.
Courtesy Africa News Service*

43 percent of all Black male workers in the White area and one-third of those in urban areas were actually migrants under the government's definition of the term.

Information on the economically active population and employment in South Africa has been obscured by the exclusion from the country's statistics of data for Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda after those three Black homelands were declared to be "independent states" in 1976, 1977, and 1979, respectively. Since independence their workers have not been regarded as domestic elements of the South African economy. At the end of 1975 the country's economically active labor force was estimated at almost 9.8 million, of which Blacks constituted 71.7 percent, Whites 17.9 percent, Coloureds 8.1 percent, and Asians 2.3 percent. More than 45 percent of the Black labor force was located in White urban areas. Another 25 percent was in the White rural areas. The remainder (less than 30 percent) comprised the rural labor force of the Black homelands. Census data for 1970 showed that Whites and Asians worked predominantly in the urban centers, as did well over 80 percent of the Coloured economically active group. Employment distribution of the different racial groups by industrial division was related in part to the size and kind of work force needed and in part to its availability. Blacks constituted an absolute majority of workers

211

in mining, manufacturing, and construction. Whites were the largest number in banking, and White and Black employees were relatively equal in numbers in some sectors such as retail and whole-sale trade. Whites constituted a majority of post office workers, the result of government policies favoring White employees (see table 21, Appendix).

Wide wage differentials existed between White workers and those of the other racial groups. Structurally this was explained by the occupational distribution of the work force. Whites, who held most of the skilled jobs, had average wages substantially higher than those of Asians and Coloureds, who occupied mostly intermediate skilled and semiskilled positions. The average wages of Asians and Coloureds, in turn, were in general considerably higher than those of Blacks, large numbers of whom held ordinarily low-paying, unskilled jobs (see table 22, Appendix). This structural pattern was rooted in apartheid policies that gave rise to severe discrimination in job opportunities and access to employment—more so for the Black work force than for Asians and Coloureds. The annual earnings of the Black, Asian, and Coloured workers in real terms improved between 1970 and 1979. During the nine years White real wages showed no increase, whereas those for Blacks rose at an average annual rate of 5.6 percent, for Coloureds at 1.3 percent, and for Asians at 3.6 percent. During the period Black wages increased from 20 to 29 percent of total wages, those for Coloureds from 7.3 to 7.9 percent, and for Asians from 2.5 to 3.1 percent. White wages meanwhile declined from 70 to 60 percent of total annual wages paid to workers in the nonagricultural sectors. The discrepancy in actual wages, however, remained great. As of early 1980 in mining, Black wages were only about 16 percent of White wages, in manufacturing about 23 percent, and in construction under 20 percent. In 1970 a gap of R2,769 existed between the average White wage of R3,247 and average Black wage of R478. In 1979 the gap had increased to R6,006—the White average wage being R7,895, and that for Blacks R1,889.

The proportionally low occupational status of the Black labor force related directly to Nationalist government policies enunciated in the early 1950s. These were based on the contention that Black workers had no place in the White area beyond certain work levels. As a result only limited Black training facilities were made available because, according to government policy, the place for Black vocational education was in the homelands. As the economy expanded and the supply of skilled White workers dried up during the 1970s, the business community put increasing pressure on the government to change its policies. In 1977 the Commission of Inquiry into Labor Legislation, popularly known as the Wiehahn Commission, was appointed to investigate and make recommendations with respect to existing labor laws in the commercial and manufacturing sectors. (The mining sector was subsequently added.) In 1979, upon the commission's recommendation, the long-standing statutory reservation of certain jobs

212

for Whites was abolished, and by the end of 1980 only two reservations remained in force, both of which were to be phased out. In June 1980 the government accepted a further recommendation that Black apprentices be trained in the White urban areas to qualify as certified skilled artisans. The early response was quite small, and the government then announced special tax incentives for employers who trained Black apprentices. But major obstacles to rapid entry of Blacks into the artisan class still remained in 1980. One hindrance was the continuing negative attitude of White artisan labor unions toward the training of Blacks. But most important were the inadequate education received in the basically inferior Black primary school system and the economic circumstances that prevented Blacks from attaining the eight years of education required for selection for apprenticeship (see Education, ch. 2).

Since its earliest history labor unionism in South Africa has borne a racial imprint. The first craft unions set up in the 1880s by immigrants from Britain consisted of skilled White workers whose self-interests gradually became identified with preventing the use of Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians in any but unskilled jobs. Racial attitudes were reflected in the first Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, the new Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, and were an important aspect of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979. The first two acts excluded Blacks from direct participation in legal unions whose members were limited to Whites and Coloureds (the latter defined as persons neither White nor Black). At the same time, agreements reached through collective bargaining could be applied by government order to all employees in an industry, thus subjecting Black workers to their provisions without representation and to the penal sanctions that were included. The 1924 act did not specify racial segregation of unions, but this provision was included in the 1956 measure, although the government was never able to effect complete separation of various mixed unions that had arisen before 1956.

Black unions could not legally register, but there was no provision in law to prevent their formation. After enactment of the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, however, Black unionization was impeded by government action against union leaders under the very broad terms of the act (see Rise of the National Party and Development of Apartheid, ch. 1). A series of strikes in Durban in 1973 involving Blacks led to a strong revival of the union movement. Despite continued government arrest, detention, and banning of various union leaders, there were over thirty active Black unions by 1979. One of the charges given the Wiehahn Commission was to recommend changes in industrial laws that would bring about sound labor relations. The 1979 Conciliation Amendment Act reflected two major recommendations. The first was a redefinition of the term "employee" to include all workers irrespective of race (excepting foreign migrant workers); the second provided for the registration of Black unions. A number of Black unions had registered

by the end of 1980, of which some were so-called parallel unions that had been assisted in organizing by White unions. The Wiehahn Commission had also recommended full freedom of association, that is the formation of integrated as well as segregated unions. In line therewith the Federal Consultative Council of the SAR&H Staff Association, whose affiliated all-white unions had about 90,000 workers, amended its constitution in order to take in unions of the other races. The association's application to register as an integrated union had not been acted on by the government, however, through 1980.

The Homelands

At the end of 1980, despite some twenty years of development efforts, the Black homelands remained economically nonviable dependencies of the industrialized White area. Increasingly during the 1970s South African and foreign economists had questioned the feasibility of developing the homelands into viable economic units—a major aspect of the National Party's race-related scheme for separate development that was promoted after the party's assumption of power in 1948. In mid-1980 a report of the semiofficial Bureau for Economic Research, Cooperation, and Development (BENSO), noting the failure to attain almost all objectives in homeland development, declared that the solution to South Africa's problem of race relations did not lie in the creation of a number of separate economies. Government recognition of the BENSO conclusion was subsequently contained in a proposed new plan whereby a number of economic regions would be delineated. Homeland borders would continue as political and ethnic boundaries, but economic development throughout the economic regions would be coordinated and administered by a joint authority from the participating entities (that is, the White area and the homeland). The revenues resulting from development activities would be shared. As of the end of 1980 the government had not revealed details on how it proposed to administer the new approach.

Early steps in the implementation of separate development included an initial major study of economic conditions in the homelands (then Native Reserves) and preparation of a rationale for such development by a government commission established in 1949. A summary of the commission's findings (popularly known as the Tomlinson Report) published in 1955 noted the marked inability of homeland subsistence agriculture to support the population and the large part played in the economy by earnings of "temporary" Black workers in the White area. The report concluded that separate development could succeed only if a large part of the homeland labor force found employment in industry. It recommended rapid industrialization of the homelands led by government and White investment and White entrepreneurship. A subsequent government white paper in 1956 rejected the proposal—as being contrary to the basic concepts of apartheid—and set the pattern for homeland

Barracks-like all-male living quarters for Black miners at a gold mine near Johannesburg. Most miners must reside apart from their families, who live in the Black homelands.
Courtesy United Nations/Pendl

economic development that persisted until the end of the 1960s: such development should be left to Black initiative alone, with some financial and technical assistance from the government.

It was accepted, however, that industrial employment for a large part of the male work force of the homelands was necessary to sustain the homeland populations and that development in the homelands would not soon meet that need. At the same time the continued industrial expansion of the White area was bound to attract additional Black labor. The movement of more Blacks to the four major centers of industrial concentration in the White area—the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging complex and areas centered on Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth—was undesirable in the National Party view. In 1960 the government proposed a solution to the entire problem through the Border Industries Scheme. Special incentives including government subsidies and other assistance were offered industries to establish plants in selected growth points located within about fifty kilometers of homeland

borders. The scheme has usually been described by South African government sources as a plan to decentralize industry, but an apologia for apartheid has stated that the chief purpose of the program was to prevent an "unhealthy" concentration of Black workers in the older White urban areas. Although border industrial development has provided a substantial amount of employment, it was generally agreed in the late 1970s—statistics varied considerably—that the areas were absorbing only part of the annual increase in the homelands work force. Moreover border industry appears to have acted negatively on homeland development by attracting as workers better qualified individuals who might otherwise contribute measurably to homeland internal development. At the same time, the better stocked White shops in the border areas absorbed most of the earnings of Black workers, thereby further hindering homeland internal development. The possibility for border industries to contribute more positively to Black development might be subsumed in Pretoria's 1980 proposal for regional economic development—assuming that both the border areas and the homelands will constitute a part of the envisioned regional economic unit.

The government's own programs for homelands development included three so-called five-year plans between 1961 and 1976. They basically outlined what the government proposed to spend on the homelands during each plan period. The first period emphasized the agricultural and pastoral sectors, and the second concentrated on education with some expenditure for economic projects. The third plan was concerned principally with the Black population in the White area, although some grants and services were also provided to the homelands. Notably, during the entire 1961–76 period no individual development plan was drawn up for any homeland. After 1976 funds were provided on an annual basis through grants and development loans.

Extremely limited capital and a pronounced lack of entrepreneurial expertise have been major factors inhibiting Blacks from assuming a primary role in the economic development of the homelands. The growing implications of this trend finally forced a government policy reversal in 1968, when White entrepreneurs were authorized to establish industries at designated growth points in the homelands. The White businessmen operated nominally as agents of the Bantu Investment Corporation that had been formed in 1959 to provide financing for homeland companies. White entrepreneurs, however, could obtain land only on a lease basis, and after an established period, at least in theory, the enterprise had to be sold to Black interests. In 1973 the agricultural sector was also opened on an agency basis to White commercial production of industrial crops such as cotton, sisal, and sugar. A new condition was introduced: Blacks would be given training, and those qualified would be advanced to the highest possible supervisory and managerial posts. In 1977 the Bantu Investment Corporation was renamed the Corporation for Economic Development (CED), and revised legislation has

216

A Black woman harvesting a sisal crop
in the Gazankulu homeland
Courtesy Jean R. Tartter

permitted Whites, Asians, and Coloureds to acquire minority hold-
ings in Black homeland companies. Legislation by the self-governing
homelands has also permitted partnerships between Blacks and
Whites. As of 1980 practically all larger scale enterprises established
in the homelands had been jointly funded by CED or the homelands'
own investment corporation and South African businesses. Private
Black holdings in these enterprises appeared to be small, as indi-
cated by figures showing that of forty-seven joint enterprises estab-
lished during 1976–78 only five had initial Black shareholdings.

* * *

A profuse literature exists on the South African economy. The
great majority deals with the effects and implications of the govern-
ment's policy of separate development on various aspects of the
economy, ranging from the shortage of skilled labor to apartheid's
inhibiting effect on the investment of foreign risk capital and the po-
tential results of international sanctions imposed to force a change.
Among substantially impartial studies are a number prepared for

217

the Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington, D.C., including those by David Hauck, David M. Liff, Kenneth Propp, and Desaix Myers, III, which have been issued also in a single volume, *U.S. Business in South Africa*. In the same category is *Oil Sanctions Against South Africa* by Martin Bailey and Bernard Rivers, a major survey of the South African oil industry. Robert I. Rotberg's *Suffer the Future* describes in an easily readable style the strengths and weaknesses of South Africa and its problems. Generally highly regarded is *The South African Economy*, a study by D. Hobart Houghton, a South African. An informed, objective examination of a homeland granted independence is offered in *Transkei's Half Loaf* by Newell M. Stultz. Especially valuable is the annual *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, which offers a wealth of detail on the Black, Asian, and Coloured populations.

South African government publications, of particular use for data on the economy, include the annual *Abstract of Agricultural Statistics* issued by the Division of Agricultural Marketing Research, the *Bulletin of Statistics* published quarterly by the Department of Statistics, and the *Quarterly Bulletin* of the South African Reserve Bank. The Department of Mines' *Mineral Resources of the Republic of South Africa* (fifth edition) provides extensive detail for those interested in mining. Also highly useful are *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa* and the privately published *Agriculture in South Africa* (1978). (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 4. Government and Politics

Union Buildings in Pretoria, executive seat of government

GOVERNING ACCORDING TO the British system of parliamentary supremacy, South Africa's Afrikaner-dominated National Party has been able to impose its program of institutionalized racial separation without serious challenge since it came to power in 1948. Under strong leaders like H.F. Verwoerd and John Vorster the government moved closer to realizing its vision of separate development for the four official racial groups, when the first three of the Black homelands were recognized by South Africa as independent states between 1976 and 1979.

By the mid-1970s, however, growing internal and external pressures forced South Africa's leaders to recast their approach. The White-ruled buffer states that had insulated South Africa from the hostile nations of Black Africa were themselves giving way to independent Black-ruled regimes. In South Africa the upheaval at Soweto (South Western Townships) and other urban townships in 1976 brought repression by the South African police and harsh application of security laws. The government's crackdown succeeded in disabling those Black political groups and leaders not already banned or imprisoned. But Black anger was not appeased by modest reforms of petty apartheid. By 1980 a pattern of illegal work stoppages, demonstrations against the inferior *educational system* for Black and Coloured pupils, and bombings such as those that damaged the government's strategic coal liquefaction plants, made it appear that civil disturbance and low-level terrorist activity had become endemic.

With the dismemberment of the United Party, the more liberal forces newly realigned in the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) succeeded in becoming the official opposition after the general election of 1977. The PFP called for a national convention of all races looking toward a federation of self-governing states founded on non-discrimination, decision by consensus, and protection of minority rights. While the 1977 election showed that the heightened internal and external threats to South Africa had strengthened the already firm grip of the National Party on the country, the small PFP group in parliament did confront the government's racial policies with the distinct alternative of political rights for all racial groups.

Prime Minister Vorster's resignation in 1978 in the wake of a Department of Information scandal brought P.W. Botha, the minister of defense and head of the Cape wing of the National Party, to power as his successor. Identifying himself with the party's *verligte* (enlightened) elements, Botha made bold promises of reform but, reluctant to test his strength in a power struggle with conservative forces within the party, moved deliberately in legislating change.

By 1980 Botha's main achievement had occurred in the field of

labor, where new laws recognizing Blacks as part of the work force permitted them to organize and form or join trade unions. Some features of these reforms were unfavorable to Blacks, particularly those that made it more difficult to leave the homelands to work in White urban areas. The government's efforts in the labor field underscored the difficulty of easing apartheid in one area without dealing with other aspects of discrimination, including education, housing, influx controls, and oppressive security laws.

In 1977, before Vorster's final election victory, and again in 1980 under Botha, new plans were advanced for constitutional changes in response to protests by the other racial groups against White exclusivity in political decisionmaking. Both initiatives—Vorster's Council of Cabinets and Botha's President's Council—were flawed by their unwillingness to modify apartheid ideology and grant political accommodation to Blacks outside the homeland areas. In spite of rejection by the more liberal opposition, by prominent Coloureds and Asians, and even by the moderate Black homelands leaders, Botha seemed intent on proceeding with his President's Council plan.

After two years of Botha's leadership in late 1980, the South African government was in a state of experiment and flux. Botha's reforms, if only a beginning, had persuaded many people of his seriousness of purpose. Yet the pervasive discontent among Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians had not abated. Still undetermined were the strength of Botha's resolve to root out the deep-seated injustices of the apartheid system and the question of whether his grip on the National Party was firm enough to prevail over its more conservative elements.

Constitutional Development

The Union of South Africa came into being on May 31, 1910, after the results of the national convention of the two British colonies of Natal and the Cape of Good Hope and the two former Boer republics of Orange Free State and Transvaal were adopted by the British Parliament as the South Africa Act of 1909. This legislation served as South Africa's constitution, known as the Union constitution, until the country became a republic in 1961. Although South Africa was a British dominion formally ruled by a governor-general representing the crown, its government was granted full independence of action in internal affairs from the outset.

The institutional structure that the South Africa Act defined closely followed the Westminster model of a bicameral legislature— a House of Assembly composed initially of 121 members elected by White adult males (except in the Cape) and a Senate based on equal representation of the four provinces. The act vested executive power in a governor-general appointed by the British sovereign and an executive council or cabinet, originally of ten members, appointed by the governor-general from members of the legislature. The act also established a Supreme Court of South Africa whose highest appeals division sat in Bloemfontein.

Although otherwise similar to the constitutions adopted by Canada and Australia, South Africa's Union constitution assigned all sovereign powers to the central parliament, rather than sharing them with states or provinces. Certain federal features were present, however, in that the provinces formed an intermediate level of government and senators were chosen by provincially constituted electoral bodies.

Initially legislation passed by the South African parliament could in theory be declared null and void if repugnant to the British Parliament, and British legislation could be made applicable to South Africa. In practice, however, the relationship was that of near equals. This equality was made explicit by Britain's Statute of Westminster in 1931, which removed constitutional limitations on the dominions in their relations with Britain. South Africa's corresponding legislation—the Status of Union Act of 1934—established that no act of the British Parliament could apply to South Africa unless extended by the Union parliament.

Numerous steps were taken by the National Party after its narrow 1948 election victory to underscore the country's independent statehood. A new uniform was adopted for the armed forces, and an exclusively South African citizenship was imposed. The singing of "God Save the Queen" on official occasions and flying of the Union Jack were discontinued. The right of appeal to the British Privy Council—the only remaining constitutional link with Britain—was abolished.

It was not until 1960, however, that the Nationalists ventured to hold a referendum on the issue of a final separation from the British crown by becoming a republic. The referendum obtained majority support and resulted in legislation converting South Africa's political status; the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act came into force on May 31, 1961. This act, with its subsequent amendments, is South Africa's present-day Constitution. It is strikingly similar to its predecessor, the South Africa Act of 1909, retaining the same parliamentary, executive, and judicial institutions. The main change was the substitution of a state president for the governor-general, intended to be a nonpolitical figure and symbol of unity. The new Constitution pruned some articles that had been superseded by amendment or disuse and added a few articles that limited parliament's power to tamper with provincial boundaries or abolish provincial councils, but these could still be overturned by a simple parliamentary majority.

The South African parliament was not subject to restraints on its power, even with respect to amendments to the Constitution which, with the exception of two entrenched clauses in the original Union constitution, could be enacted by majority vote. These entrenched clauses, which protected the status of English and Dutch (later Afrikaans) as the official languages and safeguarded the franchise for Coloureds and some Black Africans in Cape Province, could only be amended by a two-thirds majority at a joint sitting of both houses. A recent important amendment to the Constitution was the

Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act, approved in June 1980, which abolished the Senate and created a President's Council and a new post of state vice president (see The Search for Acceptable Change, this ch.).

Neither the Union constitution of 1909 nor the republic Constitution of 1961 provided for a bill of rights. Parliament thus is unrestricted as to the passage of laws that curtail individual liberties, and the 1961 Constitution specifically prevents the courts from pronouncing upon the validity of parliamentary acts. Parliamentary restraint, which is exercised in Britain by political tradition, convention, and the rule of law, is effectively absent in South Africa. A number of judicial experts, as well as the PFP opposition, have called for a bill of rights, if not lodged in the Constitution, at least adopted as legislation as Canada did in 1960.

The framers of the South Africa Act of 1909 were unable to agree on a franchise clause and decided to maintain the existing situation in each of the four provinces. Accordingly, only White males were permitted to vote except in the Cape where some Coloureds and a few Blacks could meet the literacy and property qualifications. These voting rights were stripped away by stages, and as of 1980 only White South African citizens over the age of eighteen enjoyed the right to vote in parliamentary, provincial, and local elections. An average of 13,400 registered voters reside in each of the 165 electoral districts. Sparsely populated rural areas could, however, be given greater representation than urban areas to a maximum extent of 30 percent. As a result, the largely Afrikaner rural population is overrepresented, and some electoral advantage thus accrues to the National Party.

Black voters of the Cape were deprived of their rights to vote on common rolls with Whites in 1936, and the much more numerous Coloured voters lost these rights after a prolonged constitutional dispute, which ended in 1956 when the government created additional senate seats to secure the needed two-thirds margin. The importance of the Coloured vote had already been eroded by the extension of voting rights to White, but not Coloured, women in 1930. Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians have limited voting rights within their own communities (see Politics of the Black Community; Politics of the Coloured Community; and Politics of the Indian Community, this ch.).

Structure of Government

The country's system of government has as its major principle the absolute supremacy of the national parliament. Ultimate power is vested solely in that legislative body, and it is applied by the cabinet of ministers. The second central principle of the system is that it is designed primarily to guarantee the supremacy of the interests of the country's White community.

Although the national system is clearly emphasized, some powers are delegated to subsidiary elements at the provincial and municipal

224

levels. In keeping with South Africa's proclaimed policy of racial separation, the Nationalist government since 1948 has unfurled plans to develop separate systems of local self-government for the population's other three racial components—particularly the Black majority. The basic procedure by which implementation of this policy has been attempted is the creation of separate semiautonomous Black homelands where eventually status as independent states is to be achieved and the affairs of government are to be turned over to elected Black officials (see Government and Politics in the Black Homelands, this ch.).

The National System

All legislative power in 1980 was vested in parliament, which consisted of the state president, the Senate, and the House of Assembly. Under ordinary circumstances, passage of legislation required the approval of all three constituent parts, that is, passage of the bill by both houses and signature by the president after approval by the Executive Council, or cabinet, headed by the prime minister. Actual power is centered on the Executive Council, which controls the actions of the state president and dominates the House of Assembly through enforcement of party discipline.

According to the republican Constitution adopted in 1961, the president is head of state and is elected by parliament for a nonrenewable term of seven years. His role is largely ceremonial like that of a constitutional monarch, and his official actions are based strictly on the advice of the government in power. After the death in 1978 of South Africa's third president, Nico Diederichs, John Vorster resigned the prime ministership to become president but also gave up that office in May 1979. He was succeeded as president by Marais Viljoen, who had been presiding officer of the Senate.

The Executive Council is appointed by the state president on the advice of the prime minister, who is leader of the majority party in parliament. Approximately two dozen cabinet committees existed in the Vorster cabinet although little was made public about their functions and degree of activity. When Botha became prime minister, he reduced these to five cabinet committees concerned with state security, finance, economics, internal affairs, and social affairs. The most important of these is the State Security Council which was created by legislation in 1972 on the model of the National Security Council in the United States. Under Botha the State Security Council has been expanded in scope to become a core planning group for total strategy in defense, social, economic, and constitutional matters.

Ministers in the cabinet must be chosen from among members of parliament or must become members after their selection. In December 1980 the Botha cabinet consisted of twenty ministers (see table 23, Appendix).

In accordance with the Constitution, parliament sits in Cape Town, although the administrative capital is Pretoria. Generally a parliamentary session begins in January and continues until June,

225

although a briefer session may be called later in the year if the need arises. All members of the government plus departmental secretaries and heads of other public bodies take up residence in Cape Town during this period.

Legislative Organization

Until passage of a constitutional amendment changing the parliamentary structure that was to take effect on January 9, 1981, parliament was a bicameral organization, consisting of the Senate and the House of Assembly. The Senate played a marginal role in the legislative process, making it comparable to the House of Lords in Britain. For example, appropriation and revenue bills passed by the House of Assembly became law if they failed to pass the Senate. Other bills became law without Senate consent if passed in two successive sessions of the House. In 1980 the Senate consisted of fifty-one members, of whom eight were appointed and forty-three were chosen by an electoral college in each province that comprised its members of parliament and provincial councillors. The House of Assembly, the lower body of parliament, consisted of 165 members in 1980. These seats were apportioned among the four provinces: Transvaal, seventy-six; Cape Province, fifty-five; Natal Province, twenty; and Orange Free State, fourteen. Beginning in 1981, however, House membership was to be increased and the Senate was to be abolished (see The Search for Acceptable Change, this ch.).

Under the bicameral system in effect through the 1980 session, the House of Assembly was the preeminent legislative body where most business was conducted and major legislative proposals were fully debated. Action on bills followed British procedure of three readings—the principles of the bill were debated on second reading, followed by clause-by-clause consideration by the House sitting as a committee of the whole. A structure of specialized standing committees had not developed although select committees were occasionally formed to deal with a particular bill or issue during the course of a single session. The great numerical predominance of the National Party and the rigid discipline imposed on the party's parliamentary caucus signified that the government was in a position to force its legislative program without delay or difficulty. On rare occasions the government acceded to amendment of a bill at the committee stage or even withdrew it if there was strong public outcry or if the opposition made a plausible case for a change in language. In recent years the government did retreat from press-control bills as a result of sharp criticism from abroad and from the English-language and Afrikaans press. The principal opportunities for the opposition to draw the government into defense of its policies were during the general debate on the government's policies at the start of a new session, on departmental budgets, and during the question period.

Administrative Structure

The central government's administrative apparatus has long been unusually complex. In 1978, for example, there were thirty-nine

State President Marais Viljoen
Courtesy Embassy of
South Africa, Washington

Prime Minister P. W. Botha,
South Africa's head
of government
Courtesy Embassy of
South Africa, Washington

government departments, twenty-two public corporations, twenty-one agricultural control boards, and many other special purpose boards and councils. Although subject to ministerial supervision, actual day-to-day operations of the departments have been in the hands of permanent senior civil servants holding the title of secretary. The long experience, expertise, and information available to these officials has left them with formidable power to reinforce or to frustrate government initiatives. This is particularly true of the Department of Cooperation and Development (formerly Bantu Administration and Development) and the former departments of Coloured Relations and Indian Affairs where the authority for drafting regulations, interpreting rules, and implementing government policies has enabled senior civil servants to wield tremendous power over the three disenfranchised racial groups. Even well-intentioned government efforts to ease apartheid restrictions can be frustrated by unsympathetic White officialdom, of whom more than 80 percent are of Afrikaner background.

Under the reorganization begun by Botha in 1979, the office of the prime minister was strengthened and assigned a coordinating role to see that policy changes were carried through; several business executives were brought into the public service, and government departments were consolidated. In November 1979 the thirty-nine departments were reduced to twenty-two, and most ministers were given responsibility for only one department instead of two or three

227

as before. The formerly separate departments of Interior, Coloured Relations, and Indian Affairs have for example been combined into a single Department of Internal Affairs.

The State Security Council assumed a pivotal role in 1979 in formulating and dovetailing South Africa's security and domestic strategies. The prime minister is chairman, and its members include cabinet ministers closely identified with his views: the ministers of defense, justice, foreign affairs, police, cooperation and development, finance, labor, and transport. Other permanent members are the heads of the military services, intelligence, and police, as well as the secretaries for justice and foreign affairs and the secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister. At the same level as the Security Council are four other cabinet committees covering internal affairs, social affairs, economic affairs, and finance. Secretaries of the designated departments are members of these committees along with cabinet ministers. Agendas are circulated to all cabinet members who are free to attend meetings of any of the four committees. Their activities are facilitated by working groups for each committee at the level of secretaries of departments. An enlarged Department of the Prime Minister serves as secretariat for the entire structure, keeping minutes, developing agendas, and ensuring that decisions are carried out at departmental levels. When the reorganization was announced in September 1979, J. E. Du Plessis, secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister, was named secretary to the cabinet with overall responsibility for the operation of the system.

Some observers have concluded that the various measures taken by Prime Minister Botha are intended to ensure that his reforms are fully implemented and that the previously semiautonomous and inefficient departments are made more responsive to national policy as determined by the cabinet leadership. Critics have claimed that Botha has been substituting direct rule for parliamentary democracy, making decisions with the help of a coterie within the cabinet, expanding the decree-making power of ministers in place of new laws, and circumventing the bureaucracy by enlarging the prime minister's own staff and turning to handpicked commissions of inquiry.

Augmenting the traditional departments and the new superstructure controlled by the prime minister's office are the semiindependent government institutions and corporations that have their own budgets and funding sources. These included the South African Broadcasting Corporation, the South African Railways and Harbours Administration, the Reserve Bank, the Electricity Supply Commission, the South African Iron and Steel Corporation, the Armaments Development and Production Corporation, the Corporation for Economic Development and its associated homelands development corporations, the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation, the Industrial Development Corporation, and companies for the manufacture of phosphates and aluminum.

228

House of Parliament from the shade of
Government Avenue, Cape Town
Courtesy South African Information Service

The Search for Acceptable Change

A bewildering succession of ideas, recommendations, and pro-
posals as well as three officially sponsored plans have been unveiled
in recent years that undertake to correct one crucial defect in South
Africa's governmental structure—that four out of five of its in-
habitants have no real voice in how the country is governed. The
government has long adhered unswervingly to the position that
Black demands for political expression are adequately addressed in
the homelands framework. Each Black in the country has been
designated as a citizen of a homeland by a notation in his or her
reference book—even though an urban dweller since birth or a
longtime urban resident is not likely to have taken an interest in
homeland affairs. Initially, therefore, the government's proposals
have been directed to the problem of political institutions for the
Coloureds and the Indians. The latter constitute the entire "Asian"
category except for a very small number of Chinese (see Asians,
ch. 2). Grievances were especially acute among the Coloureds, who
were totally disenfranchised in 1956; their representation in parlia-
ment by Whites was terminated in 1968, and the Coloured Persons'
Representative Council (CPRC) was useful primarily as a forum for
articulating discontent rather than as an alternative political body.

229

In 1976 Prime Minister Vorster announced the creation of a Cabinet Council in which representatives of the Coloured and Indian councils would consult with members of the White cabinet four times a year. As a purely consultative body, the Cabinet Council fell far short of meeting Coloured and Indian objectives. The Vorster plan also gave Coloureds and Asians direct representation on certain official bodies like the Wage Council, the Group Areas Board, and the Race Classification Board. The plan was nevertheless rejected by the Labour Party which controlled the CPRC.

The consultative council for Indians and Coloureds gave way a year later to another Vorster plan involving more radical restructuring of the government. The new proposal featured three separate parliamentary bodies—one each for Whites, Coloureds, and Indians—to legislate on matters pertaining to their own racial groups. Arching across the three parliaments would be a Council of Cabinets drawn from the three racially differentiated cabinets to deal with legislation of overlapping interest and to refer legislation to the respective parliaments. A president elected by an electoral college from the three bodies would have supreme authority when conflicts arose. The White members of the council could outvote the combined Coloured and Indian members and control election of the president. The plan made no provision for Blacks. It was also feared that it would be unwieldy, imposing a new governmental structure based on race over an existing three-tiered territorial structure.

The Botha government published draft legislation along these lines during the 1979 parliamentary session. But mindful of the negative reaction from many of its own supporters, from the opposition parties, and from other racial groups, it refrained from pressing for action in parliament. Instead it referred the proposals to a select committee of both houses of parliament, which was later converted into a twenty-four member commission under the chairmanship of Alwyn Schlebusch, a cabinet minister and close associate of Botha.

Accepting the Schlebusch Commission's recommendations, the government introduced the Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment Act, which was approved by parliament in June 1980. According to this amendment, the Senate would be abolished as of January 1, 1981. A President's Council of sixty members would be established under the chairmanship of a state vice president. Holding terms of five years, the members of the council would be appointed by the state president to represent the White, Coloured, Indian, and Chinese communities. The council would take account of the interests of the Black community by consulting a council of Black South Africans. The state vice president would be elected by an electoral college composed of members of the House of Assembly, whose 165 elected members would be supplemented by twelve additional ones, four appointed by the state president and eight selected by the leaders of each political party in proportion to their parliamentary strengths. This step was seen as strengthening Prime

Union Buildings in Pretoria, the national government's administrative seat
Courtesy South African Information Service

Minister Botha's power within the Nationalist caucus and enabling him to handpick cabinet members from outside parliament.

Schlebusch, the prime minister's nominee, was elected chairman of the council and state vice president by parliament during a special session in October 1980. Three other ministers were transferred to the council in the cabinet reshuffle of August 26, 1980, to chair three of the council's five committees. The new committees were to deal with economic, planning, group relations, scientific, and constitutional matters. While the functions of the council were not fully delineated, a primary task would be to continue the search for a new constitution. The expectation therefore was that the President's Council would serve as a transitional advisory body, acting in conformity with Botha's own conception of a permanent solution to the problem of political rights for the three disenfranchised racial groups. Some observers felt that the vagueness of its mandate may have been deliberate in order to obscure the prime minister's ultimate goals and to aid him in dealing with the conservatives in his party.

The Schlebusch plan was declared to be unacceptable by the Coloured Labour Party, the South African Indian Council, and the White liberal opposition. The main objections were the government's unwillingness to concede that Blacks should be accepted as equal participants in the President's Council, the advisory nature of the council's work, and the fact that the membership would be selected by the National Party—even members of opposition parties and spokesmen for the other races. Although the consultative council for Blacks was seen by some as opening the door a crack on the acceptance of urban Blacks into the political process, even six Black homeland leaders, meeting with Botha in August

231

1980, rejected a separate advisory body for Blacks. Botha thereupon withdrew the Black consultative council feature but persisted with the plan as a whole by nominating White, Coloured, Indian, and Chinese members to the council in spite of the fact that many prominent persons from the various groups declined to serve.

The National Party government by no means has had a monopoly on projects for dealing with Black, Coloured, and Asian demands for political recognition. Other proposals for restructuring South African society have been introduced by the opposition political parties, by unofficial commissions and academic think tanks, and by individual political scientists. These have included simple territorial partition into Black-dominated and White-dominated areas; autonomous regions with governments of their own choosing loosely grouped in a federal, confederal, condominium, or cantonal system; a White heartland concept where pure apartheid would continue to prevail; and a major expansion of the homeland areas to embrace ports and industrial centers which would then be consolidated into one or several African nations.

The deficiencies of these plans have been their complexity and the absence of the sense of common purpose that would be needed to effect them. A partition or confederal approach would have to apportion equitably the resources of the country, a major dilemma when half the nation's output originates in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging industrial triangle. Many of the proposals foresee shifts of racial communities on a scale that seems unrealistic.

Most of the plans have been drawn up without participation of the Black, Coloured, and Asian communities. The organizations and leaders claiming to speak for these groups have generally endorsed a unitary system of government, elected by universal franchise, the end of racial distinctions, and the opportunity for all to compete in South Africa's modern economic sector. They tend to regard other plans as subterfuges to deny them their political and economic rights as South African citizens and as camouflaged elaborations of the despised homeland concept.

But the attitude of the government and of most White South Africans has been that in a deeply divided society a majority-rule unitary system would quickly give way to Black domination, allowing little heed for the preferences of the minority White, Coloured, and Asian groups. A bitter struggle for power would ensue, and chaotic conditions would cause government machinery to break down and guarantees of minority rights to be meaningless. Although more willing than at any time in the past to examine new formulas for sharing power with other racial groups, White South Africans have overwhelmingly rejected a unitary system that could threaten their economic standards, their social status, and their cultural identity.

Provincial Government

Under South Africa's highly centralized structure, the jurisdiction of the four provincial governments is delimited by legislation enacted

by the national parliament. The chief executive officer (the administrator) of each province is appointed by the state president, which means in practice that the administrator is selected by the prime minister and is customarily a member of the party in power in parliament. The administrator plays a dual role as agent of the national government in the province and chairman of the provincial Executive Committee. The committee consists of five members, all of whom (except the administrator) are as a matter of practice members of the elected Provincial Council and selected from the majority party by council vote. The Executive Committee decides all matters before it by majority vote, the administrator casting a single unweighted ballot plus a second tie-breaking vote if necessary.

Three of the four provincial councils have the same number of members as seats held by provincial representatives in the national House of Assembly. The Orange Free State, the least populous province, has twice as many provincial councillors as seats in the lower house. The number of seats in the provincial councils are Transvaal, seventy-six; Cape Province, fifty-five; Orange Free State, twenty-eight; and Natal, twenty.

Electoral districts are the same for both national and provincial legislatures with the exception of the Orange Free State. While provincial councillors are elected for five-year terms, the practice in recent years has been for the state president to dissolve both provincial councils and parliament on the same day, permitting simultaneous balloting for national and provincial seats. Elections are contested on party lines. In the 1977 provincial elections, the National Party won majorities in three provinces while the New Republic Party (NRP) controlled the government in Natal.

Perhaps the most important function delegated to the provinces by parliament is responsibility for White education at the primary and secondary levels. Authority has also been delegated for provincial roads, construction of public buildings, administration of hospitals, and supervision of municipal and other local governing bodies.

The councils normally meet twice annually, a session of up to two months near the beginning of each year to review the budget and deal with ordinances (provincial laws) and later a short session to take up requests for supplementary expenditures. Laws passed by the national parliament take precedence, and provincial ordinances may be vetoed at the national level. About one-third of all provincial expenditures are earmarked for education and 30 percent for the operation of hospitals; most of the remainder is allotted to roads and public works, including school and hospital construction.

Subservience of provincial governments to the national parliament is further exemplified by their limited revenue sources, consisting mostly of taxation on vehicles, racing, and lotteries and license fees. Some 80 percent of their resources are in the form of grants from the central government. Provinces are precluded from borrowing on private financial markets and are obliged to turn to the central authorities for any needed credits.

233

Municipal Government

In contrast to the provinces, authorities of White municipalities are relatively independent financially, securing only about 4 percent of their income from the central and provincial governments. Local governments are nevertheless subordinate to the provinces in the execution and administration of national and provincial legislation, and their power to enact municipal bylaws is subject to approval of the provincial administrator.

The jurisdiction of municipal governments falls primarily in the areas of public health and environmental services such as water, electricity, parks and recreation, immunization, food inspection, libraries, low-income housing, trash removal, fire fighting, streets, and traffic control. The leading revenue sources are the property tax (40 percent) plus service charges, licenses, and fines (40 percent.)

The provincial administrator has authority to establish local government bodies. Only eleven urban areas have sufficiently large populations to qualify for the city council form of government. Town councils, of which there are 327, are the most common such authorities. In addition 122 village councils have been created.

Municipal councils, elected generally for five-year terms, range from three to nine members in size. Election is on a party basis in some communities like Johannesburg and on a nonparty basis in others like Cape Town. The members serve rotating one-year terms as mayor, but the role is largely ceremonial. The town clerk, a permanent civil servant, is the chief administrative and executive officer. In rural areas the local geographical divisions of government are magisterial districts except for Cape Province where divisional councils of elected officials provide local government.

Previously municipal services were extended to adjacent Black townships by the White municipal councils acting as agents for the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Since 1973, however, Black urban areas have been administered directly by the central government through regional administration boards. The White councils exercise some control over petty apartheid by their power to segregate public facilities such as parks and beaches.

White municipal councils continue to provide services to Coloured and Indian communities. Consultative committees of Coloured and Indian residents have been formed, and in some cases limited powers have been delegated to Coloured or Indian management committees; in a few instances separate municipal councils have been permitted. Large numbers of Coloureds scattered in White municipalities or in rural areas have not been provided with any form of self-government or local representation. Even where Coloured institutions exist, the lack of resource bases and weak influence on White political bodies reduces the vitality of local political activity.

The Legal System

The South African legal system, having its roots in Roman-Dutch

and English law and reflecting the historical origins of the two major ethnic components of the White population, has evolved as a hybrid institution to deal with what are perceived to be unique problems of a society of great cultural heterogeneity. Roman-Dutch law was developed through the writings of eminent Dutch jurists and through Dutch legal decisions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Reaching the Cape with the Dutch East India Company, it remained the common law during the entire 150 years of company rule.

While Roman-Dutch law continued to be regarded as the common law after the British came to power in Cape Colony in 1806, later assimilation of English law resulted in substantial modification both in principle and practice. Court procedures and behavior, the jury system, and rules of evidence were patterned on the English model. English practices were also introduced through the selection of English-speaking judges, the obligatory use of English in the courts, and the influence of English constitutional law arising from the introduction of the British system of government.

In contemporary South Africa the primary source of law is legislation rather than judicial precedent. A wide range of social, economic, and political relationships is governed by acts of parliament, provincial ordinances, municipal bylaws, and administrative regulations. Although the precedent of a superior court must be followed and that of any court in an analagous case may be drawn upon, the system of parliamentary supremacy signifies that any conflict between an act of parliament and other sources of law or legislation must be resolved in favor of the parliamentary act.

Old elements of Roman-Dutch law are sometimes cited and are symbolically significant. For the most part, however, they have proved to be inapplicable to modern conditions, and the idea held by a small school of purists that South African law can be purged of its English influence is regarded as unrealistic.

Courts and Judicial Practices

The judicial structure comprises a system of higher and lower courts or, as they are known in South Africa, the Supreme Court and the magistrates' and commissioners' courts. The Supreme Court is a collective institution embodying the Appellate Division—the highest judicial body, which sits in Bloemfontein—seven provincial divisions, and three local divisions in main population centers. With the exception of the Appellate Division, which operates solely as a court of appeal, all others in the system act as courts of first instance. The provisional and local divisions also hear appeals of the lower courts within their jurisdictions and review their proceedings.

The Appellate Division consists of the chief justice and ten judges of appeal. Provincial divisions vary widely as to size. For example, the Transvaal Division had twenty-nine judges assigned in 1976, and the Northern Cape Division had three. Judges held unlimited terms, usually serving until retirement at age seventy. They are

235

appointed by the state president on advice of the government and may be removed only by vote of both houses of parliament on grounds of misbehavior or incapacity. They are generally selected from among private advocates (lawyers) and only rarely from government ranks because the legal societies mistrust the impartiality of a judge with a background of state service. While over half of the eighty-seven judges on the supreme court bench have been identified as National Party supporters, the government does on occasion select judges known to favor one of the opposition parties. The circumstances of appointment are intended to insulate the higher judiciary against government intimidation or public pressures, and in fact the South African judges have established a reputation for independence, although with limited impact in a legal system that is largely dedicated to the maintenance of White domination.

The lower court system consists of divisional and regional magistrates' courts and commissioners' courts. There were 305 magistrates' offices and 951 magistrates, with both judicial and administrative responsibilities, in 1979. It is before these judicial bodies that most Blacks are exposed to the South African judicial system. Divisional magistrates could as of 1979 try civil actions involving property values up to R1,500 (for value of the rand—R—see Glossary) and all criminal offenses except treason, murder, and rape. They could impose sentences in criminal cases only up to twelve months' imprisonment, a fine of up to R1,000, or a whipping of up to seven strokes. Most cases in which severe sentences are foreseen are tried initially at higher levels. In 1979 the only criminal cases that could be tried in regional magistrates' courts were those in which the maximum sentences were imprisonment for ten years and fines of R10,000. Magistrates are civil servants subject to authority of the minister of justice. While some have a legal background, this has not been essential, and most qualify by passing a special civil service examination.

Commissioners' courts (former Bantu Commissioners' Courts) have jurisdiction corresponding to that of district magistrates' courts in criminal and civil cases involving only Blacks. Except for a few Black magistrates in the homelands, all presiding court officers in South Africa are White. Tribal chiefs may be conferred authority to try nonserious crimes in their areas with authority to impose small fines or whippings.

Cases tried by the district magistrates' courts are automatically reviewed when the sentences exceed a specified limit. Provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court also have jurisdiction over serious cases that exceed the sentencing authority of magistrates' courts. In addition to hearing appeals from other divisions of the Supreme Court, the Appellate Division also acts as the appeal court for the "independent" homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda.

Under South Africa's system of parliamentary supremacy the powers of the Appellate Division are more limited than those of the

Supreme Court Building, Bloemfontein
Courtesy South African Information Service

United States Supreme Court. It has no responsibility for interpreting the constitutionality of laws inasmuch as it does not have the right to exercise judicial review over parliamentary, provincial, or local lawmaking. Although the judiciary could play an important part in policy development through interpretation of laws and review of actions taken by the government with the authority it has assumed under these laws, the judiciary has tended to limit itself to procedure rather than substance and has generally failed to soften the impact of apartheid policies.

In 1969 the Abolition of Juries Act repealed laws providing for trial by jury in criminal cases. This did not represent a radical change inasmuch as the practice of employing juries in criminal cases had already fallen into disuse. Defense counsels rarely asked for jury trials, particularly when defending Blacks, because of the reputation of the White all-male juries for partiality and excessive sentences. Criminal prosecutions are under the control of an attorney general in each provincial division, who is subject to direction of the minister of justice. The attorney general has a staff that conducts prosecutions in both lower courts and the Supreme Court.

The legal profession is composed of advocates and attorneys, who are the equivalents of British barristers and solicitors, respectively.

237

Advocates specialize in appearing before the various courts after being instructed (briefed) by an attorney representing the client. Advocates called upon by the court to appear on behalf of an indigent defendant may do so without being instructed by an attorney. While attorneys may appear in lower courts and administrative tribunals, they are largely occupied with legal advice, wills, and property transfers. Attorneys outnumber advocates by about four to one.

Although South Africa's legal system resembles those of many Western countries in its traditions, substance, and procedures, one distinction is the extent to which the judiciary is occupied with application of a large body of laws and regulations ordering the relations among the country's four official racial groups. The system is also distinguished by a constantly expanding body of security laws and procedures designed to curb political activity outside the recognized framework and thus regarded as inimical to White hegemony. The judicial actions taken under the authority of these laws have been subjected to worldwide criticism and denunciation. In spite of its reputation for independence from the government in power, the judicial machinery enforces the apartheid and security laws in a stern and implacable manner, denying the accused many of the safeguards that are considered vital in other Western societies.

Treatment of offenders under the South African legal system is generally considered archaic by Western standards. Bail is not available in practice to most Blacks accused of an offense, and prolonged detention before they are brought to trial is likely. Presentence investigations are uncommon as are rehabilitation services except for White offenders. There is no formal probation system for adults. In view of the great income discrepancy between members of the different races, fines assessed by the courts often are unrealistic in relation to the convicted person's ability to pay. Reduction of sentences is precluded for persons convicted of political offenses, and detention before trial is not deducted from time to be served. Individual judges have, however, sometimes taken this into account in passing sentence.

In addition to fines and imprisonment, South African law still authorizes courts to impose both corporal and capital punishment on convicted offenders. The maximum level of corporal punishment has been reduced to seven strokes with an inflexible cane. Although whipping may be imposed as part of a sentence for certain crimes, the practice has declined in recent years. Eleven crimes are punishable with sentences of death by hanging, including murder, rape, robbery and housebreaking with aggravating circumstances, and activities broadly defined as terrorism, sabotage, and treason. In recent years, however, few executions have been carried out except where the commission of homicide was involved. A rising trend in capital punishment has been noted in recent years in contrast to the tendency's decline in other countries where the death penalty is still permitted. From sixty-one in 1976, the number of executions rose to

238

ninety in 1977, 132 in 1978, and 133 in 1979. Of these, ninety-eight were Black, thirty-three were Coloured, and two were White. It has been estimated that South Africa is responsible for nearly half of the executions reported to the United Nations (UN) annually.

Judicial critics in South Africa who have denounced the heavy reliance on the death penalty have drawn attention to the fact that Blacks and Coloureds dependent on court-appointed advocates are unlikely to secure the most capable defense. In addition, errors may result from inadequate translation from African languages during the course of a trial. Whites accused of assaults on Blacks, even when homicides result, have customarily received suspended or very light sentences by claiming that the victim was acting suspiciously or was trespassing.

The Laws of Apartheid

A unique feature of the South African legal system is the degree to which it is devoted to the maintenance of segregation among the four racial groups. It has been reported that over 300 of the country's laws deal with race relations. To these must be added innumerable ordinances, bylaws, regulations, and administrative rulings that serve to institutionalize differentiated treatment of the races in all political, economic, geographic, and social spheres.

Legal discrimination already existed before union in 1910 in such forms as pass requirements and liquor and tax laws. During the two decades that followed, discrimination was extended in the form of the prohibition of the purchase of land outside the reserves by Blacks (Natives Land Act of 1913) and in the requirement that separate living areas for Blacks be established in urban "locations" (Natives [Urban Areas] Act of 1923). After violent protests by White workers, a group of laws was passed reserving certain jobs to Whites, excluding Blacks from recognized trade unions (Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924), and shutting off Black advancement by restricting apprenticeship training (Apprenticeship Act of 1922). Under other legislation regulations have been enforced to separate facilities in the work place by race—toilets, canteens, and the factory work area.

The places where Blacks may live and conduct business as well as their physical movements are controlled under several laws. Under the 1945 (and later) amendments to the Urban Areas Act, Blacks have been forbidden to remain in an urban area for more than seventy-two hours without a permit unless they hold residential rights under Section 10 of the act. Control over movements is exercised by a law requiring all Blacks to carry reference books containing evidence of employment and payment of taxes plus endorsement by influx control officials. These influx control or pass laws are among the most objectionable features of apartheid in the eyes of Blacks. They are enforced by police sweeps through White cities and suburbs and account for a majority of all arrests in South Africa. In 1978 there were 272,887 persons arrested for violations of pass laws. Section 10 residence rights largely determine a Black person's

239

economic fate—whether he or she is to be a permanent member of South Africa's modern industrial society or whether he or she will remain consigned to a marginal existence in a homeland or rural base (see Apartheid and Its Evolution, ch. 2).

The Group Areas Act of 1950 has had the effect of zoning all of South Africa's territory according to race. It created the legal basis for massive shifts of population groups and uprooting of communities. By the end of 1976 the government had reported that 6,960 Whites, 349,616 Coloureds, and 163,770 Indians had been relocated. No data has been made available on Blacks, but it has been unofficially estimated that 1.5 million have been forcibly relocated and that another 1 million are to be moved. Also heavily affected in recent years have been Indian tradesmen evicted from White commercial areas. At the end of 1976 such removals numbered 1,482, and 3,576 traders were still to be moved. Indians are forbidden from living in the Orange Free State and may own agricultural land only in Natal.

Although social segregation was also pervasive, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 codified the system and established that the absence of separate facilities for all races did not constitute grounds for integrated use of those available. The law provided that the person in charge of any public premises or public vehicles could reserve them for exclusive use of a particular race. Local officials were thereby delegated authority to impose segregation in hotels, restaurants, parks, zoos, beaches, theaters, railway stations, libraries, museums, hospitals, trains, taxis, telephone booths, and elevators.

In justifying the apartheid system, White South Africans point out that most forms of discrimination already existed when the Union was formed in 1910. They recall that racial discrimination was then the norm in social conduct in the United States and the British Empire. Moreover the gap in education and socioeconomic standards between Blacks and Whites in South Africa was very wide. As the government in Pretoria carried forward its grand design of creating separate ethnically based sovereign states, it conceded that segregated access to certain public facilities (referred to as petty apartheid) were vestiges of an earlier period and were not fundamental to separate development. Accordingly in 1974 the South African ambassador to the UN admitted to that body that discriminatory practices and laws still existed but stated that "those laws and practices are a part of the historical evolution of our country . . . .My government does not condone discrimination purely on the grounds of race or color."

During the mid-1970s a number of actions were taken to mitigate the most visible forms of petty apartheid. Some steps were initiated by municipalities without interference by the central government, such as the opening to all races of parks, museums, and libraries in Johannesburg in 1974. In 1976 the central authorities permitted post offices to serve Blacks at the same windows as Whites. The designation of

Bilingual sign at Durban beach warns bathers
of country's apartheid policies
Courtesy United Nations/Contact

"international" (multiracial) hotels was begun in 1975, and fifty-eight of 1,448 hotels in South Africa accepted travelers on an integrated basis by 1978. Although restaurants were desegregated more recently, by late 1980 the government claimed that 133 restaurants, thirty-seven theaters, and twenty drive-in motion picture theaters had been opened to all races. The authorities have, however, continued to reject mixed patronage of indoor film theaters on the premise that adequate facilities exist for Blacks in the urban townships.

Many of the earlier restrictions imposed on Black shopkeepers in urban townships were liberalized beginning in 1976. As it ultimately emerged, the plan for ninety-nine-year leaseholds in Black townships held out to Blacks the possibility that they might build, occupy, improve, and bequeath houses in the townships even if the leasehold plan fell short of conceding outright the ownership of land by Blacks in the White area.

The trend toward casting aside the most glaring forms of social and economic segregation appeared to have Prime Minister Botha's strong encouragement when he took office in 1978, but tangible

progress has fallen short of initial hopes. Perhaps the most significant breakthrough has been in the field of industrial relations. Although the reforms proposed to parliament in 1979 were less comprehensive than two official commissions recommended, Black workers may now belong to legally registered trade unions, and the controls on the types of work Blacks may perform are being reduced. Restrictions over mobility of legal Black workers have been relaxed, but the threat of prosecutions of employers of illegal workers has intensified the employment problem for unregistered work-seekers from the homelands (see Labor, ch. 3).

In October 1980 the government announced its intention to replace the concept of Section 10 residence rights with a more flexible system permitting greater freedom of movement for Blacks already residing in urban areas. Housing and job shortages could, however, reduce the effect of this promised reform. The change would further formalize the distinction between urban and homeland Blacks.

In the daily life of most Black South Africans the reforms that have been introduced by the Botha government have brought little perceptible improvement. For some, conditions have actually worsened because of increased rigidity of influx control and the obstructiveness of lower level White officials. The legal, traditional, and social restrictions that consign Blacks to subservient status remained largely in place in late 1980. Even if the government achieves its professed objective of removing the most offensive legal forms of discrimination, Botha has repeatedly declared that the ultimate objective is still that of separate homeland political entities—a solution overwhelmingly rejected by both homeland and urban Blacks.

Security Laws

Another source of controversy regarding the legal system is the network of laws designed to protect the governmental system and to maintain internal security. Many of the security laws have counterparts in the statutes and practices of other countries of Africa and the world. What distinguishes them is that in South Africa the personal and political freedoms that are features of a democratic state have been steadily eroded as the need to buttress policies of racial exclusiveness has increased. The government views these laws as exceptional measures to meet exceptional circumstances. It notes that the country is the target of organized attacks and that many of the people tried under the security laws are saboteurs and terrorists trained abroad by agents of international communism. It argues that it cannot relax its vigilance and revoke emergency procedures and laws that are employed by the security police and the judicial system to combat the "onslaught."

Among the criticisms that have been mounted against the country's security methods are the broad definitions of what constitutes terrorism, sabotage, and treasonous conduct. Mild protest actions that would be viewed as misdemeanors or even legitimate political expression in other countries can, at the discretion of the

minister of justice, be prosecuted as crimes subject to long minimum sentences. The security laws are applied overwhelmingly to Black political activists. As of January 1980, eight Coloureds, ten Indians, and 480 Blacks were serving sentences for political offenses, nearly all on Robben Island near Cape Town.

Under the rule of detention, habeas corpus protections are suspended at the whim of the security police. The absence of external restraints on police conduct, the holding of prisoners incommunicado, withholding counsel, and laws against press reporting of police actions have cast a cloud over the administration of justice. It has been well documented that police beatings and torture have been carried out routinely and that illegal methods have been used to extract confessions and intimidate witnesses. Many unexplained deaths of political prisoners in police custody have occurred (see The National Police, ch. 5).

There is evidence that international and domestic criticism has caused the government to take steps to curb police excesses. White policemen have been brought to trial and convicted of assault and culpable homicide, and new procedures have sharply reduced the death toll of political prisoners. In addition a procedure for visits to detainees by retired judges has been instituted. A number of civil damage suits have been successfully pursued as the result of deaths or mistreatment while in custody.

The banning order with its lack of judicial oversight is an effective tool used to neutralize political activists and groups and to forbid gatherings and writings. Bannings and detentions imposed on authority of the minister of justice commonly stifle political and union organizing activity that would be regarded as reasonable in any healthy democratic environment. Political organization among Blacks and among multiracial groups, however, is treated as inherently suspicious and subject to official repression. Some of the major security prosecutions of the late 1970s have involved political activists and insurgents trained abroad for missions of sabotage in South Africa. But other government actions, like the detentions and bannings of individuals and organizations in a harsh security crackdown in October 1977, have had as their victims Black and White editors, religious leaders, and private welfare groups. The "subversion" consisted of embarrassing the government by bluntly denouncing its racial policies and bringing to public attention instances of hardship resulting from relentless imposition of these policies.

Most political prisoners in South Africa are held under laws providing minimum jail sentences or detentions for acts regarded as sabotage, terrorism, seditious activity, or advocating communist beliefs. The Terrorism Act of 1967 defines the offense in broad terms as any activity likely "to endanger the maintenance of law and order." Actions producing results such as obstructing the free movement of land, sea, or air traffic or "increasing hostility between the White and other inhabitants of the Republic" fall within the terms of the Terrorism Act. Conviction carries a mandatory sentence of

243

five years in prison and a maximum sentence of death. In 1980 three African National Congress (ANC) members were sentenced to execution for "treason" in connection with a rifle attack on a police station in which there were no casualties. One ANC member was sentenced to death for bringing arms into South Africa and under-going military training in a communist country (later commuted). Section 6 of the act permits the security police to arrest anyone sus-pected of being a terrorist (as defined in the act) and to hold him or her incommunicado for an indefinite period pending investigation.

The Sabotage Act of 1962 defines sabotage as willful acts that threaten public health and safety; interfere with supplies and deliveries of water, fuel, or food supplies; obstruct free movement of traffic; or destroy or endanger property with the intention of com-mitting a "general disturbance." Offenders may be sentenced to a minimum of five years in prison or a maximum of death.

The Internal Security Act of 1976 replaced the Suppression of Com-munism Act of 1950, which made punishable by imprisonment of one to ten years anyone who "advocates, advises, defends or encourages the achievement of any of the objects of communism. . . ." The new law was broadened to include acts that "endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the state or the maintenance of public order" and thereby encompasses members of Black consciousness and other antiapartheid movements. Sections 4 and 6 of the act also provide for detentions without trial. Section 4 provides in effect for incommuni-cado preventive detention for up to twelve months in areas of the country designated by the government. Section 6 of the act authorizes the minister of justice to detain potential state witnesses in political trials for up to six months or until the trial is held.

A frequently invoked law is the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956. As originally passed the act authorized the prohibition of public gather-ings of twelve or more people. A 1974 amendment permits a magis-trate to prohibit any gathering for forty-eight hours if he foresees a serious threat to public peace. The minister of justice may prohibit any gathering indefinitely to maintain public peace or prevent engendering of racial hostility. Large numbers of young people were charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act after the Soweto uprising in 1976, and 665 of the 1,100 convicted were punished by whippings.

The practice of detaining individuals without explanation, trial, or access to counsel has been widely condemned by human rights ad-vocates. Detentions have been used to intimidate Black, Coloured, and Indian political activists in spite of the fact that their organiza-tions were not banned and their activities could not be prosecuted even under the wide ranging security laws. Even moderate Black leaders such as editor Percy Qoboza and members of the Soweto Committee of Ten were detained during the 1977 crackdown against Black consciousness activities.

As of June 1980 there were 330 individuals in detention under one of the three security laws. In its report to Congress on human rights practices for 1979, the United States Department of State drew

*Black demonstrator in Johannesburg
is arrested by a security squad
Courtesy United Nations/Contact*

attention to the considerable evidence of physical and psychological torture of detainees and to the fact that at least fifty-two deaths had occurred among security law detainees since 1963. The report noted that the strong reaction to the death in detention of Black consciousness leader Steve Biko in September 1977 had impelled the minister of justice to announce measures to safeguard detainees. It added that no deaths had been reported since mid-July 1978.

The minister of justice may impose a banning order on anyone found to be engaged in activities considered dangerous to the security of the state or to the maintenance of public order. A banning order is usually imposed for two to five years and commonly restricts a person to a particular locality, proscribes attendance at gatherings of more than one other individual, and prohibits publication of statements and writings. Some prominent political figures have been banished to remote locations, virtually cutting them off from all social contacts. It is common for political prisoners to be served with

banning orders when released from detention. No real legal recourse is available to challenge a ministerial banning action. An Anglican clergyman was sentenced to a year in jail in 1980 for violating his banning order by attending a one-day church synod.

As of November 30, 1979, twenty-one people had been banned during the year, and a total of 152 people were under banning orders as of that date. Bannings are also used to suppress organizations and to prevent the holding of political meetings without government approval. In 1977 the Black consciousness movement was crushed by the banning of seventeen of its organizations. The Christian Institute of Southern Africa, a White-led social activist group, was banned at the same time. The act of banning also carries authority for confiscation of an organization's assets, which are donated to charities.

Criticism has been leveled in South Africa and abroad over trial procedures under the security laws. Accused political prisoners are often held in solitary confinement for long periods before trial without access to counsel. When held under the Terrorism Act they are not represented by counsel who could make their rights known to them during the magistrate's pretrial interrogation. Witnesses who have been held in detention for long periods may have been coerced by the security police or promised early release in return for cooperative testimony. Securing proper counsel may in any event be difficult for the prisoner who if indigent is likely to be assigned an inexperienced advocate and cannot select his own lawyer even in a capital case. Relatively few South African lawyers specialize in the complex security field. For business reasons, the larger and more prestigious law firms are reluctant to assume the defense of persons charged under security laws.

In spite of the prevailing perception among South African Whites that the country is under siege by international communism and exposed to internal insurrection, judges have often decided against the government in security trials when the evidence has not been conclusive or when violations within the terms of the security laws have not been strictly established by the state prosecutors. Of 135 persons arrested under the Terrorism and Internal Security acts in 1978, seventy-five were convicted. Forty-two were acquitted, released without charge, or convicted of lesser charges. Eighteen were awaiting trial at the end of the year. Eleven leaders of Soweto school demonstrations were found guilty of sedition, but only four were given prison terms. Of eighteen defendants in the Bethal Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) trial, seventeen were found guilty and sentenced from five to twelve years on charges of recruitment for military training and encouraging sabotage. The Bethal judge was widely criticized for barring foreign observers and for hearing witnesses privately in his chamber. Under South African law, persons charged with crimes are entitled to counsel if they can afford to be defended. In most cases, particularly pass law offenses, Blacks are quickly tried and sentenced without being represented. Counsel

*White students and faculty members of
University of Witwatersrand march in protest
against government use of banning orders
and other apartheid abuses
Courtesy Africa News Service*

may be withheld in the pretrial period for a number of security offenses.

Although the government now has a taxpayer-funded legal aid system, a relatively small number of Blacks have been assisted, whether for political, criminal, or civil matters. In 1979 more than twice as many Whites as Blacks sought legal aid in spite of the vastly greater number of Blacks brought to trial, many of them with little or no financial resources. Ignorance of the availability of these legal services, suspicion of government-sponsored institutions, and assembly-line justice in pass control cases may explain the small number of Blacks aided. Legal aid centers for influx control violations are intended to solve pass violation problems out of court, but the South African press has reported that the centers have become a means of removing undocumented workers without the action being reflected in official statistics.

Several private funds in South Africa provide legal assistance and relief to families of political detainees. A significant portion of these funds arise from sources in the United States and other countries.

The Fund Raising Act of 1978 set up official controls over these funds, and it was feared that the legislation might be used to interfere with legal aid from abroad.

Political Dynamics

Formal political power is legally concentrated in the hands of the White minority in South Africa. Within this group, power is exercised in the form of a parliamentary democracy on the British model. All White adults are enfranchised and within certain limits are free to express political opinions, to organize politically, and to elect any of their numbers to parliament—formally the supreme source of governmental power. After mergers and reshuffling between 1976 and 1980, three parties were represented in parliament: the ruling National Party, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP—the official opposition), and the New Republic Party (NRP—a centrist opposition group). The expression of opinion on national political issues and the establishment of political groups by non-Whites is severely controlled and frequently suppressed by statute and broad exercise of police powers. Multiracial political activity is expressly forbidden, and even among Whites politically oriented activity outside the parliamentary context is regarded by the government as undesirable.

Although South African politics has always been dominated by the issue of Black-White relations, until 1950 the issue was only debated by the two segments of the White population—Afrikaners and English speakers. Even when a small number of Coloured and Black voters were represented by White members of parliament, non-White opinion was scarcely taken into account in government decisionmaking. Black political opinion began to be mobilized in the early 1950s, but incipient mass movements were crushed by the government under harsh security laws that in effect treated protest by Blacks against their political impotence as treasonable.

Free and open interaction of political forces in White South Africa is limited by the dominance of the National Party, which has retained control of parliament since 1948. Holding the loyalty of the Afrikaner people and facing no threat to its control in the framework of legitimate White politics, the party's cabinet leadership essentially directs the course of public policy. The opposition parties cannot by themselves mount effective challenges to government initiatives, but legislative excess by the Nationalists is checked by the combined weight of the parliamentary opposition, the critical English-language press, foreign opinion, and the reactions of disenfranchised racial groups—insofar as their views can gain attention.

Under the policy of separate development, the Black, Coloured, and Asian majority has not been vouchsafed a role in the central, White-dominated areas of the country. During the 1970s authorities in Pretoria elaborated rudimentary mechanisms of self-government for the Coloured and Indian populations embracing jurisdiction over such nonsensitive areas as education and social welfare in their

own communities. Emergent Coloured and Indian political parties have tended, however, to become embroiled in disputes with the White government over broader racial issues. Even so, most Coloureds and Indians have remained apathetic and cynical over politics in the channels tolerated by Whites. Increased radicalization of attitudes, especially among the youth, has made their highly restricted legislative bodies seem irrelevant to their heightened political demands. With the unveiling of Prime Minister Botha's plan for the President's Council in 1980, the Coloureds, Indians, and Chinese were offered a voice in devising a new constitution, but the predominant Coloured Labour Party and the Indian Reform Party refused to take part if Black participation was not included.

Black political expression in South Africa, although constrained by legislation and government policy, exists at a number of levels. The only forms sanctioned by White authorities are within the semitribal legislative assemblies of homelands and in community councils of urban townships. The political and financial subordination of these bodies to White authority and the dominant position of the homelands' chief ministers and their ruling factions have discouraged genuine political activity. Radical Black politics are conducted underground or among Black nationalist groups in exile. Several of the best known Black leaders are moderates who articulate the grievances of urban people. Although they have no official status, the White leadership has increasingly been obliged to accept them as authentic Black spokesmen.

White Party Politics

In spite of its parliamentary form the South African political system, after decades of overwhelming election victories by the National Party, has become increasingly authoritarian. The government's program is largely determined by a small group of cabinet ministers under the consensus-building leadership of the prime minister, who is also the party leader. Although influenced to a degree by the caucus of Nationalist members of parliament and by other institutions of Afrikanerdom such as the Broederbond (see Glossary) society, these groups act more as strategy bodies and sounding boards for the leadership's policy initiatives.

The victory of the National Party in 1948 came on a platform of Afrikaner exclusiveness and, deriving support from strengthened Afrikaner institutions in cultural, educational, financial, business, and labor fields, the party had by the early 1960s set in place the main elements of its program of separate development of the four official racial groups. The long-standing issue of relations with Britain was resolved by conversion to a republic and severance of the link with the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961. Confidence in the future was reinforced by the economic surge of the 1960s, and dissent by opponents of the social order was suppressed by increasingly comprehensive judicial and police sanctions. Having succeeded in fully establishing Afrikaner identity, the party has subsequently moved

to attract English-speaking voters with patriotic and anticommunist themes. In 1980, reacting to the renewal of domestic unrest, Prime Minister Botha showed greater flexibility on domestic racial policies. But in spite of English-speaking support, party machinery and policy direction remained firmly in Afrikaner hands.

Although until the 1966 election it managed to attract a popular vote close to that of the National Party, the United Party (in opposition after 1948) was weakened by its failure to present a distinct alternative to the Nationalist policy of White dominance and by its inability to win Afrikaner voters from the more dynamic National Party. A series of defections by Progressives, Liberals, and others also contributed to the party's decline. Before the 1977 general elections the opposition forces regrouped. The more liberal elements joined in the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), and those from the conservative wing of the United Party formed the New Republic Party (NRP), which was concentrated in English-speaking Natal Province. The PFP, since 1977 the official opposition, has adopted an unambiguous program of political rights for South Africans of all races. It remains, however, primarily a party of English speakers from the prosperous suburbs of Johannesburg and Cape Town.

The National Party

The National Party's dominance of South Africa's political scene reached a new peak when in the general election of November 30, 1977, it won 134 seats compared with thirty captured by three opposition parties combined. After three decades of consolidating its power, the National Party enjoyed the overwhelming allegiance of Afrikaner voters and support from as many as a third of the English-speaking electorate and had little need to fear opposition forces. A great preoccupation has been the possibility of breaches within its own ranks, such as the small-scale but significant right-wing breakaway that occurred in 1969 (see The Afrikaner Conservative Opposition, this ch.). Although differences in philosophic outlook and in Afrikaner group interests have emerged in recent years, a tightly structured party mechanism and a succession of determined leaders have managed to hold together the main elements of Afrikaner political power.

From the time of its founding in 1913 by the Boer leader, General J. B. M. Hertzog, until World War II the National Party has appealed to the notion of a separate Afrikaner culture and identity in contrast to the platform of cooperation with the English-speaking sector fostered by the governments of Louis Botha and Jan Smuts during the first fourteen years of the Union (see The Anglo-Boer War and Creation of the Union, ch. 1). During the National-Labour coalition governments under Hertzog lasting from 1924 to 1932, the party sought to raise the status of White workers in mining and industry above that of the other races and to promote Afrikaans as a language and cultural movement. The economic chaos that afflicted South Africa in the early 1930s led to a coalition government,

followed in December 1934 by a fusion of Hertzog's National Party with Jan Smuts' South Africa Party into what was to be called the United Party. A group of right-wing Nationalists under D. F. Malan broke away to become the Purified National Party but had only nineteen dissident seats in the legislature.

In spite of the economic resurgence of South Africa and the high standing of Smuts as an international statesman after World War II, the Smuts United Party government was unexpectedly defeated in 1948 and Malan became prime minister. Malan's group, known thereafter as the National Party, continued to gain strength in nearly every subsequent election (see table 24, Appendix). While economic discontent contributed to disillusionment with Smuts and the United Party in 1948, the National Party's success has been attributable to its exploitation of the racial question and its identification with the aspirations of the Afrikaner. Its early years in power were marked by a procession of new laws which codified the apartheid system in all of its social, economic, geographic, and political aspects (see The Laws of Apartheid, this ch.).

Historically the National Party has represented the interests of the White labor force against low-wage competition from other racial groups and the interests of White farmers who sought government support to ensure availability of cheap Black agricultural labor. With the declining importance of White industrial workers and of union membership as well as the mechanization of agriculture, the National Party has come to reflect the outlook of the state bureaucracy (45 percent of all Afrikaners are said to be employed in the civil service and in state corporations) and of the burgeoning Afrikaner business sector (see Class and Race, ch. 2).

The party is a mass organization estimated to have had some 500,000 members in 1976. It is structured on provincial lines, and leaders of its four provincial organizations exercise major influence, dispense patronage, and customarily hold ministerial posts in the national cabinet. A Federal Council of thirty-seven members chaired by the leader of the parliamentary caucus, i.e., the prime minister, links the four provincial party divisions. Provincial congresses are annual events, but a national congress is called only when matters of special importance must be discussed. By 1978 only six such congresses had been held since the party was formed.

During parliamentary sessions the caucus of the National Party members of parliament meets weekly to discuss a common approach to bills and debates. The caucus is not a policy-forming body, however. Tight control is exercised by party whips, ensuring adherence of every member to the party line on all issues. The real focus of authority is within the cabinet under the leadership of the prime minister.

While the National Party does not depend on support from English-language voters, it does appeal for their allegiance, hoping to demonstrate to the outside world a unity of view among White South Africans. The cabinet is likely to include at least one English

speaker, and some English-speaking candidates are put forward by the party in parliamentary elections. In general, however, card-carrying Nationalists and those entrusted with internal policy deliberations are almost exclusively Afrikaners. Electoral support from English speakers has risen sharply in recent years as South Africa has faced increasing international censure and domestic unrest. According to a poll by the Afrikaans newspaper, *Rapport*, 14.7 percent of the country's English speakers identified with the National Party in September 1974 and 35.1 percent in June 1977.

The Broederbond, a secret elitist organization of Afrikaner male society dedicated to the promotion of Afrikaner interests and culture, has in the past exerted substantial influence over National Party policies, but its role is diminishing. Its 11,000 members reportedly include three-fourths of the Nationalist members of parliament, most of the cabinet, many provincial councillors, university rectors, editors and Dutch Reformed ministers. Major policy shifts in recent years in such areas as education and sports were first tested and discussed in Broederbond channels. The declining power of the Broederbond is beli d to be due in part to disclosures about its activities and its me ers in the press and in part because, like the National Party itself, is divided over basic issues of Black rights. The former head of the organization, Gerrit Viljoen, who joined the cabinet in 1980, is regarded as a liberally inclined supporter of Prime Minister Botha's reforms. His successor, Professor Carel Boshoff, is a defender of a privileged position for Whites but is regarded as a compromise figure chosen to avoid an open clash between liberal and conservative elements.

Soon after its election triumph of 1977 National Party supporters were shocked over disclosures of misapplication of secret funds used by the Department of Information for propaganda activities abroad and the government's financing of a right-wing English-language newspaper, *The Citizen*. The minister of information, Connie Mulder, who had been a leading contender for prime minister, and several other high government officials were forced to resign. Prime Minister Vorster, implicated as having at least been knowledgeable of the misconduct, resigned on grounds of health.

After taking office as Vorster's successor in September 1978, former Minister of Defence Botha pursued a more innovative policy, which he defined as "adapt or die." Although forced by conservatives to retreat after hinting of eased prohibitions on sex and marriage across racial lines, he has accelerated some earlier initiatives regarding Black labor, housing, and education and has visited Black townships and met with Black leaders. While prepared to concede a measure of consultation with urban Blacks, the constitutional changes Botha proposed in 1980 have fallen short of acceptance by authentic Black, Coloured, and Asian spokesmen.

The National Party has long been torn philosophically between its *verligte* (enlightened) elements who argue that major adaptations of separate development should not be ruled out if necessary to appease

domestic and international critics and the *verkrampte* (narrow-minded) elements who fear that even small concessions lead to erosion of separate racial development and Afrikaner identity. While the government's rhetoric has surpassed its performance in easing official discrimination, Botha has been identified with the *verligte* wing, whose most prominent spokesman has been Piet Koornhof, minister of cooperation and development and thus in charge of Black affairs. The cabinet realignment of August 1980 in which Botha's confidant, General Magnus Malan, became minister of defense, was seen as strengthening those party forces sharing Botha's outlook. Other cabinet members viewed as modernizers have been Roelof ("Pik") Botha, minister of foreign affairs and information; H. J. Coetsee, minister of justice; S. P. ("Fanie") Botha, minister of manpower utilization; and Gerrit Viljoen, minister of national education. Nevertheless, the leading spokesman for *verkrampte* views, Andries Treurnicht, remained in the cabinet because of his powerful position as head of the party's Transvaal division.

The Progressive Federal Party

Although the United Party continued to form the official opposition through the general election of 1974, signs of dissension had already begun to appear when the Nationalists came to power in 1948. After its defeat in 1953 the United Party's ambiguous position on racial policy led to several breakaway moves although only one other opposition group—the Progressives—succeeded in electing a representative to parliament. This was Mrs. Helen Suzman who, from her election in 1961 until six other Progressives joined her in 1974, provided the only uncompromising parliamentary opposition to the government's policy of separate racial development.

In 1976 the main opposition groups—the United, Democratic, Progressive, and Reform parties—sought to join in a single broadly based opposition on the platform of full citizenship and equal political rights for all races under a federal or confederal system. The United Party split over these principles, and six of its members of parliament went over to the new Progressive Federal Party (PFP); twenty-four of the more conservative United Party members joined with the Democrats to form the New Republic Party.

The PFP won seventeen seats in the 1977 general election and added one seat in a 1979 by-election. It remained weak in relation to the 134 seats won by the National Party in 1977 and exercised no real power to check government initiatives. The former United Party members constituted a right wing not fully committed to the principles agreed to by the PFP after its founding. One member was expelled in 1980 when he violated party discipline by accepting appointment to the President's Council.

At its first national convention in 1978 the PFP adopted a platform calling for South Africa to adopt a new constitution after a national convention of all races. The country would be redivided into a number of self-governing states that would determine their own

forms of government to be based on nondiscrimination. Decision by consensus and proportional representation would presumably preclude domination by any one group. A federal parliament would be restricted to such national matters as finance, defense, and foreign affairs. Minority, i.e., White, interests would be protected by veto power of 15 percent of the members. There would be a bill of rights, the provisions of which would be upheld by an independent judiciary under a supreme court. The PFP endorsed a universal franchise without educational or financial qualifications, a position that is radical by South African standards.

The main source of PFP support has been the better educated, urban, English-speaking electorate, joined by a sprinkling of liberal Afrikaners. Its parliamentary seats have been overwhelmingly held by people from residential suburbs of Johannesburg and Cape Town. Its chief financial contributor has been reported to be Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of Anglo-American Corporation, the giant mining and industrial conglomerate. Afrikaners have been represented by their parliamentary spokesmen, including the party leader since 1979, Professor Frederik van Zyl Slabbert.

Other Political Parties

The policies of the New Republic Party (NRP) are a synthesis of those of the former United and Democratic parties. While, like the PFP, calling for a confederal/federal system, the NRP's version of a federal council would comprise members of four racial groups, one of which would be the urban Blacks, while Black homelands and independent Black states would be linked via a distinct confederal system. In the 1977 election only ten NRP candidates were returned to parliament from the original United Party group which had numbered forty-four after the 1974 elections. All but one of the NRP members were from Natal where the NRP has formed the government in the Provincial Council.

The most conservative offshoot of the United Party, the South African Party, elected only three members to parliament in 1977. Having supported the Nationalist government on internal and external security issues, it voted in 1980 to merge with the National Party because, as its leader John Wiley declared, it no longer had a role to play in view of Prime Minister Botha's centrist policies and the "revolutionary situation" in the country.

The Afrikaner Conservative Opposition

Given that the liberal opposition has been both feeble and divided through most of the three decades of National Party ascendancy, the only potential threat to the present leadership is from the right-wing *verkramptes* of the party. Party dissensions came into public view momentarily in March 1980 when *verkrampte* leader Treurnicht criticized Coloured participation in a schoolboy rugby tournament. A reconciliation was effected, but the prime minister seemed to slow the pace of his reforms in race relations. The *verkramptes* have remained within the party and have on the whole muted their

dissent. If they were to leave the party, their only real alternative would be to join the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), which is viewed as outside the mainstream of Afrikaner politics even though it has attracted a substantial protest vote from Afrikaners displeased with the government's concessions on racial issues.

Formed in 1969 by Albert Hertzog after his dismissal from the Vorster cabinet, the HNP stands for Afrikaner hegemony (in place of Afrikaner-English cooperation), rejection of diplomatic relations with Black Africa, and prohibition of visiting sports teams who are not White—the issue that originally precipitated the split with the National Party. Internal squabbles have led to the resignation of Hertzog, and the HNP has never been able to elect a single adherent to parliament. Nevertheless the government continued to be preoccupied about the HNP because of fears that this crack in the facade of Afrikaner unity could widen if its more progressive course failed to hold voter allegiance.

In 1979 the National Conservative Party was founded with Connie Mulder, Vorster's ousted minister of information, as its head. Mulder has asserted that the new party would fill the "vacuum" created by the National Party's move to the left under Botha. The new movement fared poorly in a 1980 by-election in heavily Afrikaner-populated Orange Free State.

Politics of the Black Community

It may be said that the political rights of Blacks in South Africa have passed through three stages. The first embraced the period from Union in 1910 until 1936, when Blacks living in Cape and Natal provinces who could meet literacy and property (or income) qualifications could vote in general and provincial elections. Blacks were, however, barred constitutionally under the South Africa Act of 1909 from election to parliament or to the provincial councils. As of 1935 only one Black was registered in Natal because of the extraordinarily strict and discriminatory qualifications. In Cape Province where educational and financial qualifications were the same for all racial groups, 10,628 Blacks were registered in 1935.

In 1936 even the circumscribed franchise for Cape Blacks was withdrawn and was replaced by a Natives Representative Council of twenty-two members to represent Blacks from all areas of South Africa in a strictly consultative capacity. Frustrated by its own impotence, the council dissolved itself in 1946 and was officially disbanded in 1951. In addition Black voters on a separate roll of Cape Province could elect three Whites to represent them in parliament, and the country's Black population indirectly elected four White senators to represent their interests.

The third stage of Black political rights began after the National Party victory in 1948. In keeping with the apartheid policy of excluding Blacks entirely from the political life of White South Africa, parliamentary representation of Blacks was abolished, and emphasis shifted to devising governmental systems with tribal roots

in the ten homeland areas. The process was accelerated in the early 1970s. By 1979 three homelands had been declared independent, and most of the others had self-governing status with legislative assemblies combining elected members with appointed tribal leaders (see Government and Politics in the Black Homelands, this ch.).

Although some 53 percent of South Africa's Blacks lived in White urban or rural areas in the late 1970s, these Blacks were regarded as being only provisionally in the White areas in order to offer their labor. They thus had no right to political activity except insofar as they wished to participate in the political life of their designated homelands. In recent years the government has made gestures toward municipal self-government, permitting community councils in a number of Black urban townships. These councils are elected by the residents and have a restricted range of responsibilities as delegated by White administrators. In October 1980 Pretoria announced that the community councils would be replaced by town and village councils. The town councils would gradually accrue powers comparable to White municipal councils with the distinction that they would be responsible to the minister for cooperation and development instead of provincial authorities.

Blacks in Urban Areas

A characteristic feature of nearly all South African cities and towns is an area demarcated for Black housing, including standardized dwellings for families having permission to reside in the area and barracks-like accommodations called hostels, for workers. The latter are considered migrants because their job contracts run for a stipulated period of time, and their families in homeland or rural areas have not been allowed to join them. These Black townships were originally administered by the adjacent White municipalities. Despite the fact that in some cases elected Black advisory boards or urban councils were established, they held no powers and were simply consulted at the whim of White officials and administrators. The Black townships, carrying no political weight, found that utilities, health services, and housing tended to be grossly neglected. Although in 1971 responsibility for Black townships shifted from the White municipalities to twenty-two regional administration boards (fourteen in 1980) answerable to the Department of Cooperation and Development, conditions did not greatly improve. Few outside funds were earmarked for township development, and township revenues—derived mostly from beer and liquor sales and housing charges—remained wholly inadequate. Married couples entitled to housing faced delays of many years in being allocated rental quarters. When riots broke out in Soweto in 1976 White South Africans were astonished to learn that in this large Black township adjacent to modern Johannesburg, only 22 percent of homes were equipped with electricity and only 6 percent had bathrooms. Unpaved roads in the townships and squalid conditions in the community-run hostels have remained the norms. While efforts

were finally under way to electrify Soweto and the ninety-nine-year leasehold scheme was leading to some home construction, the glaring disparities between Black and White living conditions—and the resulting potential for political unrest—had been little altered by 1980.

The 1977 Community Councils Act provided that Black communities could have certain powers transferred from the administration boards. Council elections followed, marked at first by indifference or hostility on the part of many Black residents who viewed the new bodies as impotent pawns of White officialdom. In Soweto the elections in 1978 brought out only 6 percent of eligible voters, although in subsequent elections in other Black townships participation ranged from 15 to 30 percent or more.

The councils have been criticized because their powers were limited to such matters as allocation of housing and building sites, imposition of certain taxes and fees, and administration of sports, recreational, and library facilities. These responsibilities are to be extended with Soweto and other large townships ultimately to have full municipal status. If this promised development occurs it is possible that the community councils will achieve greater status as credible government bodies. The inadequacy of local revenue will remain a serious constraint. Residential taxes and charges are already burdensome when compared to family incomes. The townships have little commercial activity and no industries to provide a tax base, nor do they have access to capital markets. In 1980 they remained subservient to the White bureaucracy of the administration boards and had little political weight at higher levels of government.

In the larger townships adjoining the main White cities where political groups influenced by Black consciousness, such as the Committee of Ten in Soweto, have materialized, the community councils are not regarded as valid exponents of Black aspirations. Collaboration with the White government to gain a role in administering their own communities is rejected by Black consciousness adherents who aim at overhauling the entire political system.

In his proposals for constitutional changes in 1980, Botha offered a consultative role for urban Blacks—not on an equal basis with Coloureds and Asians but in a separate advisory body representing the community councils and homeland governments. The plan was scorned by Blacks as a further example of the National Party's rejection of genuine political dialogue with the country's majority population group. Even if Blacks had been accepted as full participants in the President's Council, which Botha has refused to concede, Black opinion would not be reliably reflected if their representatives were chosen from the unpopular community councils and homeland political officials.

Black Political Movements

Black political activity in South Africa following union was for many years moderate and suppliant in character, aimed primarily

257

at obtaining a hearing for grievances and fairer economic treatment. A greater militancy finally evolved when it became clear, particularly after the few Cape Blacks were removed from the general voting rolls in 1936, that appeals to the consciences of Whites would have little meaningful effect. The Black strategy later shifted to illegal but nonviolent actions culminating in deliberate provoking of arrest in the campaigns against the pass laws in 1952 and 1960. When the South African government retaliated by banning the ANC and the PAC, a brief period of sabotage and terrorist activities ensued. These were easily suppressed by the police, and the Black leaders were either sentenced to long prison terms or escaped into exile. Among those imprisoned were Nelson Mandela, who has been serving a life term on Robben Island but has remained the acknowledged leader of the ANC, and the late Robert Sobukwe, the founder of the PAC, who was released from prison on Robben Island in 1977 under a banning order while suffering from a terminal illness.

With the ANC and PAC crushed as internal movements, Black political activity remained at a low ebb until the Black consciousness movement, which originated with the South African Students' Organization (SASO), attained political momentum in the early 1970s under the guidance of SASO's president, Steve Biko. Many groups were formed under the influence of Black consciousness, most notably the Black People's Convention (BPC), an umbrella political body, and the South African Students' Movement (SASM) drawn from high schools and Soweto youth clubs. SASM has been credited with a leading role in the demonstrations by Soweto high school students in May and June 1976 triggered by resistance to the use of Afrikaans as a teaching medium in secondary schools (see The Soweto Riots, ch. 1).

In September 1977 South Africa's Blacks and observers worldwide were shocked by the death of Steve Biko while in police custody. Biko was already under a banning order proscribing any political activity. His death was soon followed by a security crackdown against all Black consciousness organizations and the silencing of the movement's leaders by detentions and bannings. Many BPC, SASO, and SASM activists escaped into exile in neighboring countries, particularly Botswana. Within South Africa, after a period of paralysis new groups such as the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) slowly emerged to fill the void, but the constant threat of bannings and detentions of known leaders made the resumption of political activity among the more radical internal groups highly risky.

In the wake of the Soweto riots, Black community organizations that tried to maintain communication between radical groups and the White authorities were either suppressed or disregarded by the government in Pretoria. Leaders of Soweto's Committee of Ten, including its chairman, Dr. Nthato Motlana, were detained along with Black consciousness adherents in 1977. The Committee of Ten later formed the Soweto Civic Association which has in turn sought to build a network of like-minded groups in other Black townships.

The Soweto Civic Association is essentially middle class, having close links with Black consciousness supporters among teachers, students, and clergy. It has been bitterly critical of the subservience of the community councils to the White government, demanding fully autonomous city council status for Soweto, plus the right to acquire land and introduce industry. It also has ties with AZAPO through common acceptance of Black consciousness, although AZAPO seeks to mobilize Black workers and is socialist in orientation.

After the more liberal Piet Koornhof became minister of cooperation and development in 1978, he sought to enter into dialogue with Black spokesmen like Motlana, editor Percy Qoboza, Bishop Desmond Tutu, and Reverend Sam Buti. These unofficial leaders, who enjoy the confidence of moderate Blacks, have generally rejected dialogue under terms dictated by the White authorities.

Although outlawed for two decades, the ANC remains at the core of Black radical politics in spite of the imprisonment or exile of its known leaders, many defections over the years. and numerous tactical blunders and setbacks. Founded in 1912 to defend Black rights after political power was transferred by the British to South Africa's White minority in 1910, the ANC long relied on persuasion, petitions, and delegations to advance Black interests. When the more militant Youth League of the ANC came to dominance in 1948, strategy shifted to passive resistance such as mass campaigns against pass laws and other apartheid measures. Membership rose sharply, but activities were curtailed by harsh new security laws and the arrest in 1956 of 150 ANC leaders; protracted treason trials resulted ultimately in acquittals.

In 1958 the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) broke away from the ANC in a rejection of the latter's collaboration with Coloured and Asian groups and the influence of White Communists. Simultaneous campaigns against pass laws by the ANC and PAC in March 1960 led to the massacre at Sharpeville (see Black African Resistance [1940s–50s], ch. 1). Both groups were banned and thousands of supporters were detained. While underground, hundreds of acts of sabotage and some terrorism were carried out as part of a new stage of violence. When the organizations were crushed by the police, their leaders were imprisoned or in flight. From 1964 onward the two groups have existed mainly in cadre form at headquarters abroad. They have provided some guerrilla training to refugees and recruits from South Africa, surviving on subsidies from other African states and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with aid from the Soviet Union in the case of the ANC and aid from China in the case of the PAC. The revived fortunes of the ANC in the late 1970s could be traced to South Africa's heightened vulnerability as the White-controlled buffer states disappeared and to the recruitment in Botswana and other states of youths fleeing the government crackdown against Black consciousness groups.

Discord among ANC adherents has centered on its policy of multiracialism and particularly its alliance with the South African

259

Communist Party (SACP), which is dominated by exiled Whites and Indians. Joe Slovo, a leading White Communist, is reportedly an organizer of the ANC military wing, and Yousuf Dadoo, the Indian chairman of the SACP, holds a senior position in the ANC. Although the South African government invariably portrays the ANC as a communist movement, the orientation of its Black leadership—the imprisoned Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu and the group's exiled president general Oliver Tambo—is in fact unknown. Interviewed by the press in 1980, Tambo claimed that the ANC was prepared to negotiate over the transition to a one-man-one-vote democracy in which Whites would have a place, but he expected that Black majority rule would only be achieved by violence. He rejected Pretoria's claims that the ANC was communist dominated, asserting that its political and economic doctrines were flexible. It has been speculated that the ANC might have moderated its policies because of its need for help from Robert Mugabe, the anti-Soviet prime minister of Zimbabwe.

In 1980 the PAC had not recovered from the death of its founder, Robert Sobukwe, and was weakened by factionalism and the less active role of China, its sponsor in Africa. The Black consciousness movement had offices in London and elsewhere but did not appear to have emerged as a significant force among the exile groups.

The South African security police estimated that as of 1978 at least 4,000 guerrillas were in training camps, of which 75 percent were ANC recruits. A resurgence of terrorist activities had occurred; more than forty incidents have been reported since the Soweto uprising in 1976. Attacks have been mounted against police stations and public installations, most notably the coordinated bomb attacks on the SASOL oil-from-coal complexes in June 1980. White civilians have not generally been targets (see Guerrilla Activity, ch. 5).

In spite of the growing threat from ANC guerrillas and terrorist groups, it is uncertain whether the ANC or the PAC will play pivotal roles in future Black politics. The remaining leaders of both groups have been distant from South Africa and from the day-to-day conflicts that pit Black youth against White authority. The exiled leadership—particularly of the PAC—is splintered, and the urban militants may regard it as presumptuous for the exiles to speak for all Black South Africans as they travel about the capitals of Europe and the OAU states.

Inkatha, a Black movement dating back fifty years, has been shaped since 1975 by KwaZulu's Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi into a popular organization to draw on Zulu ethnicity for political purposes. Formally known as the National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha ye Nkululeko ye Siswe), Inkatha has a rural, tribal, and grass-roots flavor. With 300,000 members it is the largest Black movement in South African history. While at least 95 percent of its supporters are Zulus and membership until 1979 was open only to members of that ethnolinguistic group, Buthelezi is widely recognized as a Black nationalist leader. A charismatic and articulate figure, he benefits from his aristocratic lineage, and his legitimacy

*Prime Minister P. W. Botha (left) and Minister of Cooperation and Development Piet Koornhof confer with Chief Gatsha M. Buthelezi (center) during a visit to Ulundi, capital of KwaZulu
Courtesy South African Information Service*

as the chief minister of the most populous dependent homeland provides him a relatively high degree of immunity to government sanctions. Inkatha is the only political party permitted in KwaZulu. Although some independent candidates have run for seats in the homeland legislature, all elected members belong to the organization. Inkatha has the overwhelming support of the tribally oriented appointed members.

While Inkatha is less confrontational in expressing its aims, its program does not diverge markedly from that of the Black consciousness movement. It demands the abolition of racial discrimination and full incorporation of Blacks into the country's decision-making process, leaving the final form of government subject to the practical give-and-take of negotiation. Inkatha foresees a continued role for Whites, and Buthelezi has taken a controversial stand in favor of investment by multinationals in South Africa. Although Inkatha stands for a blend of free enterprise and African socialism,

Buthelezi has emphasized links with the more radical nationalism of the ANC, of which he was once a member, and sought out the exiled ANC leader, Oliver Tambo, for a meeting in London in 1979. At the same time Buthelezi has maintained contact with Nationalist cabinet members and the PFP opposition. He has, however, rejected the idea of independent homelands and of the separate council for Blacks foreseen in Prime Minister Botha's President's Council plan.

The shortcoming of Buthelezi as a symbol of Black nationalism is that he is seen by educated urban Blacks and radical youth as a divisive figure, operating from a tribal homeland base. In spite of his rhetoric, it is suspected that he might in the end be willing to compromise with a reformist Botha government. With other Black political forces having to operate underground or with severe police constraints, Inkatha under Buthelezi is nevertheless an important power center. In Soweto, where Zulus form the largest group, surveys have shown considerable sympathetic affinity with Inkatha, a factor that could become significant if urban politics become more meaningful.

The granting of the right to engage in union activity in 1979 has resulted in an upsurge of labor organization by Black workers (see Labor, ch. 3). Many of the new unions have remained independent, avoiding close ties with existing White labor groups or those permitting mixed-race membership. A large number have also rejected registration that would place them under control of the official industrial conciliation machinery and prohibit them from engaging in political activity. In strikes at the automobile factories of Port Elizabeth and elsewhere, the newly organized Black workers have shown their willingness to use their combined strength to address wider economic issues. While links exist between some unions and AZAPO, the extent to which organized Black labor may become an instrument for Black political action was not yet clear in late 1980.

A weakness that undermines the negotiating power of the Black workers is the high rate of unemployment, combined with the limited skills they have to offer and the fact that they still represent only a small fraction of the total Black labor force. Repression by the police when the leaders' militancy exceeds an acceptable level is also a recognized threat. During the Johannesburg municipal workers strike in 1980, the leaders were prosecuted and more than 1,000 strikers were endorsed out (see Glossary) to their homelands.

Politics of the Coloured Community

Having progressively lost its influence in parliament, first through the abolition of voting rights for Cape Coloureds in 1956 and then in 1968 through the loss of the right to elect on a separate ballot four Whites to represent them in the House of Assembly, the paramount issue for the country's Coloured group has been the achievement of full participation in political life. When all access to the White parliament was withdrawn in 1968, with the exception of four senators deemed to have knowledge of matters affecting the Coloureds, the

Coloured Persons' Representative Council (CPRC) was created as a "parliament" for the Coloured community with delegated authority over such matters as the allocation of funds within limits set by the central government for education, social welfare, and administration. In reality the White minister for Coloured affairs exercised a dominating role. The government aroused Coloured hopes by appointing a commission on their situation. When the commission, under Afrikaner academic Erika Theron, reported in 1976, the government accepted many of the recommendations on social and economic matters but disappointed the Coloured population by rejecting direct Coloured representation at various levels of decisionmaking.

Elections for forty seats on the CPRC were held in 1969 and 1975. The additional twenty seats were filled by government appointment. Scarcely more than half the qualified voters registered in spite of fines for failure to do so, and only 35.7 percent of the potential electorate voted in 1969, falling to 25.3 percent in 1975. Apathy among the Coloured elite has been particularly marked; most professionals, businesspeople, and teachers have remained aloof from the CPRC. The Coloured Labour Party prevailed in both elections, but the government named members of the more cooperative Federal Coloured People's Party (later renamed Freedom Party) to the appointive seats in 1969, giving them a majority of thirty-four to twenty-six. In the 1975 election the Labourites captured enough seats to control the CPRC irrespective of the appointive seats, and the Labour Party leader, Sonny Leon, became chairman of the executive committee. In October 1975, after wrangling over the budget for Coloured affairs, which the Labour Party regarded as discriminatory, the government dismissed Leon and appointed a government's nominee, Alathea Jansen, as chair.

Both the Labour and Freedom parties strove for the full and equal participation of Coloureds at all levels of government, but their strategies differed. The Labour Party adopted a more confrontational stance, rejecting the Cabinet Council and President's Council plans, which it regarded as further entrenching racial divisions. It treated the CPRC largely as a platform to further its objectives. Labourites took the controversial step of entering into the South African Black Alliance with Inkatha and the Indian Reform Party. The Freedom Party under Tom Swartz and later Dr. W. J. Bergins was more reconciled to the CPRC, rejected the Black Alliance as "racist," and called for the maintenance of a distinctive Coloured community which would be represented in a single parliament of all South Africans not in the homelands.

Prime Minister Vorster's constitutional plan in 1977 for separate White, Coloured, and Indian parliaments was rejected by the Labour Party majority of the CPRC. The attitude of party chairman Sonny Leon was ambiguous, and he was replaced by the more radical Reverend Alan Hendrikse. The party was branded as negative and obstructionist by the government when it refused to give evidence before the Schlebusch Commission on constitutional

changes in 1979. The Labour group said it would cooperate if the all-White government body were converted into an independent commission on which all population groups were represented.

After Bergins and three other Federal Party members in the CPRC split off, the remaining members of the Freedom Party joined in an act of unity with the Labourites in the September 1979 session of the CPRC by approving a set of common principles, including repeal of all discriminatory legislation and a national convention leading toward a South Africa governed by all its people. The stalemate between Pretoria and the CPRC majority came to a head when the council again refused to act on its own budget in early 1980. The government retaliated by failing to hold new elections scheduled for March 1980 (all seats would have been elective) and allowing the CPRC to be disbanded. The government decided not to carry out its threat to name an entirely appointive council reportedly because few Coloured leaders would have been willing to serve. When Pretoria announced in October 1980 the name of persons who had agreed to serve on the new President's Council, only a few well-known Coloureds had accepted. Among them were the deposed leader of the Labour Party, Sonny Leon, and W. S. Africa, new leader of the Freedom Party.

Extended protests and school boycotts by Coloured students in 1980 over such issues as permits to study at White institutions and the disparity in spending on education for the different racial groups reached a degree of militancy that shocked the White community. The demonstrations suggested that the outrage in the Coloured community over discriminatory treatment was even deeper than was reflected by the obstructionism of Coloured political leaders.

Politics of the Indian Community

Recognition of South Africa's Indians as citizens and permanent residents occurred belatedly in 1961 when the government created the Department of Indian Affairs to administer the Indian community of about half a million. The Indian population was expected to find its political expression through the South African Indian Council, which was patterned on the CPRC. Formed by the government in 1964 as a twenty-five member, appointed advisory body, the Indian Council was reconstituted in 1974 with fifteen members appointed by Pretoria and fifteen elected by local Indian bodies. Having primarily advisory functions, the council has been granted executive but not legislative responsibility for education and social welfare in the Indian community. The council's size was scheduled to be increased to forty members, all but five of whom would be directly elected, and compulsory registration of voters took place with a view to elections in 1979. As of late 1980, however, the election had been further delayed and the terms of incumbents extended. The council has attracted little support from the Indian community which has regarded it as an instrument of White officialdom.

Although political parties are not yet well established, Indian political activity can be traced back to the early part of the twentieth century when the Natal Indian Congress was formed by Mahatma Gandhi, then living in South Africa. This congress was for many years a moderate organization but shifted to a more aggressive stance, aligning itself with the ANC in 1952 and later becoming linked with Black consciousness. Although never banned, it was crippled by restrictions imposed on its leaders in the early 1960s. The congress reemerged in 1971 as a movement of more militant students and young professionals. It does not participate in the politics of the Indian Council, which it has denounced as a fraud, and has urged Indians to boycott elections. It stands for universal suffrage and a national convention of all races leading to a unitary state.

In 1977 a small opposition Reform Party was formed by five members of the Indian Council under Y. S. Chinsamy. Disagreeing with the council's decision to participate in Vorster's Cabinet Council on a one-year trial basis, the Reform Party joined with Inkatha and the Coloured Labour Party in the Black Alliance. The party later launched a recruitment and organizational drive enlisting independent members of the Indian Council. By July 1980 these efforts resulted in the party's domination of the council. Among those joining was J. N. Reddy, the government-appointed chairman of the council's executive elements. Having opposed Vorster's Cabinet Council plan because it denied urban Black representation, the party welcomed the decision to form the Schlebusch Commission in 1979 and testified before it in favor of a ten-year-interim assembly with an agreed number of Indians, Coloureds, and Blacks. Although the Reform Party's ultimate objective, like that of the Coloured Labour Party, is a national convention leading to a one-person-one-vote unitary state, it has adopted a more patient, gradualist attitude. The Reform Party decided against participation in Botha's President's Council, although several Indian businessmen have accepted appointment and one leading Party member, Salaam Abram-Mayet, resigned to serve on the council.

Another new Indian political organization, the Democratic Party, was launched in 1979 as a merger of the National Federal and Republican Labour parties. Advocating more conservative policies than the Reformists and composed mainly of Indian businessmen of Natal and Transvaal, the Democrats advocated evolutionary change, direct representation of all races in local, provincial, and national affairs, and safeguards for minority rights.

Government and Politics in the Black Homelands

Although portions of South Africa have been delimited as Black reserves since the nineteenth century, the homeland concept that has emerged under the Nationalist government during the past two decades has carried the notion much further. It asserts that the country's entire Black population is to be regarded as having dual citizenship in both South Africa and a homeland. It asserts that the

265

1.0

1.1

1.25   1.4   1.6

4.5   2.8   2.5

5.0   3.2   2.2

3.6

4.0   2.0

1.8

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

homelands should evolve through several stages of partial self-government into wholly independent states whereupon their Black "citizens," wherever located, would lose their rights as South African citizens. As of late 1980 three of the homelands—Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda—were already regarded by South Africa as having achieved the ultimate stage of independence and a fourth—Ciskei—has projected the same step for late 1981.

The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 designated eight national units—later increased to ten—as the homeland territories under White commissioners-general representing the central government in Pretoria. The act was intended to provide a framework for gradual self-government through extension of executive and legislative power over prescribed matters, subject to final approval by the Pretoria authorities. Transkei was the first homeland permitted to establish its own territorial authority in 1963, having a six-member cabinet under a chief minister and a legislative assembly of sixty-five nominated chiefs and forty-five elected representatives. This pattern of homeland government, based on a majority of non-elective representatives assumed to have traditional rights to authority and an executive headed by a senior chief, has been emulated in other homelands in order to ensure stable and submissive assemblies.

The Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 furnished Pretoria authority to establish additional homeland governments by proclamation without resorting to separate legislation as in the case of Transkei. Self-government of the remaining homelands has proceeded in two stages as defined in the act. In the first stage a legislative assembly (initially appointive) replaces the territorial authority, and an executive council is formed. The council is responsible for finance, community affairs, education, public works, agriculture, justice, and health. At the second stage, the executive council is transformed into a cabinet and the legislative assembly becomes partially elective. The territory may adopt a flag and a national anthem and, subject to the approval of the South African state president, the assembly may alter acts of parliament relating to its citizens and matters it controls. But even after the second stage has been reached, responsibility for security, communications, movement of noncitizens, customs, excise, and monetary matters remain under South African jurisdiction. An amendment in 1979 extended to homeland legislatures additional powers over Black African education, businesses, libraries, sports and recreation, the police, and internal security. The homelands were authorized to pass laws in the interest of public order and safety, including banning organizations and persons, censorship of speeches and writings, and the resettlement of tribes, communities, and individuals within the homeland.

The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 declared that any Black, wherever resident in South Africa, has a national home in one of the homelands. The act assigned power to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development to issue certificates of travel

266

and citizenship. While the implications of this act were not immediately apparent, it has become one of the chief sources of contention surrounding the homelands. It has meant in practice that when a homeland achieves independence, people defined as its citizens but who resided elsewhere were to be deprived of their South African citizenship, lose their right to a South African passport, and incur a threat to their intrinsic right to live and work in the urban areas. During 1980 reports circulated that the government was reconsidering the citizenship issue with a view to devising a kind of commonwealth citizenship and a single passport.

The citizenship issue, while serious in itself, was only one factor in the repudiation of the homelands policy by urban Blacks and most homeland residents as well. The homelands signified overcrowded conditions, primitive subsistence agriculture, economic backwardness, and few wage-paying jobs except for distant migratory work. Forced removal of unwanted Blacks from the cities and White rural areas to dumping grounds in the homelands made the homelands a symbol of the impermanence of Black existence. The setting up of homeland governments under White auspices with outmoded traditional leaders failed to impress urbanized Blacks who regarded the homelands concept as a pretext for continuing to deny them their political rights.

In addition to the three homelands that had already been declared independent in late 1980, five were at stage two, and two—Kangwane and KwaNdebele—were at stage one. Kangwane, the homeland of the Swazi people, had an appointed legislature of thirty-six members, nine from each of its four regional authorities. Although its territory had not yet been fixed, KwaNdebele was recognized in 1979 as a territorial site for the South Ndebele. A legislature of four chiefs and forty-two members of the tribal authorities had been appointed by Pretoria.

When the homeland governments are constituted, the White officials who formerly headed the administrative divisions are replaced by Black ministers, and the White officials become secretaries of departments within the territorial governments. When the homelands are declared independent, Black officials are normally elevated to replace the department secretaries, but the Whites often remain in an advisory capacity. Most senior administrative posts continue to be held by White civil servants and technicians on loan from the South African government—even after independence is attained. In 1979 three of twelve ministers in Bophuthatswana were White, and a South African army officer had been appointed minister of defense.

The unicameral homeland assemblies, which meet briefly twice a year ratify legislation and appropriate funds without extensive debate within their delegated jurisdictions, but these actions are subject to promulgation or denial by the South African state president. South African laws continue to apply even in the independent homelands unless specifically repealed by the homeland government. Laws

267

reflecting aspects of apartheid have generally been abolished at independence. But the new states have adopted security laws corresponding to those enforced in South Africa, and practices such as bannings and detentions without trial have persisted. Even Bophuthatswana, which has a bill of rights in its constitution, passed detention and internal security laws in 1979 enabling it to outlaw certain organizations and publications.

Among important homeland officials are the urban representative, who is the authorized link between the homeland government and de jure homeland citizens living in urban areas of South Africa, and the commissioner-general, who represents the Pretoria government in the homeland. The commissioner-general's role is largely ceremonial, and most serious business is transacted directly with Nationalist government authorities in Pretoria. When homeland independence is achieved, the commissioner-general's office is converted to that of a South African embassy.

Although a number of political parties emerged before or soon after the initial elections in the homelands, many of them were weak in organization and membership and did not survive for long. In 1979 about ten parties were still active, but most were the political organizations of the territories' ruling chief ministers. Among the factors accounting for the decline of parties has been the relative status and power of the leadership group. Chiefs and headmen have found it risky to oppose the ruling party which dispenses community resources, their own stipends, and appointments. Disillusionment with the homeland governments' ability to deal successfully with poverty, land consolidation, and other differences with the South African government brought waning interest in party politics and decreased voter participation.

The chief ministers of the homelands play an anomalous role in black politics. As authorized spokesmen for segments of Black society they are prominent public figures, and their views are given some attention in the South African media. They are relatively immune to the legal sanctions that are a constant threa⁺ ⁻ᵃ ᵃofficial Black leaders. To a limited degree they can bring infl : ᵒ bear on Pretoria to ameliorate the economic and political ᵅ ᵔⅾitions under which their constituents live. They hold themselves out as moderates with whom the South African government should reach accommodation before more radical leaders take over. Nevertheless they are viewed suspiciously by most politically conscious Blacks as instruments of the White power structure and symbols of the despised homelands policy.

Several of the homeland leaders, notably chief ministers such as Cedric Phatidi of Lebowa, Buthelezi of KwaZulu, Hudson Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu, and Kenneth Mopeli of QwaQwa, have rejected "independence" for their fragmented territories because acceptance would mean continued economic subservience to South Africa. After the Quail Commission of South African and foreign experts advised the leaders of Ciskei against independence in favor of an autonomous

multiracial regional set-up, Chief Sebe nevertheless endorsed independence. In a national referendum on the issue in December 1980, over 98 percent of Ciskeians reportedly voted for independence although the Quail Commission had found that an overwhelming majority of residents did not favor a separate state.

When Transkei became the first of the homelands to be granted a territorial government in 1964, the votes of the chiefs in the legislative assembly determined that Kaiser Matanzima, an advocate of separate development, be named chief minister. Most of the elected members opposed independence, and Matanzima resorted to detentions before the final preindependence elections, even though he had sufficient support from the appointed chiefs.

Matanzima's domination has remained assured by support from the tribal majority in the assembly. Transkei has proclaimed itself a nonracial state, permitting South Africans to become citizens and to own land. White hospitals and schools continue to operate, although hotels and other facilities are integrated. In municipal elections in 1977 both White and Black councillors were elected in the capital city of Umtata and in other communities. Although not a signatory to the Southern African Customs and Monetary Unions, under independence agreements with South Africa Transkei participates on a bilateral basis. Thus South African currency is circulated and South African authorities assess import duties on behalf of Transkei. Most of the Transkei labor force is employed on a contract basis in White South Africa, and at least 75 percent of its budget derives from South African grants and customs receipts.

Transkei has engaged in acrimonious disputes with South Africa over the forced repatriation of squatters from the Cape and over claims to the district of Griqualand East which separates two elements of Transkei. In April 1978 Matanzima announced the breaking of diplomatic relations with South Africa over the land claims, but ties were resumed in February 1980 after Matanzima's hopes for international sympathy over his disputes with South Africa were not fulfilled. The recent improvement in relations was cemented by Transkei's interest in Pretoria's constellation scheme (see Foreign Relations, this ch.). While Transkei has removed South African police and military advisers, 359 South African civil servants continued to work in Transkei government agencies during the break in relations.

On December 6, 1977, Bophuthatswana followed the example of Transkei in adopting independence in spite of previous declarations by Chief Minister Lucas Mangope that a solution to Bophuthatswana's fragmentation into seven parcels of land would first have to be found. Mangope justified the move by asserting that as a separate state Bophuthatswana would have more leverage in ending racial discrimination in South Africa.

Although the Bophuthatswana cabinet adopted the position that citizenship should be optional for the 40 percent of the Tswana who live in White areas, Mangope failed to extract this key concession

269

from Pretoria in intensive negotiations right to the eve of independence. Consequently the many thousands of Tswana permanently resident in White areas have forfeited their South African citizenship, and their offspring born after the date of separate status have not been assured of their legal rights to work and live in White areas.

A further problem for Mangope has been the large number of other Black Africans living within his territories—not only the Ndebele and Sotho people having historical claims to land but also vast numbers of squatters who commute to work in the Pretoria region from adjacent areas of Bophuthatswana. South Africa has not yet fulfilled its commitment to resettle the people who are unwilling to take out Tswana citizenship. It was reported that by 1979 considerable numbers of squatters had applied for citizenship to escape police raids and legal harrassment.

Chief Mangope won an overwhelming victory in the election of August 1977 shortly before independence, when his Bophuthatswana Democratic Party gained ninety of the ninety-six seats, which are evenly divided between elected members and those appointed by chiefs. Questions, however, were raised about conduct of the election, and the turnout of 13 percent of eligible voters in the homeland did not demonstrate enthusiasm for severing legal ties with South Africa. Mangope's capitulation to Pretoria on the citizenship issue has been a source of resentment among the large Tswana population living in urban areas.

Venda became the third independent homeland on September 13, 1979. The small territory in the northeastern corner of the Transvaal is more cohesive than other homelands, consisting of two sections (which the Nationalist government has promised to join) and with 68 percent of its official population actually living within its borders. The decision to opt for independence appeared tainted, however, by the tactics of Chief Minister Patrick Mphephu against the opposition party. Although it won a majority of elective seats in both homeland elections, the party was kept from power by detention of twelve of its members and by Mphephu's influence over appointed traditional members of the assembly.

As of late 1980 the three independent homelands had not been recognized by any countries except South Africa and each other. The UN General Assembly declared by a vote of 134 to zero that Transkei's independence was invalid and requested members to prohibit dealings with its citizens. The United States abstained on the UN vote but has stated that it would not recognize the independence of any of the homelands. It has been argued that Transkei, if not the more fragmented Bophuthatswana, has more attributes of statehood than some countries that have been admitted to the UN. The prevailing view in the international community, however, is that recognition would imply acceptance of Pretoria's homelands policy. The independent homelands are thus seen as artificial creations, instigated by the Nationalists against the wishes of most of the people affected, to justify the apartheid system.

At a conference in Johannesburg in November 1979 and in a parliamentary statement in February 1980, Prime Minister Botha elaborated a constellation design for southern Africa which, at least in its initial stages, seemed to consist of a newly structured relationship between South Africa and the independent homelands based on a loose economic confederation. In July 1980 Botha met with the leaders of the three independent homelands to discuss the new relationship, but as of late 1980 it was unclear to what extent the constellation scheme would alter the dependency of these territories on White-dominated South Africa.

Politics and the Media

In terms of technical facilities for disseminating information to its inhabitants, South Africa must be counted among the more advanced countries of the world. It supports a flourishing newspaper industry, and its government-owned radio network broadcasts in English, Afrikaans, and most Bantu languages. Although still in its infancy, television is enormously popular with White South Africans.

In 1980 thirteen daily (Monday through Saturday) newspapers were published in English and eight in Afrikaans. There were three English language Sunday newspapers and one in Afrikaans. A high proportion of the White, Coloured, and Indian populations were readers of the daily or Sunday press. Special editions of some English-language newspapers as well as White-owned but Black-edited newspapers catered to a growing Black readership. In addition about 100 provincial newspapers—mostly weeklies—served small towns and districts with local coverage. Most of these publications were bilingual (see table 25, Appendix).

Considering the size of the White population that forms the bulk of the readership of published material, the number of such publications is astonishingly large. About 700 newspapers, periodicals, specialized journals, and popular magazines of all kinds appeared in 1979. In addition a range of European and United States-published magazines is available and some, like *Time* and *Newsweek*, enjoy substantial readership.

The English-language press has a considerable edge in circulation over the Afrikaans press in spite of the predominance of Afrikaans speakers in the White population. A feature of the English-language press has been its vigorous criticism of the government's racial policies and its exposure of the conditions of life in the other racial communities. The Afrikaans press, initially the defender and interpreter of National Party policies to the Afrikaner people, has shifted in recent years to become an exponent of liberalization within the Afrikaner power structure and a forum for introducing fresh concepts to rank-and-file Afrikaners, although still within the accepted framework of White political hegemony.

The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), an agency of the central government, holds a monopoly over radio and television transmissions. SABC has been enlisted as an instrument for

271

presenting the government's views on political, social, and economic matters. The television service, which began only in 1976, is a powerful influence in White homes to which it is primarily directed. Radiobroadcasts in the main Bantu languages are leading sources of news and information for millions of Blacks in areas poorly served by independent media.

Censorship laws governing literature and public entertainment do not extend to the press, which engages in self-censorship through the Press Council. The government boasts that South Africa enjoys one of the few mass media on the African continent that deserves to be called free. Nevertheless severe legal sanctions are imposed for unauthorized disclosures relating to prisons, the military, and the police, and for quoting banned persons. The government has shown its willingness to close newspapers and to prosecute editors and journalists. It periodically threatens more direct censorship, creating an intimidating atmosphere that inclines editors to be circumspect in their treatment and range of coverage.

The Press and Publishing

Grouped into large publishing empires, little direct competition exists among either English-language or Afrikaans newspapers. Most large cities are served by one morning and one afternoon journal in each language. In Johannesburg, however, a sharp rivalry has existed in recent years for morning readership, not only between the two English-language papers but also for readers in the Afrikaner business community who turn to the English press for its wider coverage and greater editorial independence. Of the two English-language papers, the *Rand Daily Mail* is known for its conscientious and critical handling of racial issues, a policy that has embroiled its editors in legal strife with the government over the years. The *Mail's* special edition circulating in Soweto and other urban townships is widely read by educated Blacks. The other morning newspaper, *The Citizen*, is the only English-language newspaper in South Africa supporting the Nationalist government. The secret launching and financing of *The Citizen* by the government was a key disclosure in the 1978 Department of Information scandal that led to the downfall of leading National Party figures. It has now been taken over by the Afrikaner-owned publishing house, Perskor.

The two Afrikaans newspapers vying for morning readers in Johannesburg are *Die Transvaler*, regarded traditionally as the mouthpiece of the provincial National Party organization but recently more independent, and *Beeld*, currently the most successful and prestigious Afrikaans paper, which beginning in 1974 carried the more liberal views of the Cape wing of the National Party to the Transvaal region.

Johannesburg's afternoon *Star* claims the highest circulation for a daily and the most comprehensive news coverage. Two nationally distributed Sunday newspapers have a readership far exceeding those of any dailies. Jointly reaching 75 percent of White households, the

English-language *Sunday Times*, with circulation in 1980 of 469,000, is the largest, followed closely by *Rapport* (Afrikaans) with 415,000. The Sunday press tends to be sensationalistic but includes some political analysis and business news.

The *Post (Transvaal)* is the foremost newspaper aimed at Black readership. Although part of the Argus chain, the *Post* has a Black editor and staff. The *Post*, which appears in English, originated in Natal but was extended to Transvaal, absorbing many staff members from the *World* and *Sunday World* when these newspapers were banned in 1977. The *World's* editor, Percy Qoboza, became editor of the *Post* when he was released in 1978 after five months' detention.

Other Black newspapers are the *Ilanga* of Durban, a Zulu and English biweekly, and *Imvo* of King Williams' Town, a weekly in Xhosa and English. The *Cape Herald* is a Coloured weekly published in Cape Town. *Nation*, the weekly journal of the Zulu cultural movement Inkatha, began appearing in December 1976 as the only significant Black journal not controlled by White publishing interests. After nine consecutive issues of *Nation* were banned in early 1979, publication was suspended in Transvaal. It continued to publish in Natal but only in Zulu.

Special editions of numerous English-language newspapers, both Sunday and weekday, cater to a growing Black readership. With the exception of *Die Burger* of Cape Town and the Sunday *Rapport*, both of which have extra editions for Cape Coloureds, Afrikaans newspapers tend to have exclusively White readership.

The major newspapers of South Africa were in 1980 grouped within either of the two English-language publishing empires, Argus Printing and Publishing Company and South Africa Associated Newspapers (SAAN), or the two Afrikaans groups, Nasionale Pers and Perskor. Argus, the largest group, is linked in its financial structure to large Johannesburg-based mining concerns. In 1979 Argus controlled seven dailies, the largest of which were the *Star* of Johannesburg, *The Daily News* of Durban, *The Argus* of Cape Town, and the Black-edited *Post*. SAAN published the *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), *The Cape Times* (Cape Town), the giant *Sunday Times*, and the tabloid *Sunday Express*, as well as a small but influential business weekly, *Financial Mail*. In 1976 Argus became the largest shareholder of SAAN, blocking a takeover bid by a progovernment Afrikaner consortium.

The Afrikaner press centers on two publishing giants based in Johannesburg and Cape Town, which parallel in some degree the north-south polarity of Afrikaner politics. Nasionale Pers of Cape Town publishes *Die Burger* (Cape Town), *Beeld* (Johannesburg), and dailies in Bloemfontein and Port Elizabeth. Perskor of Johannesburg is the largest publishing enterprise in South Africa, producing both books and magazines in English and Afrikaans and enjoying profitable government printing contracts. It publishes both *Die Transvaler* and *Die Vaderland* in Johannesburg and two dailies

273

in Pretoria. Perskor and Nasionale Pers jointly own the largest Afrikaans newspaper, the Sunday *Rapport*.

Among the few independent newspapers are *The Natal Mercury*, the *Natal Witness*, and the *Daily Dispatch* of East London. The latter was regarded as the most unflinching critic of the government's racial policies when its former editor, Donald Woods, was banned in 1977 and later escaped from the country. In spite of the fact that to a great extent the English-language press is financed and controlled by large mining conglomerates, a tradition of editorial independence is strong. The Afrikaans newspapers have traditionally been coupled with the National Party. Former Prime Ministers Malan and Verwoerd were at one time editors, and Vorster and P.W. Botha were directors of publishing groups. Both gave up their directorships, and P. W. Botha asked members of his cabinet to divest themselves of newspaper links as well, ending a tradition of personal identification of Nationalist politicians with Afrikaner newspapers.

The English-language press has held up a critical mirror to apartheid since the ascendancy of the National Party in 1948. Even more than in national voting patterns, the English-language and Afrikaans presses tend to bring into sharp relief the disharmony of outlook between the country's two White groups. Although supportive of the United Party in earlier years, editors of the English-language press were among those who became disenchanted with the party's failure to confront the Nationalist government on the racial question, thereby contributing to the breakup of the United Party in 1977. On issues of racial justice and political expression for Blacks, the leading English-language newspapers are in sympathy with the platform of the PFP opposition. In some ways their influence is greater than that of opposition members of parliament who, limited in numbers and research capabilities, cannot match the press in exposing instances of racial injustice or in forcing government leaders into public defense of their policy's course. A climactic event in the political and investigatory role of the English-language press was its involvement in the disclosures of the Department of Information scandal that shook the Nationalist government in 1978 and precipitated Vorster's departure from politics.

In the early years of Nationalist rule the Afrikaans press moved in close step with the party, vigorously defending and interpreting its policies of apartheid and separate development. With the party's political dominance no longer challenged, the press has shifted in recent years to a more independent outlook, without forgetting its mission of promoting the cohesion of Afrikaner society. Political shadings are now less pronounced; all major newspapers, especially since the Soweto riots of 1976, are associated with *verligte* attitudes, although the Cape-based Nasionale Pers most closely reflects the thinking of Prime Minister Botha. The press has performed a useful function in educating the Afrikaner public to accept such innovations as multiracial sports, labor reforms, and the dismantling of the more blatant forms of petty apartheid, while remaining loyal to the

fundamentals of separate racial development. A kind of watershed in the role of the Afrikaner newspapers as obedient expositors of party policies came in 1977 and 1978 when most Afrikaans editors joined their English-language counterparts in denouncing legislative proposals to further circumscribe the press.

Radio and Television

Radio and television are government monopolies in South Africa and are supervised by a nine-man SABC Board of Control selected by the Nationalist government. The SABC makes little pretense of presenting public issues in an impartial manner as its charter dictates. The corporation sees its role as one of presenting the government's policies in a favorable and optimistic light and of promoting the culture and standards of Afrikaner society.

SABC radio programs are beamed by ninety-nine frequency modulation transmitters, reaching an estimated 98 percent of the country's total population. The principal services are the separate English-language and Afrikaans cultural stations, both transmitted nationally, and Springbok Radio, a commercial station carrying more popular programs in English and Afrikaans with regional transmissions in the four provinces. A single all-night service, Radio South Africa, is carried by the commercial transmitters from midnight to 5:00 A.M. Special programs for Coloureds and Indians are broadcast at designated times on these services.

Radio Bantu consists of seven commercial services, each broadcasting for 168 hours a week over FM transmitters in the following languages: South Sotho, Zulu, Xhosa, North Sotho, Tswana, plus a service shared by Venda and Tsonga. The potential of Radio Bantu for shaping Black attitudes seems high inasmuch as battery powered radios are widely used, and few alternative sources of information are available in the homelands and other rural areas. Only Whites were represented on the SABC Board of Control and the Black Program Control Board as of 1978.

When full television transmissions commenced in early 1976, South Africa became the last industrialized country in the world to initiate video service. The primary reasons for the delay were the fears and uncertainties of Afrikaner government, church, and cultural leaders regarding the new medium's effect on traditional values of Afrikaner society and the threat to its language and culture if South African television were forced to rely heavily on American and British programming. There was also concern over the psychological and political effects of exposing the urban Black population to attitudes and ways of life beyond South Africa's borders.

Public pressures in support of television became irresistible when momentous events like the American landings on the moon were seen in nearly every part of the world except South Africa. Even after a favorable policy decision was reached, several years were required to prepare adequate domestic programming and to inaugurate service

275

simultaneously in all populous parts of the country. A high quality German color system was adopted. By 1979 an estimated 83.5 percent of the White population had access to television broadcasts as well as 86 percent of all Asians, 64 percent of all Coloureds, and 42 percent of all Blacks.

Popularity of the new medium was immense and, in spite of the initial high cost of receivers—virtually all are assembled within the country in keeping with a government policy decision—3 million were in use by 1979. By comparison only 2.5 million sets were in use in all of sub-Saharan Africa at the time television was introduced to South Africans.

In 1980 only one television channel was in operation, transmitting thirty-seven hours a week from 5:30 P.M. to 10:30 P.M. each evening with additional sports programming on Saturday afternoons. Programming is divided equally between the English and Afrikaans languages. Peak viewing periods and the main news program appear in English and in Afrikaans on alternate evenings. Although 60 percent of content is of domestic origin, many of the most popular programs have been those of popular American dramatic, detective, and comedy series. Some of these are dubbed in Afrikaans despite the fact that few Afrikaners are unable to comprehend English. Video material of British origin is limited by an embargo by British Actors Equity against the sale to South Africa of radio or television programs in which its members are involved.

Television content is heavily oriented toward White viewers. It is unusual to see a member of another racial group in programs of domestic origin, except commercials. The government has assented in principle to a Black channel, although the date of its introduction has been repeatedly postponed. In 1980 the minister of communications said that the Black channel, scheduled to operate three hours a day in five Bantu languages, would be inaugurated not later than 1982. Potential advertisers are reported to feel that programming in the various Bantu languages is impractical and argue that English should be adopted. Black audiences will be further limited by the absence of electricity in many homes.

Although imported material is screened for its suitability in South Africa, the enormous success of the medium and the popularity of programs from the United States have undoubtedly contributed to the breaking down of Afrikaner insularity and to the introduction of doubts over racial stereotyping. Blacks have been portrayed as doctors, judges, and police officials in mixed racial situations and have been featured on American variety programs—roles which were still inconceivable in South African society of the 1970s. The decline of the Afrikaans language that was feared with the introduction of television has not occurred and in fact the insistence on its use has probably strengthened comprehension of Afrikaans within the White community.

While televised news attracts large audiences, the technical quality falls short of that in Britain and the United States. In 1979 most

domestic events distant from the Johannesburg area where the SABC television studios are located could not be shown the same day. Because of the high cost of COMSAT satellite feeds, newsclips from other countries are generally received by airmail and shown after a delay of several days.

The SABC has been accused of biased, progovernment news treatment by opposition party leaders, newspaper editors, and representatives of non-White groups. Surveys indicated that during the 1977 election campaign more than 80 percent of the political coverage was devoted to National Party views. At all times lengthy interviews with cabinet ministers addressing questions posed by sympathetic reporters are common features. Foreign political or military visitors are often shown commenting favorably on local conditions or criticizing their own countries' policies. Blacks appearing on SABC television news are generally those who cooperate with the government, although homeland leaders and moderate Black spokesmen like Bishop Tutu have appeared from time to time.

Government leaders regard the SABC as a counterbalance to the English-language press, which is seen as unremittingly hostile to the National Party and unwilling to present issues fairly to the electorate. SABC officials have denied that radio and television are government propaganda tools, declaring that the mission of broadcasting is to promote understanding and cooperation between all racial groups, to stimulate optimism about the future of South Africa, and to discourage unrest and panic. The importance that the government attaches to radio and television in upholding Afrikaner culture and values may be deduced from the Broederbond society's reputed influence over the SABC. Until his replacement in 1980 Piet Meyer, a former head of the Broederbond, was for many years chairman of the SABC Board of Control.

The Government and Freedom of Information

Contradicting the government's boast that the country's information media are among the few on the African continent deserving to be described as "free" in the Western sense, a South African legal expert has observed that this claim is "one of the most skillfully nurtured South African myths." Although from time to time legislation that would bring the press under a formal regime of censorship has been proposed, the resultant domestic outcry and the potential effect on South Africa's already unfavorable reputation abroad have each time caused the government to stay its hand. Nonetheless the coercion implied in these threats, the legal taboos, the self-censorship "voluntarily" adopted by the press, and Pretoria's readiness to prosecute and ban journalists have had a chilling effect on editorial enterprise.

In the perspective of the government, freedom of the press is not a natural right and, particularly at a time when South Africa is a target of worldwide criticism and abuse, it is regarded as a luxury the country can ill afford. The government contends that South

277

Arica's record should not be compared with that of settled Western countries but should be considered in an African context. As a besieged society, the Nationalists feel they must protect themselves from untrammeled reporting that can undermine security and prestige. They are acutely aware that most instances of crude discrimination and racial injustice would not get worldwide attention if not uncovered and publicized by the country's own English-language press. Moreover constant criticism by the press will, it is feared, incite Black discontent and unrest. Minister of Police Louis Le Grange said in 1978 that press freedom is a privilege that carries responsibilities. The public only has a right to be informed, he said, when this is in the interests of the state.

The constraints under which the South African press operates are, first, the statutory limitations that make it impossible to treat freely matters affecting prisons, the police, and the military and, second, the limitations set out in the Press Code. The Prisons Act of 1959 prohibits publication of any false information concerning prison conditions without taking reasonable steps to verify such information. An exposé of prison administration by the *Rand Daily Mail* resulted in a long and costly prosecution in 1969 in spite of care taken by the paper to secure the sworn affidavits of witnesses. As a result the effect of the Prisons Act has been to debar criticism of prison conditions. The Police Amendment Act of 1979 imposed similar restrictions on publishing "untrue matter" about activities of the police force, the effect of which is expected to deter any reporting of police actions that has not been officially approved. The Official Secrets Act prohibits publication of police or security matters "prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Republic," which precludes discussion of security police methods. Under the Defence Act of 1957 no information relating to the composition, movements, or dispositions of the South African Defence Force (SADF) may be published without consent, nor may comments or rumors concerning SADF appear that are "calculated to prejudice or embarrass the Government in its foreign relations or to alarm or depress members of the public." This provision was invoked to prevent the press from carrying even international press agency reports of South Africa's 1975 intervention in Angola.

To avoid censorship by the Publications Control Board, newspaper publishers, acting through the Newspaper Press Union, drew up a Code of Conduct in 1962, vesting authority in a three-man Board of Reference to examine complaints of inaccuracy or offensiveness to decency. The press also agreed to conduct itself with restraint in dealing with racial problems and issues involving security of the country. Under government pressure to tighten the code, the press union decided in 1974 to empower the board to impose fines of up to R10,000 and to extend the code's coverage to material capable of "stirring up feelings of hostility between the different racial, ethnic, or religious, or cultural groups in South Africa or which can affect the safety and defence of the country and its peoples."

In 1977, in the aftermath of press accounts of the Soweto riots that had questioned police conduct, the government introduced a newspaper bill that would establish a press code enforced by a largely government-appointed press council with powers to ban journalists and editors and to suspend newspapers. The code would have demanded that the press ensure that the "name of the Republic is not damaged abroad." Fierce opposition led by both the English-language and Afrikaans press greeted the proposal, and the government withdrew the bill on the understanding that the press would be on one-year "probation" to discipline itself under a stricter press code. The new code, adopted in April 1977 and enforced by a three-man Press Council chaired by a retired judge, obliged editors to handle with due care and responsibility "subjects that may cause enmity or give offense in racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural matters in the Republic or incite persons to contravene the law; [and] matters that may detrimentally affect the peace and good order, the safety and defense of the Republic and its people, the economy, and the country's international position."

In May 1979 the government introduced a bill that would make it a crime to publish allegations of corruption without first reporting the matter to a government-appointed advocate general—who would decide whether the allegations affected national security. The bill was seen as a form of punishment of the press for its role in uncovering financial improprieties, unethnical actions, and surreptitious funding of progovernment journals in the Department of Information scandal. In the face of bitter criticism at home and abroad, the bill was withdrawn by the government.

Augmenting the legal prohibitions facing publishers and editors, individual journalists in South Africa are confronted by threats to their personal freedom and their access to normal news sources. In 1976 the Black newspapers *World* and *Weekend World* were banned, their editors and other Black journalists were detained, and the White editor of the East London *Daily Dispatch* was silenced by a banning order.

Policy-level Afrikaner officials, cabinet members, and informal sources on government plans and initiatives are often inaccessible to representatives of the English-language press, who are regarded as hostile. In such crucial matters as political and economic activities in the Black homelands, defense readiness, strategic production and resources, and oil and nuclear energy, independent reporting and analysis are severely curtailed or prohibited. Articles dealing in detail with racial injustices run the risk of prosecution on grounds that they are "likely to engender hostilities between the races" under the Riotous Assemblies Act. Criticism of Nationalist foreign policy tends to be muted, as editors are presumably reluctant to be accused of giving comfort to South Africa's critics abroad.

South Africa's press freedom is of the utmost importance because it allows some light on the internal workings of a society subjected to the political domination of a close-knit minority group. Yet the

continual encroachment against journalistic independence by real or threatened sanctions leads to suppression of essential facts that the public in a fully functioning democracy would insist on knowing.

Under the Publications Act of 1974, censorship review is imposed on publications (with the exception of newspapers covered by the Press Code), films, and public entertainment. Committees appointed by the minister of the interior decide whether a publication or other commodity is undesirable. The committees issue prohibition orders if in their judgment the material might harm public morals, bring any population group into ridicule, offend the religious convictions of any section of the population, harm relations between population groups, or threaten the safety, general welfare, peace, and good order of the state. Appeals against the decision of any committee may be lodged with the Publications Appeal Board of twelve members selected by the government. Decisions by the appeal board are essentially final and are not subject to review by the courts. The censorship administration is composed of Whites although Indian and Coloured advisory committees may be consulted regarding films to be shown to those population groups.

Many foreign texts and literary works containing criticisms of South Africa have been banned under the Publications Act, including reports by Amnesty International. Communist writings such as the works of Karl Marx are banned, although like other banned books they may be consulted in libraries by scholars. Many foreign films cannot be shown, although it is more likely that a film with offensive passages will be shown in censored form. Student newspapers, which do not fall under the press code, have been frequent targets for banning—often because of critical comments concerning military service. In recent years controversy has erupted over bannings of works by highly regarded Afrikaner writers. In 1979, however, bans on novels written by Andre Brink and Nadine Gordimer were lifted on appeal, indicating a slight liberalization for works by internationally known South African authors.

In 1979 the government announced that in the preceeding year 2,520 publications and other materials were reviewed. Of these, 1,326 publications had been declared undesirable; forty-seven films had been rejected, and 253 had been subject to excisions. One program of public entertainment had been rejected, and thirteen had been approved conditionally.

Foreign Relations

South Africa's primary foreign policy goal throughout the 1970s was to reinforce its common political, economic, and strategic interests with the Western industrialized world in order to safeguard itself from the perceived encroachments of international communism in Africa. South Africa had endeavored to preserve the other White-controlled territories of southern Africa—Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), Mozambique, Angola and Namibia (South West Africa)—as buffers against the antagonistic,

anticolonialist, and often Marxist-oriented Black governments that had secured power in the rest of the continent. Concurrently it sought dialogue and the development of working relations with receptive Black African states.

The 1970s, probably the most politically turbulent decade in southern Africa's modern history, must be viewed as a time of setbacks for the republic's foreign policy. The buffer zone of White-ruled states gradually disappeared. The nightmare of having to share the country's long borders with Black states under radical leaders helped to power by communist political and military actions turned into distressing reality. Relations with Western nations deteriorated, culminating in the adoption in 1977 of a mandatory arms embargo in the UN Security Council—the first such action taken against any country by the UN. Efforts to enter into practical contacts with moderate Black states met with only fitful success, South Africa's racial policies forming an unbridgable political and psychological gulf.

In 1980 the nationalist government was engaged in tortuous negotiations over the terms of a UN-supervised election leading to the independence of Namibia. The choices confronting Pretoria were not promising. If the election took place eventually, it might well result in victory by the Soviet-supported South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) leader, Sam Nujoma. If South Africa finally rejected the UN-sponsored settlement, it could lead to tougher international sanctions and continued indecisive antiguerrilla warfare by South African draftees on the Angolan border.

White South Africans have been perplexed at the unwillingness of major Western powers to base their relations more on shared strategic interests of curbing Soviet expansion in Africa and of protecting supply lines around the Cape. But for the West the advantages of closer ties have been counterbalanced by the stigma of cooperating with a state condemned by most countries of the world for its racism. The fact that South Africa has escaped additional punitive measures aimed at isolating it probably has been due less to the adroitness of Pretoria's foreign policy than to the fortuitous economic situation. During the 1970s the republic's importance as a supplier of essential mineral resources expanded sharply, and multiple increases in the price of its leading export—gold—reduced the vulnerability to economic sanctions. The breakdown of transport systems in neighboring countries—aggravated by the Rhodesian civil war and crop failures in the subcontinent in 1979 and 1980—necessitated imports of grain from South Africa and underscored the importance of the country as the region's economic focal point.

Foreign Affairs Structure

South Africa was only a minor participant in world affairs until after World War II, its influence deriving primarily from the international reputation of its longtime prime minister, Jan Smuts. Because its forces participated in World War I, the country was

281

entitled to join in the peace negotiations and to be a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles and concurrently a founding member of the League of Nations. Yet it was only at the Imperial Conference of 1926 that the autonomy of South Africa and other dominions of the British Empire in foreign affairs was explicitly recognized.

On June 1, 1927, a separate Department of External Affairs was created, but until 1955 each prime minister reserved the external affairs portfolio for himself. In 1929 the first legations were opened in The Hague, Rome, and Washington. South Africa had been represented since 1910 by a high commissioner in London, and it was only after the country's withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Nations in 1961 that the London office was converted to an embassy responsible to the Department of External Affairs in Pretoria. The department has been noted for the stability of its leadership, having been headed by only three ministers of foreign affairs since 1955 and only four department secretaries since its founding in 1927. In 1980 the minister of foreign affairs was Roloef ("Pik") Botha, who had served as South Africa's ambassador in Washington before his appointment in 1977. Brand Fourie, a senior civil servant, was named as secretary for external affairs in 1966 and remained in the post in 1980.

As prime minister, John Vorster engaged personally in numerous foreign policy initiatives, such as the dialogue undertaken with other African states in the early 1970s and the Southern Rhodesian peace efforts in 1976. During the Vorster era, the Department of Information under Minister Connie Mulder and Secretary Eschel Rhoodie became a supplemental instrument of foreign relations. The scandal in 1978 over South Africa's propaganda activities abroad led to the removal of Mulder and Rhoodie and the downgrading of the department to an arm of the Department of External Affairs. "Pik" Botha has retained the foreign affairs portfolio under Prime Minister P. W. Botha and has gained increased importance partly because of his popularity with the public stemming from his passionate advocacy of South African interests in the domestic and international media. Also thought to be influential in foreign relations are military advisers from the prime minister's earlier tenure as minister of defense, particularly General Magnus Malan, the former SADF chief of staff, who joined Botha's cabinet in 1980.

As of 1979 the republic had embassies or legations in twenty-seven countries, excluding the independent homelands. Its diplomatic contacts were truncated because the countries of Black Africa, the Near East, and Asia have generally refrained from exchanges of missions in disapproval of Pretoria's racial policies. No relations were maintained with communist countries. A total of twenty-four countries had embassies or legations in South Africa as did the independent homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda. A number of Latin American states as well as Denmark, Norway, and Japan limited relations to the consular level. Only one country of Black Africa—Malawi—had defied the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by establishing an embassy in Pretoria.

As South Africa's isolation deepened in the mid-1970s, new align-
ments were sought with other so-called pariah states. The results
were meager—visits with leaders of the military regimes in
Paraguay and Uruguay and closer contacts with Taiwan cul-
minating in a visit to T'ai-Pei by Prime Minister Botha in 1980.
Trade and industrial links with Israel were cultivated, but coopera-
tion in military production was suspended after the UN arms em-
bargo of 1977. Rumors of nuclear research cooperation have per-
sisted. On a political level, Israel has kept relations at a low key.

South Africa and the United Nations

Although former Prime Minister Smuts had played an active part
in the drafting of the United Nations Charter, South Africa's
domestic policies became an early target for criticism in the UN
when India raised the question of political rights for the country's
400,000 Indians in 1947. Pretoria was also vulnerable over its ad-
ministration of Namibia with the effect that its racial policies were
drawn further into the world spotlight. Resolutions critical of the
country's apartheid policy that were introduced in the UN's General
Assembly and in its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) were
at first admonitory, drawing attention to the violations of the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, urging a negotiated end to apartheid,
and expressing regret at Pretoria's failure to reconsider its policies.
As a result of the worldwide protest over the shooting of Black pro-
testers at Sharpeville in 1960 major Western powers became less in-
clined to fall back on the domestic jurisdiction argument in dealing
with the South African situation in the UN. Moreover the rapid
emergence of independent states in Africa, highly sensitive to color
discrimination, was accompanied by a new militancy on the issue.
In 1961 the General Assembly called on states to take "separate and
collective action" against South Africa, although a stronger African
resolution asking the Security Council to help with enforcement
failed to gain the required two-thirds vote. In the Security Council
Ghana's resolution calling for a voluntary arms embargo was ap-
proved in August 1963. The United States (which already had a par-
tial arms embargo in place), Britain, and other states complied with
the resolution. But sales by France, Italy, Israel, and other countries
reduced the embargo's effectiveness.

Coordinated through their membership in the OAU, the Black
African countries pressed their campaign against South Africa in the
other UN organs, succeeding in forcing the republic's withdrawal
from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1963 and
from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World
Health Organization (WHO) in 1964. South Africa also withdrew
from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). Although the OAU failed in its efforts to
expel South Africa from the International Telecommunications
Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, the country has been prevented from attending

283

individual conferences of these bodies. After a number of attempts to reject the credentials of the South African delegation to the General Assembly, the effort finally succeeded on November 12, 1974, although a move by the OAU members to have the country removed entirely from the UN was vetoed in the Security Council by the United States, Britain, and France. Pretoria retains its delegation to the UN, but its ambassador has not attempted to take his seat in General Assembly sessions except in 1979 when the Namibia question was being debated.

South Africa remains an active member of the World Bank (see Glossary) and the International Monetary Fund, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, although it has been forced into secondary roles in these agencies by the ostracism imposed by other African countries. The republic is active in certain other international undertakings where other African states do not have a voice, such as scientific cooperation under the Antarctic Treaty and the Whaling Convention.

Repeated attempts mounted by members of the OAU to invoke more punitive actions against South Africa largely failed until 1977, when Steve Biko's death and the subsequent internal security crackdown impelled the international community to give a firm sign of its disapproval. Although the Security Council's Western members stopped short of declaring South Africa to be a "threat to peace," the council did compromise by making the arms embargo compulsory on the grounds that the republic's acquisition of such equipment would constitute a "threat to international peace and security." The consequences of this November 1977 action were limited by the fact that many countries were already abiding by the 1963 General Assembly resolution against arms for South Africa, but it was psychologically important as the UN's first mandatory sanctions measure. Moreover France and Israel, leading suppliers of military equipment to Pretoria, announced that they would obey the UN action.

The dispute over Namibia can be traced to 1946 when South Africa rejected a UN trusteeship arrangement and sought instead to annex the territory it had administered since 1920 as South West Africa under a League of Nations mandate. Ignoring a 1950 advisory opinion of the World Court that the UN General Assembly had the right to supervise South Africa's rule, Pretoria further offended the General Assembly by extending apartheid measures to the territory, including a contract labor system, controls over the movement of Black Africans, and ethnically defined areas resembling South African homelands. The territorial assembly was all-White, and Whites representing South West Africa sat in the national parliament.

When various mediation efforts failed, a proceeding was undertaken in 1960 in the World Court, which six years later ruled in South Africa's favor on technical grounds. Affronted by the court's action, the General Assembly voted by 114 to two (South Africa

and Portugal opposed) on October 27, 1966, to revoke South Africa's mandate. The court upheld the resolution in 1971 and declared that South Africa should end its occupation of South West Africa. The General Assembly also took the controversial step of designating the externally based Black nationalist movement, SWAPO, as the sole representative of the Namibian people.

A further complication was introduced in 1975 when South Africa set up the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference of delegations from the various Black ethnic groups and the White and Coloured inhabitants of Namibia. The conference gained no international acceptance in view of the fact that it was not sanctioned by the UN, was organized on an ethnic basis without consulting the peoples ostensibly represented or allowing them to choose their delegates, and did not include SWAPO. In 1977 while an internal government was being organized, Vorster entered into negotiations with the United States, Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Canada over UN-supervised elections that would include SWAPO. After intensive negotiations with South Africa, SWAPO, and the nearby states of Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania, the five Western countries announced a plan for a cease-fire and elections, which both South Africa and SWAPO finally acceded to. A succession of South African objections, centering on the size and composition of the UN military force, the monitoring of SWAPO bases, and the UN's anti-South African bias reflected in the General Assembly's legitimizing of SWAPO's claims to preeminence, delayed launching of the UN plan.

Mugabe's swamping of the moderate internal Black leaders in the Zimbabwe election of April 1980 gave further pause to South Africa. The situations in Namibia and Zimbabwe presented certain parallels. In both areas popular Marxist-oriented guerrilla leaders—Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Sam Nujoma of SWAPO—were pitted against moderate interracial coalitions. The political reaction within the National Party could be severe if after P. W. Botha agreed to UN elections, Nujoma, the most radical of the contending leaders, came to power in Namibia, just as Mugabe did in Zimbabwe.

As 1980 drew to a close South Africa continued to mask its ultimate intentions, keeping the door to a UN-administered settlement slightly ajar while promoting Namibian self-government under the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the multiracial party emerging from the Turnhalle conference. SADF attacks on SWAPO concentrations inside Angola had weakened SWAPO militarily. South Africa's failure to accept a date for UN elections, however, had reaffirmed the view of the OAU member states that South Africa was not truly committed to free elections and seemed certain to lead to renewed pressure for economic sanctions which might induce South Africa to end its defiance of the UN.

Relations with Other African States

Led by Nigeria, the most powerful new state of sub-Saharan

Africa, and orchestrated through the OAU, the nations of Black Africa have been implacable in their efforts to stigmatize the South African regime for its racism and to isolate it from the international community. The OAU has tried to enforce a trade embargo against South Africa and to prohibit overflights or landings in member countries by its aircraft. South Africa has been forced out of international organizations and sports competition. Nevertheless a number of other African countries have bowed to economic realities and have traded more or less openly with the continent's leading industrial power and food exporter.

Notwithstanding the inauspicious political climate, the government in Pretoria stands to reap major advantages if it can expand practical contacts with Black African states and moderate their hostility. Not only would this ease the security problems at the national frontiers and enable South Africa to capitalize economically on its location, but it might also induce a more understanding Western attitude. The Nationalist regime regards the Western nations, whose support may be crucial to South Africa's survival, as strongly conditioned by the antagonism of the independent Black African states.

Preoccupied with domestic matters in the early 1960s, Prime Minister Verwoerd relied on Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique to insulate his republic from the political turmoil to the north as former colonies gained their independence. When Vorster became prime minister in 1966, he introduced a cautious, outward-looking policy of discussion, which achieved some initial success among moderate African leaders. The Lusaka Manifesto, announced by fourteen east and central African states in April 1969 and reflecting the influence of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, acknowledged the rights of White southern Africans and the legitimacy of the South African republic. The declaration urged negotiations to bring about a change in racial policies but threatened boycott and isolation if change failed to materialize. Under no strong international pressure at the time and facing a breakaway of his party's right wing at home, Vorster rejected the idea that apartheid could be the subject of negotiation.

The collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in 1974, followed by intensified guerrilla warfare in Southern Rhodesia brought a shift in Vorster's approach from one of dialogue to détente. Concerned over being drawn into a futile struggle for White supremacy in Southern Rhodesia—Pretoria was already helping the Ian Smith regime with arms, a contingent of border police, and helicopters—Vorster pressed Smith to move toward majority rule by negotiation with the Black nationalist leaders. The high point of the détente effort was a strategy meeting over Southern Rhodesia in September 1975 between Vorster and Kaunda in a railway coach on the Victoria Falls bridge straddling the Zambia-Southern Rhodesian border.

A fatal miscalculation in pursuit of détente was Vorster's intervention in Angola in late 1975 and early 1976 at the request of one of

the competing Angolan factions led by Jonas Savimbi. According to the South Africans the SADF military thrust had backing from some Black African leaders who were concerned over Cuban-Soviet influence in Angola, and it received covert encouragement from the United States as well. In spite of an initially ambiguous response from the OAU, the Nationalist government found that it had seriously misjudged attitudes in Africa and the United States. The Black states were not ready to accept South Africa as the defender of a neighboring African country against international communism, and American public opinion and congressional opposition precluded Washington's involvement.

After meetings with United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976, Vorster made one further effort at détente by bringing Ian Smith and Southern Rhodesia's Black nationalist leaders to the conference table in Geneva. After the failure of this initiative, Pretoria gave its wholehearted support to the short-lived Southern Rhodesian internal settlement with the Black leaders Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole.

When P. W. Botha took office as prime minister in 1978, he declared that his country would turn to a more neutral posture on East-West issues and that his government would emphasize regional interests with the objective of a "constellation" of southern African states. Such a regional grouping would help preserve a cushion of friendly states on South Africa's borders, would bring about an alliance with countries enjoying Western support, and would lead to greater economic interdependence, thus serving to deflect the sanctions threat against the republic. While the countries that were being courted by Pretoria were not identified, it was believed that, in addition to the independent homelands, Botha had in mind the former British protectorates of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland plus Zimbabwe, Namibia, and possibly Malawi, Zambia, and Zaire.

While it cannot be denied that economic links bind most countries of the region to South Africa, it became clear that the Nationalists' racial policies would remain a fundamental obstacle to more open collaboration, just as Vorster's dialogue and détente policies had foundered in the early 1970s. At a well-publicized meeting on the constellation plan in July 1980, the only Black territories represented were the homeland governments of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda. Far from giving serious attention to Pretoria's initiative, the Black-ruled countries of the region were meeting to examine whether the recent independence of Zimbabwe had improved their prospects for loosening economic ties with South Africa.

In spite of the OAU strictures against economic relations, other neighboring countries acknowledge with varying degrees of candor the extent of their economic ties with the republic. The customs union with Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland has been renewed from the earlier period when these countries were British protectorates. Customs revenues remitted to them under a generous formula by Pretoria have been a major source of government revenues.

Swaziland and Lesotho have remained within a monetary union with South Africa, but Botswana has had its own central bank and monetary system. All three countries have imported a wide range of consumer goods from the southern industrial republic, and much of their investment—notably the valuable diamond mines in Botswana—has originated in South Africa. The provision of migrant labor to South Africa's mines has been important to their economies in terms of both jobs and balance of payments.

Pretoria's pragmatism in handling relations with neighboring states has been most evident in the case of Mozambique. Profitable trade links were disrupted when Mozambique became a Marxist state in 1975, but the two countries' railway and harbor administrators have cooperated to keep South African trade moving through the port of Maputo, and in 1979 plans were announced to expand the tonnage moving through the port to levels far beyond those of the Portuguese colonial period. Although in 1978 Pretoria terminated the highly favorable rates at which it had been transferring gold to Mozambique for mine wages, considerable numbers of Mozambicans are still recruited for the South African mines. One-tenth of the republic's electrical power has come from the Caboro Bassa hydroelectric plant in Mozambique.

The South African rail and port system, already an important element in the subcontinent's transport network, became indispensable when other routes for mineral shipments, foodstuffs, and fertilizers were blocked by guerrilla activity in Southern Rhodesia and Angola. Droughts in 1979 and 1980 forced Mozambique and Zambia to buy large quantities of grain from South Africa and, according to the South African press, countries as distant as Kenya were also making purchases. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have been regular buyers of South African maize at the subsidized domestic price.

The dislocation and hardships that would result from attempts by neighboring countries to reorient their economies have been restraining factors against comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa. At the same time, the political impediments to normal business relations mean that Pretoria's trade with the rest of Africa falls short of its potential. In 1964 about 19 percent of the republic's total exports went to other African countries. In 1977 this had fallen to 9 percent, most of which comprised trade with Southern Rhodesia and food exports to nearby states.

Relations with the United States

For many years after World War II the United States treated the political problems of southern Africa as deserving only secondary attention. But the growing communist military assistance to Black nationalist guerrilla forces followed by the massive introduction of Cuban troops into Angola in 1975 brought an abrupt change in this attitude. After 1976 the spotlight shifted to South Africa's domestic actions as President Jimmy Carter began to stress human rights in his foreign policy. Pretoria's handling of the Soweto unrest in 1976

and its suppression of Black consciousness in 1977 had a pronounced negative impact on Washington. After the election of President Ronald Reagan in November 1980, American policy toward South Africa was subjected to review, and a change of emphasis was expected to result.

In the immediate postwar years South Africa had been treated as a political ally, respected for its role in two world wars and its contribution of an air squadron in the Korean conflict. Cooperation was, however, limited to such matters as research in peaceful uses of atomic energy, a natural field of activity inasmuch as South Africa had long been a valued source of uranium ore. Until 1958 the United States abstained, on grounds of domestic jurisdiction, on UN resolutions critical of South Africa's race policies. While later prepared to join with the majority of the General Assembly in condemning South Africa, the United States has not been willing to characterize the situation in South Africa as a "threat to the peace" under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which might lead to mandatory punitive actions.

In spite of British and French abstention the United States voted in favor of a resolution in the Security Council in 1960 blaming Pretoria for the Sharpeville tragedy. A voluntary American arms embargo was instituted in 1963 even before the UN resolution was passed calling on members to refrain from the sale of arms to South Africa. In 1964 the Export-Import Bank suspended direct loans to finance exports to South Africa, although it continued to offer guarantees of private loans until passage of the Evans Amendment in 1978 effectively brought the bank's activity to a halt.

Charges were made that President Richard M. Nixon had decreed a more sympathetic attitude toward South Africa by approving a recommendation in National Security Council Study Memorandum 39 of August 15, 1969, that the scope of relations and contacts should be broadened gradually because "the Whites are here to stay, and the only way that constructive changes can come about is through them." The Nixon administration claimed that none of the six options in the memorandum had been adopted as such, although minor actions were taken, including approval of sales of commercial helicopters and small passenger aircraft for air force use. Officials maintained that the policy was fundamentally unchanged but now stressed "communication without acceptance of apartheid."

A more active United States role in southern Africa was foreshadowed in Kissinger's speech at Lusaka, Zambia in April 1976, but his call for majority rule governments was aimed more at Southern Rhodesia and Namibia in the near term. The first high-level contact with the Carter administration came at a meeting between Prime Minister Vorster and Vice President Walter Mondale in Vienna in May 1977. Mondale gave South Africa's domestic policies equal prominence with majority government in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, appealing for the end of racial discrimination and full political participation by all citizens of South Africa. He declared

that the United States was not proposing any blueprint or timetable but urged dialogue between the races as a first step.

When the death in detention of Steve Biko and South Africa's security crackdown in October 1977 provoked renewed outrage in the UN and demands for economic sanctions under Chapter VII, the United States, France, and Britain exercised their vetoes. But as a compromise with the Black African states, all three agreed to a mandatory arms embargo. While this had little practical significance to the United States, which had maintained a voluntary embargo since 1963, Washington went a step beyond the UN boycott by banning all exports, including commercial equipment and spare parts, intended for the South African police or military.

Pretoria reacted bitterly to the Carter administration's censure. Making American policy, which he described as "strangulation with finesse," a major issue in his 1977 reelection campaign, Vorster charged that the United States presented a threat greater than that of international communism. American critics of the Carter policy maintained that the administration had done little more than sharpen the tone of its language and was reluctant to invoke tangible pressures to force South Africa to change its course.

United States economic involvement in South Africa has compounded the difficulty of fashioning a policy that reflects United States strategic interests and human rights standards. Over 300 American firms, including many of the largest corporations, are represented in the republic by subsidiaries or affiliates. The value of these direct investments rose from US$666 million in 1967 to US$1.9 billion in 1979, although increases in recent years are believed to have accrued largely from reinvestment of profits and upward valuation of assets (see Foreign Investment, ch. 3). The United States accounts for only one-sixth of total direct foreign investment in South Africa but that portion is qualitatively important. Most of the investments are concentrated in high technology areas such as computers, refining, auto manufacture, mine and farm machinery, and electronics.

In appealing for greater understanding from the West, Pretoria stresses the republic's reliability as a prime supplier of minerals essential to the West's strategic industries. South Africa's regular weekly shipments of gold to the international market make a contribution to the stability of the world's monetary structure. While the United States is less dependent than are the economies of Europe, South Africa is a leading source for United States needs in platinum, chrome, manganese, vanadium, and industrial diamonds. Strategic and industrial stockpiles in the United States, substitution of other materials, and alternative sources could mitigate a cutoff of supply from South Africa, but severe dislocations could result in the short term from an interruption of shipments.

Although the United States Department of State issued voluntary guidelines in 1973 for labor practices by American firms in South Africa, efforts by these companies to reduce apartheid in the work

place received greater impetus after the introduction of the Sullivan Code in 1977. The Reverend Leon Sullivan, a civil rights activist and member of the board of directors of General Motors Corporation, announced in 1980 that 140 American campanies in South Africa had agreed to adopt the six principles of the code aimed at desegregation of facilities, equal pay for equal work, training and advancement of Blacks, and recognition of the right of Blacks to be union members and engage in collective bargaining. Although progress is uneven, as reported by the individual firms, the code is responsible for palpable improvements in the situation of Black workers. While the number covered is small—perhaps 1 percent of the entire Black work force—the example set by Sullivan has encouraged the adoption of labor codes by South African firms and employer associations and by other foreign governments with investments in the country, including the European Economic Community (EEC).

Notwithstanding evidence that South Africa has engaged in weapons research and the suspicion with which other African countries view any form of nuclear collaboration with the republic, the United States in late 1980 was continuing contacts aimed at South Africa's adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the opening of its nuclear facilities to international inspection and safeguards. In the meantime the United States has suspended the supply of enriched uranium for South Africa's research reactor and has refused to license exports of fuel for the Koeberg nuclear power plants, which are to be completed in 1982 and 1983 (see The Nuclear Question, ch. 5).

Campaigns mounted by antiapartheid student, labor, and religious groups in the United States have sought to bring pressure on American corporations and banks to give up their links with South Africa. While downgrading its promotion of commerce, Washington has not discouraged normal trade relations and has taken a neutral stand on the issue of disinvestment. It endorsed the Sullivan Code in 1979 but did not rule out direct government action if the code's voluntary approach failed to achieve sufficient improvement in Black labor conditions. Recognizing America's limited ability to influence events, the Carter administration urged peaceful change aimed at bringing all South Africans into full participation in political life and not simply reforms of the apartheid system.

* * *

South Africa's constitutional system and its governmental structure at the national, provincial, and local levels are outlined in *South Africa 1979*, the republic's official yearbook. For fuller analysis of the dynamics of government, *The Government and*

Politics of South Africa, edited by Anthony de Crespigny and Robert Schrire, should be consulted. South Africa's system of justice with emphasis on its racial components is treated in John Dugard's *Human Rights and the South African Legal Order. Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa*, compiled by Muriel Horrell for the South African Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg, examines in detail the laws, regulations, and judicial actions through 1976 that form the legal underpinnings of apartheid.

Domestic political events of recent years, both within the White political arena and across racial lines, are recapitulated in the annual volumes of *Africa Contemporary Record* edited by Colin Legum and in the annuals of the *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, edited by Loraine Gordon and published by the South African Institute of Race Relations. The latter is a primary source of data on the administration of justice and the security laws, Black political activity in the homelands and urban areas, trade union matters, and publication control. *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*, edited by Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg, contains a number of valuable articles on domestic political trends, labor, and Black nationalist movements.

A lively and controversial account of the course of South Africa's foreign policy under former Prime Minister Vorster may be found in R. W. Johnson's *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* In *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis* (edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara), Thomas Karis critically appraises American policy toward South Africa. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security

Official emblem of South African Defence Force

SOUTH AFRICA'S PREOCCUPATION with national security in the aftermath of the Portuguese withdrawal from Africa and the subsequent fall of the White regime in Rhodesia—coupled with a growing sense of political isolation and abandonment by the West—has reinforced the siege mentality that had been a facet of life in the White—and particularly in the Afrikaner—community. This attitude has been symbolized by the laager—the circled wagons behind which the nineteenth century Boer trekkers defended themselves on the open veld against their Black enemies and from which the pioneers could lash out with counterattacks. Although the country's Whites are regarded by many observers as being obsessed by what in Afrikaans is called *swartgevaar* (an inordinate fear of being overwhelmed by Blacks), South African authorities have not tended to equate all opposition to their regime with indigenous Black unrest but rather with communism. The Nationalist regime has loosely defined communism as any doctrine or scheme that seeks to change the political, social, or economic structure of South Africa or to promote disorder and violence. Some South African analysts see the Soviet Union preparing to make the African continent a theater of operations in a future East-West confrontation. According to South African spokesmen, their country has an intrinsic strategic value for the West derived from its geographic location and vast natural resources.

In 1980 the country had committed a significant part of its military manpower to containing the insurgency in northern Namibia (South West Africa). Its conventional defense capability was bolstered against the perceived threat of Soviet-backed aggression from Angola and other Black African states. Border security had also been intensified against Black nationalist guerrillas operating out of Mozambique and Botswana. The existence of operational areas within South Africa reflected concern for stepped up guerrilla activities. Moreover internal security had assumed new importance after the Soweto riots of 1976, and the future of relations with neighboring Zimbabwe also loomed large in Pretoria's planning.

The South African government under Prime Minister P. W. Botha had introduced a "total strategy" designed to cope with the perceived "total threat." South Africa was geared up both materially and psychologically to fight a prolonged war of low intensity, but it also had extended its sphere of potential military commitment to all of subequatorial Africa. Fundamental to the "total strategy," however, was the concept expressed by its chief architect, Defense Minister Magnus Malan, that the conflict for South Africa's survival went beyond war by military means. National security objectives had been formulated whereby all of the country's resources would be available to be mustered and managed on a coordinated level for defense. Every activity of the state was to be understood as a function

of the "total strategy." Also essential to the task, according to Malan, was the attempt to give the Black majority a larger share in the country's future and to involve them more in maintaining its security.

In 1980 the South African Defence Force (SADF) was the strongest in Africa south of the Sahara in terms of leadership, training, technical proficiency, equipment, and general fighting ability. Reputable foreign analysts considered that this military capability was so awesome in relation to that of neighboring Black states that it could meet any conceivable aggressive threat from them and could not be defeated by conventional means without significant intervention by the great powers (see fig. 20). The SADF's standing force of 86,000 personnel was the third largest in sub-Saharan Africa after distant Nigeria and Ethiopia, but no country in the region could match the more than 400,000 regular and reserve personnel that the military establishment and the paramilitary police forces could mobilize in the event of an emergency. An effective logistical system assured all fighting units of reliable support in supplies and equipment maintenance.

Desired strength levels were achieved by a national system of two years compulsory military service for qualified White males, followed by a ten-year reserve commitment. Enlistment of Blacks was encouraged, and eligible White women were recruited to form auxiliary units.

As a result of frequent and prolonged call-ups of reservists for active duty in operational areas, a large proportion of the SADF had gained combat experience. Excellent training procedures emphasized endurance and individual initiative as well as disciplined response to orders. South African servicemen were credited as being physically tough, well motivated psychologically, technically skilled, and patriotic. Service conditions were considered excellent by modern military standards.

Defense costs claimed nearly 20 percent of the annual national budget, reflecting steep increases in expenditures during the 1970s, but this figure was not excessive in relation to the country's expanding gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary). A mandatory embargo on the export to South Africa of goods and technology capable of being used for military purposes was imposed by the United Nations in 1977. Although most long-standing sources of supply were cut off as a result of this action, the embargo did not appear in 1980 to have damaged South Africa's defense posture. Adequate support for the SADF was well within the capabilities of the diversified national industrial base, and the armed forces were virtually self-sufficient in all military matériel (except heavy tanks and large naval vessels) and in all technical equipment (except the most advanced electronics gear). Most observers conceded that South Africa had or could soon acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

The South African Police (SAP), a national law enforcement

Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 1980–81, London, 1980.

Figure 20. Military Balance in Southern Africa, 1980

agency of more than 35,000 regular police and 20,000 police reservists in 1980, is the primary instrument for maintaining law and order and for preserving internal security in areas not assigned to the SADF. Trained and equipped to meet modern law enforcement standards as well as paramilitary requirements, the SAP has a reputation for efficiency. Although a large percentage of regular police personnel are non-Whites, many Blacks and Coloureds regard the SAP as a symbol of White domination and repressive regulation.

297

The police have been granted extensive powers to invade private rights in the course of exercising their prescribed functions, a significant part of which deals with enforcing security laws and the large body of apartheid legislation (see Apartheid and Its Evolution, ch. 2; The Legal System, ch. 4).

In 1980 there was evidence that many Whites would concede some modification in race relations for the sake of improving their country's security. But they also appeared willing to make whatever sacrifices were necessary to defend their way of life. In the words of General Constand Viljoen, Chief of the SADF, they would have to be prepared to enter each day "the plough in one hand, the gun in the other."

History of the Military Tradition

The traditions of South Africa's armed forces reflected both the frontier experience of the Afrikaner trekker and the country's British colonial heritage. Within a few years of Jan van Riebeeck's landing on the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 the burghers had raised a uniformed militia to supplement mercenaries in the Dutch East India Company's small garrison. The early Dutch, French, and German settlers were drilled in conventional European tactics to protect the young colony from Khoi and San. They and their Afrikaner descendants were expected to put aside everyday occupations to take up arms as citizen-soldiers whenever a threat to life and property arose.

As the colony's frontier expanded farther inland, the militia no longer waited for authorization from the company in Cape Town to react to raids against settler farmsteads. The term commando (Afrikaans, *kommando*; literally, a command) was used to describe the local vigilante bands that were quickly assembled to retrieve stolen livestock and to exact rough retribution against the indigenous population. To participate in such a mission was to "go on commando." All able-bodied White males between the ages of sixteen and sixty were expected to be ready to report with horses, provisions, and weapons whenever summoned for duty. The company supplied ammunition. Each commando acted independently, and only enough men were called up as were needed for a particular mission. Units were led by a field cornet (*veldkornet*), elected by his neighbors, who also functioned as local magistrate. All commando officers had an equal voice in the war council (*krygsraad*) that met in time of trouble to plan operations. By the late eighteenth century the *krygsraad* was electing a field commandant (*veldkommandant*) to coordinate military activity over an entire sector of the frontier.

Commando units resisted British military expeditions that seized the Cape in 1795 and that retook it in 1806. Later, however, they assisted the British garrison there as scouts and auxiliaries. The Boers were superb guerrilla fighters whose skilled horsemanship, expert marksmanship, and resourceful self-sufficiency in the field more than made up for their disregard for more conventional soldierly discipline. They sharpened their irregular tactics on the great treks

298

into Natal, the Orange River country, and the Transvaal that began in the 1830s and pitted them against Xhosa, Zulu, and occasionally against British regulars. The trekkers also perfected the wagon laager as a mobile stronghold on the open veld. Essentially defensive in nature, the laager could be an effective base for offensive tactics in a large-scale battle like that which the Boers fought against the Zulu impis (regiments) on the Blood River in 1843.

The safety of the Boer republics founded by the trekkers depended on the willingness of part-time citizen-soldiers to go on commando. Whenever an action required more than one commando unit, a commandant general was elected by other officers of the *krygsraad* to supervise operations. In the early days of the republics, the state president usually assumed command as commandant general. When these functions were eventually separated in the Transvaal, the commandant general continued to exercise an important political role and was a member of the executive council. Before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), the Transvaal had 30,000 men enrolled in the commandos, the Orange Free State about 20,000. Both republics maintained a regular mounted police force and a small professional artillary corps.

The military tradition of English-speaking Whites derived from the colonial period when British regulars were garrisoned in Cape Province and Natal. The Volunteer Ordinance of 1854 directed the creation of a militia whose regiments were trained according to the British army's drill book and were often affiliated with regular army regiments stationed in the two colonies. As in the British army, the colonial regiments were recruited on a territorial basis and possessed distinctive colors, uniforms, and traditions.

Among the Coloureds, the independent Griquas were especially noted for their fighting ability, defending their land against both Blacks and Boers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Boer farmers often took armed Coloured retainers with them on commando. After the Cape became a British possession, regular Coloured units, formed under British command, assumed a large share of peacekeeping responsibilities in the colony.

The Boer commandos and subsequently British regulars and militia engaged in a series of campaigns—the so-called Kaffir or Frontier Wars—against the Xhosa between 1779 and 1878. In 1879 British forces finally broke the formidable power of the disciplined Zulu impis, but only after a hard-fought campaign in which the Zulu inflicted a crushing defeat on the British at Isandlwana. In a brief war in 1881, British territorials were routed by Boer commandos at Majuba Hill, and Britain was forced to remove its garrisons from the Transvaal. The great Anglo-Boer war, however, cost the Boer republics their independence. Boer forces laid siege to British garrisons at Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and fighting from entrenched positions turned back relief columns at Colenso, Magersfontein, and Spionkon. But conventional warfare had deprived the Boer commandos of their mobility. The reinforced British

army broke through the Boer lines to relieve the besieged garrisons and quickly occupied all urban centers in the republics. By resorting to guerrilla tactics and fighting in small units, however, the commandos disrupted communications and attacked targets of opportunity while avoiding contact with British columns sent in pursuit of them. Although vastly outnumbered and lacking organized logistical support, the commandos sustained their desperate struggle for two years. From an initial investment of 50,000 troops, British forces in South Africa (including militia) had grown to 250,000 by 1902. The war had cost Britain more than 22,000 dead and the Boers nearly 6,000 lost in battle.

The defeated Boers were disarmed, and the commando system was abolished. A British garrison of 30,000 men that remained in the four provinces after the war included militia regiments and a volunteer corps of English-speaking troops recruited in the Transvaal. Each of the provinces was policed by an independent paramilitary mounted force.

In 1912, two years after the Act of Union, the Union Defence Force (UDF) was established as South Africa's regular armed forces. General Jan C. Smuts, the Afrikaner war hero who had become minister of defense and interior, drew up plans to provide an effective defense system in a short period of time that would take into consideration the military traditions of both Boer and Briton. Relying on a small cadre of British regulars, experienced Afrikaner officers, and a large reservoir of battle-tested reservists, the UDF was organized and trained according to the British model. A military school for officer candidates was opened at Bloemfontein, and efforts were made to attract more Afrikaners into the permanent force. Although the Defence Act of 1912 creating the UDF specified that every White male citizen was liable for military service, it was intended that only a limited proportion of the manpower pool would be selected each year by lottery for training as reservists. Those not called up were expected to join rifle associations for weapons familiarization and target practice.

Initially the permanent force of the UDF consisted of a headquarters, a training staff, five artillery batteries, and five mounted rifle regiments, numbering about 2,500 men who were expected to perform law enforcement and border patrol tasks in peacetime. The Active Citizens Force (ACF) was composed of 25,000 reservists serving four-year tours in fifteen mounted regiments and fourteen infantry regiments that incorporated established territorial militia units from each of the four provinces. ACF regiments had small standing depot detachments responsible for training reservists in the areas where they had been recruited. In the British tradition, a regiment's ethnic composition or territorial base was usually reflected in its distinctive designation, for example, the Transvaal Scottish Infantry and the Durban Light Infantry. The Defence Act provided for reserve coastal defense batteries, a small flying corps, and naval reserve and also reinstated the commandos as a separate voluntary

reserve formation. The UDF's first operational task was the containment of a miners' strike on the Witwatersrand in J... ary 1914, when thousands of reservists were called up to maintain order in the region. One month after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in August 1914, the Union government agreed to mobilize reserves for military operations against German forces in South West Africa in support of the British war effort. In protest against the decision to go to war, which was opposed by a significant segment of the Afrikaner population, a group of Afrikaner officers resigned their commissions and organized an armed uprising against the Union, and an Afrikaner UDF unit stationed on the border defected to the Germans. It required two months for loyal UDF forces to quash the Afrikaner rebellion in fighting that often pitted pro-Union and anti-British commandos against one another.

Three South African brigades invaded South West Africa in January 1915, capturing Windhoek and forcing the surrender of the German command at the conclusion of a six-month campaign. The Union government had in the meantime launched a recruiting drive aimed at building a volunteer expeditionary force for overseas service. Some of these troops were diverted to Egypt, where they saw action against pro-Ottoman Arab tribesmen, and a battalion of the Cape Corps (Coloureds under White officers) stayed on in the Middle East to serve with distinction against the Turks in Palestine. The South African expeditionary force that reached France consisted of an infantry brigade with supporting heavy artillery and medical and signal units. White combat troops were supplemented by a Black labor corps. The brigade's successful but costly six-day holding action at Delville Wood during the battle of the Somme in 1916 is commemorated annually throughout South Africa. The Union's largest contribution, however, was in East Africa where for three years five brigades, commanded at the outset by Smuts, hunted the elusive German General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck. In 1916 Smuts was recalled to serve on the Imperial War Cabinet in London. Approximately 150,000 White troops (of whom half were sent overseas), 60,000 Coloured auxiliaries, and 25,000 Black laborers saw service during World War I. Losses totaled 12,500 dead, including 8,500 killed in combat.

A chronic shortage of defense funds restricted development of the armed forces during the postwar period. Demobilization was rapid, although reserve levels were kept at about 15,000 men. Pay scales were reduced to such an extent, however, that many regulars resigned to accept more remunerative jobs in the civilian sector, and others were discharged as part of the peacetime retrenchment. The last British army forces were withdrawn from South Africa in 1921, and fortifications were turned over to the Union government. But the country's defense was closely linked to that of the rest of the British Empire. The Royal Navy retained its bases at Simonstown and Walvis Bay, and South Africa continued to rely on British training personnel and equipment acquired from British stocks. Only

in 1934 were regiments formed in the ACF that used Afrikaans exclusively as the language of command.

In 1922 the ACF was called up to put down a violent uprising by striking communist-led White mineworkers on the Witwatersrand. The armed forces were also deployed on several occasions during the interwar period to quell tribal rebellions in South West Africa, whic᳁ had been mandated to the Union by the League of Nations. The depression years brought further military spending cutbacks, however, that made it necessary in 1934 to mothball the naval service temporarily and to reduce regular personnel to the minimal complement required to train reservists. Plans for introducing additional economies were shelved at the outbreak of World War II.

The Nationalist government opposed South Africa's entry into World War II, but its proposal for "qualified neutrality" was narrowly defeated in parliament, allowing Smuts to form an interventionist government that declared war on Nazi Germany. In September 1939 the UDF had only 5,500 men on active duty, backed by 13,500 reserves. There were no contingency plans for mobilization, and the government was legally prohibited from sending conscripted reservists overseas. Even career servicemen and volunteers were enlisted under a contract guaranteeing that none would be assigned outside the country. Regulars, reservists, and conscripts, however, might volunteer for overseas duty under contracts in which they agreed to accept either service anywhere in Africa or anywhere in the world. The task confronting the defense minister was to mobilize troops on a voluntary basis sufficient to meet South Africa's wartime commitments. The response, particularly from English-speaking South Africans, amply met these requirements.

Early in 1941 the newly formed 1st South African Division invaded Italian Somaliland as the southern wing of a two-pronged British offensive against Italian forces in East Africa and took part in the subsequent liberation of Ethiopia, leading the column that entered Addis Ababa in April 1941. Two divisions, part of the 100,000-man South African contingent in the British 8th Army, fought in North Africa and distinguished themselves in the Alamein offensive late in 1942. The 6th South African Armored Division, attached to the American IV Corps in Italy in 1944–45, participated in the final Allied thrust into the Po Valley. South African forces also undertook the occupation of Vichy-held Madagascar. Of the more than 350,000 South Africans who served in the country's armed forces during World War II, 12,000 were killed in action. As in World War I, thousands of South African personnel joined or were seconded to the British army, the Royal Air Force (RAF), and the Royal Navy, and Prime Minister Smuts was summoned to London by Winston Churchill to serve once again in the war cabinet.

In addition to ground elements, the Defence Act of 1912 had also provided for the creation of naval and air contingents in the UDF. Volunteer naval militias in Cape Province and Natal had for some years provided personnel to man coastal defense installations. In

302

1913 the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve/South Africa (RNVR/SA) was formed as an auxiliary to Royal Navy forces stationed at Simonstown and during World War I used converted trawlers to patrol coastal waters. At the outset of World War II volunteer South African crews were also assigned to several British warships. Of 8,000 South African naval officers and ratings, 3,000 served on secondment to the Royal Navy. Coast guard duties were performed by the Seaward Defence Force which, after being redesignated the South African Naval Force in 1942, extended its responsibilities to minesweeping and antisubmarine patrol on Cape shipping lanes and in the Mediterranean. In 1948 the naval service was reorganized as the South African Navy (SAN) and reequipped with surplus British warships of World War II vintage. Traditionally close ties to the Royal Navy were retained through joint maneuvers, technical exchanges, and training missions. In 1957 command of Simonstown was transferred to the SAN, although British naval units continued to operate from the base until 1971.

South Africa was the first of Britain's overseas dominions to form an independent air force. The South African Aviation Corps came into being during World War I and was engaged on a limited scale in South West Africa. Pilots from South Africa flew with the Royal Flying Corps (which became the RAF in 1918) in all its theaters of operation. An "imperial gift" of 100 military aircraft from surplus British stocks was used to equip the fledgling South African Air Force (SAAF), organized in 1920. That same year two SAAF pilots completed an epic flight from London to Cape Town to test the feasibility of linking parts of the British Empire with a series of landing strips. In 1925 the SAAF began operation of the country's first air mail service. Despite its proven usefulness, the SAAF, restricted by lack of funding in the postwar period, remained a small, select body of fewer than 1,500 flying officers and technical personnel barely sufficient to maintain equipment and installations and to train reservists. In 1930 South Africa began the domestic production of certain types of military aircraft, but in 1939 the SAAF had an inventory composed largely of obsolete equipment ill-suited for modern combat.

The SAAF's primary mission throughout World War II was the protection of the vital Cape sea route. Although many of its pilots had been seconded to the RAF, the SAAF provided most of the air support for British Empire forces in the East African campaign against the Italians. The two tactical squadrons of the rapidly expanded SAAF that were dispatched to North Africa in 1941 increased to sixteen by 1943. Additional squadrons, flying Spitfires and Mosquito fighter-bombers, were attached to the RAF and the American 12th Tactical Air Command in Italy, and SAAF bomber squadrons were extensively utilized in missions over the Balkans. The SAAF attained a maximum wartime strength of 45,000 personnel in 1945, but its contribution to the success of the Allied air war was disproportionate to its size.

SAAF transports were flown on more than 1,200 missions during the eight-month Berlin airlift in 1948–49. In October 1950 an SAAF squadron joined UN forces in Korea where it flew 12,000 sorties as part of the American 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing. Initially flying F-51 Mustangs, the squadron was reequipped in early 1953 with F-86 Sabres, the first jet warplanes to become operational in the SAAF. Additional American and British-built jet aircraft were added to its inventory in the 1950s, and modernization continued with the acquisition of French Mirage III all-weather fighters in 1962.

After regaining power in 1948, the Nationalists undertook to assure Afrikaner domination of the armed forces. Afrikaner officers, sympathetic to the National Party, were promoted to top positions. Particularly in the army, many British-trained, English-speaking officers were prematurely retired and replaced by less experienced Afrikaners. Changes in personnel were more gradual in the SAAF and SAN, which were closely linked to the RAF and Royal Navy, but recruitment of native English-speaking personnel was effectively discouraged in all service branches by new regulations requiring fluency in both national languages for all regular commissioned and noncommissioned officers. New army uniforms and service insignia were introduced, and new decorations were substituted for those of British origin. In 1960 a number of regiments were merged, and historic regimental names were replaced uniformly by the designation of the region from which the territorial-based units recruited personnel. Although some alleged that it represented a further attempt to purge the army of British influence, the renaming of regiments—as with earlier reorganization measures—was justified officially as being done in the interest of unifying the armed forces. The move, which affected not only those regiments with proud colonial traditions but also Afrikaner regiments named for Boer heroes, aroused considerable resentment in both communities and was seen to have such an adverse effect on morale that in 1966 Defence Minister Botha restored some traditional designations.

Only in the 1970s did South Africa consider it necessary to build up a defense capability for countering an invasion by external conventional forces. With the realization of the existence of such a threat—coupled with the ever-present danger of guerrilla infiltration and internal subversion—the whole question of national security began to transcend political differences between Afrikaners and English-speaking Whites. The armed forces were viewed by both communities, perhaps for the first time, as a truly national institution. At the same time, genuine efforts, advocated at the highest levels of the SADF command, were made to provide Blacks, Coloureds, and Asians greater opportunity to serve in voluntary military units.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s South African security patrols cooperated with Portuguese forces in southern Angola. South Africa also provided air reconnaissance and transport facilities, and at one point the SADF and Portuguese forces maintained a joint

command center in the region, although the Defence Act at the time required parliamentary approval for the commitment of troops outside the country. After the Portuguese military withdrawal in 1975, South Africa became secretly involved in the civil war that had broken out between rival liberation groups in Angola. A company-strength team of advisers was dispatched to aid forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—UNITA) at the request of the movement's leader, Jonas Savimbi. Several combat groups trained, equipped, and led by South Africans were subsequently credited with halting an advance by troops from the rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA) near Huambo.

From October to December 1975 three ground operations were undertaken by a mixed force composed of SADF units and elements from UNITA and the allied National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—FNLA) against areas held by the MPLA. Operation Zulu advanced 600 kilometers to Novo Redondo on the coast, pushing back Cuban combat units hurriedly brought up to reinforce MPLA forces, while Operation X-Ray succeeded in gaining control of strategic points along the cross-country Benguela railway. By mid-December Operation Foxbat—composed of one SADF infantry company, one armored car squadron, two artillery batteries and three UNITA companies—had driven 700 kilometers northward and made a bridgehead over the Cuanza River about 350 kilometers east of Luanda against stiff Cuban resistance.

The objective of the Angolan expedition was unclear. Parliament was not notified in advance of the action, and tight censorship on press coverage kept the South African public in the dark about the operation until after it was completed. Aware of the international reaction that it was likely to evoke, the government of Prime Minister John Vorster had purposely limited the scope of the military commitment. SADF columns were not allowed air cover or the support of heavy armor. Reportedly an operational plan existed for a combined ground and amphibious assault on Luanda, the MPLA-controlled capital of Angola, then under seige by the FNLA. But UNITA, whose air is were confined to solidifying control of its traditional sphere in southern Angola before seeking a negotiated settlement with the MPLA, was reluctant to cooperate in increasing the stakes in the civil war. It was judged in Pretoria that deeper penetration into Angola by the SADF, particularly in the face of increasing opposition from well-equipped Cuban troops, would have required the introduction of substantially more men and equipment than South Africa was willing or, at the time, able to commit.

Confronted with a Cuban buildup, the SADF had effected an orderly withdrawal from positions deep inside Angola by the end of the year. South Africa subsequently argued that the limited military intervention had been intended to prevent the communists from

gaining a foothold in Angola through the MPLA. But it was in response to the SADF operation that massive Soviet aid wa; airlifted into the country, and the number of Cuban troops stationed there increased from an estimated 4,000 in December to at least 13,500 in spring 1976. Gains made by UNITA with South African assistance were soon lost in the Cuban counteroffensive, but UNITA guerrilla activity in southern Angola continued, supposedly with South African support. For several months SADF troops continued to guard the Ruacana hydroelectric station and refugee centers on the Angolan side of the border.

About 2,000 SADF troops were involved in the Angolan operations, often fighting at five-to-one odds against Cuban and MPLA forces on whom they reportedly inflicted severe casualties. According to official sources, South African losses during the six-week campaign amounted to thirty-three killed and 100 wounded. The Angolan intervention tested on a small scale the ability of the SADF to fight a classic army-versus-army war against a well-equipped and well-trained enemy. Although the South Africans demonstrated resourcefulness and impressive small-unit mobility, the SADF was found deficient in equipment—particularly long-range artillery to match the Soviet-made weapons deployed against it—and in logistical support systems. The experience contributed significantly to the revamping of military organization, armament development priorities, and security concepts, especially regarding the upgrading of the SADF's ground capability, that was undertaken in the late 1970s

South African Concepts of National Security

South Africa did not play a role of primary significance in the overall defense scheme of the British Empire before World War II. No foreign power had designs on it nor did any have the capability to invade it. During World War II the Union's armed forces made valuable contributions to the Allied effort in fighting that took place in North Africa, East Africa, and Europe. White South Africans were confident of their ability to ensure the internal security of the country out of their own resources. In 1950, however, Prime Minister D.F. Malan expressed fears that India and China might seek to colonize Africa as an outlet for their excess population, and during the 1950s and 1960s the Nationalist government was intent on keeping the "winds of change" that were sweeping across a rapidly decolonized Africa from blowing into South Africa. The specter of a Soviet-abetted communist threat to Africa was used to mobilize public opinion to support government racial policies. Communism was broadly defined in security legislation as "any doctrine or scheme which aims to bring about any political, social, or economic change" by promoting disorder, particularly through racial unrest. "Russian imperialism" was more commonly cited as a destabilizing force in Africa than was Black nationalism, which was believed to depend on Soviet support. A scenario was advanced in which the Soviet Union launched the decisive phase of its campaign for world

*South African soldier
and his German shepherd
guard dog
Courtesy African News Service*

dominance in Africa, seizing coveted resources and gaining control
of South Africa's vital strategic position to choke the West into sub-
mission. Until the mid-1970s, however, South Africa felt relatively
secure behind a buffer of Portuguese colonies and White-controlled
Southern Rhodesia that shielded it from direct confrontation with
independent African states.

South African strategists proposed that in the event of another
global confrontation, the enemy must be engaged as far as possible
from South Africa in order to minimize the effects of a popular Black
uprising within the country itself. South Africa also tried to impress
upon Western opinion a consciousness of its strategic and economic
importance. Thus, while the South African government proposed
new avenues for joint participation with the Western powers in the
defense of Africa, it also sought to become involved formally in ex-
isting Western defense alliances. South Africa contributed a fighter
squadron to UN forces in Korea, and in 1951 joined the British-
sponsored Middle East Defence Organization, acquiring a number
of heavy tanks as evidence of its willingness to make an effective
commitment in that region. Disappointed when the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) failed to extend its cover to the South
Atlantic area, Pretoria pushed for formation of an African Defence

307

Organization—to include NATO members Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal, together with South Africa—as a southward extension of the NATO shield. Discussions took place at the ministerial level, but the plan died for lack of interest on the part of the European powers, which at the time saw Africa as being far from the main arena of the struggle to contain Soviet expansion. Association with South Africa had already become an ideological liability for NATO countries, and the Simonstown Agreement in 1955, which transferred the naval base to South Africa in return for continued technical cooperation, fell short of the bilateral alliance the country had sought with Britain.

The thoroughgoing review of defense policy that coincided with the beginning of hostilities in Portuguese Africa in the early 1960s was a watershed in South African security planning. Lacking allies, Pretoria determined to improve the SADF's state of readiness with a view to its being required to fight on different levels of intensity on several fronts: contributing to a war involving East-West confrontation on a global scale, dealing with intensified domestic Black militancy, upgrading the defense of borders against infiltration, and countering (within its capacity) aggressive action undertaken against South African territory by hostile foreign forces. The Permanent Force was increased from 9,000 men in 1960 to 15,000 in 1964, while the number of reservists in training and on active duty at any given time with the Citizen Force was increased tenfold from 2,000 to 20,000. The boost in manpower was intended to serve as a deterrent to potential enemies and to enhance South Africa's credibility as a potential ally. The buildup also allowed the SADF to maintain a standing force for rapid deployment in counterinsurgency operations, a contingency with which South Africa believed it could cope without allies. In 1968 the SADF's first large-scale joint military exercise was aimed against hypothetical terrorists infiltrating from Portuguese Mozambique. Exercises of this nature were conducted regularly thereafter to provide training in counterinsurgency tactics for all service units.

South African security planning continued, however, to be posited on the arrival of Western aid if its resources or the Cape sea route were threatened by Soviet-backed forces. By the late 1960s, according to then Defence Minister P.W. Botha, Moscow had adopted new methods in its drive for strategic domination of Africa, arming and training insurgents for wars of liberation in southern Africa as a prelude to the "final conventional confrontation" with South Africa. The West, Botha concluded, would be compelled to intervene in such an event in its own self-interest—either through direct military involvement or by use of its nuclear deterrent.

The Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and the establishment of self-avowed Marxist regimes in both countries drastically altered the strategic balance in southern Africa, according to Pretoria. The victory of Robert Mugabe's Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe in 1980 seemed to some White South Africans to

complete the "Marxist encirclement" of their country. These events, coupled with the UN-imposed embargo on the sale of military equipment and the escalation of guerrilla activity in Namibia, called for further rethinking of security concepts.

South African military planners perceived three types of security threats in the 1980s: violent civil disorders, cross-border infiltration by well-armed guerrilla units, and a Soviet-assisted conventional attack from one or more neighboring countries. In the first case, the greatest potential for disorder was understood to lie in large urban areas, where except for Cape Town and Pretoria the Black population significantly outnumbered the White. Sustained armed insurrection in those areas was considered unlikely, but security forces anticipated sporadic violence of increased intensity on the pattern of Soweto in 1976 and random acts of terrorism in protest against specific acts of repression on the part of the government. In the second instance the SADF expected intensified infiltration by well-armed and trained guerrilla units connected with the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) assigned to commit calculated acts of terrorism, such as shootings, attacks on government installations, and sabotage. Finally, the analysts pointed to the presence of an estimated 20,000 Cuban and up to 4,000 East German troops in Angola and Mozambique where they trained Black troops in the use of modern armor and artillery provided by the Soviet Union. A 1979 biennial white paper on defense described armed forces there and in certain other nearby states as being equipped "with the ability to wage integrated revolutionary and conventional warfare." A "worst case" scenario envisioned a simultaneous invasion with Soviet-bloc support and serious internal insurrection, combined with a naval blockade involving Soviet warships. A clash between South African and Soviet naval vessels policing an international blockade also held the potential for broadening the conflict outside of the region.

In 1976 Vorster spoke of South Africa, shorn of the geographical insulation provided by the former Portuguese colonies, awaiting the "ultimate communist onslaught" in Africa, exposed and unaided. To deal with the threat of war on a "total scale," General Magnus Malan, then chief of the SADF, formulated what became known as the "total strategy," a plan for which Malan acknowledged his indebtedness to the Maoist concept of waging a protracted war of low intensity. He argued that South Africa found itself surrounded by "potentially dangerous" Black states, where Marxism was posing as African nationalism. Although he argued that South Africa acting alone could not stop Marxist regimes from gaining control in those countries, it could employ its resources to prevent a Marxist revolution from making headway within its own borders. The 1977 defense white paper which incorporated the "total strategy" concept, outlined a "game plan" that would be operative "within the restrictions [on military power] inherent in our democratic system," adding bluntly that "whether we wish to accept it or not" South Africa was at war.

Fundamental to the "total strategy" concept was the recognition that the struggle for South Africa's survival must be carried beyond preparation for armed conflict. According to Malan, the plan's architect and its most effective spokesman, the war would be fought on eight "fronts": economic, political, diplomatic, psychological, cultural, ideological, and semantic, as well as military. Indeed, Malan insisted that the long-term solution to South Africa's security problems was only "twenty per cent military." The time had come, Malan explained in the 1977 defense white paper, for a reallocation of social, political, economic, and manpower resources that amounted to a "national reorientation aimed at our survival, while at the same time ensuring the continued advancement of the well-being of all South Africans." Every activity of the state and the private sector of the economy was to be understood as a function of the "total strategy," with a contribution to make in fighting the "total war." In words that were unprecedented for a South African official, Malan insisted that improved race relations were essential to the defense of the country. He concluded that as part of its defense policy the government must launch a "hearts-and-minds" campaign designed to win support from a greater portion of the country's non-White population. Specifically Malan requested more Black recruits for the SADF.

South Africa had already conceded the urgency of its security situation in 1974 when a decision was made in reaction to the impending Portuguese departure from Africa to compress an ongoing ten-year defense expansion program into a period of five years. As a result, defense spending soared from R481 million (for value of the rand—R—see Glossary) in the 1973–74 budget to R702 million in the 1974–75 budget, a figure amounting to 17 percent of total government expenditures that year. Justification for continuing increases to finance military aspects of the "total strategy" cited in the 1977 defense white paper was the Cuban intervention in Angola and perceived Soviet military aid to nearby African states that gave them, according to South African estimates, the capability to initiate conventional attacks. Also cited were the cost of operations in Namibia and requirements for self-sufficiency in the development and production of weapon systems. Operational procedures were reconsidered, with Defence Minister Botha advising that a protracted war of low intensity invalidated previously held concepts of warfare. Like Israel, he said, South Africa would have to become accustomed to coping with a warlike situation of long duration. Solutions included manpower increases, extended tours of duty for reservists, and service reorganization that would allow the SADF to deal with day-to-day operational problems in Namibia and along the borders. Cutbacks were ordered in operations that had been designed to contribute to collaboration with possible allies.

Exercise Blitz One, the first large-scale maneuvers conducted under the influence of revised security concepts, tested the conventional capability of a mechanized combat group to resist an

310

armored division that had hypothetically advanced with air support into South Africa from Namibia. Major structural changes were introduced in 1977–78 to facilitate maximum involvement of territorial Citizen Force reserve units and commandos in local defense. Strategic strongpoints were established throughout the country as staging areas for the rapid deployment of reservists by local command centers to intercept intruding guerrilla units. Active service counterinsurgency forces were also assigned to maintain a continuous presence on the borders, along which "no-go" sectors were designated to inhibit infiltration. The most significant item in naval expenditures was small craft for counterinsurgency-related inshore defense. Although the air force would maintain long-range maritime reconnaissance, plans to upgrade the navy's deep-sea capability were shelved when France acceded to the UN embargo in 1978 and canceled delivery of new submarines and antisubmarine corvettes. In accordance with revised security priorities, the air force emphasized its conventional ground support and counterinsurgency roles, relying increasingly on domestically produced aircraft.

In the 1979 defense white paper, the Botha government put forward a "concept of mutual defense against a common enemy [communism]" for southern Africa, picking up on the prime minister's earlier proposal for an open-ended "constellation of states" in the region (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4). The plan for a formal military alliance between South Africa and unspecified Black African states was introduced as evidence of the government's shift to a "pro-African" as distinguished from a "pro-Western" foreign and defense policy, according to which South Africa would move to a "more neutral position" in the East-West conflict and concern itself only with regional security. South Africa's explanation that it would bind itself within the "constellation" to resist any external interference in the region was presumed to apply to Western powers as well as to Marxists.

Many foreign and nonofficial observers considered the "constellation" concept lacking in real substance, but they interpreted its proposal as being part of the carrot-and-stick approach taken by the Botha government to relations with the other states of southern Africa. Neighboring countries were reassured that South Africa's military buildup did not indicate aggressive intent against them and argued that they had been drawn into confrontation by foreign powers interested in winning control of their strategically important region. South African spokesmen underscored the mutual political, economic, and military advantages of closer regional cooperation. But in strongly worded statements Botha also warned that South Africa could "hit back" at countries that allowed themselves to be used as springboards for attacks against its territory, and he hinted ominously that South Africa possessed in its arsenal resources to defend itself about which antagonists were not aware.

On the one hand, the "total strategy" and "constellation" concepts appeared to expand considerably the definition of South

311

Africa's area of legitimate regional security concern, which the 1979 defense white paper defined as encompassing all of subequatorial Africa. Legislation enacted that year enabled the government to commit the SADF to action anywhere in that region if it was deemed necessary for the defense of South African interests. On the other hand, analysts also saw the pronouncement of these security concepts as indicating a tightening of the laager around "Fortress South Africa," but one from within which South Africa would be able to strike out with force against its enemies—as Andries Pretorius had done against the Zulu impis at Blood River (see Settlement of Natal, ch. 1).

Despite the apparent reorientation of South Africa's foreign and defense policy, spokesmen continued to emphasize the importance to the West of the country's resources and its strategic position. They pointed out that Soviet bases in Angola and Mozambique could be utilized to outflank the Cape sea route, allowing the Soviets to strangle the vital maritime supply lines along which--according to South African estimates—were transmitted more than 60 percent of Western Europe's oil requirements, 25 percent of its food imports, and 30 percent of the United States' oil needs (a figure expected to double by 1990). As a result of the UN-imposed embargo, Pretoria argued, the country was no longer in a position to protect the route unaided. Facilities at South African naval bases were offered, however, to "friendly nations in the West" willing to cooperate in its joint defense. The most important of these bases at Simonstown had been enlarged to accommodate warships considerably larger and more numerous than units in the SAN's inventory. The Royal Navy made regular use of berthing facilities there until 1975 when the 1955 Anglo-South African naval agreement was terminated. At that time British Prime Minister James Callaghan cited political disadvantages that outweighed the military advantages of such an arrangement with South Africa. British warships continued to refuel at South African ports when it was operationally necessary, but formal naval visits were disallowed on the grounds that they conferred a "badge of respectability" on South Africa. No American naval vessel has berthed at a South African port since 1968.

South African spokesmen stressed the crucial nature of their country's position for the West as a supplier of vital strategic materials, arguing that any disruption in these exports would be highly destabilizing to the world's mineral markets. South African sources noted that the country was the world's leading supplier of vanadium, fluorspar, and precious metals such as gold and platinum. They also pointed out that South Africa was the second largest producer—after the Soviet Union—of manganese and chrome, providing more than 90 percent of United States requirements of those minerals, and was estimated to possess 25 percent of known world reserves of uranium. South African officials have argued that the risks to these supplies, which would result from internal disorders or Soviet-inspired aggression, justified a more

Strategic sea route around Cape of Good Hope
as filmed from Landsat-II 920 kilometers in space
Courtesy NASA

sympathetic attitude from Western customers, and some were persuaded that in the event of war strategic necessity would outweigh the West's moral reservations about coming to the country's aid.

In 1980 there was little question in the minds of South African Whites of the SADF's ability to contend with internal disorder or to defeat forces coming from neighboring Black states. There was concern, however, for the possibility of the worst case scenario and for South Africa's inability to defend the Cape sea route against the Soviet Union in the event of war or a blockade. In official circles the country's greatest potential weaknesses were perceived as the need to bear economic burdens imposed by increased defense spending, difficulties in repairing and replacing sophisticated military equipment, fuel shortages, fulfilling manpower requirements, and maintaining the morale of conscript servicemen. There was also a growing

313

public recognition of South Africa's political isolation, particularly after the emergence of an independent Black regime in Zimbabwe in early 1980.

Opinion polls of White South Africans in 1980 indicated that about one-third of those questioned were pessimistic about their country's future, while 40 percent believed that neighboring countries posed a serious threat to South Africa's security. For 75 percent of Afrikaners and over one-half of English-speaking Whites, military preparedness was the highest national priority. A similar proportion in both communities saw the continuation of White dominance as an imperative, but less than 40 percent of English-speaking Whites and only 16 percent of Afrikaners accepted the premise that Black discontent constituted a serious threat to security. The latter figure, although demonstrating a relatively low level of concern, marked a sharp increase over previous polls.

SADF public relations personnel and local base commanders were assigned to address public gatherings across the country on how to cope with the challenge of intensified Black militancy as expressed during periods of unrest in 1980. Officers supported the Botha government's stated aim of relaxing petty apartheid and warned the White public against regarding Black South Africans as "the enemy." Improved race relations, combined with stepped-up military preparedness, were advocated as the most effective means of preventing the Black population from being intimidated into providing support for subversive movements.

Areas of Conflict

After the disorders at Soweto in 1976, the undercurrent of unrest that ran through the everyday life of South Africa's non-White communities surfaced with increasing frequency in outbreaks of open discontent, which at times were accompanied by violence. Student boycotts, illegal strike actions, and demonstrations in Black townships posed problems for security forces. The distinction between internal and external security was blurred by growing evidence of organized armed insurgency and guerrilla infiltration during the same period, requiring intensified precautions to be taken on the borders as well as the introduction of counterinsurgency measures throughout the country. The greatest demand on security force manpower since 1976, however, was the major effort directed against the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and the defense of its northern border against penetration by guerrillas operating from bases in Angola and Zambia. The SADF struck at SWAPO bases and conducted interdiction missions outside South African-controlled territory.

Internal Unrest

The violence that began in Soweto in June 1976 as a student protest against the use of Afrikaans in Black secondary schools spread around the country during the next eight months leaving nearly 600

dead by official count. Most of the victims were Blacks, and 450 of the deaths were the result of police action. An additional 4,000 persons were reported injured, and incalculable damage was done to public and private property, chiefly in Black areas. Several thousand Blacks, mostly young men from Soweto, fled from South Africa, many to join militant guerrilla groups.

In a 1,000-page report published early in 1980 the Soweto commission, an official investigation undertaken by Justice Petrus Cillie into the unrest in 1976–77, placed the blame on apartheid policies, which had engendered Black "hatred" against Whites that had fed the violence. This was an abrupt departure from previous official explanations that the unrest resulted from communist influence. The commission criticized security forces for failing to heed the developing danger signals in Soweto. According to the report the SAP had been "totally out of touch" with deteriorating conditions there, although it was exonerated by the commission from charges that police had employed excess force in suppressing disturbances. The report also warned that the potential for violence was as great in the Black townships as it had been in 1976 (see The Soweto Riots, ch. 1).

Trouble from another and unexpected source erupted in Cape Town in April 1980 when Coloured students boycotted classes to protest educational standards in their schools. In some areas the walkout was supported by Indian and White students. Although students returned to classes at the end of May, unrest continued in the streets of Coloured townships in Cape Province.

As the date of the Soweto anniversary approached, Black students, following the example of the Coloureds, also boycotted schools in some areas. In July Black municipal employees in Johannesburg went out on strike to demand recognition of an independent union. Over 1,200 strikers were arrested when they refused to return to work, and many others were discharged from their jobs—an action that resulted in being "endorsed out" (see Glossary) to their respective homelands. Prime Minister Botha put protest leaders on notice that attempts to create unrest would be met with the "full power of the state." Police used batons, tear gas, water cannons, and, in extreme cases, firearms to disperse demonstrators who had succeeded in disrupting life in South Africa's major cities for several weeks.

Guerrilla Activity

Security forces were assigned to patrol a 4,500-kilometer border where their attention focused on three so-called guerrilla fronts. These areas, particularly vulnerable to hostile infiltration, included the northern frontier with Mozambique with its access to the Witwatersrand; the Botswana border opposite Bophuthatswana, which at points lay less than 250 kilometers from Johannesburg; and the border with Mozambique and Swaziland in northern Natal, considered the most dangerous front in 1980.

A specially trained SAP task force had overall responsibility for border patrol, although it was assisted in most areas by combat

troops assigned from the SADF. In northern Natal the SADF had assumed responsibility for border patrol at the request of the SAP. Counterinsurgency forces, consisting largely of local commando units and reservists on short-term call-up, maintained a continuous presence in troubled areas where in 1980 they made regular contact with infiltrating guerrillas. Police and army security forces were directed from regional command centers to assure quick and economic deployment.

A 1978 amendment to the Defence Act authorized the government to remove inhabitants and to clear dwelling places from a ten-kilometer-wide "no-go" zone established along stretches of the border. In addition a twenty-meter-wide sisal barrier was planted over more than sixty kilometers of the border facing the Limpopo River in northern Transvaal; a mature two-meter-high hedge was considered a formidable obstacle capable of stopping a tank. Electronic countermeasures were employed in other areas. In 1979 a military area radio network was installed in northern Transvaal that allowed farmers in isolated districts to make instant contact with command centers to report guerrilla activity. Plans were also announced to settle soldiers-farmers—ideally national servicemen with agricultural training—on abandoned farmsteads in rural areas between Johannesburg and the Botswana border to put land back into production while operating a defense system in the region.

Two rival militant Black nationalist organizations, the ANC and the PAC, were held responsible for the insurgency in South Africa (see Black Political Movements, ch. 4). The larger and politically more significant ANC advocated violence as the only means of turning out the White regime. Its military wing, Umkonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), initiated guerrilla activities within South Africa in 1978. SAP sources estimated at that time that Umkonto had 5,000 Soviet-bloc trained and equipped effectives operating from at least three bases in Mozambique and another 500 men in Angola. The ANC, led by Oliver Tambo, was linked to the illegal pro-Moscow South African Communist Party (SACP). White SACP members were heavily involved in organizing Umkonto raids and sabotage in South Africa. The smaller PAC was founded in 1959 by dissidents who objected to the role played by Whites in the ANC. It received support from China and had attracted aid from radical Arab countries, such as Iraq and Libya. The faction-ridden movement declined in strength after the death of its leader, Robert Sobukwe, in 1978, but it was believed by the SAP to have maintained an active force level of over 1,000 men in its military wing, Poqo (We alone). Under pressure from younger members, the PAC's central committee announced its intention in 1979 to step up guerrilla operations inside South Africa in competition with the ANC.

Police crackdowns all but wiped out underground ANC and PAC cells in the early 1960s, driving the leadership into exile. Black nationalist guerrilla operations did not begin until after Soweto, when youthful refugees provided volunteers for military training.

According to SAP estimates, about 4,000 exiles had received training in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, and Libya by 1978—3,000 with Umkonto and the remainder with Poqo. Guerrilla units were typically organized in small teams of from six to ten men, uniformed in camouflaged battle dress for border penetration. Teams were assigned to hit specific targets, collecting weapons and explosives carefully packed in prepositioned caches. Police conducting search-and-sweep missions in areas of suspected guerrilla activity uncovered large stores of Soviet- and Czech-made weapons. Captured equipment included AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles, heavy machine guns, RPG-7 antitank rockets, and an assortment of grenades and land mines.

Early Umkonto missions were aimed at bombing railroad lines and public buildings and utilities and were later extended to sabotage of strategic industrial installations and attacks on police stations. Black policemen and their families and outlying White farmsteads were also targets for attacks. The ANC reputedly employed *tsotsis* (young Black thugs) as enforcers in Soweto and other Black townships. Poqo launched two larger scale operations designed to enhance the PAC's faltering prestige among Black South Africans. Guerrillas were intercepted soon after penetrating South African territory, however, and most were killed or captured by security forces.

Guerrilla raids grew bolder in 1980 as the ANC appeared to exploit the unrest that exploded in the townships. Incidents of urban terrorism increased and security forces fought running gun battles with guerrillas in several locations, but guerrilla operations were uncoordinated and largely ineffective. In January three Umkonto guerrillas, who had occupied a Pretoria bank and held fifteen Whites as hostages for the release of Nelson Mandela, were killed when police stormed the building. In April a guerrilla team opened fire with automatic weapons and grenades on a police station in a White Johannesburg neighborhood without inflicting casualties. Police barracks in Soweto were also attacked. In June, however, Black insurgents opened a new phase of economic warfare aimed at strategic industrial complexes with the simultaneous sabotage of two refineries owned by the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (SASOL). Damage to storage facilities at Sasolburg in the Orange Free State and at Secunda in the Transvaal amounted to more than R6 million. Guerrillas refrained from hitting economic targets, which if destroyed would cause deprivation among the Black population and risk their disaffection.

In an interview in August 1980, ANC leader Tambo predicted larger scale operations in the future, adding that it was "too late in the day" for peaceful solutions in South Africa. Independent White South African analysts agreed that the country was entering a "period of endemic turbulence," which an observer at the University of Cape Town likened to a "state of revolutionary war." Tambo, however, conceded that a full-blown war of national liberation in South Africa was years away.

Namibia

Combat operations against SWAPO forces in Namibia made the largest single demand on SADF manpower in 1980. The insurgency there first came to notice in 1966 with an announcement in Pretoria that a police patrol had intercepted a well-armed band of intruders in Ovamboland. From its exile headquarters in Dar es Salaam, SWAPO was quick to identify the guerrillas as members of its military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). Continued contacts with small PLAN groups infiltrating from Angola forced the deployment of additional South African security forces to the territory's remote northern border country. Guerrilla activity in Namibia stepped up rapidly after Portugal's withdrawal from Angola in 1975.

SWAPO was Marxist in its orientation, was backed by all of the nearby states, and was recognized by the UN as the "only authentic representative of the Namibian people." SWAPO's leadership and the PLAN were composed predominantly of Ovambo, who constituted about one-half of the population of Namibia. The militant Black nationalist movement, which sought the forcible outster of South African forces, had been led since 1967 by Sam Nujoma. Its founder, Toivoja Toiva, was a prisoner in the maximum security facility on Robben Island. Accusations of corruption and political deviation in the PLAN led to the arrest by Zambian authorities in 1976 of several of the movement's leaders who opposed Nujoma and to subsequent purges in the organization. About 1,800 PLAN members, labeled as "South African agents," were reportedly being held under arrest in Zambia in 1980.

SWAPO military forces were trained by Soviet, Cuban, and East German advisers in six-month sessions at bases in Angola. The Afrikaans-speaking guerrillas were reportedly better able to communicate with East German instructors and preferred them to the Soviets, whom they considered arrogant. PLAN units were armed with AK-47s of both Soviet and Chinese manufacture as well as with Soviet Simeinov carbines and RPG-7 rocket launchers. Air defense for base areas was provided by PLAN-operated antiaircraft guns and radar-controlled SAM-7s provided by the Soviet Union. Long-range capability was obtained from 82mm medium mortars. Some reports indicated that heavy armor may have been added to the PLAN's inventory. Its most effective weapons, however, were Soviet land mines—including the TM-57 tank-killer—which inflicted casualties on both soldiers and civilians in Namibia. The PLAN's estimated strength in 1978 was 300 to 500 guerrillas operating at any one time inside Namibia in combat units of up to eighty men, engaged mostly in mine-laying operations. South African sources reported that until early 1979 SWAPO was able to recruit more personnel than the PLAN was losing by attrition, but losses inflicted during South African raids on base camps after that date altered the picture significantly. According to information extracted from prisoners, morale in guerrilla camps was low and many recruits undergoing training were described as being as young as fifteen.

Windhoek, capital of Namibia (South West Africa)
Courtesy United Nations/Contact

Areas in northern Namibia immediately affected by the insurgency were divided into three operational zones with headquarters at Rundu, taking in Kavango, western Caprivi, and Bushmanland; at Oshakati for Kaokoland and Ovamboland; and at Katima Mulilo in eastern Caprivi (see fig. 21). In 1980 over sixty combat and support units, including two SAAF squadrons on duty in Namibia were integrated with Namibian units under the command of the director general of operations, a major general who reported to the South African administrator general in Windhoek. These units were composed of about 20,000 national servicemen, reservists on extended duty, and regular cadre, as well as members of Black Permanent Force combat battalions and support units. The South West Africa Territory Force, recruited in Namibia, had 2,000 personnel organized in several ethnic and one multiracial batallion. The SADF was responsible for all training. Homeguard units were raised in Black homeland areas. The remainder of the command consisted of the logistical and administrative base supporting operations in Namibia and raids into Angola, substantial police security forces, and personnel eng. ed in public works projects. These activities included road construction and repair, medical services, training, and education. SADF motor launches patrolled the Zambezi and Kazungula rivers, and naval coastal patrol boats were berthed at Walvis Bay.

Serious insurgency in Namibia began in 1973 when guerrillas

319

Figure 21. Operational Zones in Namibia, 1980

destroyed an SADF arms depot at Katima Mulilo. The SADF reacted within a month, calling up 7,000 men for a sweep of the northern area. The operation, code-named "Swaland Blitz," involved the largest force that South Africa had put in the field since World War II and compelled the PLAN to withdraw its base facilities to Angola and Zambia. After the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola in 1975, the SADF took over responsibility for border security from the police, although technically this action was in contravention of the League of Nations mandate under which South Africa administered Namibia.

SWAPO conducted a terror campaign against Namibian political figures accused of collaborating with the South African administration. Among those assassinated were Clemens Kapuuo, chief of the Herero people and national president of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, and a number of local Ovamboland officials. Its most effective military operation was mine laying in Ovamboland and the Caprivi Strip, where South African sappers were obliged to sweep

320

major roads daily in an effort to keep them open to traffic. Most contacts with insurgents came as a result of intercepts of mine-laying parties. In 1979 the PLAN pressed home a series of raids on SADF bases and outposts supported by heavy mortars, sometimes fired from across the border. Attempted offensives in Kaokoland in 1980 were costly to the PLAN in casualties and failed to disrupt extended South African logistical support lines. Guerrillas also conducted sabotage operations, severing in 1980 the power line between the South African-built Ruacana hydroelectric station in Angola and Windhoek.

Hostile incidents in 1979 were double those of the previous year, while the more than 600 incidents recorded during the first eight months of 1980 marked an increase over the total for 1979. About 170 guerrillas were reportedly killed each month during 1980. South African combat-related casualties—most from mines—were put at sixty-nine dead in the first half of 1980, twice the total figure for all of 1979. During the same period, seventy-eight Namibian civilians lost their lives in raids, by assassination, or as victims of land mines. The total SADF dead in the fourteen-year insurgency was approximately 400.

In response to the steady escalation in hostilities noted after 1976, the military command at Windhoek ordered increased air strikes against PLAN sanctuaries in Angola. South African aircraft were occasionally lost to ground fire in attacks on guerrilla staging areas and training centers. In May 1978 security forces crossed the Angolan border in strength to destroy PLAN bases code-named "Moscow" and "Vietnam" in the vicinity of Cassinga, 250 kilometers inside Angola. At least 800 PLAN and regular Angolan troops—as well as a large number of civilians—were believed killed in the raid. In March 1979 a joint airborne and cross-country assault eliminated a dozen SWAPO camps across the border in Angola and Zambia, and during the summer SADF ground forces, reinforced by 8,000 reservists called up for active duty, conducted an operation that netted several hundred infiltrators in Ovamboland.

"Operation Smokeshell" in June 1980 was carried out by a large strike force composed of both White and Black light infantry units against what was described as SWAPO's nerve center—a complex of camouflaged bunkers, reinforced against air attack, that covered an area of more than sixty square kilometers between Lubango and Cassinga. The initial phase of the attack achieved complete surprise. But insurgents backed by artillery managed to regroup, and several hours of fighting ensued before South African forces could claim a victory. About 200 enemy dead were counted and over 300 prisoners were taken back to Namibia for transfer to South Africa, where they were held under the Terrorism Act (see Security Laws, ch. 4). Strongpoints were demolished and some 100 tons of Soviet arms and munitions were seized. Sixteen South African troops were killed, the highest number in any single engagement up to that date.

As a result of the operation's success, South African authorities

claimed to have dismantled SWAPO's military infrastructure in southern Angola, leaving PLAN leaderless and disoriented. Although air attacks against SWAPO depots there continued periodically throughout the remainder of 1980, Pretoria admitted that a completely military solution to the insurgency in Namibia was not likely. Priority in military operations was given to keeping roads cleared of mines and the power lines open from Ruacana, but long-range South African aims were to encourage a political settlement that would permit a continued South African military presence to assure protection of the difficult-to-defend border with Namibia and the safety of the territory's White minority. South Africa also intended to retain use of the strategically important deep-water port and naval facilities at Walvis Bay and its many economic interests in Namibia, which included the world's largest uranium mine located at Rossing.

The Armed Forces

The South African Defence Force (SADF) is relied on as the primary instrument of military power. The SADF enjoys a favored position among institutions in the national life and, ironically, is an organization in which certain practical modifications in the country's apartheid system have been introduced by senior military commanders, apparently with the quiet acquiescence of the civil authorities.

Mission, Organization, and Training

The SADF is composed of the regular Permanent Force, the reserve Citizen Force, recruited through compulsory national service, and the commandos. The first two elements are organized functionally into an army, air force, and navy. The Permanent Force consists of professional servicemen of all ranks who are employed as cadres for training reservists and as command technical personnel in operational units. The Citizen Force is the SADF's standing reserve made up of national servicemen on active duty and reservists subject to periodic call-up. National servicemen fulfill a two-year obligation for training and active service. As members of Citizen Force reserve units, they are required to participate in eight "camps" or tours of thirty days each over a ten year period. Reservists are sometimes mobilized for three-month tours of duty to bring combat and support units in operational areas up to full strength. A large number of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers on active service are Citizen Force reservists fulfilling their national service obligation. The commandos are essentially a paramilitary homeguard organized in infantry and air auxiliary components.

The authorized active duty strength of the SADF in 1980 was 86,000, including 66,000 national servicemen under training and on active duty with the Citizen Force. By mobilizing all personnel in Citizen Force units not on active duty, the SADF could add more than 150,000 trained men to its strength within two days, with local

*South African soldier using a mine detector during
counterinsurgency operations in Namibia
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington*

commando units contributing another 110,000. South Africa's mobilization capacity was expected to increase in the 1980s as compulsory two-year national service introduced 30,000 reservists into the trained manpower pool each year. Conscription to national service was limited to Whites. About 2,000 Blacks were enlisted in Permanent Force units in 1980, while several thousand more Coloureds and Asians were on active duty with training and auxiliary corps and Citizen Force volunteers. Women's auxiliary units were expanding rapidly in size in the late 1970s as were school cadet corps in which White secondary students were enrolled.

The statutory mission of the SADF is fourfold: defense of the territory and institutions of the republic; prevention and suppression of internal disorder; preservation of life, protection of property, and maintenance of essential services; and assistance to the police in the performance of their duties. Traditionally SADF personnel have not been liable for service outside the country unless specifically volunteering for duty abroad. In 1976 the area to which the government could commit troops was extended by statute to include all of subequatorial Africa. The official mandate of the SADF in the 1957 Defence Act to perform "service in the defense of the Republic" was reworded to read "operations in the defense of the Republic," thereby encompassing cross-border counterinsurgency missions as well as internal security and border patrol duties normally performed by the police. Although it was not specified in the Defence Act, the manifold mission of the SADF included the support of what were in South African terms the West's strategic interests in the region, particularly the defense of the Cape sea route. In the late 1970s, however, South Africa confined its role to regional defense and restructured the SADF to meet threats against its territory "without outside help."

The chief of the SADF, an army officer who holds the rank of general, directs an integrated command through subordinate chiefs of the three service branches. The army and air force chiefs are lieutenant generals, and the navy chief is a vice admiral. As commanding officer, the chief of the SADF is ultimately responsible for the training, discipline, and welfare of all SADF military personnel as well as civilian employees. He is also the chief accounting officer of the Department of Defence, in which capacity he supervises the disbursement of funds appropriated to the department by parliament. Policy dictated by civilian authorities is administered by the Defence Command Council, composed of the chief of the SADF, the three service chiefs, the surgeon general, the quartermaster general, and the chief of staff for operations. The Defence Staff Council (DSC), whose members include the chief and the service chiefs as well as the chiefs of staff of the headquarters divisions, is responsible for the internal management of the SADF.

Operations of the so-called defense family—which includes the armed forces and supporting civilian agencies, the research and development community, and arms production and procurement

facilities—are coordinated by the Defence Planning Committee, consisting of members of the DSC, the chairman and the senior manager of the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR), and members appointed by the defense minister. The committee is advised by a strategic studies section attached to the DSC. The eighteen-member Defence Advisory Council, chaired by the defense minister, brings together civilian defense officials, representatives of industry and commerce, and top armed forces officers to consult on the economic aspects of defense policy. The State Security Council (SSC), whose functions were upgraded by the Botha government, is a ministerial-level supervisory board vested with statutory responsibility for long-range "state security planning." Chaired by the prime minister and assisted by a large permanent staff, the SSC directorate coordinates the activities of the SADF, SAP, and fifteen departmental security committees (see The National System, ch. 4; The Intelligence Service, this ch.).

SADF headquarters and component branches are located in Pretoria. Headquarters command has divisions for operations, personnel, training, intelligence, logistics, and management. The self-contained military township of Voortrekkerhoogte, established in 1920 near Pretoria, accommodates a defense college, service schools, the headquarters of the Northern Transvaal Military Command, a large military hospital, and various training stations and supply depots. Voortrekkerhoogte is adjacent to the Swartkop military airfield (see fig. 22). The country is divided into territorial commands, each of which maintains its own training units as well as logistical and administrative support.

All activities of the three services and reserve organizations are closely coordinated through the integrated command structure, which uses the facilities of a sophisticated underground control and communications center at SADF headquarters. Responsibility for planning and supervising of land operations by combined arms is assigned to the headquarters of the Joint Combat Forces (JCF). Seaward operations conducted by navy and air force units are coordinated by the headquarters command of Maritime Defence. International observers give the SADF headquarters command top marks for its staff procedures, technical and managerial efficiency, and the professionalism of its personnel.

Training facilities for the three services are also integrated. The Military Academy, established at Saldanha Bay in 1956, provides an academic education and professional training for career officer candidates. Officers rising from the ranks or seconded from civilian jobs are also required to take some part of their training at the academy. Graduates are granted a bachelor's degree in military science through the University of Stellenbosch, which also offers advanced degrees to officers. Newly commissioned officers are assigned to specialized service-related schools upon graduation. The South African Defence College at Voortrekkerhoogte prepares regular officers selected for senior commands and staff appointments in a

325

Figure 22. Principal South African Military Installations, 1980

variety of subjects, including management, security theory, national and international affairs, and joint operations procedures.

A complex of support service schools at Voortrekkerhoogte provides specialized training for regular and national service personnel assigned to various branches of the SADF. Recruits for the Corps of Military Police receive intensive training in conventional police duties. Courses on munitions supply and handling, including bomb disposal, are given at the Ammunition School. Among other programs, a two-year course is offered in computer technology and advanced communications procedures. The Department of Defence also sponsors qualified Permanent Force officers pursuing medical and dental studies at the University of Pretoria and prospective engineering officers at the University of Stellenbosch. Ordnance officers are enrolled in special programs at the Pretoria College for Advanced Technical Education. Each of the three services also operates separate facilities for advanced training.

The Army

The strength of the standing army in 1980 totaled approximately 71,000 personnel. These included 6,000 White and 3,000 Black and Coloured regulars serving in the Permanent Force and some 60,000 national servicemen completing two-year tours of active duty, as well as 2,000 women volunteers. This number was supplemented by reservists called back to service for periods of up to three months at a time from an active Citizen Force army reserve pool of 120,000 men. Tactically the army consisted of a conventional force organized in a single army corps with two divisional headquarters and a counterinsurgency task force assigned to regional commands. The largest concentrations of troops were found in Namibia.

In the 1950s and early 1960s elements of the army were trained and equipped to contribute to collective Western military actions overseas, but traditionally the SADF concentrated on preparing army reservists for unconventional warfare against guerrillas operating inside South Africa. In the 1970s, however, the SADF embarked on a major restructuring of landward defense in which units were designated for either counterinsurgency or conventional roles and were given specialized training to accomplish their respective missions. These measures reflected South African concern at the perceived threat posed by Soviet-equipped armies in Angola and Mozambique and by Cuban forces stationed in Angola. The Citizen Force became the mainstay of a conventional force organized in larger formations capable both of resisting a foreign invasion of South Africa and delivering a counterattack. Cadre units formed one armored and one infantry division when brought to full strength by mobilization of the Citizen Force. They included three armored and mechanized brigades; four motorized infantry brigades; more than fifty light and medium field artillery, antiaircraft, missile, engineer, and signal regiments; and other support units. A standing airborne brigade was established in 1979 by combining previously

independent battalion-strength paratroop units to ensure more efficient command for a quick-reaction force that could be deployed on short notice with conventional forces or in smaller units on counterinsurgency operations.

Additional units, trained in counterinsurgency tactics, were assigned to each of the eight regional military commands into which South Africa's four provinces were divided. Composed of Permanent Force cadre, national servicemen, commandos, and selected Citizen Force reservists, who had knowledge of local terrain and population, these units were designated as a task force whose mission was extended by a 1977 amendment to the Defence Act to encompass "prevention and suppression of internal disorder" as well as "antiterrorist operations." Emphasizing mobility, elements of the counterinsurgency task force were based at strategically located staging areas for speedy deployment to troubled areas.

More than sixty SADF combat and support units, including Black Permanent Force battalions, were on active duty in Namibia in 1980, including specialized counterinsurgency units. A garrison under a separate regional command was stationed at Walvis Bay.

With the exception of tanks and some vehicles and light artillery, first-line weapons systems employed in combat units in operational areas were of recent vintage and comparable in quality to similar types of equipment in the inventories of Western armies (see table 26, Appendix). Armored vehicles included about 3,000 armored cars, armored personnel carriers (APC), and scout cars, most of which were of recent South African manufacture. The Eland APC, South Africa's version of the French Panhard, and the Ratel APC were the standard armored support vehicles that provided the army with on-the-ground mobility in most types of terrain. The Ratel, an entirely homegrown weapons system, was used extensively for reconnaissance as well as personnel transport. Armed with a 20mm cannon, it also proved its value as a combat vehicle on counterinsurgency operations. The SADF reportedly had as many as 200 Centurion tanks, which were in the process of being modernized with new guns, fire control systems, and armor. Artillery weapons included aging British 25-pounders; 5.5 inch and 155mm guns; a variety of antiaircraft and antitank guns; and 120mm heavy mortars. The deficiency in long-range artillery, felt acutely by South African troops confronting Cuban forces during the Angolan campaign in 1975, encouraged the development of enhanced-range 155mm howitzers and ammunition of innovative design (see Military Logistics, this ch.). Another by-product of the experience in Angola was a 127mm multiple artillery rocket launcher developed to match the "Stalin Organ," which the SADF encountered there and on which the design was based. Conventional forces deployed Milan and ENTAC antitank missiles. Three batteries of the advanced French-designed, South African-made Cactus and nine batteries of the older Tigercat surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were linked to a modern radar warning system to provide antiaircraft defense along

the northern border. The SADF's standard infantry weapon, the R-1 automatic rifle, was a late model of the NATO FN 7.62mm rifle, originally manufactured in South Africa on license from Belgium's Fabrique Nationale. A similar domestic copy of the Israeli Galil assault rifle—itself an adaptation of the Soviet AK-47 Kalashnikov—was introduced into service with some combat infantry units in the late 1970s as the R-4.

Helicopters from the air force's transport command gave units vertical mobility for quick deployment in counterinsurgency operations. An aerial reconnaissance squadron, manned by pilots assigned to the army from the air force's light aircraft command, had about seventy-five observation planes, including the South African-produced Kudu. These aircraft were supplemented by several hundred private planes owned by members of air commando units and ready on a standby basis for spotting and reconnaissance missions.

National servicemen received basic training from Permanent Force cadre at depots in each of the regional commands. Recruits usually trained in the military region where they had been inducted. The advanced combat school at Lohatlha in Cape Province served as the conventional warfare training center for brigade-sized units. A new infantry battalion training base was opened in 1980 at Phalaborwa, situated in northern Transvaal only fifty-four kilometers from the Mozambique border. An artillery and missile firing range was located at Eland's Point, part of the large military reservation at Saldanha Bay. Apart from individual unit and field training, the army provided specialized courses at armor, infantry, artillery, airborne, and engineer schools in various parts of the country, while specialists received additional training at technical schools located at Voortrekkerhoogte. Since 1972 the army women's college at George had taken 100 entrants a year for basic military training. The Army Staff College accepted selected officers for advanced instruction in tactics and command.

Blacks traditionally have been employed by the South African armed forces in wartime in noncombatant labor corps. In 1974, however, the SADF advertised for volunteers from local ethno-linguistic groups to form a multiethnic Black infantry battalion. Brought to full strength at 500 men and designated 21 Battalion, the unit was given a combat role in Namibia under White officers and NCOs and participated in operations inside Angola. By 1980 four additional Black battalions, recruited on an ethnic basis, had been formed by Zulu, Swazi, Venda, and Shangaan volunteers. Black NCOs from 21 Battalion served as training officers for the new Black units. Like 21 Battalion, the 113 (Shangaan) Battalion distinguished itself in fighting in Namibia, but it was planned that the regular assignments of Black ethnic units would be to the counterinsurgency task force and border patrol duties in their home territories. Some Blacks were scheduled to be commissioned as officers for posting to these units. In addition to Black combat units, the Cape Corps Battalion, a volunteer Citizen Force unit, also saw action in Namibia.

*Eland armored personnel carrier equipped with
90mm gun is produced in South Africa
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington*

The SADF planned to recruit similar units from other parts of the country in an effort to double the size of the Permanent Force with the enlistment of significant numbers of Blacks.

The Air Force

In overall terms of the quality of personnel, training, maintenance, and equipment, South Africa's air force in 1980 was the most powerful in Africa. The most professional of the three services, its complement of 10,000 men and women included 6,000 Permanent Force regulars and 4,000 national service personnel. The Citizen Force air reserve numbered 25,000, among them experienced pilots and crews who were regularly recalled to active duty. Many flight personnel had thereby gained operational combat experience. To compensate for a chronic shortage of ground personnel, the air force had opened enlistment in support units to a small number of Coloureds and Blacks. Equipment was maintained in a high state of combat readiness. The 1978 embargo deprived South Africa of the means of replenishing its inventory in some categories of sophisticated weapons systems. Increasingly the air force depended on less expensive, domestically produced aircraft designed for multi-purpose deployment. Advanced aircraft were armed with air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles and computer guidance systems.

Air doctrine emphasized the air arm's ground support mission in

331

both conventional and counterinsurgency situations. Air defense systems were significantly upgraded in the late 1970s and tied into a radar screen across northern Transvaal to enhance the ability of interceptor squadrons to maintain air superiority over the battlefield in a conventional war. Although the air force retained a limited long-range strike capability, preemptive air attacks against guerrilla bases in frontline states were not an important factor in tactical planning. Defense officials admitted that losses might be unacceptable if a possible conventional war required strikes deep inside neighboring Black countries that possessed sophisticated SAMs and radar-directed antiaircraft guns supplied by the Soviet Union. The air force also had a small but effective maritime patrol capability and attached great importance to missions involving ground surveillance, quick-response airlift, and supply to troops in the field.

The SADF's regular air arm was organized tactically into five operational commands. Strike Command had at its disposal two light bomber squadrons and three mixed fi'"hter, fighter-bomber, and reconnaissance squadrons; two of the i...cer three were organized for forward ground attack missions and possessed all-weather capability. Helicopter squadrons were also attached to the command. Maritime Command, which conducted joint operations with the navy, consisted of two long-range patrol squadrons, a transport and training unit, and a flight of helicopters geared for reconnaissance, air-sea rescue, and antisubmarine warfare. Three squadrons of light and heavy transports and five helicopter squadrons were at the disposal of Transport Command. An additional light transport squadron attached to this command in 1977 was staffed by female crews trained for casualty evacuation missions. Light Aircraft Command had four liaison squadrons that operated in support of the army and were utilized mainly for border surveillance. Approximately 200 aircraft of various types were assigned to the Training Command. They included a number of obsolescent jet aircraft as well as newer trainers capable of conversion to combat and support roles.

The Citizen Force operated six reserve squadrons with about 100 light trainer aircraft that also were adaptable for strike and counterinsurgency missions. The inventory of these units was being steadily improved with the introduction of additional South African-produced Impala Is and IIs. Air force personnel were also responsible for the nation's air defense alert system and manned all of the radar sites in the early warning network.

In 1980 the exact number of aircraft in inventory was not known, and estimates varied widely from source to source. Of approximately 520 fixed-wing aircraft listed in the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance*, 204 were designated as combat capable, and many reconnaissance and training aircraft were adaptable to combat roles (see table 27, Appendix). Nearly 200 helicopters were available for reconnaissance, transport, and ground support. The bulk of first-line operational aircraft were

332

*Impala II jets built in South Africa provide the
air force a versatile trainer/light strike capability
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington*

acquired from France, Britain, Italy, and the United States before
the UN embargo. These included approximately ninety supersonic
Mirage III and Mirage F-1 fighters and fighter-bombers fitted with
sophisticated instrumentation. They were observed armed with
French-designed air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, manufac-
tured in the 1970s under license in South Africa. The state-owned
Atlas Aircraft Corporation was developing a simplified version of
the Mirage F-1 for production in South Africa and also manufac-
tured the versatile Impala II, the South African version of the
Italian-designed Aermacchi MB-326, for dual use as trainers and
light strike aircraft, under licenses acquired before the UN embargo.
A completely indigenous light aircraft, the Kudu, was also coming
off Atlas' assembly lines in the late 1970s. High standards of mainte-
nance were enforced, although spare parts for some systems were
difficult to obtain. On a yearly average there was less than one air-
craft write-off per 10,000 flying hours because of accidents.

Strategically important military air bases are located at Water-
kloof near Pretoria; Pietersburg, a large air defense installation in
northern Transvaal; and Hoedspruit in northeast Transvaal, South
Africa's largest operational fighter base. Opened in 1976, Hoed-
spruit is situated on the edge of Kruger National Park—within a few
minutes' flying time of the Mozambique border—and provides air
support for the operational area in northern Transvaal. Air support
and strike forces in Namibia are based at Mpacha in the Caprivi
Strip, about twenty kilometers from the Zambian border. Other
important air bases include the maritime reconnaissance base at

333

Langebaan in the Saldanha Bay military complex and the air reconnaissance headquarters near Potchefstroom.

Student fliers move from the basic flight training center at Dunnottar to the advanced school at Langebaanweg. All pilots are cross-trained in helicopters at Ysterplaat. Before undertaking flight training, officers are required to have spent some time at the Military Academy. After basic training at Voortrekkerhoogte, enlisted personnel are posted to various specialist schools like that for electronics in the same complex, for ground crews at Ysterplaat, and for air traffic controllers at the air defense school at Waterkloof. Academic courses in service-related subjects are offered to mid-level officers at the Air Force College at Voortrekkerhoogte.

The Navy

Formed originally to augment the Royal Navy in its defense of the Cape sea route and the reaches to the South Atlantic and Indian oceans, South Africa's navy attempted to assume these responsibilities alone after the British decision in the 1960s to abandon its "east of Suez" strategy and to withdraw its naval units from South African waters. The further development of a credible blue-water force was canceled in 1978, however, when France stopped delivery of two corvettes and two submarines South Africa had ordered. Lack of more powerful ships, which domestic shipyards were incapable of building, dictated a complete reframing of naval strategy to one concentrating on harbor and coastal defense.

Navy headquarters in Pretoria administers the service's important role in the country's maritime defense. Separate regional commands at Simonstown, Port Elizabeth, and East London were consolidated under the Naval Cape Command at Simonstown, a reorganization that reflected a change in the navy's mission from survey of shipping lanes to protection of coastal and harbor facilities.

In 1980 responsibility for this mission fell to 4,500 officers and ratings of whom 1,500 were national servicemen, and to 10,000 Citizen Force reservists. Naval personnel levels declined slightly in the late 1970s as a result of the shift to vessels with smaller complements. By all accounts the navy was the most racially integrated of the armed services. Coloureds and Asians made up about 20 percent of naval Permanent Force personnel. Most of the Asians were employed as stewards, but about 30 percent of crews assigned to sea duty were Coloureds, who performed a variety of tasks aboard ship. The survey ship S.A.S. *Protea* had an all-Coloured crew. On other ships Coloured petty officers sometimes were in charge of White ratings. Close quarters made apartheid inapplicable at sea, where crew members shared mess and sleeping accommodations. A marine infantry unit provided security for the naval installation at Walvis Bay. A company-sized Black labor unit was employed at Simonstown.

An in-service fleet of thirty-odd vessels included three refitted antisubmarine warfare frigates with helicopters, three Daphne-class deep-dive submarines, and six fast attack craft (see table 28,

Appendix). The latter consisted of six Minister-class vessels (the South African version of the Israeli Reshef-class attack craft). All were armed with Israeli Gabriel ship-to-ship missiles (designated Scorpion in the South African inventory), which had a demonstrated single-shot kill capability. Six more Minister-class attack craft were on order in 1980 from South African shipyards. Savings resulting from the cancellation of orders from France were more than offset by spending on fixed assets, such as modernization and expansion of base facilities. The proportional increase in naval appropriations was higher than those of the other services in the late 1970s.

Smaller ships were being introduced into the "new navy" geared to counterinsurgency patrol against hostile landings, sabotage, and interference with shipping in coastal waters. While the refitted frigates would continue to provide an oceangoing capability in the 1980s, they were already judged inadequate to the task of keeping the Cape route open in time of war. South African naval authorities agreed that the day of the large ship was drawing to a close, a point that was underscored when an old destroyer, the S.A.S. *President Steyn*, was designated to be used as a target ship for missile-firing attack craft, which provided the offensive clout for the "new navy." These small, hard-hitting, multipurpose vessels were capable of interdicting hostile surface ships with their Scorpion missiles, but their range was limited to sea-denial operations within South Africa's 320-kilometer exclusive economic zone.

During the 1970s the naval base at Simonstown was trebled in size, with the addition of berths for up to fifty vessels. Repair and maintenance facilities were improved at the Salisbury Island attack craft base near Durban, and on the west flank of the navy's defense perimeter the base at Walvis Bay was reactivated. Operational support facilities are also located in commercial harbors at Port Elizabeth, East London, and Richards Bay. Installations like that at Simonstown are far larger than a navy the size of South Africa's required, but an invitation has been extended to Western navies to use these facilities in return for a commitment to assist in patrolling the Cape sea route. The navy shares the air-sea rescue base at Langebaanweg and command headquarters at Silvermine with the air force's Maritime Command, whose aircraft extend the range of the navy's antisubmarine patrol. A joint antisubmarine warfare school is operated by the two services out of the Simonstown base. Naval personnel are assigned to fly as observers on maritime command flights, and airmen in the command are obliged to receive shipboard orientation at sea. Joint operations are coordinated through Silvermine.

The Silvermine facility on the Cape peninsula near Simonstown was opened in 1973 after six years of construction. It is a combined service communication and surveillance center contained in a four-story subterranean bunker intended to withstand a nuclear attack. Computers monitor air and ocean traffic in the South Atlantic and

western Indian oceans, conduct meteorological surveys, and direct air-sea rescue missions from Langebaanweg in the hazardous seas around the Cape. The system reportedly is capable of digesting and storing information on movements over 40 million square kilometers of ocean between Venezuela and India.

Newly commissioned Permanent Force officers are posted to the navy from the Military Academy for specialized service training at the South African Naval College at Gordon's Bay, which also offers advanced courses to mid-level officers. Selected national service personnel with backgrounds in engineering and technical subjects are sent to the college for Citizen Force naval reserve officer training, while other naval officers take courses leading to degrees in engineering at the University of Stellenbosch. Basic training bases for enlisted personnel are located at Simonstown and Saldanha Bay. On completion of boot camp at these installations, ratings are placed in training courses in more than fifty specialized categories. Recruits are often assigned according to their civilian qualifications to attend courses with Permanent Force personnel. Seamanship training for all ratings is carried out aboard a frigate at sea.

The Commandos

In the tradition of the Boer militia, the commandos are paramilitary homeguard units organized on a territorial basis for quick response to local emergencies. The total force is comprised of several hundred units, each known individually as a commando, having a collective strength in 1980 of more than 110,000, more than double the number that could be mustered ten years earlier. Except for a small number of conscripts who are assigned to their ranks, members of the commandos are all volunteers, who receive basic training identical to that of national servicemen during an initial one-year tour of active duty. Their commitment thereafter entails participation in an annual nineteen-day training exercise. In the course of their service, many also receive advanced instruction in infantry tactics and weapons at the Danie Theron Combat School at Kimberley. A limited number of Black volunteers were integrated into some commando units to perform support services and guard duty. Membership in auxiliary units was also opened to women volunteers, who filled administrative posts.

The commandos are organized in rural, urban, and industrial units. The size of each commando varies, depending on the nature and situation of the area to be defended. Rural units are generally of platoon or company size and organized regionally into infantry battalion formations, while the basic urban commando unit is a battalion. Industrial commandos guard factories, utilities, refineries (designated collectively as "national key points"), and transportation facilities, with volunteers drawn from employees at these installations. During the military buildup in the late 1970s some commandos were assigned outside their own defense areas on extended tours in operational areas.

Depending on its size, each commando contains a squad, platoon, or company of trainees. In 1980 thirteen air commando squadrons, flying some 300 privately owned light aircraft, provided aerial surveillance for ground units. Flight techniques are upgraded in annual two-week training sessions supervised by regular air force instructors.

The Cape Corps

During World War II Coloured volunteers were employed in support units, and Blacks were recruited for labor units. After the war all Blacks were demobilized, but a modest complement of Coloureds was retained in the Cape Corps. The corps was essentially a training and holding unit that provided support personnel for the three services. Army-assigned recruits were initially utilized as drivers, quartermasters, clerks, and medical orderlies. In 1973, however, the Cape Corps Battalion was created to produce combat troops and by 1978 fielded a fully complemented infantry battalion that saw active duty in Namibia under Coloured officers. In 1965 trained personnel from the Cape Corps were accepted on a permanent basis by the navy, and a limited number of Coloureds were subsequently assigned to maintenance units in the air force. Cape Corps cadre, trainees, and volunteers on active duty with armed services numbered about 3,000 men in 1980.

Recruits to the Cape Corps, who sign up for two years of national service, are sent for basic training to corps headquarters at Eerste River and receive specialized training with the service branches to which they are assigned. A contingent of Cape Corps veterans was admitted in 1980 to the Kimberley Regiment of the Citizen Forces.

A parallel Indian Corps was established in 1974 to train Asian volunteers, who numbered several hundred in 1980. Recruits are trained primarily for the navy, where most were assigned as mess stewards. Introduction of an officer training course has anticipated an expanded role for Asians in the navy.

Homeland Defense Forces

South Africa regarded the small military forces organized in the three Black homelands it recognized as independent in the late 1970s as an integral part of an overall defense system. Although Transkei expelled the SADF training mission when diplomatic relations with South Africa were broken off in 1978, a defense agreement under which South Africa provided arms and supplies remained in effect. The Transkei Battalion had an authorized strength of 400 men and was supplemented by volunteers participating in a six-month national service scheme designed to build up a trained reserve. The 250-man Bophuthatswana Defence Force was trained and commanded by personnel seconded from the SADF, and a retired South African officer served as the homeland's defense minister. In 1980 two combat infantry companies cooperated with South African forces in counterinsurgency operations along the border with Botswana. An embryonic homeguard was authorized for Venda in 1979.

337

South West African Territory Force

Whites in Namibia have the same compulsory military obligations as those in South Africa and usually perform their national service with SADF units in the territory. A distinct South West African Territory Force, trained and commanded by South African army cadre, is composed of a racially mixed battalion and several ethnic and homeland battalions on line or being raised in 1980. The latter include battalions designated as Rehobother, Nama, Ovambo, Kavango, Kaokolander, Caprivian, and Bushmanlander. Troopers of the Bushman Battalion, whose people were displaced from their tribal lands by fighting in Namibia and Angola, are particularly valued as trackers. Black and Coloured officers are being introduced into the service (see Namibia, this ch.).

Role in the National Life

The Constitution Act of 1961 provides for the supremacy of the civilian administration in all matters relating to military policy and operations. Supreme authority over the armed forces is vested in the state president, who is designated commander in chief. The legislation transferred to his office those powers exercised by the former governor-general under the Public Security Act of 1957 to mobilize the armed forces in time of war or in case of threatened internal disorder. In practice, however, the state president acts only on the recommendation of the government. Executive functions are reserved for the prime minister, who as head of the government formulates overall security policy in consultation with responsible cabinet ministers. Administrative control of the armed forces is exercised by the minister of defense, who is appointed by the prime minister. Enabling legislation specifies that as the minister responsible for the armed forces he "may do or cause to be done all things which in his opinion are necessary for the efficient defense and protection of the Republic or any part thereof."

Security policy decisions are made within the framework of the Defence Act of 1957, which has been amended periodically in parliament as conditions warrant. A number of amendments, for instance, were made to the basic law in 1976 and 1977 in response to political developments in Angola, the insurgency in Namibia, and mounting unrest in South Africa that generated a demand for increased military preparedness and a recasting of defense doctrine. After a review of security legislation already on the statute books, parliament gave the government far-reaching powers to act in security-related matters not included in the basic law. Legislation was enacted authorizing the state president to invoke strict censorship in areas believed by the government to affect national security and extending his authority to commandeer private property for security purposes. These powers, the use of which had previously been restricted to times of declared war, were broadened to meet demands likely to be imposed by protracted, low-intensity security threats. The state president was also empowered to determine on

the basis of the government's advice whether a conflict outside the country's territorial limits constituted a threat to national security sufficient to require armed intervention by South Africa. This legislative action served to legalize retroactively the 1974 incursion into Angola, in which troops had been committed beyond South Africa's jurisdiction without prior parliamentary approval. Although general mobilization of the armed forces continues to require a presidential proclamation, duly published in the official *Government Gazette*, further amendments to the Defence Act have allowed the defense minister greater flexibility in deploying SADF reservists in a police capacity to suppress internal disorders and in lengthening their tours of active duty. Emergency measures of this nature are supposed to be submitted for parliamentary approval, but in urgent situations the defense minister can act immediately and defer notification of parliament for up to fourteen days. The government's defense policy is outlined in unclassified, semiannual white papers.

As the member of the government immediately concerned with national security, the defense minister receives policy recommendations from a number of statutory advisory bodies as well as from agencies involved in defense research and development. The Department of Defence has a close working relationship with the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR), the parastatal consortium that directs domestic defense production and coordinates procurement abroad, and with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), which provides essential scientific and engineering information and carries on important defense-related research. In addition to its statutory association with these groups, the department also has working relationships with such quasi-governmental bodies as the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), the Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation, and the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (SASOL). It cooperates with and expects cooperation from private industry, financial institutions, and the academic community.

Military Influence in Government

Although South Africa's first three prime ministers were former generals and one of them, Jan Smuts, achieved international stature during World War II as a statesman in uniform, the presumption of military subordination to civilian authority and noninterference in politics by military personnel was axiomatic throughout the country's development as a modern state. Linkages were forged, particularly in the postwar era, between uniformed and civilian officials, but they were the product of their common identification with Afrikanerdom rather than evidence of extraconstitutional military influence on political decisionmaking. Civilian control remained unquestioned in 1980. But the Botha government gave particular prominence to military concerns, and accordingly military

339

advisers were given a noticeably more pronounced role to play in it.

Before being named prime minister in 1978 Botha had spent twelve years as defense minister, and he chose to retain that portfolio until 1980. During his long tenure in the Department of Defence, he built up an entourage of trusted uniformed advisers whom he continued to rely on as prime minister—not only in security matters but also for advice and assistance in the wide range of political, social, and economic areas that fell under the umbrella of the "total stragegy." Botha clearly preferred the military intelligence apparatus to police agencies that had advocated tough apartheid measures, and he expanded the SADF's internal security mission.

SADF representatives take part in important interdepartmental meetings, regardless of whether military interests are immediately apparent in their proceedings. Military officers are appointed to advisory bodies and frequently are chosen as spokesmen for government policy. Botha has encouraged the military to adopt a sharper profile, not only as public relations for the services but also to drum up popular support for specific programs—particularly those dealing with the sensitive issue of race relations, which the military has argued is the weak link in South Africa's defense structure. The SADF has sponsored seminars for civilian groups, and local commanders frequently are assigned to address citizens' meetings, briefing the White community on threats facing the country and describing the means considered necessary to counter them.

In some instances high-ranking officers have joined South African delegations engaged in diplomatic negotiations. Military influence was believed by some observers to have been crucial in determining the course taken by South Africa in 1980 in negotiations on Namibia, during which General Malan stated publicly that South Africa could not accept the Zimbabwe-style solution offered by the UN (see South Africa and the United Nations, ch. 4). Military opposition was also said to have been decisive in preventing a proposed territorial consolidation of the KwaZulu homeland that would have isolated Durban and its military installations from the rest of the country.

Speaking disparagingly of "Botha's Junta," the government's opposition has accused the prime minister's office of implementing policy through the military and intelligence establishment without proper consultation with parliament. Opposition leader Frederik van Zyl Slabbert has spoken of a "totalitarian drift" in the conduct of public affairs that has threatened to undermine representative institutions. In a similar vein right-wing members of the National Party have challenged the role of military spokesmen in supporting Botha's *verligte* (enlightened) policies.

The opposition's worst fears were highlighted by the revelation that certain SADF officers had devised and circulated a "psychological action plan" designed to create the "right climate" for the parliamentary debate on defense appropriations in the 1980–81

budget. The plan called for using SADF resources to influence public opinion and, if necessary, to mute criticism of government measures. The government denied knowledge of what was offic' 'y described as the work of "overzealous" officers and promise a thoroughgoing investigation of the incident. But as of late 1980 no evidence of actual military interference in the parliamentary process had been produced.

Civil Defense

The Civil Defence Act of 1977 transferred control of the eleven-year-old Directorate of Civil Defence from the minister of police to the defense minister, giving him authority to declare a state of emergency with parliamentary approval. The directorate assists local authorities of over 600 urban and rural jurisdictions in providing protection for the civilian population and property in the event of natural disasters, acts of war, or internal unrest of a serious nature. The country is divided into regional target areas, each under a civil defense controller, who often has been a retired military or police officer and whose duties include planning at the local level for the maintenance of public utilities, provision of sites and supplies for medical stations and shelters, and training of civilian volunteers for rescue work. In areas not covered by local authorities, the regional SADF commander has assumed responsibility for providing needed services through the commando organization. Military medica' services are put at the disposal of local civil defense leaders throughout the country. Extensive use is also made of civilian volunteer first aid societies, including the South African First-Aid League, the South African Red Cross, and the St. John's Ambulance Brigade, to supplement military medical services. The directorate headquarters in Pretoria is responsible for overall planning, coordination of local efforts, and implementation of projects that are national in scope. The defense minister reserves the authority to assume control of civil defense operations from local authorities as conditions require.

Under the terms of the 1977 act the defense minister is empowered to proclaim a three-month "state of disaster" in an area where he determines that "extraordinary measures" are necessary "to combat civil disruption" resulting from a "disaster"—a situation defined officially as an act of God, an influx of refugees, or "consequences arising out of terrorism." Provincial and municipal councils are encouraged to enact supplementary civil defense ordinances, but the act expressly excludes training civilian civil defense volunteers in security tactics or using civil defense funds for precautionary measures against civil disorder. This fills a gap left in earlier legislation that had allowed municipal authorities in Johannesburg and Pretoria to use civil defense units as police reserves to protect public property during the unrest in 1976–77.

Defense Expenditures

Spending for defense, which in 1970 claimed only 2 percent of the gross national product (GNP), was accelerated in the late 1970s (see

table 29, Appendix). Defense spending increased by 700 percent during the course of the decade, with annual increments rising dramatically between 1974 and 1977. The percentage of the national budget devoted to defense nearly trebled during that period, and its share of the GDP almost doubled. Requests for increased appropriations were justified by the government in annual parliamentary debates on the grounds that more military spending was necessary to counter the "Soviet threat to all of Africa." The government indicated that it was prepared to give defense a priority in its budgetary considerations until—in the words of Finance Minister Owen Horwood—detente in southern Africa was "unequivocally achieved."

Defense appropriations were cut in the fiscal year 1978–79 budget to R1.6 billion, indicating that canceled deliveries oɪ some items ordered abroad could not be replaced domestically. The amount of current expenditure for defense from the fiscal year 1979–80 national budget was R1.8 billion. This figure represented a 12.5 percent increase over the previous year, but with inflation at about the same rate real growth in military spending was not significant. Although defense claimed 16.1 percent of the national budget in that fiscal year, its share actually decreased from 1978 because of the overall expansion of public spending. The defense budget presented to parliament for the fiscal year 1980–81, which totaled R2.07 billion, represented a proposed 15 percent increase in military spending. An additional R250 million was appropriated by the Namibian administration for SADF operations in that territory.

Landward defense absorbed more than half of all military spending, reflecting domestic development and acquisition of new equipment and substantial augmentation of army personnel. The most significant increases proportionately, however, were for naval construction. A smaller air force budget was attributable to the shift from high-performance, foreign-built combat aircraft to less sophisticated, domestically assembled equipment. A rough balance was maintained between operational and capital costs. Stockpiling of arms and fuel accounted for a significant portion of total spending.

In 1976 the government introduced a defense bond scheme that raised upwards of R500 million in succeeding years. Bonds returned an annual 9.5 percent in interest, 2.5 percent of which was turned over to purchase additional issues. Under the scheme, denounced by some church leaders as "gambling," bonus bonds were awarded to certain investors through a computerized random selection process.

Military Logistics

According to estimates published in the 1977 defense white paper, South Africa's defense industry could produce military hardware that was adequate for the country's "internal protection," but not the equipment that was required to repel a "conventional external threat." For that contingency foreign sources of supply were still needed. Revised estimates in 1980, however, showed that as a result

of a concerted effort to mobilize the economy to meet the country's defense needs, South Africa was 80 percent self-sufficient in its overall military logistical requirements and had achieved 100 percent indigenization in armored cars and small arms. Domestic suppliers met all conventional needs for automatic weapons, ammunition, bombs, mortars, and light artillery and were approaching self-sufficiency in light aircraft, missile systems, and heavy artillery. Advances were also claimed in computers and electronics for national defense application. Equipment and fuel for military use were being stockpiled, and South Africa was building an export capability, especially in conventional explosives.

The Indigenous System

Backed by policy guidance from the government's Defence Resources Board, logistical support for the armed forces operates efficiently and receives high-priority attention at all levels. The system is administered for the SADF by a large staff attached to the office of the chief of logistics. Within each service component, logistical staffs provide expeditious handling of needed supplies. The backbone of the essentially decentralized system consists of a series of supply and maintenance depots scattered strategically throughout the country. The supply networks are linked by extensive government-operated rail, road, and air services. The rapid supply of matériel to operational units is further aided by the large fleets of motor transport vehicles assigned to quartermaster units and by the air force's transport command.

Maintenance of aircraft, motor vehicles of all types, and naval vessels is performed both by uniformed technicians and under contracts with local commercial firms. Major repair and overhaul of jet aircraft are undertaken by the Atlas Aircraft Corporation, and maintenance and servicing are handled within the air force's operational commands. Naval vessels are similarly maintained at commercial shipyards and at the repair facility at Simonstown.

Authority is granted to the minister of economic affairs by the National Supplies Procurement Act to mobilize the economy at short notice to full war footing without the declaration of a state of emergency. The minister is empowered, by legislation enacted the week after imposition of the UN embargo in 1977, to direct the local manufacture, acquisition, and supply of any goods and services deemed necessary for the country's security. Not only domestically owned firms but also subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms operating in South Africa can be compelled to produce military goods and strategic commodities on demand. If necessary the minister could order the confiscation of such materials and determine compensation to be paid for them. Under this authority he could also direct the stockpiling of domestically produced items and imported commodities, such as fuel. A low-interest loan program assists selected firms to stockpile imported materials and spare parts.

Total arms manufacturing and procurement were coordinated

by ARMSCOR, whose activities were overseen by a government-appointed board of directors. In addition to obtaining all manner of goods for the SADF from bootlaces to advanced electronics, ARMSCOR also supervised defense research projects and weapons testing and development, provided maintenance, and manufactured arms in state-owned factories. It attempted to identify potential gaps and to stockpile critical components as well as identify critical production areas for expansion. ARMSCOR had the necessary expertise on its staff in the late 1970s to continue development and production of items manufactured in South Africa on license if the licenser pulled out of the agreement in compliance with the embargo.

ARMSCOR was established by act of parliament in 1968 and was funded with R100 million to "meet as effectively and economically as feasible South Africa's armaments requirements" by initiating research and development for domestic defense production. In 1976 it was merged with the Armaments Production Board, which had been founded in 1964 to acquire military know-how abroad for domestic use. The new organization, which was granted vastly expanded statutory powers in the area of economic management, was largely responsible for directing South Africa's spectacular military buildup in the late 1970s and for creating a largely self-sufficient domestic arms industry. Its turnover in 1978 was estimated at nearly R1 billion, with about 70 percent of its expenditures dispensed internally. The allocation for ARMSCOR in the 1980–81 state budget was believed to have been in excess of R1.2 billion. ARMSCOR was authorized to issue public shares in 1980 and expected to raise an additional R100 million on the domestic capital market that year.

The parent corporation and its eight manufacturing subsidiaries employed 23,000 workers in 1980, a 40 percent increase in three year.. Plant capacity expanded annually by an average rate of 25 percent. Atlas Aircraft Corporation, founded in 1965 with assistance from Sud-Aviation of France to handle licensed production of French and, later, Italian aircraft, was taken over by ARMSCOR in 1969. Among its other subsidiaries were Kentron, manufacturers of missiles and guidance systems, and Telcast, which produced manganese alloys for aircraft. Subsidiaries owned an additional fourteen plants engaged in assembling components that were imported or manufactured by private-sector contractors in South Africa. These included more than 600 firms with over 100,000 employees that absorbed half of ARMSCOR's outlays in funds. Through centralized planning by ARMSCOR, no component or assembled unit was duplicated in any other factory in the country, nor did state-owned factories compete in the manufacture of any item with private producers. Some domestic contractors had corporate affiliates abroad or interests in foreign companies through which technology could be transferred to South Africa despite the embargo.

Effects of the Arms Embargo

In 1963 the UN called on all members to cease sales of arms,

ammunition, and military vehicles to South Africa. Although the country had an expanding small arms industry at that time, South Africa was dependent on foreign suppliers, particularly Britain, for heavy equipment such as tanks, aircraft, artillery, and ships, as well as for sophisticated electronic equipment and a wide variety of component parts. Most UN member states complied formally with the voluntary embargo, although the definition of goods to be excluded was variously defined. The United States and Britain soon enacted legislation closing some of the many loopholes that appeared, including those permitting transmission of certain types of technical data relating to armaments, but the embargo had little real effect on South Africa's defense posture. The embargo did, however, compel South Africa to diversify its foreign sources of supply. For France in particular South Africa became a significant arms export market as French firms picked up contracts dropped by traditional British suppliers. Not only was the cooperation of France, which had refused to heed the 1963 Security Council resolution, a decisive factor in modernizing the South African armed forces, but South African orders financed development of new advanced weapon systems that were employed in upgrading the French arms inventory as well. French manufacturers supplied armored vehicles, missiles, submarines, helicopters, nuclear and radar technology, and the Mirage III and F-1 jet aircraft that became the mainstay of South Africa's air force. A number of licensing agreements with French firms promoted the further development of SADF weapons systems.

Meanwhile Pretoria set about revitalizing the military capacity of such industries as ISCOR, on which much of the country's World War II production had been based. Small arms and ammunition were produced in the mint by government ordnance workers and by the African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI), which had previously confined its output to explosives for mining operations. In 1966 Atlas Aircraft Corporation began turning out light jet aircraft under license. South Africa developed its own napalm ordnance entirely from local raw materials as well as new types of antitank and antipersonnel mines, aerial fragmentation bombs, and artillery shells. Uniforms, shoes, field gear, blankets, and parachutes were made exclusively in domestic factories. All food products required by the armed forces came from local sources. The rapid increase in military expenditures after the embargo was also accompanied by a strong emphasis on defense research, with the Defence Research Council sponsoring basic and developmental programs in the fields of physics, chemistry, electronics, and nuclear technology. Military equipment reached South Africa from several other Western countries, eluding the intent of the UN resolution through legitimate licensing arrangements like those that permitted the manufacture of Italian aircraft and Belgian rifles in South Africa. In addition to exchanges of training missions and military intelligence, South Africa collaborated closely with Israel on a number of defense-related projects, including work on technology for improved armor plate,

equipment upgrading, ship construction, and electronic counter-measures. In 1974 Jordan sold its entire Tigercat air defense system as well as a number of Centurion tanks to South Africa. Under a Conservative government in the early 1970s, Britain resumed trade in military goods for a time and sold Pretoria helicopters, electronic gear, and spare parts for aircraft and tanks.

In November 1977 the UN Security Council, citing South Africa's gross violation of human rights, unanimously passed a resolution imposing a mandatory total ban on the sale to the country of goods intended for military use. UN Resolution 418 also requested member states to examine current licensing with a view to termination of contracts and forbade cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. France, South Africa's chief foreign supplier, had already decided in 1975 not to accept new orders after it had delivered outstanding ones for four naval vessels and forty-eight Mirage F-1s. The aircraft and Matra missiles were shipped by Dassault-Breguet just under the wire of the 1977 embargo. But delivery was stopped on two submarines and two corvettes, one of which was undergoing sea trials with its South African crew. The French government explained, however, that it had no authority to interfere with licensing arrangements with South Africa already entered into by private firms. This was also the approach taken by Italy and Belgium with respect to contractors in those countries. South African authorities admitted that it would in fact be cheaper to produce goods, built until that time on licenses, if contracts were revoked. They added, however, that their country intended to pay licensing fees as usual as long as contractors were willing to continue their cooperation.

Among the items produced under license from France was the Eland APC. Using armor plate technology obtained through collaboration with France and Israel, South Africa also produced several indigenous makes of armored vehicles that were fitted to the particular demands imposed by the country's terrain and security conditions. The versatile Ratel APC was developed to double as an infantry fighting vehicle, and 1,500 had been put in service. Designed with high ground clearance and a compartment for ten troops, the Ratel mounted a 20mm cannon. A variety of domestically developed light APCs, including the Hippo and Rhino classes also rolled off assembly lines in the late 1970s. State-owned ordnance factories turned out the R-1 rifle and the R-4 assault rifle.

With the licensed production by Atlas of the Impala, a light strike and trainer version of the Aermacchi MB-326, South Africa appeared to have achieved self-sufficiency in conventional and counterinsurgency ground-support aircraft. About 200 of these highly adaptable planes were being flown by the air force in 1980, and production was in full swing to meet additional orders. Several dozen South African-designed Kudu light observation and close support aircraft, which used American-designed engines built on license in Italy, were also in the air force inventory. With aircraft licensing firmly

*South African-built Ratel armored
personnel carrier is armed with 20mm gun*
Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington

established, Atlas also advanced plans for subassembly of the supersonic Mirage F-1, using domestically made components.

Because its shipyards lacked the capacity to build replacements for the navy's aging frigates or substitutes for the undelivered French-built corvettes, the SADF shifted to the concept of a "small ship" navy built around Israeli-designed, missile-armed fast attack craft. The first three Reshef-class vessels, constructed in an Israeli shipyard, entered the navy's inventory in 1974 as redesignated Minister-class vessels. Three more of these attack craft were subsequently completed in South Africa, and an additional six were on order in 1980. The prototype for an unconventionally designed, double-hulled scientific workboat was built in South Africa for the navy and was undergoing sea trials. Despite the embargo South African continued to obtain electronic systems abroad for refitting three President-class frigates, probably extending their usefulness through the 1980s.

The experience of the 1974 Angolan campaign, during which the SADF came under fire from Soviet-made heavy ordnance that

347

outranged its own light artillery, showed the need for long-range artillery with more intensive firepower and stimulated development of two field weapons systems that met those specifications. The first was an indigenously produced 127mm rocket launcher, adapted from the "Stalin Organ" the SADF had faced in Angola but considered to be superior to the Soviet model, and the enhanced-range G5 155mm howitzer, evaluated by some observers as the finest artillery piece in service with any army. Research and initial development on the G5 was performed in 1976–78 by an American-Canadian firm, Space Research Corporation, in contravention of laws in both countries that restrict sales of military equipment or technology to South Africa. The firm shipped six specially rifled gun barrels, 50,000 full-bore, ballistically improved shells, and mobile, radar-guided range-finding devices. It also conveyed know-how for assembling the howitzer, which was based on the firm's GC45, before its operations were halted. Assembly and production of further models were carried out in South Africa, and the weapon was put in service with the army. In 1980 Space Research Corporation was found guilty of making illegal transactions with South Africa and fined by courts in Vermont and Quebec.

The drive for self-sufficiency was a boon to the domestic electronics industry, which tooled up to manufacture missile delivery systems on license. These included the Scorpion, the indigenous version of the Israeli Gabriel naval missile that reportedly gave attack craft a single-shot kill capability, and the French Crotale surface-to-air missile, for which South Africa bore 85 percent of the research and development costs. Redesignated Cactus, it was a vital element of South Africa's air defense capability in 1980. Matra antiaircraft and air-to-air missiles, purchased earlier from France for the air force's Mirage fighters, were also reportedly being made in South Africa.

While providing for defense needs at home, the South African arms industries also developed a capacity for exporting goods but found few markets for surplus production. Military supplies went to neighboring Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana and, until early 1980, to Southern Rhodesia.

Since 1977 British, West German, Canadian, and American courts have prosecuted firms for selling equipment and spare parts with military uses in South Africa, and those found guilty were fined. Dutch and Danish courts also levied fines against shipping companies in their countries whose vessels were used in illegal trade with South Africa.

So-called third-country licensing has also been used to evade embargo restrictions. Likewise, components not included in the embargo have been transferred through third-country licensees and are used in building combat support systems covered by it. South African industry has been particularly adept at mixing "cocktails" from parts obtained from various sources to build items denied them by some foreign suppliers as a result of the embargo. Occasionally

Pretoria has obtained arms through unlikely channels. In 1979, for instance, ARMSCOR off-loaded and retained a number of Soviet tanks and a large quantity of ammunition from a ship docked at Durban. The Soviet arms, it was learned, had been transferred by Libya to Uganda but were diverted to Angola for use by SWAPO when Idi Amin was overthrown. ARMSCOR reportedly gave the ship's captain a receipt for the 150 tons of military cargo and assurances of payment to the owners of the goods if they identified themselves.

Under authority granted by the National Supplies Procurement Act, domestically produced items, imported components, and fuel have been stockpiled for military use. In 1980 it was variously estimated that enough oil had been stored away in tank farms and mines to meet military needs for eighteen months to five years, but the precise size of this strategic reserve was a closely guarded secret, as was the anticipated effect of SASOL production in the early 1980s. Oil destined for the reserve was being purchased on the spot market, but there was a shortfall in critical diesel fuel reserves. Military requirements accounted for about one-third of total fuel consumption in the late 1970s.

The Nuclear Question

South African authorities have repeatedly denied that the SADF arsenal contains nuclear weapons, but they have left open the question of whether the country has the capability to build them. In 1980 few outside observers questioned South Africa's nuclear weapons potential: the country was one of the world's largest producers of uranium; it had an advanced enrichment program under way; its air force possessed a delivery system; and its government was not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). But many doubted the military value of nuclear weapons in southern Africa and suggested that the appearance of a South African capability might lead other countries in the region to seek security guarantees from the Soviet Union.

In 1977 American intelligence analysts confirmed Soviet claims, based on satellite sightings, that South Africa was preparing what seemed to be a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert, and Western powers undertook a diplomatic offensive to dissuade South Africa from detonating a device. The government in Pretoria denied the allegation, which it charged had been concocted for propaganda purposes by Moscow to coincide with the opening in Nigeria of a UN conference on apartheid. In September 1979, however, an American Vela satellite spotted a double flash in the South Atlantic indicating the possibility (among others) of a nuclear blast, but United States intelligence agencies could not agree on the significance of the sighting. The United States Defense Intelligence Agency and naval intelligence were convinced that there had been a nuclear explosion, although radioactive traces were not detected. At the White House, the Office of Science and Technology concluded on the basis of the

scanty evidence presented that the American satellite had recorded some natural phenomenon. The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) subsequently reported to a congressional committee that in its judgment the satellite sighting could have been anything from a nuclear blast to a lightning bolt. The CIA went on to offer the opinion that, if it had been the former, it was more likely an Israeli device than a South African one. Spokesmen for the South African government, meanwhile, labeled the episode "complete nonsense," and speculated that the explosion was caused by a Soviet missile that had fallen in those waters some years earlier.

All matters relating to nuclear energy in South Africa are under the statutory control of the Atomic Energy Board, which is responsible for regulating production and sale of uranium as well as for implementing research and development at the National Research Center at Valindaba, west of Pretoria. Research is conducted at the uranium enrichment facility at adjoining Pelindaba on a reactor of American design based on the Oak Ridge research reactor. In 1980 it was believed that weapons-grade material could be enriched at the Palindaba facility in sufficient quantity for military use during the early part of the decade employing a South African-developed jet nozzle process for extracting U-235 by gaseous diffusion and that the country was stockpiling the material.

In 1976 the French firm Framatome secured a contract to build two light water power reactors at Koeberg to supply electricity for the Cape region. These reactors, which were scheduled for completion by 1983, would provide plutonium that could be applied to military purposes upon chemical separation from the spent fuel. Until 1975 small quantities of enriched uranium were provided by the United States as fuel for the research reactor at Pelindaba under an agreement that was intended to assure the United States access to a reliable supply of uranium ore. Washington suspended further supply of fuel in 1977, however, after exposure of the purported South African nuclear test site in the Kalahari and prohibited further licensing for fuel exports unless Pretoria adhered to the NPT and opened its nuclear facilities to inspection. The American embargo on the export of nuclear fuel forced a slowdown in research at Pelindaba. South Africa refused to sign the NPT unless it received safeguards to preserve the secrecy of its enrichment process. South Africa also demanded that as a signatory it be given equal access to nuclear technology. Nuclear research activities are closely guarded secrets in South Africa, and the law attaches stiff penalties for unauthorized disclosures about nuclear installations. The American defense attache in Pretoria was expelled in 1977 for flying in an embassy plane equipped with photographic gear in the vicinity of the Kalahari site. South African authorities have insisted that the country's research and development is directed solely to the peaceful application of nuclear energy and have repeatedly denied any intention to build nuclear weapons. Deputy Defence Minister H. J. Coetsee admitted in 1980, however, that "if nuclear weapons are a

last resort to defend oneself, it would be very stupid not to use them." His remarks reminded many foreign observers of Prime Minister Botha's earlier warning to potential enemies that South Africa had access to weapons "about which they do not know."

Sources and Quality of Manpower

Entering the 1980s South Africa had an estimated potential man-power pool totaling more than 5 million men of all races who were of military age. The Defence Act limited compulsory service in the SADF to Whites, thereby reducing the military reservoir to about 1.2 million men aged sixteen to sixty-five. White males considered of prime military age (eighteen to thirty-five) numbered approximately 750,000. A comprehensive system of national service was intended to provide an adequate standing armed force and a large trained reserve that was capable of being mobilized on short notice. In the late 1970s national service was sufficiently pervasive to assure that virtually every White male of military age received training unless exempted for disability or because of holding a civil occupation, such as police service, deemed more valuable to national interests than service in the SADF. Determined efforts were directed toward incorporating larger numbers of non-Whites in the armed forces on a voluntary basis.

The Defence Act specified that all White male citizens between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five were liable for military service in event of a national emergency and required compulsory military training for White males aged seventeen to twenty-five. Although conscripts were not inducted until their eighteenth year, all were obliged to register at the age of sixteen. White residents of Namibia were subject to the same regulation. Failure to register within the specified period of time was an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment. Of slightly more than 70,000 men who became eligible for conscription during a given year, about half were deferred for later induction—usually in order to complete their education—or were exempted.

White youths, aged twelve to seventeen, were encouraged to take part in training with the Cadet Corps attached to most secondary schools. In 1977 more than 150,000 White students enrolled in 600 schools across the country had participated in the program, which included attendance at summer "adventure camps," and that number was expected to double in the early 1980s. Training was considered a preparation for eventual national service. Cadet units were also formed in some Coloured schools.

Traditionally no South African could be detailed for service outside the country's borders without his written consent. In World War II, for instance, military personnel either contracted for service in South Africa, for service anywhere in Africa, or for worldwide duty. But according to a 1976 amendment to the Defence Act, servicemen became liable for "operations in defense of the Republic. . .anywhere in southern Africa," and the definition of

351

the region was expanded to take in all African countries south of the equator. The Defence Act also provided for the establishment of an interdepartmental committee to coordinate internal security operations between the SADF and the police. In times of emergency, Citizen Force and commando units could be mobilized without a presidential proclamation to be utilized as policemen or in a civil defense role. Army troops were called in to back up the police during serious civil disturbances like those at Soweto in 1976. In small towns and isolated rural areas having few police on regular assignment, augmentation by Citizen Force and commando units was deemed essential to the maintenance of public safety.

In 1980 the regular officer corps was a highly professional technocracy but did not constitute a conscious caste within White South African society. Since 1948, however, the officer corps—particularly in the army—made common cause with supporters of Afrikanerdom and developed close links with members of the civil service, professional organizations, and the National Party. As a result of the policy of Afrikanerization of the armed forces sponsored by the Nationalist government, an estimated 85 percent of professional army officers in service in 1980 were Afrikaners, as were 75 percent in the air force and 50 percent in the navy, where British traditions remained the strongest. All officers were required to be functionally bilingual, but Afrikaans was the language of the officers' mess in most units.

A social cross section of the Afrikaner population was represented in the officer corps. There was no sharp social distinction between commissioned and noncommissioned officers, or between junior and senior grade commissioned personnel. About one-third of all officers had risen from the ranks. Promotion was based strictly on merit and could be rapid for a talented officer. A high proportion of officers in higher general staff and field command positions were men in their forties. All officer candidates were secondary school graduates and had received at least some higher education before being commissioned. Advanced in-service courses were available through SADF educational and training programs. Most senior officers had acquired university degrees. The military bureaucracy in Pretoria was not rigidly stratified and mobility in assignments was the rule. The officer corps was constantly reinforced by reservists coming on active duty and by candidates with critical skills appointed from the private sector or those seconded from posts in the civil service.

The South African army boasted of its one-to-one ratio in the deployment of combat and support troops in operational areas. Most soldiers, therefore, stood a good chance of exposure to combat. Soldiers, as well as police, were granted immunity from prosecution for acts committed in a combat situation in an operational area. But reported acts of assault and brutality against Black civilians—some involving fatalities—resulted in criminal charges being leveled against soldiers. These cases typically involved teenaged conscripts on their first tour of operational duty.

Young Afrikaners in particular reacted patriotically to the near certainty of national service, while a degree of antipathy was noted among youth in the English-speaking community. In the late 1970s about 4,000 of the nearly 70,000 eligible for call-up each year had failed to report—a figure representing more than 10 percent of the number actually inducted. Some stayed at home out of apparent ignorance of requirements, and others were found to have been absent without intent to break the law. There was, however, a small but steady flow from the country of young English-speaking South Africans seeking to avoid compulsory military service. SADF authorities admitted encountering more opposition to conscription than they had expected, a phenomenon that was blamed on "social attitudes." Most of the eighteen-year-olds not called to active duty received temporary deferments to continue their education. Some exemptions, in addition to those for disabilities, were granted on occupational grounds, but demonstrated religious commitment was the only acceptable excuse for conscientious objection to military service. Well-funded protest organizations in the United States and Britain encouraged conscientious objection in South Africa and received small numbers of draft evaders and deserters who had fled the country. Draft evasion or refusal to serve was punishable by a prison term of three years and a fine. An estimated 1,000 offenders of this type were being held in 1980.

South African manpower resources were strained throughout the 1970s by the need to deploy a larger number of security forces in Namibia and within South Africa, while building a self-contained conventional task force to resist an invasion by conventional forces. Solutions to the chronic shortage in manpower that were proposed and carried into operation included extension of national service, longer and more frequent mobilization of reserves, and expansion of the Permanent Force, in part by recruitment of larger numbers of non-Whites and women into the armed forces.

An amendment to the Defence Act in 1977 increased national service to two years with an additional ten-year active reserve commitment, replacing the one-year selective service and eight-year reserve commitment that had been in effect since 1968. More than 30,000 men were inducted each year in two levies. Three months of basic training was followed by some form of specialized schooling and assignment to an operational unit. No Citizen Force reservist was liable to be called back to active duty until nine months after completion of the initial two-year tour and then only for thirty days. Due to the shortage of Permanent Force and national service troops, Citizen Force reservists were subject to subsequent mobilization for as long as three months for service in operational areas. In such circumstances reservists were credited with only thirty days on their training obligations, however, the other sixty days being considered "war service." In 1979 some Citizen Force reservists returning from active duty were ordered to report for an additional tour because of an insufficient supply of new recruits. Demands for more manpower

caused many occupational exemptions to be withdrawn, and defer-
ments were tightened up on the grounds that too many irrelevant
applications had been made and that there had been misuse of the
permissions granted. For instance, special exemptions for jockeys,
who had claimed that an injury in service could ruin their careers,
were ended in 1980. An amendment to the citizenship law required
immigrants under the age of twenty-five to apply for citizenship
within two years and become liable for military service or be de-
prived of residence rights. Agricultural unions pointed out the hard-
ship imposed by three-month reserve call-ups on small farmers who
were forced to leave their farms unsupervised and requested that
they be exempted from the Citizen Force and assigned to the com-
mandos. The government took the recommendation under advise-
ment but had not acted upon it in 1980. With substantially in-
creased conscription and reduction of exemptions, it was anticipated
that active military duty obligations would be spread more evenly in
the early 1980s, limiting "war service" by reservists in operational
areas to alternate years.

Although military service was generally recognized and willingly
accepted as every citizen's duty, the professional military was not an
occupation to which White South Africans were readily attracted.
Consequently the Permanent Force consistently fell short of its
authorized strength, and in 1980—with 20,000 regulars in uniform,
of whom 20 percent were non-White—it stood at only 80 percent of
its authorized level. The annual attrition rate through resignation
and retirement was 15 percent, and the average length of enlistment
6.5 years. Most acute were the shortages of junior officers and ex-
perienced sergeants, especially in cadres required for training the in-
creased numbers of conscripts. It was not possible in 1980 to form a
scheduled Permanent Force brigade as a standing force. Difficulties
were also encountered in retaining skilled personnel, especially air-
crews who could demand well-paid jobs in the private sector.
Through better pay and benefits, appeals to patriotism, and recruit-
ment of more Blacks, the government planned to double the per-
centage of regular servicemen in the SADF in the early 1980s.

Defense white papers in 1977 and 1979 indicated that a manpower
policy based solely on the induction of White national servicemen was
a major source of weakness in the overall national security system.
Non-Whites comprised nearly 85 percent of the population but only
2.5 percent of all personnel, although this figure included nearly one-
third of the regular army. With few exceptions, non-Whites in the
army were assigned to ethnic units, integrated only to the extent that
most of the officers and sergeants were White. Coloureds and Asians
made up 20 percent of the navy's complement, but only a handful of
non-Whites were in the air force.

A recruiting drive to tap the reservoir of Black manpower was
launched after 1974 under the aegis of General Malan, who pro-
posed to "encourage the Black man at every possible opportunity to
make his contribution in defending the country." The multiethnic

21 Battalion was brought to full strength as a combat infantry unit and subsequently provided training cadre and noncommissioned officers for four ethnic battalions raised in the late 1970s. More Black battalions were planned, but in 1980 the existing ethnic units were still understrength. Several Black cadets were admitted to the Naval College on an experimental basis in 1980.

Recruiting of Coloured volunteers was disappointing to SADF authorities. The 1977 Manpower Commission recommended extending national service and compulsory cadet corps training to Coloureds. Organizations representing the Coloured community strenuously opposed a bill pending in parliament to compel registration of Coloureds for possible national service and protested against imposition of a mandatory military obligation without commensurate political rights. Coloured army and navy officers were acknowledged with salutes from White enlisted ranks and ratings, and Coloured officers commanded the Cape Corps infantry battalion in combat in Namibia. A few Coloured paratroopers were integrated in the army's elite airborne brigade, and Coloureds were admitted in 1980 to the Kimberley Regiment of the Citizen Force and to the East Cape Commando. A few hundred Asians were employed in support roles in the three services, and one Asian had received a navy commission.

The first women volunteers since the end of World War II were accepted in the early 1970s, but the expansion of female participation in the armed forces was cautious. By 1980 more than 2,000 women—all White—were on active duty with the SADF in noncombatant capacities, most with the army. Among them were a detachment of forty specialists who staffed a radar station at Louis Trichardt in northern Transvaal and several hundred who served in a more traditional role as medical orderlies. The army women's college at George accepted 100 trainees a year, and in 1978 the first female officer candidates entered the Military Academy to begin three years of study for a degree in military science. Sixty Swans (members of the women's naval auxiliary) were engaged in a support role at Citizen Force bases. The air force had organized a Citizen Force auxiliary squadron that was crewed and maintained by women, several of whom had qualified as instructors. A total of 6,000 women were enrolled in the commandos, where they formed support units.

Morale and Conditions of Service

The morale of the armed forces was severely strained in the National Party's rise to power in 1948 by the wholesale replacement and resignation of English-speaking senior officers thought to be partisans of the opposition United Party or actually lacking in loyalty to the Nationalist regime. In the late 1950s the defense minister expressed misgivings about the trustworthiness of the air force. There was considerable resentment in English-speaking areas over the abandonment of colonial insignia associated with traditional

British military influence. During the 1960s, however, morale was markedly strengthened, in large measure because of the extent to which Afrikanerization had succeeded in the officer corps. Professional military service held little appeal for English-speaking South Africans. Among men in uniform, rivalry between the two national language groups had virtually disappeared by the 1970s, as both found common cause in protecting the dominant position of the country's White minority from growing external and domestic threats.

Professional military service allowed for a reasonably high standard of living. Although the way of life could be arduous and demanded dedication, hard work, and discipline, service personnel received approving public recognition and standing in society as well as fair treatment by the SADF for their efforts. Regulars were entitled to free medical care for themselves and their dependents, annual vacations and sick leave, holiday bonuses, advantageous group insurance, housing, transportation fare concessions, and generous pension benefits. Pay was somewhat less than that attainable in jobs at a similar level in the civilian sector, but the government in its concern for retaining experienced personnel regularly upgraded pay and allowances for Permanent Force members. In addition to base pay, qualifying members of the armed forces received monetary compensation for hazardous duty and bonuses for professional competence. Pay for Blacks in the Permanent Force was 60 percent that of Whites of similar rank, but equal compensation was given for combat duty in Namibia, and SADF policy called for narrowing differentials in base pay as circumstances permitted. In 1979 pay for national servicemen was increased from 33 percent to 75 percent of the minimum Permanent Force rates.

National servicemen were accommodated in comfortable, if plain, barracks equipped with modern amenities. A nutritious and balanced diet was provided to all enlisted ranks. The health of the SADF was maintained at a level comparable to that available to Whites in the civilian sector, and military hospitals were among the best staffed and equipped in the country. Dispensaries were available at most military depots, and field medical services gave adequate attention to casualties in a combat environment and facilitated speedy evacuation of the wounded by air to hospitals in rear areas.

South African commentators compared morale in the enlisted ranks to that of the Israeli army, and Prime Minister Botha spoke frequently of the SADF in terms of its being a "people's army." There was evidence of a sense of solidarity among members of the service who were convinced they were fighting for their country's survival. The armed forces were seen as binding together the whole White population in a time of multiple threats to its security. Military service was an experience shared by virtually all able bodied White males of military age in the late 1970s. Discipline was tough, but not arbitrary. Individual initiative was stressed along with endurance and versatility. Within the ranks there was little

evidence of internal class cleavage among Whites or friction between Afrikaans- and English-speaking troops.

Military authorities, led by General Malan, expressed concern, however, about the long-term effects on morale of national service members fighting a twilight war that did not admit to a completely military solution, as well as the less selective induction of younger conscripts and extended duty for older reservists. After the introduction of longer terms of service and larger draft calls in 1977, there was a higher reported incidence of troops being absent without leave from their units and some increase in desertion. Evidence of drug abuse in the ranks also proved troublesome. The extent of these offenses did not appear great in comparison with that in some other Western armies, but the rise in such occurrences was noticeable in relation to earlier SADF experience.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

In addition to the quality of its manpower, equipment, and training, the ability of any military establishment to perform its assigned missions depends to a marked degree on whether it gives evidence of a sense of institutional solidarity and esprit de corps. The SADF recognizes and accepts this principle, and within the context of a thoroughly integrated command structure, each component service fosters allegiance to it in part through distinctive uniforms and a system of ranks designated by insignia (see figs. 23, 24).

Uniforms are functional in design, but the SADF puts a premium on appearance and strict observance of dress code regulations. Uniform components, colors, and materials vary according to climate and duty. The army's service uniform consists of a brown jacket and tie and a shirt and trousers of a lighter shade of brown. An open-collared, short-sleeved khaki shirt or light bush jacket replaces the jacket and tie in warmer weather. The senior army officers' service uniform is distinguished by poppy-red lapel tabs. The field uniform is required for a wide variety of work details as well as for training and field exercises. It includes a brown shirt, either short-sleeved or worn with sleeves rolled neatly above the elbows, fatigue trousers with large side pockets, webbed utility belt, and boots. Camouflaged battle dress is authorized for some units. A peaked cap or beret complements the service uniform; the beret is standard with the field uniform. Some combat units, such as the airborne brigade, are identified by the distinctive color of their berets. Bush hats are worn in the field but not in public. The regimental traditions of some Citizens Force units are reflected in variations in their parade dress. Battalions with Scottish links, for example, reserve the kilt for ceremonial occasions. New dress regulations have been introduced, however, to standardize uniforms throughout the army.

The style of uniforms for the air force and navy conforms to British patterns. Air force uniforms are steel blue, and the navy's are dark blue or white depending on the season. All enlisted ranks of the navy are attired in similar uniforms that include jacket and tie in

ARMY and AIR FORCE (Lëer) (Lugmag)		NAVY (Vloot)	
	General / Generaal	Admiral / Admiraal	
	Lieutenant General / Luitenant Generaal	Vice Admiral / Vise Admiraal	
	Major General / Majoor Generaal	Rear Admiral / Skout Admiraal	
	Brigadier / Brigadier	Commodore / Kommodoor	
	Colonel / Kolonel	Captain / Kaptein	
	Commandant / Kommandant	Commander / Kommandeur	
	Major / Majoor	Lieutenant Commander / Luitenant Kommandeur	
	Captain / Kaptein	Lieutenant / Luitenant	
	Lieutenant / Luitenant	Sublieutenant / Onderluitenant	
	2d Lieutenant / Tweede Luitenant	Ensign / Vaandrig	

Figure 23. Officer Ranks and Insignia

AIR FORCE (Lugmag)	NAVY (Vloot)	ARMY (Léer)
Warrant Officer Class 1 Adjudant Offisier Klas 1	Warrant Officer Class 1 Adjudant Offisier Klas 1	Warrant Officer Class 1 Adjudant Offisier Klas 1
Warrant Officer Class 2 Adjudant Offisier Klas 2	Warrant Officer Class 2 Adjudant Offisier Klas 2	Warrant Officer Class 2 Adjudant Offisier Klas 2
Flight Sergeant Vlugsersant	Chief Petty Officer Eerstebootsman	Staff Sergeant Stafsersant
Sergeant Sersant	Petty Officer Bootsman	Sergeant Sersant
Corporal Korporaal	Leading Seaman Baasseeman	Corporal Korporaal
Lance Corporal Onder Korporaal	Able Seaman Bevareseeman	Lance Corporal Onder Korporaal
Private Weerman	Seaman Seeman	Private Skutter/Weerman

Figure 24. Enlisted and Warrant Officer Ranks and Insignia

cool weather and white jacket with a high collar in summer. Both services, like the army, permit an open-collared shirt (light blue in the air force, white in the navy) as an alternative component of the service uniform in warm weather. All services authorize the wearing of shorts and knee socks as the climate dictates and duty permits.

New military honors and awards were instituted in 1975 to recognize various categories of conspicuously outstanding service and execution of duties by SADF officers and enlisted ranks. South Africa's highest decoration is the Castle of Good Hope, which is reserved for exceptional heroism on the battlefield. The Honoris Crux in four classes is awarded for valor. The Order of the Star of South Africa, conferred in two classes, is restricted to general officers who have performed meritorious service in promoting the efficiency and preparation of the armed forces. Other ranks are eligible for the Southern Cross and Pro Merito decorations and medals in recognition of outstanding service and devotion to duty.

The Intelligence Service

Until 1962 the SADF lacked a specialized military intelligence section capable of collecting and evaluating defense-related information for application in strategic planning. But the flow of information of military value between the Directorate of Military Intelligence (formed in that year), the SAP internal security intelligence unit, and civilian intelligence services attached to various government departments was cumbersome, and coordination of their activities was inefficient. In an effort to correct these deficiencies, the Bureau of State Secur'ty (BOSS) was established in 1969 as South Africa's central intelligence organization with responsibility for supervising both military intelligence and internal security operations. From the outset BOSS exercised great latitude in the suppression of perceived subversive activities and tended to emphasize police-related internal security investigation rather than analysis of military intelligence. Questionable activities by BOSS came to light during the Department of Information scandal that contributed to Vorster's political eclipse in 1978 (see The National Party, ch. 4). The bureau's head, General Hendrik van den Bergh (a close friend of Vorster), was portrayed as a sinister behind-the-scenes political manipulator.

In 1978 the intelligence organization was reorganized by the Botha government as the Department of National Security (DONS) to upgrade intelligence gathering and evaluation as part of its "total strategy" effort. The importance placed on the development of an effective intelligence agency capable of integrating military, internal security, and economic intelligence operations was underscored by the fact that Botha also held the portfolio for national intelligence. Lukas Daniel Barnard, the thirty-one-year-old dean of the political science faculty at the University of Orange Free State, was subsequently named as operational director of the DONS. His appointment to the post over the heads of intelligence professionals

who had risen from the ranks of the security service was recognized as a final break with the group closely identified with BOSS and was further intended to improve the image and morale of the intelligence community. The influence and participation of military intelligence experts from the SADF in DONS operations also became more pronounced. In 1980 the organization was renamed the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI), but its functions and mode of operation remained unchanged.

The DNI has statutory responsibility for identifying threats to national security. It collects and interprets all intelligence broadly defined as security related, extending from military and internal security matters to analysis of foreign political developments and economic intelligence. The directorate is also responsible for counterintelligence activities and is believed to maintain an intelligence network abroad.

In addition to gathering intelligence, the DNI acts as a clearing-house for information collected or required by other government departments. Working closely with the SADF, it also coordinates the activities of the separate military intelligence sections operated by the Joint Combat Forces, Maritime Defence, and the three service branches. The DNI reports to the prime minister through the State Security Council (SSC), for which it prepares an annual national intelligence estimate and formulates intelligence policy for approval and implementation.

After coming to office as prime minister, Botha significantly broadened the role of the SSC in long-range strategic planning and reorganized its permanent professional staff, bringing on board military officers and civilian technicians of the sort with whom he had worked successfully as defense minister. Annoyed that the bureaucracy in the various government departments made decisions on a daily basis without reviewing their overall implications for national security, Botha directed the expanded SSC staff to cut through bureaucratic procedures in order to deal directly with such interrelated areas of concern as weapons procurement, manpower development, defense research, production of strategic materials, and methods of circumventing the arms embargo against South Africa. The SSC staff also serves as the government think tank on security questions, processing information and acting on recommendations made by the DNI, with which it is closely linked.

The National Police

The South African Police (SAP) is a paramilitary law enforcement agency centrally organized as a state service. It is the primary instrument for maintaining internal security, although the SADF is prepared to provide supplementary assistance in the event of serious disorders. Established by the Police Act of 1912, the force operates under the authority of the minister of police and is administered by an appointed commissioner of police, who has the rank of general. Expenditures for the Department of Police allocated in state budgets

1.0

1.1

1.25 1.4 1.6

4.5
5.0
5.6

2.8 2.5

3.2 2.2

3.6

4.0 2.0

1.8

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

averaged over R200 million annually in the late 1970s, with public works appropriations of over R10 million for the construction and upkeep of police facilities.

In 1980 the SAP had an authorized strength of 35,500 full-time police backed by some 20,000 police reservists, who were available for active duty in times of emergency. The regular force consisted of 19,500 Whites of all ranks, 14,000 Blacks, 1,700 Coloureds, and 800 Asians. Of 2,200 commissioned officers commanding and administering police units, about 100 were non-Whites. In 1978 these non-White officers included sixty-three Blacks, twenty-three Coloureds, and twelve Asians ranking up to lieutenant colonel. Most metropolitan police units had personnel of all races, although assignment practices avoided posting White police in subordinate capacities to non-White officers or senior constables. Senior officers were promoted from the ranks, and this policy included accession to the post of commissioner of police. There was no direct entry system to the commissioned ranks.

The police service uniform consists of a blue-gray belted jacket, worn with lighter gray trousers and a peaked cap. Constables and NCOs add a black Sam Browne belt. In summer police appear on duty wearing blue-gray bush jackets and shorts. All constables on patrol duty are armed for personal protection with batons and handguns, which had been prohibited for non-White policemen before 1972.

After the passage of the Group Areas Act of 1950, which enforced the resettlement of much of the urban Black and Coloured populations, non-White police personnel were given responsibility for maintaining law and order in the racially segregated townships. Black police were generally brought from different parts of the country to areas where it was believed they would be less likely to feel sympathy for the local population. In the late 1970s Black officers and constables were in sole charge of thirty-nine police stations. Coloured personnel were responsible for fourteen stations, and Asians for one station.

In addition to its internal security role, the SAP is responsible for law enforcement in South Africa and Namibia, protection of life and property, and the prevention of crime. A large part of its work involves implementing apartheid laws. The force conducts its own recruiting program, organizes and operates training schools, and provides services for the welfare of its members and their dependants. Personnel are enlisted voluntarily on a nationwide basis. An overwhelming majority of White police are Afrikaners, and most Blacks are recruited in rural areas where unemployment is acute. White youths enlisting in the SAP obtain exemption from national service with the SADF. A women's police contingent was organized in 1972, and a number of women have also been employed in clerical jobs and specialized occupations.

Amendments to the Defence Act allow military reservists and commandos to be mobilized on short notice to assist police in emergency

situations. In sparsely populated areas augmentation of the SAP by military reserve forces is deemed essential for the maintenance of public safety. A separate South West African Police was planned for early 1981. The commander and initially most of the other personnel of the new multiracial force would be South Africans previously assigned to SAP units in Namibia.

Traffic control is not a function of the SAP. Most larger municipalities maintain local traffic police, and the enforcement of traffic laws on the nation's road system is exercised by provincial highway patrols. Similarly, policing of railways, harbors, and airports is handled by police of the South African Railways and Harbors Administration (SAR&H).

The SAP developed as the outgrowth of a variety of security forces created over the years to meet changing conditions and problems. The Boer republics had tough, paramilitary mounted police forces, and in Cape Colony the British colonial administration established an efficient modern force modeled after London's Metropolitan Police. Although numerically small, the Cape Constabulary adequately kept public order in Cape Colony in the late nineteenth century. It was aided by the Water Police, who were responsible for patrolling the waterfront and combating smuggling. In rural districts law and order was maintained by a few constables known as *landdrosts*. When additional assistance was needed the *landdrosts* called for local volunteers, who were organized in commandos. The Natal Mounted Police undertook law enforcement in the neighboring British colony and provided effective military support for the British army during the Zulu War in 1879.

After the Anglo-Boer War, the mounted police in the Transvaal and Orange Free State were reorganized by the British administration. The police forces of the four provinces were consolidated shortly after the Act of Union in 1910, and from the amalgamation two law enforcement agencies emerged. The South African Mounted Riflemen were detailed to rural areas and to border patrol, while the SAP became responsible for public order in urban areas and the adjacent countryside. When the mounted riflemen were mobilized for military service in World War I, the SAP assumed the task of providing law and order in rural areas as well. The SAP subsequently absorbed the mounted riflemen and in 1936 received statutory jurisdiction for law enforcement throughout the country. In 1939 its responsibilities were extended to policing South West Africa. Amendments to the Police Act permitted the use of SAP units in areas outside South Africa when requested by friendly governments and when such operations could be construed as essential to South Africa's internal security. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the SAP was engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) and in Portuguese Mozambique.

Organization and Operations

All SAP operations are controlled from a central headquarters in

363

Pretoria where the commissioner of police and his staff establishes policy, guides the activities of police units throughout the country, and coordinates operations with the SADF. For administrative purposes the force is divided into territorial police divisions, each commanded by a divisional commissioner. Individual divisions vary in strength and organization, depending on the size and the degree of urbanization within a jurisdiction. Each division is subdivided into police districts, which contain varying numbers of police stations responsible for law enforcement in a specific precinct.

Operationally the SAP is organized into three branches: the Uniformed Branch, the Detective Branch, and the Security Branch. Police recruits are initially assigned to constabulary duties in the Uniformed Branch, where the bulk of the force is employed. Those with special aptitudes are subsequently enrolled in academic and technical courses for advanced training. The Uniformed Branch is concerned essentially with crime prevention and other routine police work as well as with clerical duties and the overall administration of the SAP. Also part of the Uniformed Branch, the SAP Quartermaster is responsible for the supply and maintenance of police equipment, including motor transport.

The SAP makes extensive use of dogs in the investigation of criminal activity, pursuit of suspects, crowd control, and on constabulary patrols. Dogs and their handlers are trained in four-month sessions at the Kwaggaspoort Dog Training School in Pretoria. Most of the animals are German shepherds trained for tracking as well as for detecting the characteristic odor of dagga (cannibis sativa) and sniffing out land mines. Dogs and handlers in a special section are also given parachute training as part of an operational concept that calls for dog-and-master teams to be air dropped into areas inaccessible to motorized police. Airborne tactics of this type have proved particularly useful in border patrol and counterinsurgency operations. The Radio Patrol Service, popularly known as the Flying Squad, operates high-speed motor vehicles equipped with two-way radios. As circumstances demand, the Flying Squad works in combined operations with the SAP's Air Wing, which flies light ai. and helicopters on reconnaissance and liaison missions.

The Detective Branch is a centralized service that operates out of SAP headquarters. Operational offices include the Criminal Investigation Division, which assigns plainclothes personnel to assist divisional and district commands with criminal and security investigations, and the Special Branch, which is concerned with police intelligence gathering, surveillance, and investigation of subversive activities. Most detectives are experienced police who had served their apprenticeship in the Uniformed Branch before being detailed to plainclothes work.

A number of technical sections deal with specific types of criminal offenses and with laboratory and data-bank investigation procedures. Among the latter is the Criminal Bureau, which serves as a clearinghouse for fingerprints and an archive for criminal records.

The SAP's Forensic Science Laboratory is one of the best equipped facilities of its kind in the world. Established in 1974, the Narcotics Bureau investigates unlawful dealing in and possession of narcotics on a specialized basis.

The Security Branch is responsible for border patrol and internal security operations in areas of South Africa and Namibia not otherwise assigned to the SADF. It is composed of hard-hitting mobile units, trained in counterinsurgency tactics and riot control, that are ready for deployment anywhere in the country at short notice to quell civil disturbances, break illegal strikes, or intercept guerrilla infiltrators. Since 1972 the Security Branch has recruited Black units that are feared particularly by the Black population. All units are self-sufficient in weapons, communications and transport equipment, and logistical support. Security Branch units participate in counterinsurgency operations in Namibia and in South Africa alongside the SADF.

In operational situations Security Branch police are provided camouflaged battle dress, gas masks, body armor, and helmets and are armed with assault rifles, automatic weapons, shotguns, and tear gas cannister launchers. Units are transported in South African-made Hippo armored personnel carriers and specially designed riot trucks. In the field they can call on assistance from police reconnaissance aircraft and river and coastal patrol boats.

The SAP refined its techniques of riot control after the overreaction at the start of the Soweto demonstrations in 1976, and more emphasis was placed on preparing the Security Branch for urban guerrilla warfare. In addition to an array of lethal ordnance, units also rely on rubber bullets, electric prods, Plexiglas shields, and the "sneeze machine"—a truck-mounted rotary dispenser that emits tear gas mixed with talcum powder to control urban disorders. Tactics in the streets revolve around the capability of the Hippo, both for breaking up demonstrations and as an armored fall-back position for police overwhelmed by large groups of demonstrators. Baton charges, water cannons, and mounted units were found to have only limited effectiveness and were vulnerable to counterattack.

Riot control is undertaken by platoon-size units, who move quickly into assigned areas in Hippos. Each unit is assigned a dog team and record keepers, who obtain written and videotaped accounts of incidents. According to the SAP's riot control procedures, attempts are made to defuse potentially violent demonstrations before they result in crises. Police action escalates in several stages: dialogue to head off a confrontation;. show of force with police arriving on the scene in armored vehicles; verbal persuasion, including a reading of the "riot act"; release of tear gas, using the "sneeze machine" if available, to break up crowds; use of bird shot; use of buckshot fired at the legs of demonstrators; and, finally, selective, controlled rifle fire directed at armed opposition. If all else fails, the heavily armed, mine-resistant Hippos advance into the crowds. It has been noted by observers, however, that these steps are not always followed in sequence and

that police often resort quickly to an indiscriminate use of firearms, especially shotguns.

In the late 1970s "combined manoeuver" techniques were employed for large-scale sweeps in Black townships. Quietly assembled police, army, and commando forces surrounded an area, usually at midnight, and for the next twelve hours searched all persons and vehicles attempting to leave or enter, while riot platoons conducted a house-to-house search inside the perimeter.

In combating ordinary crime, the SAP engages in the routine professional task of maintaining law and order. As enforcers of myriad apartheid laws, however, the police deal daily with a state of endemic resistance by the Black majority of the population (see Apartheid and Its Evolution, ch. 2; The Legal System, ch. 4). Many categories of criminal offenses committed by Blacks are viewed as potential threats to White control of the country. In addition to enforcing apartheid, the SAP devotes much of its energy and capabilities to detecting subversive activities, utilizing networks of informers to gather information that is collected and sifted by national and police intelligence agencies. The organization of Black political and social movements is likewise regarded as endangering internal security, and police monitor their activities and suppress them when ordered to do so. There have been continuing reports of the systematic use of torture and intimidation by the police that resulted in the deaths of several hundred suspects detained for interrogation during the late 1970s. In 1977, for instance, 128 persons were reported to have died in detention while awaiting trial. Of these, twenty-eight were listed as suicides, while others ostensibly succumbed to assaults by fellow prisoners, or died as the result of bizarre accidents. Some of these fatalities were believed to have been caused by police-inflicted torture during interrogation. Controls on prisoner welfare at the hands of the police were tightened in 1977 after the death in custody of Steve Biko, head of the South African Student Organization (see Black Political Movements, ch. 4).

During the same year 138 persons were killed and 400 wounded by police gun fire. Of 128 Black fatalities, eleven were juveniles. In 1978 there were 250 policemen—the majority of them Blacks—convicted of crimes of violence, including four murders and twenty-two culpable homicides. Not all were service related, but extensive evidence of police brutality was revealed during the trials. (Allegations of brutality normally have resulted in temporary suspension or immediate transfer of police involved.) Indemnities were paid out that year to individuals and families in respect to thirty-nine cases of assault by police and fifty-one complaints of false arrest. Legislation guarantees immunity to police for acts committed in the line of duty in designated operational areas, and under an amendment to the Police Act in 1979 the press was restrained from "hostile" investigations of police actions.

The public image of the police has varied among the different racial groups. The SAP seldom comes in contact with the majority

of the White community except when police assistance is requested. For most Whites, the SAP is the institution that upholds the laws assuring their continued dominance in South Africa and is the first line of defense in the event of internal unrest. To non-Whites, particularly Blacks, the SAP is a force to be feared, and police are avoided whenever possible. Despite these contrasting attitudes, many South Africans recognize the police as capable of rough kindness on ordinary occasions. In emergencies, such as fires and natural disasters, police are humane, responsive, and frequently heroic. Devotion to duty and traditional disregard for personal safety bring numerous citations to members of the force from all racial groups.

The Police Reserve, established in 1961, is composed of civilian volunteers who are organized to perform ordinary police duties when members of the regular force are diverted to more urgent tasks. In 1980 it numbered 20,000 members, about one-fourth of them non-White, having varying degrees of military experience and training in police tactics. The Police Reserve consists of four separate personnel categories. Group A reservists are regarded as full-time police in times of emergency. They receive paramilitary training and are issued firearms. Inclusion in this category is limited to Whites. Group B reservists are designated as a "home guard" and perform part-time police duties in their own neighborhoods. All racial groups are eligible for membership in this category. Group C reservists are typically employees of local authorities and key industries, and their reserve role is the protection of their employers' property in the event of an emergency. Group D reservists are drawn from rural areas and constitute a civilian restraining force, willing to carry out police duties in the initial stages of an emergency until regular police or military forces arrive in sufficient strength.

In the late 1960s Black police reservists were trained for part-time service in Soweto and were placed under the supervision of regular police officers in the township. The apparent success of the experiment led to the recruiting of more Black contingents for police reserve duty in the townships. For many years, however, real police power in the crime-ridden townships belonged to unsanctioned local vigilantes, the *makgotla*, who acted ostensibly to control crime and punished malefactors according to tribal law. Eventually the *makgotla* became a political force within the community and often wielded arbitrary power that frequently degenerated into strong-arm tactics and racketeering. The Community Councils Act of 1977 provided for the establishment of community guards, supplementing the police, as an alternative to the *makgotla*, who were subsequently banned.

Training

The SAP places great emphasis on training, and the broad scope of technical and academic instruction given members of the force, coupled with drill and combat training, has led to a high level of professional competence. Four separate training institutions are

in operation. The largest and most important of these is the South African Police College in Pretoria, where all White recruits receive basic training and where other White personnel attend advanced courses in specialized subjects. The college maintains facilities to accommodate more than 2,000 trainees a year. Black recruits and reservists are trained at Hammanskraal, north of Pretoria, Coloureds at the Bishop Lavis police depot near Cape Town, and Asians at Wentworth near Durban. Recruits at all schools undergo an identical six-month basic training course and White candidates an additional six-month academic course before assignment to duty.

Recruit training includes both practical and theoretical instruction in physical conditioning, self-defense, first aid, use of firearms, crowd and riot control, close order drill, and infantry tactics. Instruction is also given in the various laws police are called on to enforce. All trainees attend lectures on race relations, methods of interacting with various ethnic groups, and social problems such as alcoholism and drug abuse. White recruits are required to have completed secondary school and to be bilingual in Afrikaans and English. Their academic curriculum includes courses in language, sociology, ethnography, criminology, criminal procedure, and statute law. Graduates are expected to continue their studies in these areas by correspondence. Minimum educational qualifications for non-Whites are primary school education and fluency in either Afrikaans or English. After completing basic training, recruits are promoted to the rank of constable and assigned for two months of duty with a metropolitan police station before receiving a permanent station assignment.

In addition to recruit training, the SAP schools provide instruction for police specialists, advanced courses in criminology and law enforcement techniques for senior personnel, and refresher training in the use of firearms and riot control procedures. Other specialized training includes techniques and procedures associated with crime laboratory work, the use of electronic devices, computer technology, and radio operation and repair. Security Branch forces receive intensive training in counterinsurgency tactics. More than 1,000 police are trained annually in motor vehicle operation and maintenance at the Quartermaster's mechanical school at Benoni, while two mounted troops are instructed each year in horsemanship and veterinary science, or are trained as dog handlers. Three-year courses of study leading to university degrees in police-related subjects are offered police personnel seeking higher academic qualifications through the extramural program of the University of South Africa.

The Penal System

The national penal system is administered by the Department of Prisons, which is organized into regional commands, each responsible for the operation of prisons within the command area. Ultimate authority for policymaking rests with the minister in charge,

who usually also holds the government portfolio for justice or police. The senior officer within the department is the commissioner of prisons, whose authority includes command of the Prison Service that operates the penal facilities. Prisons are staffed by civil servants, and their management is subject to review by the government's Public Service Commission. Operating and maintenance costs of all institutions within the system are financed from state revenues. Appropriations for the Department of Prisons in the late 1970s averaged over R80 million annually, and further allocations of more than R16 million were made for construction costs on prison facilities.

In 1980 the authorized personnel strength of the Prison Service totaled 15,800, including 9,000 Whites, 5,200 Blacks, and 1,600 Coloureds and Asians. Of the total, 1,200 were women. Most of the White personnel were Afrikaners. Of 615 officers on active duty in 1978, all but thirteen were White, and the highest ranking Black was a captain. Although generally lower than those of the police, pay rates for Prison Service personnel were considered satisfactory, especially for Blacks who had lower income expectations. Retirement on a generous government pension at the age of sixty was the rule. Staff personnel and their dependents received full medical benefits and housing in the vicinity of prisons to which they were assigned. Despite such benefits, however, there was a high staff turnover, amounting to 15 to 20 percent annually in the late 1970s, that resulted from retirements and from the resignations of trained prison warders who frequently accepted security jobs with private industrial concerns. South Africa's improved economic situation also had a negative effect on recruitment as did community pressure on potential Black recruits, and in recent years the Prison Service had not been able to maintain its authorized personnel strength.

To be eligible for the Prison Service, recruits must be at least eighteen years old and meet minimum physical standards. Proficiency in either English or Afrikaans and a secondary school certificate are required of Whites, and a primary school education is required of Black applicants. Before candidates are assigned to prison duties they are required to complete a six-month course. White recruits are trained at Kroonstad, Coloureds at Pollsmoor, Asians at Durban, and Blacks at Baviaanspoort Prison near Pretoria. The course of instruction emphasizes discipline, suitable methods of punishment, conduct toward prisoners, physical conditioning, self-defense techniques, first aid, fire fighting, and close-order drill. All candidates are instructed on details on the Prisons Act and attend lectures on practical psychology, sociology, and fundamental criminology. A number of recruits receive vocational training and are later assigned to supervise prisoner education in similar areas. Selected members are given courses in management, legal procedure, and agriculture.

Arduous working conditions for most Prison Service personnel include long hours on duty and often irregular schedules. Under guidelines introduced in the 1970s, however, attempts were made

to bring working hours in line with the norm generally observed in the private sector, and warders working unusual hours were eligible for compensatory time off. Warders serving on the system's prison farms are armed with truncheons, while those assigned to medium- and maximum-security prisons are authorized to carry firearms. Prisons also employ dogs trained at the SAP dog school. The animals are highly effective in controlling prison disturbances and in tracking down escapees.

Installations

There were more than 250 penal institutions operating under the jurisdiction of the Department of Prisons in the late 1970s. A major proportion of these were local or district prisons generally used as reception centers for newly convicted offenders and for persons remanded into custody while awaiting trial. The remainder included minimum-security prison farms and large central prisons imposing maximum security. Although local prisons were usually classified as medium-security installations, the prison department maintained maximum security at those facilities as well because of the indeterminable quality of behavior among remanded prisoners, who made up at least 40 percent of the prison population. Reformatories for juvenile offenders were not part of the penal system but were administered by the separate departments responsible for segregated education.

Some prisons built in the colonial period were still in use in the 1970s, although most had been extensively modernized since World War II. The trend in new prison construction begun in the 1960s, however, favored the gradual replacement of outdated prison facilities with consolidated complexes; each contained a reception center, a maximum-security section, and a prison farm. This concept permitted advancement from closed to open prison conditions without the need for transfers and readjustment to new surroundings as prisoners progressed toward completion of their confinement. Typical of modern prisons built on this model were the complexes at Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, and Paarl in western Cape Province.

Physical features, such as floor space, cubic air space, ventilation, lighting, and sanitary facilities, were subject to the health regulations of the area in which each prison was located. Maintenance of an optimum standard of hygiene was often hampered by overcrowding and the continued use of older installations. Allegations of unsanitary conditions in some prisons usually were leveled at those installations in which non-White offenders were confined. Although the government has declared that "in principle" basic facilities were the same for all population groups, sharp discrepancies were also reported to exist between conditions of incarceration, including diet, for White prisoners and those of other groups.

The oldest prison in the system was located off Cape Town on Robben Island in Table Bay. Approximately five square kilometers in size, the island originally served as a refuge for seamen, but a

penal colony was established there in the eighteenth century. In 1980 it was the site of South Africa's most impenetrable maximum security prison. Of more than 350 Black and Coloured inmates convicted under security legislation, about 10 percent were serving life sentences. Among these was Nelson Mandela, head of the African National Congress (ANC), who was committed to Robben Island in 1965. In 1977 the prison population also included thirty-six South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) leaders, six Black juveniles convicted of sabotage, and thirteen Whites, four of whom were women. This special category of prisoner was cut off from any contact with the outside world and was deprived of current news. Prisoners typically worked a nine-hour day at hard physical labor.

Each of the Black homelands operated its separate penal system, using facilities turned over by the Department of Prisons in Pretoria. Homeland governments were fully responsible for policies regarding prisons that had been adopted within their jurisdictions. Prison personnel continued, however, to receive training in South African facilities.

Operations

In 1980 South Africa had one of the largest prison populations per capita of any advanced noncommunist country. During 1978, the latest year for which detailed statistics were available, 502,000 persons spent some time in custody in the penal system—258,000 admitted as sentenced prisoners and 244,000 remanded while awaiting trial. Of the former, 6,000 were White, 210,000 Black, 41,000 Coloured, and 1,000 Asian. Nearly 50,000 of the total were women, 80 percent of them Black. About 80 percent of all prisoners were sentenced to terms of six months or less and 40 percent to terms of one month or less. About 40 percent of all Blacks imprisoned were convicted of pass law offenses. The average daily sentenced prison population was about 100,000. Prisons were segregated according to race and gender, and non-White warders were not assigned to supervise White inmates.

Prisoners are classified according to their criminal offenses, past records, and length of sentence, but a basic consideration in allotting prisoners to a specific category and institution is their psychological condition and prospect of rehabilitation. In 1980 approximately 10 percent were designated Class A and served on prison farms under minimum security. About 80 percent were placed in medium-security institutions as Class B prisoners. The remainder, assigned to Class C and Class D, were admitted to maximum-security units. Class A prisoners earn their more lenient classification and treatment by good behavior, usually by promotion from Class B. Most Class B offenders have committed crimes against property without attendant violence or have violated various apartheid regulations. Hardened criminals and those who have committed violent crimes or have been convicted of serious security offenses are assigned to the remaining two classes. Of these, Class C is

371

reserved for prisoners considered capable of being rehabilitated, while those deemed incorrigible are placed in Class D.

The sentence usually imposed on prisoners found guilty of disciplinary violations is solitary confinement with reduced diet for a period not to exceed six days. Admissions of guilt for minor contraventions bring reprimand and denial of privileges for periods not to exceed one month. Corporal punishment up to a maximum of six strokes can be imposed on those convicted of serious infractions involving violence or in cases where other punishments have proved ineffective in deterring disciplinary violations. Officially, whipping is permitted only after a medical officers certifies that the prisoner is fit to undergo corporal punishment.

Charges of brutality by prison personnel and ill-treatment of prisoners are frequently made by the UN, international religious and judicial forums, the International Commission of the Red Cross, and Amnesty International. The South African government has consistently dismissed such criticism as lacking in objectivity and has stated that prison management in any country is a domestic matter. Because the Prisons Act of 1959 makes it risky to publish criticisms of prison administration, only limited information on conditions in penal institutions has been available from nonofficial South African sources. Studies on reform of the penal system were undertaken in the 1970s, however, by government-appointed commissions.

* * *

No analysis of South Africa's national security affairs using publicly available sources would be possible without the use of the detailed annuals *Africa Contemporary Record*, edited by the Africanist Colin Legum, and *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, edited by Loraine Gordon and published by the South African Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg. The same is true of the International Institute for Strategic Studies' excellent annuals, *Strategic Survey* and *The Military Balance*. Figures presented in the latter are accepted as definitive in this study. Also recommended are the comprehensive and reliable yearbooks, *World Armaments and Disarmament*, published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the *Annual of Power and Conflict*, edited by Brian Crozier for the Institute for the Study of Conflict. Readers who wish to keep current on the subject will also appreciate the usefulness of the *Africa Research Bulletin* and *Keesings Contemporary Archives*. Several fine studies, based on research done in the late 1970s, provide analyses of South Africa's security problems from different perspectives. A succinct overview of defense policy is found in Robert S. Jaster's *South Africa's Narrowing Security Options*, a volume in the Adelphi Papers series published by the International

Institute for Strategic Studies. Possible responses to internal and external threats are considered by Gwendolen M. Carter, an American authority on South African affairs, in her probing study *Which Way Is South Africa Going?* Kenneth L. Adelman's *African Realities* offers a critical appraisal of the Nationalist government's "total strategy" concept. Indispensable shorter studies are Chester Crocker's essay "Current and Projected Military Balances in Southern Africa" in the volume *South Africa into the 1980s* and "Southern Africa: A Study in Conflict," an article by William Gutteridge appearing in *The Dynamics of the Arms Race*. A sympathetic but not uncritical appraisal of South African strategic thinking is given by L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan in *South Africa: War, Revolution or Peace?* South Africa's position is placed in the context of global confrontation by Dirk Kunnert in an article, " 'Windows of Perils': Africa, the World, and the 1980s," appearing in the July 1980 issue of *South Africa International*. A contrary view of the country's strategic value as weighed against its liabilities to the West is presented by Richard E. Bissell's "How Strategic Is South Africa?" in *South Africa into the 1980s*. Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee's *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* gives interesting sociological data on the armed forces. Philip H. Markel's article "South Africa: The Politics of Police Control" in the journal *Comparative Politics* offers insight into the influence and tactics of the SAP. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m²)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	.98	long ton
	1.1	short ton
	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9 divided by 5 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Population by Racial Composition, 1970 and 1980

Race	1970		1980[1]	
	Population	Percent of Total	Population	Percent of Total
Blacks	15,339,975	70.4	20,609,000[2]	72.5
Whites	3,773,282	17.3	4,453,273	15.7
Coloureds	2,050,699	9.4	2,554,039	9.0
Asians	630,372	2.9	794,693	2.8
TOTAL	21,794,328	100.0	28,410,951	100.0

[1] Estimate based on preliminary analysis of government census statistics.
[2] Includes estimate of 4,639,000 de facto populations of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda.

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979; Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1979; South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, "National Census Figures," *South African Digest* [Pretoria], September 19, 1980, p. 3; South African Institute of Race Relations, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979*, Johannesburg, 1980.

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

Table 3. Percent of Urban Population by Racial Group, Selected Years, 1921-70

Year	Whites	Blacks	Coloureds	Asians
1921	59.7	14.0	52.4	60.4
1936	68.2	19.0	58.0	69.5
1946	75.6	24.3	62.5	72.8
1951	79.1	27.9	66.2	77.6
1960	83.6	31.8	68.3	83.2
1970	86.8	33.0	74.1	86.7

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa,* Johannesburg, 1979, p. 32.

Table 4. Population of Principal Urban Areas by Racial Composition, 1970

Urban area	Total	Asians	Blacks	Coloureds	Whites
Johannesburg	1,441,366	40,021	819,706	85,597	496,042
Cape Town	1,107,763	11,086	108,827	606,075	381,775
Ea t Rand	909,680	11,462	550,118	19,617	328,483
Durban	850,946	321,204	227,717	45,189	256,836
Pretoria	563,384	11,275	236,896	11,448	303,765
Port Elizabeth	475,869	5,225	205,055	114,879	150,710
West Rand	428,386	2,042	261,430	11,691	153,223
Vanderbijlpark/Vereeniging/					
Sasolburg	310,188	2,253	192,668	2,382	112,885
Orange Free State goldfields	210,629	—	158,322	1,533	50,774
Bloemfontein	182,329	—	96,748	10,291	75,290
Pietermaritzburg	160,855	37,283	69,237	8,898	45,437
East London	124,763	1,972	52,178	13,571	57,042
Kimberley	105,258	957	49,662	24,917	29,722

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa,* Johannesburg, 1979, p. 33.

Table 5. Black Population Estimates by Official
Ethnolinguistic Categories, 1979

Category	Number	Percent of Total
Nguni		
Zulu	5,244,000	27.7
Xhosa[1]	4,872,000	25.7
Swazi	611,000	3.2
Sotho		
Tswana[2]	2,644,000	14.0
North Sotho (Sepedi)	2,037,000	10.8
South Sotho (Seshoeshoe)	1,686,000	8.9
Other		
Tsonga-Shangaan	788,000	4.2
North and South Ndebele[3]	579,000	3.1
Venda	466,000	2.5
TOTAL	18,927,000	100.1[4]

[1] Xhosa estimate includes 1,832,000 in Transkei; Blacks of other ethnic groups are also included, but the orders of magnitude are not significantly affected.

[2] Tswana estimate includes 1,280,000 in Bophuthatswana; Blacks of other ethnic groups are also included, but the orders of magnitude are not significantly affected.

[3] The South Ndebele comprehend roughly three quarters of the Ndebele.

[4] Figures do not add to 100 because of rounding.

Source: Adapted from Loraine Gordon (ed.), *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979*, Johannesburg, 1980, pp. 70-71.

Table 6. Composition of Soweto and Eastern Bantu Townships by
Official Ethnolinguistic Category,
1973

Ethnolinguistic Category	Percent of Population
Zulu	29.8
Xhosa	10.0
Swazi	6.9
Total Nguni speakers	46.7
Tswana	16.2
South Sotho	14.2
North Sotho	9.9
Total Sotho speakers	40.3
Tsonga	7.2
Venda	4.4
Others	1.4
Total others	13.0
TOTAL	100.0

Source: Adapted from Philip Mayer, "Class, Status, and Ethnicity as Perceived by Johannesburg Africans" in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds.), *Change in Contemporary South Africa*, Berkeley, 1975, p. 42.

Table 7. Religious Affiliation by Race, 1970[1]

Religion	White Number	White Percent	Black Number	Black Percent	Coloured Number	Coloured Percent	Asian Number	Asian Percent
Nederduitse Gereformeerde	1,512,066	(40.1)	909,861	(5.9)	583,838	(28.5)	—	—
Gereformeerde	110,277	(2.9)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nederduitsch Hervormde	225,283	(6.0)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Anglican	404,024	(10.7)	982,093	(6.4)	322,790	(15.7)	7,282	(1.2)
Methodist	361,727	(9.6)	1,825,862	(11.9)	116,131	(5.7)	—	—
Presbyterian	118,782	(3.2)	451,186	(2.9)	—	—	—	—
Congregational	—	—	216,627	(1.7)	156,846	(7.7)	—	—
Lutheran	41,972	(1.1)	811,669	(5.3)	95,499	(4.7)	—	—
Roman Catholic	309,572	(8.2)	1,375,456	(9.0)	197,628	(9.6)	14,755	(2.3)
Apostolic Faith Mission	72,904	(1.9)	—	—	20,746	(1.0)	—	—
Other Apostolic	81,708	(2.2)	500,025	(3.3)	129,756	(6.3)	—	—
Baptist	46,427	(1.2)	178,673	(1.2)	—	—	—	—
African Independent	—	—	2,716,019	(17.7)	—	—	—	—
Other Christian	255,530	(6.8)	1,010,067	(6.7)	231,600	(11.3)	31,884	(5.1)
Jewish	118,200	(3.1)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Islam	—	—	—	—	134,087	(6.5)	125,987	(20.0)
Hindu	—	—	—	—	—	—	430,318	(68.3)
African Indigenous	—	—	3,945,916	(25.7)	—	—	—	—
Other	10,617	(0.3)	72,641	(0.5)	14,501	(0.7)	2,844	(0.4)
Refuse to state and no religion	69,541	(1.8)	19,475	(0.1)	25,689	(1.3)	6,104	(1.0)
Unknown	34,652	(0.9)	324,405	(2.1)	21,688	(1.1)	11,318	(1.8)
TOTAL	3,773,282	(100.0)	15,339,975	(100.0)[2]	2,050,699	(100.1)[2]	630,372	(100.1)[2]

[1] The only religious groups or categories shown are those that include 1 percent or more of at least one racial category. When such a group has less than 1 percent of the population in another category it is included with "other Christian" or "other" in that category.

[2] Figures do not add to 100 percent because of rounding.

Source: Adapted from South Africa, Department of Statistics, *Population Census 1970, Religion,* Pretoria, 1975.

Table 8. Primary and Secondary Schools, Enrollment, and Teachers, 1979

Racial Category	Schools	Pupils	Teachers
Whites	2,576	954,426	48,639
Blacks*	11,056	3,394,000	66,764
Coloureds	2,002	707,923	24,676
Asians	391	214,481	7,642
TOTAL	16,025	5,270,830	147,722

* Does not include the "independent" homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda.

Source: Adapted from Loraine Gordon (ed.), *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979,* Johannesburg, 1980, pp. 485-523.

Table 9. Per Capita Expenditures for Primary and Secondary Education by Race, FY 1977–78
(in hundreds of rand[1])

Racial Category	Primary Schools	Secondary School	Average
Whites	n.a.	n.a.	551.0
Blacks[2]	49.0	93.4	54.0
Coloureds	149.2	363.5	185.2
Asians	n.a.	n.a.	236.1

n.a.—not available.

[1] For value of the rand—see Glossary.

[2] Does not include students in homeland schools.

Source: Adapted from Loraine Gordon (ed.), *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979*, Johannesburg, 1980, pp. 485-523.

Table 10. Enrollment in Universities by Race, 1979

University	Language Medium	Whites	Blacks	Coloureds	Asians	Total
Cape Town	English	8,935	62	687	173	9,867
Durban-Westville ...	English	34	4	55	4,559	4,652
Fort Hare	English	0	2,695	3	0	2,698
Medical University of Southern Africa (MEDUNSA)	English	0	193	0	0	193
Natal	English	7,346	356	156	623	8,481
The North (Turfloop)	English	0	2,173	1	0	2,174
Orange Free State ...	Afrikaans	8,312	7	1	0	8,320
Port Elizabeth	Afrikaans, English	2,919	23	16	28	2,986
Potchefstroom	Afrikaans	6,521	10	1	2	6,534
Pretoria	Afrikaans	16,584	0	0	0	16,584
Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) .	Afrikaans	4,215	0	0	0	4,215
Rhodes	English	2,650	32	40	88	2,810
Stellenbosch	Afrikaans	11,539	11	47	4	11,604
University of South Africa[*]	Afrikaans, English	38,006	9,026	2,724	4,464	54,220
Western Cape	Afrikaans, English	12	35	3,387	137	3,571
Witwatersrand	English	11,172	145	117	714	12,148
Zululand	English	0	1,243	0	0	1,243
TOTALS		118,245	16,015	7,235	10,802	152,300

[*] Nonresidential institution; offers only correspondence courses.

Source: Adapted from Loraine Gordon (ed.), *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979*, Johannesburg, 1980, p. 545.

Table 11. Production of Principal Crops, Crop Years
1970-71-1978-79[1]
(in thousands of tons)

Product	1970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79[2]
Maize[3]	8,600	9,483	4,160	11,105	9,140	7,314	9,625	10,081	7,872
Sorghum	551	510	222	682	401	280	382	611	362
Wheat	1,396	1,670	1,746	1,871	1,596	1,792	2,239	1,860	1,690
Sunflower seed	138	157	253	263	221	270	484	453	315
Sugarcane	12,144	16,751	16,805	15,454	16,895	16,814	19,220	19,009	18,828
(Sugar)	(1,399)	(1,865)	(1,915)	(1,732)	(1,883)	(1,801)	(2,042)	(2,084)	(n.a.)
Cotton	46	49	53	120	122	55	104	153	155
Deciduous fruits	1,390	1,458	1,420	1,319	1,517	1,597	1,402	1,739	1,978
(Grapes)	(855)	(830)	(850)	(750)	(884)	(895)	(740)	(1,059)	(1,088)
Citrus	637	709	667	735	660	712	613	745	718
(Oranges)	(498)	(545)	(513)	(571)	(534)	(580)	(486)	(581)	(546)
Pineapples	174	187	174	194	177	182	159	167	202
Potatoes	606	675	559	648	712	684	757	701	696

n.a.—not available.

[1] Crops harvested at varying times, extending through parts of two years, except maize, which is harvested May-August.

[2] Preliminary.

[3] 1971-77 figures include production in homelands (estimated) and White area; 1978 and 1979 figures exclude estimated production in Transkei; production in Bophuthatswana also excluded in 1979.

Source: Based on information from South Africa, Division of Agricultural Marketing Research, *1980 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics*, Pretoria, n.d., pp. 14, 16, 18, 21-22, 24-26.

Table 12. Production of Selected Minerals, 1972-78

Mineral	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
In metric tons							
Gold	909.6	855.2	758.6	713.4	713.4	699.9	704.6
Silver	102.4	113.6	83.9	87.7	87.7	97.4	96.5[1]
In million carats							
Diamond	7.38	7.565	7.510	7.295	7.023	7.643	7.793
In million tons							
Iron Ore	11.223	10.955	11.553	12.298	15.663	26.481	24.206
Chrome	1.483	1.650	1.877	2.075	2.409	3.319	3.141[1]
Manganese	3.373	4.242	4.835	5.881	5.503	5.290	4.425[1]
Copper	.162	.176	.179	.179	.197	.205	.201[1]
Coal	58.440	62.352	66.056	69.440	76.453	85.411	90.265
Asbestos	.321	.333	.333	.355	.370	.380	.259[1]
Fluorspar	.211	.210	.208	.203	.291	.351	.379
Phosphates	1.966	7.955	7.618	11.626	12.362	14.583	18.063
Lime and limestone	15.615	16.825	17.520	17.892	18.543	17.274	18.101[1]
Salt	.370	.391	.221	.264	.224	.242	.486[2]

[1] Excludes production in Bophuthatswana.

[2] Includes production in Walvis Bay.

Source: Adapted from South Africa, Department of Statistics, *Bulletin of Statistics*, Quarter ended March 1976, 10, No. 1, pp. 5.2-5.3; South Africa, Department of Statistics, *Bulletin of Statistics*, Quarter ended March 1978, 12, No. 1, pp. 5.2-5.3; and South Africa, Department of Statistics, *Bulletin of Statistics*, Quarter ended March 1980, 14, No. 1, pp. 5.2-5.3.

Table 13. Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin in Current Prices, 1972-79
(in millions of rand)[1]

Industry	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977[2]	1978[2]	1979[2]
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	1,320	1,531	2,214	2,154	2,405	2,660	2,866	3,112
Mining and quarrying	1,513	2,244	3,068	3,059	3,306	4,038	5,616	8,092
Manufacturing	3,268	4,092	4,896	5,991	7,132	7,547	8,181	9,903
Electricity, gas, and water	408	478	587	610	794	1,137	1,476	1,711
Construction (contractors)	761	988	1,234	1,362	1,488	1,511	1,604	1,868
Wholesale and retail trade, catering, and accommodation	2,138	2,669	3,226	3,585	4,055	4,317	4,760	5,327
Transport, storage, and communication	1,387	1,766	2,047	2,406	2,733	3,282	3,606	3,960
Finance, insurance, real estate, and business services	2,221	2,599	3,102	3,339	3,752	4,182	4,861	5,673
Community, social, and personal services	272	301	341	389	463	523	617	675
(less imputed financial service charges)	259	336	366	363	533	636	766	868
Total business enterprises	13,029	16,332	20,299	22,532	25,595	28,561	32,821	39,453
General government	1,508	1,785	2,115	2,488	2,815	3,184	3,508	4,055
Other producers	486	561	641	742	831	900	951	1,033
Gross domestic product (at factor cost)	15,023	18,678	23,055	25,762	29,241	32,645	37,280	44,541

[1] For value of the rand—see Glossary.   [2] Preliminary.

Source: Adapted from South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin*, Pretoria, No. 137, September 1980, p. S-82.

Table 14. Destinations of Exports, 1975-79
(in millions of United States dollars and percentages)[1]

Country	1975		1976		1977		1978		1979	
EEC[2]										
Belgium	162		225		241		297		419	
Denmark	11		10		16		29		82	
France	156		171		246		318		529	
West Germany[3]	602		544		595		767		1,400	
Ireland	40		59		81		64		61	
Italy	125		165		171		227		837	
Netherlands	120		144		164		230		227	
Subtotal	1,216	(22.7)	1,318	(25.7)	1,514	(22.8)	1,932	(23.3)	3,555	(31.0)
United Kingdom	1,255	(23.5)	1,147	(22.4)	1,512	(22.8)	1,401	(16.9)	1,121	(9.8)
Total EEC	2,471	(46.2)	2,463	(48.0)	3,025	(45.7)	3,332	(40.2)	4,676	(40.9)
Switzerland	233	(4.4)	190	(3.7)	243	(3.7)	533	(6.4)	1,305	(11.4)
United States	590	(11.0)	527	(10.3)	911	(13.8)	1,559	(18.8)	1,908	(16.7)
Japan	665	(12.4)	592	(11.5)	737	(11.1)	876	(10.6)	1,130	(9.9)
Africa	573	(10.7)	521	(10.2)	599	(9.0)	615	(7.4)	617	(5.4)
Rest of world	814	(15.2)	837	(16.3)	1,108	(16.7)	1,367	(16.5)	1,794	(15.7)
GRAND TOTAL[4]	5,346	(100.0)	5,130	(100.0)	6,623	(100.0)	8,282	(100.0)	11,430	(100.0)
Special Category[4]	3,613		2,846		3,364		4,571		6,801	

[1] Figures as published.
[2] EEC—European Economic Community (also known as the Common Market).
[3] Federal Republic of Germany.
[4] Principally gold bullion not included as part of merchandise trade.

Source: Adapted from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1980*, Washington, 1980, pp. 338-39.

Table 15. Composition of Exports by SITC Commodity Groups, 1975-79[1]
(in millions of rand)[2]

Commodity Group	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979[3]
Food and Livestock					
Fruit	279.7	286.2	286.5	313.2	244.3
Other	801.2	710.1	754.7	748.5	389.1
Subtotal	1,080.9	996.3	1,041.2	1,061.7	633.4
Beverages and Tobacco	19.3	24.6	20.0	28.7	13.3
Crude Materials, inedible					
Hides and skins	25.8		49.8	69.3	51.8
Wool	136.6		223.8	230.6	130.9
Asbestos	96.9		149.4	138.3	62.0
Metal ores	213.5		447.6	445.6	252.8
Other	280.4		561.6	687.2	419.0
Subtotal	753.9	2,066.1	1,432.2	1,571.0	916.5
Fats and Oils	22.4	19.5	29.3	62.1	20.1
Chemicals	139.0	167.4	242.8	318.3	191.8
Manufactured Goods classified by material					
Textiles	15.5	19.7	29.0	32.3	22.3
Diamonds	336.5	467.2	814.5	952.0	599.9
Metals and metal products	465.5	734.8	975.7	1,190.2	760.5
Other	69.6	112.2	162.8	176.1	88.6
Subtotal	887.1	1,333.8	1,982.0	2,350.6	1,471.3
Machinery and Transport Equipment	196.8	214.5	295.2	282.5	186.4
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles					
Clothing	4.2	7.7	19.8	26.8	15.7
Other	38.5	38.0	42.1	56.6	33.1
Subtotal	42.7	45.7	61.9	83.4	48.8
Unclassified Goods	266.6	297.4	312.6	487.3	363.1
GRAND TOTAL	3,408.1	4,194.1	5,417.2	6,245.5	3,844.6
Not included in export total					
Gold bullion and coin	2,540.3	2,346.3	2,795.2	3,906.5	2,482.4

[1] SITC—United Nations Standard International Trade Classification. Figures as published.
[2] For value of the rand—see Glossary.
[3] Six months, January-June, preliminary.

Source: Adapted from South Africa, Department of Statistics, *Bulletin of Statistics*, Quarter ended September 1979, 13, No. 3, pp. 9.5–9.7; and South Africa Department of Statistics, *Bulletin of Statistics*, Quarter ended March 1980, 14, No. 1, pp. 9.5–9.7.

Table 16. Composition of Imports by SITC Commodity Groups, 1975-79[1]
(in millions of rand)[2]

Commodity Group	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979[3]
Food and Livestock	201.7	199.1	243.4	209.2	112.7
Beverages and Tobacco	49.0	47.4	40.6	45.8	19.8
Crude Materials, inedible	297.7	382.9	341.9	347.5	187.7
Fats and Oils	22.5	36.4	37.6	37.3	25.3
Chemicals	515.2	591.9	576.8	745.6	413.9
Manufactured Goods classified by materials					
Leather and rubber	54.1	58.5	53.0	63.6	38.1
Wood and cork	14.6	16.1	12.3	13.5	8.5
Paper and paperboard	97.7	109.9	102.0	112.1	58.6
Textiles	224.5	277.8	198.6	245.3	132.8
Nonmetallic mineral products	81.5	85.2	83.4	89.7	47.4
Metals and metal products	563.3	347.3	307.1	352.4	203.5
Subtotal	1,038.3	895.6	757.1	877.6	489.5
Machinery and Transport Equipment					
Machinery	2,075.8	2,150.1	1,835.3	2,322.1	1,204.2
Motor vehicles	712.5	697.3	577.3	873.1	452.4
Other	157.3	369.4	274.6	322.9	148.0
Subtotal	2,945.6	3,216.8	2,687.2	3,518.1	1,804.6
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles	425.0	433.2	387.8	441.6	242.0
Unclassified Goods	52.0	55.9	45.9	32.4	19.2
GRAND TOTAL[4]	5,547.0	5,859.4	5,118.3	6,255.2	3,314.6

[1] SITC—United Nations Standard International Trade Classification. Figures as published.
[2] For value of the rand—see Glossary.
[3] Six months. January-June, preliminary.
[4] Excluding oil and arms imports.

Source: Adapted from South Africa, Department of Statistics, *Bulletin of Statistics*, Quarter ended March 1980, 14, No. 1, pp. 9.2-9.4

Table 17. Sources of Imports, 1975-79
(in millions of United States dollars and percentages)[1]

Country	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
EEC[2]					
Belgium	144	102	117	132	164
Denmark	32	28	23	25	30
France	335	295	275	547	602
West Germany[3] ...	1,409	1,218	1,073	1,466	1,598
Ireland	18	12	13	13	24
Italy	276	244	244	254	329
Netherlands	193	170	132	172	200
Subtotal	2,408(32.0)	2,068(30.8)	1,878(32.0)	2,610(36.3)	2,947(35.2)
United Kingdom	1,494(19.8)	1,185(17.6)	971(16.6)	1,200(16.7)	1,507(18.0)
Total EEC	3,902(51.8)	3,253(48.4)	2,849(48.6)	3,810(53.0)	4,545(53.2)
United States	1,341(17.8)	1,458(21.7)	1,124(19.2)	1,136(15.8)	1,475(17.6)
Japan	840(11.2)	691(10.1)	720(12.3)	947(13.2)	953(11.4)
Africa	344(4.6)	356(5.3)	330(5.6)	282(3.9)	223(2.7)
Rest of world	1,102(14.6)	967(14.4)	844(14.4)	1,007(14.0)	1,275(15.2)
GRAND TOTAL[4]	7,529(100.0)	6,725(100.0)	5,867(100.0)	7,182(100.0)	8,380(100.0)

[1] Figures as published.
[2] EEC—European Economic Community (also known as the Common Market).
[3] Federal Republic of Germany.
[4] Excluding imports of oil and arms.

Source: Adapted from International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1980,* Washington, 1980, pp. 338-39.

Table 18. Balance of Payments, 1972-79
(in millions of rand)[1]

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977[2]	1978[2]	1979[2]
Merchandise exports, f.o.b.[3]	2,216	2,517	3,165	3,653	4,889	6,293	7,449	8,844
Net gold output	1,161	1,770	2,565	2,540	2,346	2,795	3,864	6,003
Receipts from services	762	962	1,114	1,400	1,497	1,595	1,949	2,334
Merchandise imports, f.o.b.[3]	-2,840	-3,550	-5,768	-6,742	-7,443	-6,881	-8,019	-9,739
Payments for services	-1,436	-1,765	-2,157	-2,802	-3,056	-3,429	-4,010	-4,604
Total goods and services (net)	-137	-66	-1,082	-1,951	-1,767	373	1,233	2,838
Transfers (net)	47	14	84	138	96	39	97	163
Balance on current account	-90	-52	-998	-1,813	-1,671	412	1,330	3,001
Long-term capital movements	628	214	761	1,746	989	296	5	-951
Central government and banking sector	96	-11	129	331	148	-58	-427	-100
Public corporations and local authorities	171	269	431	718	606	98	237	-125
Private sector	361	-44	201	697	235	256	195	-726
Basic balance	538	162	-237	-67	-682	708	1,335	2,050
Short-term capital movements not related to reserves[4]	-114	-221	54	-238	-374	-832	-861	-1,584
Central government and banking sector	56	-14	-74	-49	163	29	21	11
Public corporations and local authorities	8	-12	31	173	6	103	202	267
Private sector, including unrecorded transactions[5]	-178	-195	97	-362	-543	-964	-1,084	-1,862
Change in net gold and other foreign reserves owing to balance of payments transactions	424	-59	-183	-305	-1,056	-124	474	466
Liabilities related to reserves[4]	-65	-39	84	418	536	-221	-437	-441
SDR allocations and valuation adjustments	78	-14	31	85	30[1]	246	1,405	2,027
Change in gross gold and other foreign reserves	437	-112	-68	198	-219	-99	1,442	2,052

[1] For value of the rand—see Glossary.

[2] Preliminary.

[3] Free on board—adjusted customs figures.

[4] Liabilities related to gold and other foreign reserves are limited to the short-term foreign liabilities of the South African Reserve Bank and the short-term foreign loans of the central government and the monetary banking institutions from foreign banks and authorities.

[5] Including errors and omissions on both the current and capital accounts.

Source: Adapted from South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin* [Pretoria], No. 137, September 1980, pp. S-67.

Table 19. Foreign Investment, 1973–78
(in millions of rand)*

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Direct Investment						
Central Government and Banking Sector						
Long-term	133	161	182	207	236	272
Short-term	29	58	45	46	35	27
Subtotal	162	219	227	253	271	299
Private Sector						
Long-term						
Ordinary and other shares, nominal value	758	804	884	999	1,036	1,116
Share premium, reserves, and undistributed profit	3,226	3,674	3,912	4,432	4,725	5,155
Branch partnership balances	206	247	298	273	194	187
Debentures, loan-stock, and similar securities	27	23	35	34	35	101
Mortgages and long-term loans	501	554	602	624	760	740
Other	9	8	9	7	9	8
Subtotal	4,727	5,310	5,740	6,369	6,759	7,307
Short-term	724	1,174	1,476	1,559	1,671	2,077
Total Private Sector	5,451	6,484	7,216	7,928	8,430	9,384
TOTAL DIRECT INVESTMENT	5,613	6,703	7,443	8,181	8,701	9,683
Nondirect Investment						
Central Government and Banking Sector						
Long-term	644	916	1,502	1,801	2,462	2,344
Short-term	457	519	1,216	2,033	1,877	1,453
Subtotal	1,101	1,435	2,718	3,834	4,339	3,797
Public Corporations and Local Authorities						
Long-term	945	1,431	2,299	3,056	2,714	3,047
Short-term	70	101	143	177	340	564
Subtotal	1,015	1,532	2,442	3,233	3,054	3,611
Private Sector						
Long-term						
Ordinary and other shares, nominal value	320	308	291	288	276	296
Share premium, reserves, and undistributed profit	1,298	1,437	1,566	1,966	2,173	2,388
Debentures, loan-stock, and similar securities	85	100	114	105	100	90
Mortgages and long-term loans	372	524	953	1,140	1,530	1,845
Other	105	105	112	133	119	124
Subtotal	2,180	2,474	3,036	3,632	4,198	4,743
Short-term	517	631	824	950	1,040	1,052
Total Private Sector	2,697	3,105	3,860	4,582	5,238	5,795

*Table 19. Foreign Investment, 1973-78—*continued
(in millions of rand)*

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
TOTAL NONDIRECT INVESTMENT	4,813	6,072	9,020	11,649	12,631	13,203
Total Investment						
Central Government and Banking Sector						
Long-term	777	1,077	1,684	2,008	2,698	2,616
Short-term	486	577	1,261	2,079	1,912	1,480
Subtotal	1,263	1,654	2,945	4,087	4,610	4,096
Public Corporations and Local Authorities						
Long-term	945	1,431	2,299	3,056	2,714	3,047
Short-term	70	101	143	177	340	564
Subtotal	1,263	1,654	2,945	4,087	4,610	4,096
Private Sector						
Long-term						
Ordinary and other shares, nominal value	1,078	1,112	1,175	1,287	1,312	1,412
Share premium, reserves, and undistributed profit	4,524	5,111	5,478	6,398	6,898	7,543
Branch and partnership balances	206	247	298	273	194	187
Debentures, loan-stock, and similar securities ..	112	123	149	139	135	191
Mortgages and long-term loans	873	1,078	1,555	1,764	2,290	2,585
Other	114	113	121	140	128	132
Subtotal	6,907	7,784	8,776	10,001	10,957	12,050
Short-term	1,241	1,805	2,300	2,509	2 711	3,129
Total Private Sector ...	8,148	9,589	11,076	12,510	13,668	15,179
TOTAL FOREIGN LIABILITIES	10,426	12,775	16,463	19,830	21,332	22,886

* For value of the rand—see Glossary.

Source: Adapted from South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin* [Pretoria], No. 137, September 1980, pp. S-74–S-75.

Table 20. Foreign Investment by Geographic Source, End of 1978
(in millions of rand)*

	Total	EEC Coun-tries	Rest of Europe	North & South America	Africa	Asia	Oce-ania	Interna-tional Organi-zations	Unallo-cated
Direct Investment									
Central government and banking sector									
Long-term	272	254	7	10	—	—	1	—	—
Short-term	27	1	10	2	14	—	—	—	—
Subtotal	299	255	17	12	14	—	1	—	—
Private Sector									
Long-term									
Ordinary and other shares, nominal value	1,116	682	170	236	5	8	15	—	—
Share premium, reserves, and undistributed profit	5,155	3,368	385	1,288	55	30	29	—	—
Branch and partnership balances	187	71	1	111	1	1	2	—	—
Debentures, loan-stock, and similar securities	101	67	—	34	—	—	—	—	—
Mortgages and long-term loans	740	501	76	140	6	10	7	—	—
Other	8	4	1	1	1	1	—	—	—
Subtotal	7,307	4,693	633	1,810	68	50	53	—	—
Short-term	2,077	1,067	180	493	243	69	9	—	—
Total Private Sector	9,384	5,760	813	2,303	311	119	62	—	16
TOTAL DIRECT INVESTMENT	9,683	6,015	830	2,315	325	119	63	—	16
Nondirect Investment									
Central government and banking sector									
Long-term	2,344	1,457	156	635	32	5	—	—	59
Short-term	1,453	238	86	105	201	12	10	798	3
Subtotal	3,797	1,695	242	740	233	17	10	798	62
Public Corporations and Local Authorities									
Long-term	3,047	1,995	511	394	13	110	2	—	22
Short-term	564	446	69	45	—	4	—	—	—
Subtotal	3,611	2,441	580	439	13	114	2	—	22
Private Sector									
Long-term									
Ordinary and other shares, nominal value	296	161	51	57	14	2	1	—	10
Share premium, reserves, and undistributed profit	2,388	1,219	372	640	82	10	5	—	60
Debentures, loan-stock, and similar securities	90	30	3	50	5	—	1	—	1
Mortgages and long-term loans	1,845	856	144	685	3	144	1	—	12
Other	124	56	2	5	49	6	3	—	3
Subtotal	4,743	2,322	572	1,437	153	162	11	—	86
Short-term	1,052	329	70	483	28	99	6	—	37
Total Private Sector	5,795	2,651	642	1,920	181	261	17	—	123
TOTAL NONDIRECT INVESTMENT	13,203	6,787	1,464	3,099	427	392	29	798	207

Table 20. Foreign Investment by Geographic Source, End of 1978—continued
(in millions of rand)*

	Total	EEC Coun-tries	Rest of Europe	North & South America	Africa	Asia	Oce-ania	Interna-tional Organi-zations	Unallo-cated
Total Investment									
Central Government and Banking Sector									
Long-term	2,616	1,711	163	645	32	5	1	—	59
Short-term	1,480	239	96	107	215	12	10	798	3
Subtotal	4,096	1,950	259	752	247	17	11	798	62
Public Corporations and Local Authorities									
Long-term	3,047	1,995	511	394	13	110	2	—	22
Short-term	564	446	69	45	—	4	—	—	—
Subtotal	3,611	2,441	580	439	13	114	2	—	22
Private Sector									
Long-term									
Ordinary and other shares, nominal value	1,412	843	221	293	19	10	16	—	10
Share premium, reserves, and undistributed profit	7,543	4,587	757	1,928	137	40	34	—	60
Branch and partnership balances	187	71	1	111	1	1	2	—	—
Debentures, loan-stock, and similar securities	191	97	3	84	5	—	1	—	1
Mortgages and long-term loans	2,585	1,357	220	825	9	154	8	—	12
Other	132	60	3	6	50	7	3	—	3
Subtotal	12,050	7,015	1,205	3,247	221	212	64	—	86
Short-term	3,129	1,396	250	976	271	168	15	—	53
Total Private Sector	15,179	8,411	1,455	4,223	492	380	79	—	139
TOTAL FOREIGN LIABILITIES	22,886	12,802	2,294	5,414	752	511	92	798	223

* For value of the rand—see Glossary.

Source: Adapted from South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin* [Pretoria], No. 137, September 1980, pp. S74–S75.

Table 21. Employment by Racial Group in Selected Industry
Divisions, Selected Years, 1970–78
(in thousands)[1]

Industry		1970	1972	1974	1976	1978
Agriculture						
Regular	White	41.6[2]	11.9	12.4	13.8	n.a.
	Black	708.5[2]	626.7	601.6	564.9	n.a.
	Asian	4.5[2]	3.7	3.7	3.4	n.a.
	Coloured	102.5[2]	94.0	95.1	101.3	n.a.
	Total	830.1[2]	736.2	712.9	683.4	n.a.
Casual	White	1.8[2]	.6	.9	.9	n.a.
	Black	650.4[2]	549.1	527.0	415.7	n.a.
	Asian	1.6[2]	.4	.2	.2	n.a.
	Coloured	125.2[2]	94.0	95.1	84.2	n.a.
	Total	779.0[2]	664.1	623.2	500.9	n.a.
Manufacturing	White	254.3	258.2	260.8	276.9	274.0
	Black	567.2	614.4	683.8	717.9	694.6
	Asian	64.3	66.9	71.6	72.9	69.3
	Coloured	183.1	188.0	207.7	205.7	206.1
	Total	1,068.9	1,127.5	1,223.9	1,273.4	1,244.0
Mining and quarrying ..	White	62.4	59.8	62.2	65.7	67.4
	Black	585.9	555.2	604.1	597.5	588.2
	Asian	.6	.6	.5	.6	.7
	Coloured	6.5	7.6	7.3	7.5	8.2
	Total	655.3	623.1	674.1	671.2	664.6
Construction	White	50.2	52.4	58.6	60.5	54.2
	Black	213.1	235.1	303.2	327.7	288.0
	Asian	5.8	6.1	6.0	5.8	5.0
	Coloured	48.7	50.3	54.4	52.9	45.5
	Total	317.8	343.9	422.2	446.9	392.7
Motor trade..........	White	41.0	43.8	44.6	43.9	44.3
	Black	45.0	49.4	49.6	51.7	49.5
	Asian	2.8	3.3	3.9	3.6	4.2
	Coloured	9.3	10.2	10.5	11.6	12.1
	Total	98.1	106.7	108.6	110.8	110.1
Retail trade	White	111.4	118.9	127.7	134.2	134.4
	Black	127.7	141.3	151.9	160.3	160.3
	Asian	15.8	17.3	18.5	19.3	19.3
	Coloured	34.2	39.2	43.8	46.1	46.8
	Total	289.1	316.7	341.9	359.8	360.8

**Table 21. Employment by Racial Group in Selected Industry
Divisions, Selected Years, 1970–78—continued
(in thousands)[1]**

Industry		1970	1972	1974	1976	1978
Wholesale trade	White	75.6	78.7	81.0	82.8	83.0
	Black	80.7	84.8	88.3	90.6	91.3
	Asian	8.7	9.7	10.8	11.1	11.4
	Coloured	18.0	20.0	22.0	22.7	22.5
	Total	183.0	193.2	202.1	207.2	208.2
Banking institutions ...	White	42.2	44.1	48.2	49.1	47.6
	Black	5.0	5.2	6.1	6.8	6.9
	Asian	.2	.4	1.0	1.4	1.6
	Coloured	1.2	1.4	2.3	3.0	2.9
	Total	48.5	51.1	57.6	60.3	59.0
South African Rail- ways and Harbours ..	White	109.1	111.0	107.0	113.0	116.5
	Black	97.0	100.6	105.7	120.9	126.4
	Asian	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.7	1.9
	Coloured	14.4	15.5	16.9	20.3	24.6
	Total	221.7	228.4	231.9	255.9	269.3
Central government ...	White	99.3	104.1	102.6	119.1	122.5
	Black	135.5	109.6	107.7	120.3	127.0
	Asian	7.3	8.0	8.5	9.1	10.2
	Coloured	30.7	34.1	43.1	46.9	53.9
	Total	272.8	255.8	261.9	295.5	313.5
Post office	White	38.4	41.0	41.6	43.1	44.8
	Black	12.5	14.7	16.8	18.9	20.6
	Asian	.5	.6	.7	.9	1.1
	Coloured	4.0	4.2	5.3	5.9	6.9
	Total	55.3	60.4	64.3	68.9	73.3

n. a.—Not available.

[1] Figures as published.

[2] 1969.

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of
South Africa,* Johannesburg, 1979, pp. 472–73.

Table 22. Average Annual Earnings by Racial Group in
Nonagricultural Sectors, 1977
(in rand)*

Sector and Industry	White	Coloured	Asian	Black	Black earnings as a percentage of White earnings	Absolute difference between White and Black earnings
Mining (all)	8,916	2,720	3,420	1,272	14.3	7,644
Coal	10,860	6,852	3,480	1,260	11.6	9,600
Gold	9,336	3,928	3,228	1,224	13.1	8,112
Diamond	7,536	2,508	4,908	1,500	20.4	6,036
Manufacturing (all)	7,932	2,124	2,520	1,788	22.5	6,144
Basic metals	8,220	3,252	3,770	2,064	25.1	6,156
Metal products	7,644	3,096	2,868	1,848	24.1	5,796
Machinery	7,716	3,252	3,816	2,064	26.7	5,652
Electrical machinery . .	7,188	2,496	3,024	2,280	31.7	4,908
Clothing	6,756	1,452	1,704	972	14.4	5,784
Textile	7,368	1,740	2,556	1,284	17.4	6,084
Motor	7,320	2,376	3,176	1,848	25.2	5,472
Chemicals	7,992	2,460	3,756	2,112	26.4	5,880
Food	6,912	1,764	2,724	1,428	20.6	5,484
Beverages	6,960	2,256	3,804	1,872	26.8	5,088
Tobacco	6,720	2,028	---	2,016	30.0	4,704
Leather	7,326	1,788	2,184	1,452	19.8	5,874
Footwear	6,600	1,980	2,124	1,584	24.0	5,016
Wood and cork	6,684	1,500	2,868	1,152	17.2	5,532
Furniture	6,612	2,592	2,620	1,560	23.6	5,052
Paper	7,992	2,340	2,424	2,220	27.8	5,772
Plastic products	7,788	2,064	2,316	1,944	25.0	5,844
Nonmetallic mineral products	7,548	2,016	3,096	1,548	20.5	6,000
Rubber	7,284	2,352	2,376	1,956	26.8	5,328
Printing	6,612	2,784	3,612	2,304	34.8	4,308
Construction	8,436	2,868	3,996	1,488	17.6	6,948
Trading and Services						
Banking	6,756	2,856	3,420	2,268	34.5	4,488
Building societies	5,436	2,580	3,996	1,752	32.2	3,684
Insurance	7,968	3,226	5,064	2,544	31.9	5,424
Wholesale trade	6,372	1,992	2,796	1,560	24.5	4,812
Hotels	3,612	1,116	2,064	816	22.6	2,796
Retail trade	3,456	1,512	2,352	1,092	31.6	2,364
Motor trade	6,384	2,088	3,216	1,512	23.7	4,872
Public Authorities						
Central government . .	5,496	2,424	4,992	2,052	37.3	3,444
Provincial authorities .	5,928	1,812	3,636	1,248	21.0	4,680
Local authorities	7,356	2,268	2,388	1,464	19.9	5,892
Railways, harbors, and airways	6,780	1,620	2,376	1,572	23.1	5,208
Post and telegraphs . . .	5,484	1,968	3,348	1,488	27.1	3,996

* For value of the rand—see Glossary.

--- Equals none

Source: Adapted from Loraine Gordon et al., *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1978*, Johannesburg, 1979, pp. 188-97, 213, 219-22, 226-33; and International Labour Conference, 65th Session, 1979, *Fifteenth Special Report of the Director-General on the Application of the Declaration Concerning the Policy of Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa*, Geneva, 1979, pp. 14-15.

Table 23. Composition of the National Executive, December 1980

Office	Officeholder
State President	Marais Viljoen
State Vice President	Alwyn L. Schlebusch

Executive Council

Prime Minister	Pieter Willem Botha
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries	P. T. C. Du Plessis
. . . . Community Development and State Auxiliary Service	S. F. Kotze
. . . . Cooperation and Development	Piet J. G. Koornhof
. . . . Defence	Magnus Malan
. . . . Education and Training	Ferdinand Hartzenberg
. . . . Finance	Owen Horwood
. . . . Foreign Affairs and Information	Roelof F. Botha
. . . . Health, Welfare, and Pensions	L.A.P.A. Munnik
. . . . Industries, Commerce, and Tourism	David J. De Villiers
. . . . Internal Affairs	J. Chris Heunis
. . . . Justice	H. J. Coetsee
. . . . Manpower Utilization	S. P. Botha
. . . . Mineral and Energy Affairs	F. W. DeKlerk
. . . . National Education	Gerrit Viljoen
. . . . Police and Prisons	Louis le Grange
. . . . Posts and Telecommunications	H. H. Smit
. . . . State Administration and Statistics	Andries Treurnicht
. . . . Transport Affairs	Hendrik Schoeman
. . . . Water Affairs, Forestry, and Environmental Conservation	C. V. Van der Merwe

Table 24. Results of General Elections, 1910–77
(in numbers of seats won in parliament)

	1910	1915	1920	1921	1924	1929	1933	1938	1943	1948	1953	1958	1961	1966	1970	1974	1977
National Party[1]	–	27	44	45	63	78	75	27	43	70	94	103	105	126	117	120	134
South African Party	67	54	41	79	53	61	61	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3
United Party	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	111	89	65	57	53	49	39	47	44	–
Unionist Party	39	39	25	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Labour Party	4	4	21	9	18	8	2	3	9	6	5	–	–	–	–	–	–
Progressive Federal Party[2]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	1	7	17
New Republic Party	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10
Other	11	6	3	1	1	1	12	9	9	9	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
TOTAL SEATS	121	130	134	134	135	148	150	150	150	156	156	156	156	166	165[3]	171	164[3]

[1] Known as Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (Purified National Party) 1934-40 and Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party) 1940-51.
[2] Known as Progressive Party until 1975 and Progressive Reform Party 1975-77.
[3] Death of a candidate necessitated a subsequent election, won by National Party.

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1979, p. 188.

Table 25. Principal Newspapers, 1980

	Language	Publisher	Circulation[1]	Orientation
Johannesburg				
Beeld (m)	Afrikaans	Nasionale Pers[2]	65,000	National Party
Die Transvaler (m)	–do–	Perskor[3]	69,000	–do–
Die Vaderland (a)	–do–	–do–	57,000	–do–
Post (Transvaal) (a)	English	Argus[4]	114,000	opposition; Black readership
Rand Daily Mail (m)	–do–	SAAN[5]	132,000	opposition
Star (a)	–do–	Argus	175,000	–do–
The Citizen (m)	–do–	Perskor	47,000	National Party
Rapport (Sundays)	Afrikaans	Nasionale Pers and Perskor	415,000	–do–
Sunday Express (Sundays) ..	English	SAAN	92,000	opposition
Sunday Times (Sundays) ...	–do–	–do–	469,000	–do–
Cape Town				
The Argus (a)	English	Argus	103,000	opposition
The Cape Times (m)	–do–	SAAN	64,000	–do–
Die Burger (m)	Afrikaans	Nasionale Pers	69,000	National Party
The Cape Herald (weekly) .	English	Argus	70,000	opposition; Coloured readership
Durban				
The Daily News (a)	English	Argus	93,000	opposition
The Natal Mercury (m)	–do–	independent	65,000	–do–
Post (Natal) (Sundays)	English	Argus	45,000	opposition; Indian readership
Sunday Tribune (Sundays) .	–do–	–do–	129,000	opposition
Ilanga (biweekly))	Zulu and English	–do–	100,000	opposition; Black readership
Pretoria				
Pretoria News (a)	English	Argus and SAAN	26,000	opposition
Oggenblad (m)	Afrikaans	Perskor	4,000	National Party
Hoofstad (a)	–do–	–do–	15,000	–do–
Port Elizabeth				
Eastern Province Herald (m)	English	SAAN	27,000	opposition
Evening Post (a)	–do–	–do–	25,000	–do–
Oosterlig (a)	Afrikaans	Nasionale Pers	11,000	National Party
East London				
Daily Dispatch (m)	English	independent	31,000	opposition
Bloemfontein				
Die Volksblad (a)	Afrikaans	Nasionale Pers	25,000	National Party
The Friend (m)	English	Argus	7,000	opposition

(m)—morning   (a)—afternoon.
[1] Circulation figures for July–December 1979 rounded to nearest thousand.
[2] Nasionale Pers—Nasionale Koerante Beperk, Parow, Cape.
[3] Perskor—Perskor Publishers, Johannesburg.
[4] Argus—The Argus Printing and Publishing Company, Johannesburg.
[5] SAAN—South Africa Associated Newspapers, Johannesburg.

Source: Adapted from *South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1979.

Table 26. Principal Ground Force Weapons, 1980

Type	Description	Country of Origin	In Inventory
Tanks			
Elephant	Modified Centurion Mk V main battle tank; refitted with fire control, armor, 105 mm gun	Britain[1]	150–200
Comet	Refitted as armored repair vehicle	–do–	20
Armored personnel carriers			
Eland Mk IV/VI	South African version of Panhard AML 60/90; 60mm or 90mm cannon, 7.62mm machine gun	South Africa[2]	1,600
Sandock Ratel	Maximum speed 100 km/hr; turret-mounted 20mm cannon, two 7.62mm machine guns	South Africa	600
Rhino/Hippo	Mine-resistant armor; varied armament; Hippo version used by South African Police	–do–	500
Alvis FV–603 Saracen	Two turret-mounted 7.62mm machine guns	Britain	280
Daimler Ferret	Armored scout car	–do–	In reserve
Artillery			
25-pounder	Light (88mm) towed gun; range 12,250 meters	–do–	125
Sexton 25-pounder	Light self-propelled gun	–do–	50
BL 5.5 inch	Medium (140mm) towed gun; range 16,500 meters	–do–	50
155mm	Medium towed gun	–do–	40
155mm G5	Medium towed howitzer; enhanced range	South Africa	n.a.
17-pounder	76mm antitank gun	Britain	In reserve
127mm	Truck-mounted 24-tube rocket launcher; range 20,000 meters; modeled on Soviet BM–21	South Africa	n.a.
12.7mm	Light antiaircraft gun mounted on armored vehicles	–do–	n.a.
20mm	Light antiaircraft gun	–do–	n.a.
Oerlikon 35mm	Twin-barreled, automatic, radar-controlled antiaircraft gun	Switzerland	55
Bofors 40mm	Light antiaircraft gun; also effective against ground targets	Britain	25
Mortars			
81mm	Medium mortar; range 4,600 meters	South Africa	n.a.
120mm	Heavy mortar; range 7,000 meters	–do–	n.a.

Table 26. Principal Ground Force Weapons, 1980—continued

Type	Description	Country of Origin	In Inventory
Missiles			
Cactus	South African version of Matra Crotale SAM; vehicle launched, infrared guidance; mach 2.3; range 500 meters-8.5 kilometers; effective against low-flying aircraft	France[3]	18 (in three batteries)
Tigercat	Close-range SAM; optical or radar/TV tracking; trailer-mounted, 3-missile firing unit	Britain[4]	54
Aérospatiale ENTAC	Wire-guided antitank missile; individually ground fired or launched from vehicle; range 400-2,000 meters	–do–	n.a.
Aérospatiale Milan	Wire-guided antitank missile; crew served, ground fired; range 25-2,000 meters	–do–	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

SAM—surface-to-air missile.

[1] Jordan delivered forty-one in 1974; India reportedly furnished 100 in 1978.

[2] Built in South Africa under license from France.

[3] South Africa paid for 85 percent of research and development costs.

[4] Delivered from Jordan in 1974.

Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1980-81*, London, 1980; and *Jane's Weapon Systems 1980-81*, London, 1980.

Table 27. Principal Air Weapon Systems, 1980

Type	Description	Country of Origin	In Inventory
Bombers			
BAC Canberra B(I)12	Twin-engine light bomber; combat radius 1,295 km; bomb load 3,600 kg; four 20mm cannon	Britain	9[1]
Hawker Siddeley Buccaneer S-50	Light bomber; combat radius, 3,700 km; bomb load 7,257 kg	–do–	6
Fighters and Fighter-bombers			
Dassault-Breguet Mirage F-1AZ	Single-engine jet fighter; combat radius 640 km; two 30mm cannon, AAMs; weapons payload 4,000 kg	France[2]	32
Dassault-Breguet Mirage F-1CZ	Multipurpose use as all-weather fighter, fighter-bomber, and armed reconnaissance	–do–	14
Dessault-Breguet Mirage III	Single engine jet fighter-bomber; combat radius 1,200 km; two 30mm cannon, AAMs; weapons pay—load 4,000 kg	–do–	51[3]
Multipurpose Aircraft			
Atlas Impala I/II	South African version of Aermacchi MB-326M/K; used in variety of training, reconnaissance, and com—bat roles; Mk II armament includes AAMs; subsonic speed suitable for COIN[4] missions	Italy/ South Africa[5]	200–300
North American T-6 Harvard	Piston engine trainer and light ground attack aircraft; range 1,400 km; three 7.62mm machine guns	United States/ Britain	60
Avro Shackleton MR-3	Four-engine turbojet used for maritime reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare; range 6,000 km; weapons payload 4,500 kg of bombs, depth charges, or torpedos	Britain	7
Aermacchi AM-3C Bosbok	Single-piston engine, light tactical support and observation aircraft, two 7.62mm machine guns, rockets, bombs	Italy	20
Transports and Utility Aircraft			
Atlas C4M Kudu	General purpose light transport derivative of Italian Aermacchi AM-3C	South Africa	30

Table 27. Principal Air Weapon Systems, 1980—continued

Type	Description	Country of Origin	In Inventory
Douglas DC-3	Twin-piston engine cargo/personnel transport	United States	28[6]
Douglas DC-4	Four-piston engine transport	–do–	5
Swearingen Merlin IVA	Twin-engine turboprop general and medevac transport	–do–	5
Lockheed C-130B Hercules	Four-engine turboprop transport	–do–	7
Hawker Siddeley 125 Mercurius	Twin-engine turbofan troop carrier and medevac transport	Britain	4
Vickers Viscount 781	Four-engine turboprop transport	–do–	1
Dassault-Breguet Transall C-160	Twin-engine turboprop transport	France	4
Piaggio P-166S Albatross	Twin-piston engine coastal patrol, search and rescue aircraft	Italy	18
Cessna 185A/D/E Skywagon	Single-piston engine light utility aircraft	United States	20
Helicopters			
Westland AS.1 Wasp	General purpose and antisubmarine warfare	Britain	11
Aérospatiale Alouette II/III	Light multipurpose aircraft	France	67[7]
Aérospatiale SA-330 Puma	Medium all-weather tactical transport	–do–	40
Aérospatiale SA-321L Super Felon	Medium military transport	–do–	15
Agusta-Bell AB-205A	Multipurpose utility aircraft	Italy	25
Missiles			
Matra R.530	AAM; range 18 km	France	n.a.
Matra R.550 Magic	AAM, range 10 km	–do–	n.a.
Aérospatiale Nord AS-20/30	ASM; range 7-10.8 km; radio command guidance	–do–	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

AAM—air-to-air missile.

ASM—air-to-surface missile.

[1] Includes three trainers (T-4) refitted for combat.

[2] Assembled under license in South Africa.

[3] Includes twenty-nine reserved for training.

[4] Counterinsurgency.

[5] Mk II produced in South Africa under license.

[6] Includes five used as trainers.

[7] Includes ten used as trainers.

Source: Mark Hewish et al., *Air Forces of the World: An Illustrated Directory of the World's Military Power*, New York, 1979; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1980-81*, London, 1980; and *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1980-81*, London, 1980.

Table 28. Principal Naval Weapon Systems, 1980

Type	Description	Country of Origin	In Inventory
Frigates	President class (ex-British Rothesay class); displacement 2,800 tons; two 4.5-inch (115mm) guns, two 40mm antiaircraft guns, six torpedo tubes, antisubmarine mortar, one Wasp helicopter.	Britain[1]	3
Submarines	Daphne class; displacement 869 tons; twelve torpedo tubes	France	3
Fast attack craft	Minister class (Israeli Reshef class); displacement 430 tons; six Scorpion SSMs, two 76mm guns, two 20mm guns, four 12.7mm guns	Israel/ South Africa	6[2]
Large patrol craft	Ex-British Ford class; displacement 160 tons; one 40mm gun; two have antisubmarine warfare armament	Britain	5[3]
Harbor patrol vessels	New class of 9-meter craft; two machine guns, antisubmarine armament	South Africa	1[4]
Minesweepers	Ex-British Ton class for coastal operations; displacement 440 tons, one 40mm gun, two 20mm guns	Britain	10
Missiles	Scorpion SSM; South African version of Israeli Gabriel Mk II; active radar, passive homing, optical guidance; range 40 km	South Africa[5]	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

SSM—ship-to-ship missile.

[1] Refitted in South Africa.

[2] Three built in Israel, three in South Africa; six more on order.

[3] One used as survey ship.

[4] More being built.

[5] Produced under license from Israel.

Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1980-81*, London, 1980; and *Jane's Fighting Ships 1980-81*, London, 1980.

Table 29. Military Manpower and Defense Expenditures, 1966-80

Year	Military Service Requirement	Active Military Forces[1]	Military Reserves	Paramilitary Forces[2]	Paramilitary Reserves	Defense Expenditure (in billions of rand)[3]	Defense as Percent of GNP[4]
1966–67	6 months	22,200	40,000	80,100	15,000	0.256	2.8
1968	9 to 12 months	38,200	40,000	90,700	12,000	0.253	2.5
1969	–do–	39,700	40,000	90,700	12,000	0.272	2.4
1970	–do–	43,800	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.257	2.0
1971	–do–	44.250	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.316	2.4
1972	–do–	17,300[5]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.362	2.1
1973	–do–	18,000[5]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.481	2.5
1974	–do–	47,500	61,000	n.a.	n.a.	0.702	2.6
1975	12 months	50,500	173,400	n.a.	n.a.	0.948	3.8
1976	–do–	51,500	173,500	n.a.	n.a.	1.400	4.7
1977	24 months	55,500	173,500	125,500	20,000	1.650	4.9
1978	–do–	65,500[6]	173,500	145,500	20,000	1.600	4.2
1979	–do–	63,250[6]	135,000	145,500	20,000	1.800	4.0
1980	–do–	86,000[6]	155,000	145,500	20,000	2.070[7]	3.5

n.a.—not available.
[1] Includes Permanent Force and Citizen Force (conscripts) on active duty.
[2] Includes comandos and South African Police.
[3] For value of the rand—see Glossary.
[4] Gross national product.
[5] Permanent Force only.
[6] Includes 2,000 women auxiliaries.
[7] Budgeted.

Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, (annuals 1966–67 through 1980–81), London, (1966 through 1980).

Bibliography

Chapter 1

Birmingham, David, and Shula Marks. "Southern Africa." Pages 567–620 in Roland Oliver (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, III* (from c. 1050 to c. 1600). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Bonner, Philip. "Black Trade Unions in South Africa Since World War II." Pages 174–93 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

Carter, Gwendolen M. *The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948*. (Rev. ed.) New York: Praeger, 1959.

Clark, J. Desmond. "*The Legacy of Prehistory: An Essay on the Background to the Individuality of African Cultures.*" Pages 11–86 in J.D. Fage (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, II* (from c. 500 B.C. to A.D. 1050.) Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Cope, John. *South Africa*. New York: Praeger, 1967.

Davenport, T.R.H. "The Consolidation of a New Society: The Cape Colony." Pages 272–333 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa, I* (South Africa to 1870). New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

_____. *South Africa: A Modern History*. (2d ed.) Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978.

Ethrington, N. "Social Theory and the Study of Christian Missions in Africa: A South African Case Study," *Africa* [London], 47, No. 1, 1977, 31–40.

Farwell, Byron. *The Great Anglo-Boer War*. New York: Harper and Row, 1976.

Giliomee, Hermann. "The Afrikaner Economic Advance," Pages 145–76 in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), *Ethnic Power Mobilized*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

_____. "The Growth of Afrikaner Identity." Pages 83–127 in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), *Ethnic Power Mobilized*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

Hepple, Alex. *South Africa: A Political and Economic History*. New York: Praeger, 1966.

Hexham, Irving. "Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism," *African Affairs* [London], 79, No. 315, 1980, 195–208.

Horrell, Muriel. *Introduction to South Africa: Basic Facts and Figures*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1968.

Houghton, D. Hobart. "Economic Development, 1865–1965." Pages 1–48 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.),

Oxford History of South Africa, II (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Inskeep, R.R. "The Archaeological Background." Pages 1–39 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa, I* (South Africa to 1870). New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Kaplan, Irving, et al. *Area Handbook for South Africa.* (DA Pam 550–93.) Washington: GPO for Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1970.

Katzen, M.F. "White Settlers and the Origin of a New Society." Pages 187–232 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa, I* (South Africa to 1870). New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Keppel-Jones, Arthur. *South Africa: A Short History.* London: Hutchinson University Library, 1968.

de Kiewiet, C.W. *A History of South Africa: Social and Economic.* London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

Kuper, Leo. "African Nationalism in South Africa 1910–1964." Pages 424–76 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa, II* (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Legum, Colin (ed.). *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1971–72.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1972.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1972–73.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1973.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1973–74.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1974.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1974–75.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1975.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1975–76.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1976.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1976–77.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1977.

Marks, Shula, and Richard Gray. "Southern Africa and Madagascar." Pages 384–468 in Richard Gray (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, IV* (from c. 1600 to c. 1790). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Marquard, Leo. *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa.* (3d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

_____. *The Story of South Africa.* (2d ed., rev.) London: Faber and Faber, 1967.

Meer, Fatima. *Portrait of Indian South Africans.* Durban: Avon House, 1969.

Moodie, T. Dunbar. *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Oliver, Roland, and Brian Fagan. "The Emergence of Bantu Africa." Pages 342–409 in J.D. Fage (ed.), *The Cambridge History*

of Africa, II (from c. 500 B.c. to A.D. 1050). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Omer-Cooper, J.D. "Colonial South Africa and Its Frontiers." Pages 353–93 in John E. Flint (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, V* (from c. 1790 to c. 1870). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

_____. "The Nguni Outburst." Pages 319–52 in John E. Flint (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, V* (from c. 1790 to c. 1870.) Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Pakenham, Thomas. *The Boer War.* New York: Random House, 1979.

Roux, Edward. *Time Longer Than Rope.* (2d ed., rev.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964.

Spence, Jack. "South Africa and the Modern World." Pages 477–529 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa II* (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Stanbridge, Roland. "Contemporary African Political Organizations and Movements." Pages 66–98 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination.* Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

Thompson, Leonard. "The Compromise of Union." Pages 325–64 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa, II* (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

_____. "Cooperation and Conflict: The High Veld." Pages 391–446 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa, I* (South Africa to 1870). New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

_____. "Cooperation and Conflict: The Zulu Kingdom and Natal." Pages 334–90 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa, I* (South Africa to 1870). New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

_____. "Great Britain and the Afrikaner Republic, 1870–1899." Pages 289–324 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa, II* (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

_____. "The Subjection of the African Chiefdoms, 1870–1898." Pages 245–88 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa, II* (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

de Villiers, Rene. "Afrikaner Nationalism." Pages 365–423 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa II* (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Welsh, David. "The Growth of Towns," Pages 172–244 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South*

405

Africa, *II* (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Wilson, Francis. "Farming, 1866–1966." Pages 104–71 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, *II* (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Wilson, Monica. "Cooperation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape Frontier." Pages 233–71 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, *I* (South Africa to 1870). New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

_____. "The Growth of Peasant Communities." Pages 49–103 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, *II* (South Africa 1870–1966). New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

_____. "The Hunters and the Herders." Pages 40–74 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, *I* (South Africa to 1870). New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

_____. "The Nguni People." Pages 75–130 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, *I* (South Africa to 1870). New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

_____. "The Sotho, Venda, and Tsonga." Pages 131–86 in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.), *Oxford History of South Africa*, *I* (South Africa to 1870). New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Chapter 2

Adam, Heribert. "Ideologies of Dedication vs. Blueprints of Experience," *Social Dynamics* [Rondebosch, South Africa], 2, No. 2, December 1976, 83–91.

_____. "The Rise of Black Consciousness in South Africa." Pages 72–76 in A. Paul Hare et al. (eds.), *South Africa: Sociological Analyses*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Adam, Heribert, and Hermann Giliomee. *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

Adams, R.C. "The 'Coloureds' of South Africa." Pages 253–69 in Brian M. du Toit (ed.), *Ethnicity in Modern Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Anglin, Douglas G., Timothy M. Shaw, and Carl G. Widstrand (eds.). *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa: Papers from a Scandinavian-Canadian Conference.* Washington: University Press of America, 1978.

Argyle, J., and E. Preston-Whyte (eds.). *Social System and Tradition in Southern Africa.* Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Behr, Abraham L. *New Perspectives in South African Education.* Durban: Butterworths, 1978.

"Blackboard Bungle: African Education," *Financial Mail* [Johannesburg], 76, No. 2, April 11, 1980, 145–48.

Bonner, Philip. "Black Trade Unions in South Africa Since World War II." Pages 175–93 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination.* Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

British Broadcasting Corporation. "The White Tribe of Africa." David Harrison (producer) and David Dimbleby (presenter). Television program). London: 1979.

Burns, John F. "In South Africa, a Zigzag in Racial Change," *New York Times,* September 21, 1980, A1, A20.

Butler, Jeffrey. "The Significance of Recent Changes within the White Ruling Caste." Pages 79–106 in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds.), *Change in Contemporary South Africa.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

_____. "Social Status, Ethnic Division and Political Conflict in New Nations: Afrikaners and Englishmen in South Africa." Pages 147–69 in W. Bell et al. (eds.), *Ethnicity and Nation-Building.* Beverly Hills: 1974.

Butler, Jeffrey, Robert I. Rotberg, and John Adams. *The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu.* (Perspectives on Southern Africa, 21.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Carter, Gwendolen M. *Which Way is South Africa Going?* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980.

Carter, Gwendolen M., and Patrick O'Meara (eds.). *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.

"Compulsory Education for Blacks to Begin in South Africa on Jan. 1," *New York Times,* November 12, 1980, A14.

Cook, Robert C., and Dawn Hill. *World Population Estimates 1980.* Washington: The Environmental Fund, 1980.

Cranmer, David J., and Valerie A. Woolston. *Southern Africa.* (World Education Series.) Washington: American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, 1980.

Doman, E. J. "The In-Betweeners: A Look at the Coloured People of South Africa," *Optima* [Johannesburg], 25, No. 3, 1975, 131–51.

"The Economics of Health Care in Southern Africa: A Review Article," *Social Dynamics* [Rondebosch, South Africa], 4, No. 2, 1976, 109–60.

Education in South Africa: Conceptual Framework. (Backgrounder No. 7/80.) Washington: Information Counselor, South African Embassy, August 1980.

Frankel, Philip. "The Politics of Passes: Control and Change in South Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* [Cambridge, England], 17, No. 2, June 1979, 199–218.

_____. "The Politics of Poverty: Political Competition in Soweto," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* [Ottawa], 14, No. 2, 1980, 201–20.

Fullerton, Anne. *Public Health Problems in Apartheid South Africa.* (Paper submitted to Conference on Apartheid or Health in London, February 3, 1979, under auspices of Anti-Apartheid Health Committee. Centre Against Apartheid Notes and Documents Series, No. 7/79.) New York: Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, March 1979.

Giliomee, Hermann. "The Afrikaner Economic Advance." Pages 145–76 in Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee (eds.), *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

_____. "The Development of the Afrikaner's Self-Concept." Pages 58–66 in A. Paul Hare et al. (eds.), *South Africa: Sociological Analyses.* Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Gordon, Loraine, et al. *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1977.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1978.

_____. *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1978.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1979.

Gordon, Loraine (ed.). *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1980.

Hammond-Tooke, W.D. (ed.). *The Bantu-speaking Peoples of Southern Africa.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974.

Hellman, Ellen. "African Townswomen in the Process of Change," *South Africa International* [Johannesburg], 5, No. 1, July 1974, 14–22.

_____. "Soweto," *Optima* [Johannesburg], 23, No. 1, March 1973, 14–45.

Hellmann, Ellen, and Henry Lever (eds.), *Race Relations in South Africa 1929–1979.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Hexham, Irving. "Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism," *African Affairs* [London], 79, No. 315, 1980, 195–208.

Horrell, Muriel. *The African Homelands of South Africa.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1973.

Horrell, Muriel (comp.). *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa, 1948–1976.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1978.

Hugo, Pierre J. "Academic Dissent and Apartheid in South Africa," *Journal of Black Studies,* 7, No. 3, March 1977, 243–62.

"In 'Tin Town,' Scant Water and Minimal Medical Care," *New York Times,* November 23, 1980, A22.

Kaplan, Irving, et al. *Area Handbook for South Africa.* (DA Pam 550-93.) Washington: GPO for Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1970.

Kiernan, J. P. "The Work of Zion: An Analysis of an African Zionist

Ritual," *Africa* [London], 46, No. 4, 1976, 340–56.

Kuper, Adam. "How Peculiar Are the Venda?," *L'Homme* [Paris], 19, No. 1, January–March 1979, 49–72.

———. "The Social Structure of the Sotho Speaking Peoples of Southern Africa (Part I)," *Africa* [London], 45, No. 1, 1975.

Kuper, Hilda. *Indian People in Natal.* Natal: University Press, 1960.

———. "Strangers in Plural Societies: Asians in South Africa and Uganda." Pages 247–78 in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds.), *Pluralism in Africa.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.

Lanham, L. W. "An Outline History of the Languages of Southern Africa." Pages 13–28 in L.W. Lanham and K. P. Prinsloo (eds.), *Language and Communications Studies in South Africa.* Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Legum, Colin (ed.). *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1971–72.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1972.

———. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1972–73.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1973.

———. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1973–74.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1974.

———. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1974–75.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1975.

———. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1975–76.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1976.

———. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1976–77.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1977.

———. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1977–78.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1978.

———. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1978–79.* New York: Africana Publishing, 1979.

Lelyveld, Joseph. "Despite Plenty, Hunger Is Rife in South Africa," *New York Times,* November 23, 1980, A1, A22.

———. "South Africa Plans to Ease Curbs," *New York Times,* November 1, 1980, A1, A7.

Malan, T., and P. S. Hattingh. *Black Homelands in South Africa.* Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1976.

Mason, David. "Industrialization, Race and Class Conflict in South Africa: Towards a Sociological Resolution of a Reopened Debate," *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 3, No. 2, April 1980, 140–55.

Mayer, Philip. "Class, Status, and Ethnicity as Perceived by Johannesburg Africans." Pages 138–67 in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds.), *Change in Contemporary South Africa.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

———. *Townsmen or Tribesmen.* Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1961.

———. *Urban Africans and the Bantustans.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1972.

Mechanic, David. "Apartheid Medicine." Pages 127–38 in Ian

Robertson and Phillip Whitten (eds.), *Race and Politics in South Africa*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978.

Meer, Fatima. *Portrait of Indian South Africans*. Durban: Avon House, 1969.

Meyer, Lysle E. "Oppression or Opportunity?: Inside the Black Universities of South Africa," *Journal of Negro Education*, 45, 1976, 365–82.

Moodie, T. Dunbar. "The Dutch Reformed Churches as Vehicles of Political Legitimation in South Africa," *Social Dynamics*, 1, No. 2, 1975, 158–66.

_____. *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Moodley, Kogila A. "South African Indians: The Wavering Minority." Pages 250–79 in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds.), *Change in Contemporary South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

_____. "Structural Inequality and Minority Anxiety: Responses of Middle Groups in South Africa." Pages 217–35 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1960.

Morse, S. J., and E. Nel. "National Identity among a Sample of Students at an Afrikaans University in South Africa," *Social Dynamics* [Rondebosch, South Africa], 3, No. 1, June 1977, 35–44.

Murphy, Caryle. "Black Unions Gain Strength in South Africa," *Washington Post*, September 15, 1980, A16–17.

_____. "Black Youths, S. Africa in Test of Wills," *Washington Post*, September 27, 1980, A21.

_____. "S. Africa Moves to Control Black Migration to Cities," *Washington Post*, November 3, 1980, A30.

"National Census Figures," *South African Digest* [Pretoria], September 19, 1980, 21–22.

Ngubane, H. *Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine: An Ethnography of Health and Disease in Nyuswa-Zulu Thought and Practice*. (Studies in Anthropology.) London: Academic Press, 1977.

Nyquist, T. E. *Toward a Theory of the African Upper Stratum in South Africa*. (Papers in International Studies, African Series, No. 15.) Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1972.

Pauw, B.A. *Christianity and Xhosa Tradition: Belief and Ritual among Xhosa-speaking Christians*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Peel, Quentin. "S. Africa Apartheid 'Working'," *Financial Times* [London], September 13, 1980, 2.

Petryszek, Nicholas. "The Dynamics of Acquiescence in South Africa," *African Affairs* [London], 75, No. 301, October 1976, 444–62.

du Preez, Peter D. "Explanations of Racial Antagonism," *Social Dynamics* [Rondebosch, South Africa], 3, No. 1, June 1977, 17–25.

_____. "Politics and Identity in South Africa." Pages 341–64 in P. Stringer and D. Banmaster (eds.), *Constructs of Sociality and Individuality*. London: Academic Press, 1979.

Price, Robert M. "Apartheid and White Supremacy: The Meaning of Government-led Reform in the South African Context." Pages 297–331 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1980.

Price, Robert M., and Carl G. Rosberg. *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. (Research Series No. 43.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1980.

Qoboza, Percy. " 'Separate But Unequal' Ruling in South Africa." *Washington Star*, October 6, 1980, A1, A11.

Reader, D. H. *Zulu Tribe in Transition*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966.

Rebusoajoang (pseud.). "Education and Social Control in South Africa," *African Affairs* [London], 78, No. 311, April 1979, 228–39.

Rex, John. "The Sociology of South Africa: A Review Article," *Journal of Southern African Studies* [London], 1, No. 2, April 1975, 247–52.

Robertson, Ian. "South African Education." Pages 103–25 in Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten (eds.), *Race and Politics in South Africa*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978.

Robertson, J., and P. Whitten (eds.). *Race and Politics in South Africa*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978.

Robertson, Neville L., and Barbara L. Robertson. *Education in South Africa*. Bloomington: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1977.

Savage, M. "Costs of Enforcing Apartheid and Problems of Change," *African Affairs* [London], 76, No. 304, July 1977, 287–302.

Savage, Michael. "Major Patterns of Group Interaction in South African Society." Pages 280–302 in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds.), *Change in Contemporary South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Schlemmer, Lawrence. "English-Speaking South Africans Today: Identity and Integration into the Broader National Community." Pages 91–135 in Andre de Villiers (ed.), *English-Speaking South Africa Today: Proceedings of the National Confernce, July 1974*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1976.

_____. "Institutionalised Inequality and Differentiation: An Evaluation of Race Discrimination in South Africa." Pages 294–326 in William A. Veenhoven (ed.), *Case Studies on Human Rights and*

Fundamental Freedoms, Vol. V. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.

_____. "Patterns of Political Identification, Adaptation and Reaction among Urban Africans in South Africa." Pages 123–35 in Henry Lever (ed.), *Readings in South African Society*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1978.

_____. "Political Adaption and Reaction among Urban Africans in South Africa," *Social Dynamics* [Rondebosch, South Africa], 2, No. 1, June 1976, 3–18.

_____. "Theories of the Plural Society and Change in Africa," *Social Dynamics* [Rondebosch, South Africa], 3, No. 1, June 1977, 3–16.

Schlemmer, Lawrence, and Tim. J. Mail. "Social and Political Change in the African Areas: A Case Study of KwaZulu." Pages 109–37 in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds.), *Change in Contemporary South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

South Africa. Department of Foreign Affairs and Information. "National Census Figures," *South African Digest* [Pretoria], September 19, 1980, 3, 21–22.

South Africa. Department of Statistics. *Bulletin of Statistics, Quarter Ended March 1980*. Pretoria: Government Printer, March 1980.

_____. *Population Census 1970*. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1975.

_____. *Population Census 1970, Religion*. (Report No. 02–05–03.) Pretoria: Government Printer, 1975.

South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa. (6th ed.). Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications, 1979.

Stokes, R. G. "The Afrikaner Industrial Entrepreneur and Afrikaner Nationalism," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 22, No. 4, July 1974, 557–79.

Stokes, Randall, and Anthony Harris. "South African Development and the Paradox of Racial Particularism: Toward a Theory of Modernization from the Center," *Economic Deve.'opment and Cultural Change*, 26, No. 2, January 1978, 245–69.

Thatcher, Gary. "Behind Black School Boycott in S. Africa: Dissatisfaction with Apartheid," *Christian Scie*n*e Monitor*, October 3, 1980, 4.

Thompson, Leonard, and Jeffrey Butler (eds.). *Change in Contemporary South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

du Toit, B. M. "The Isangoma: An Adaptive Agent among Urban Zulu," *Anthropological quarterly*, 44, No. 2, April 1971, 51#65.

du Toit, Brian M. "Ethnicity, Neighborliness, and Friendships among Urban Africans in South Africa." Pages 143#74 in Brian M. du Toit (ed.), *Ethnicity in Modern Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

United Nations Fund for Population Activities. "South Africa," *Population Facts at Hand*. Saddle River, New Jersey: Echo Publications, 1980, 92.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. *International Population Dynamics 1950-79: Demographic Estimates for Countries with a Population of 5 Million or More*. Washington: GPO, 1980.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Office of Technical Services. Joint Publications Research Service—JPRS (Washington). The following items are from the JPRS series:

Sub-Saharan Africa Report:

"Control of Indian Schools," *The Star*, Johannesburg, July 19, 1980. (JPRS 76232, No. 2280, August 14, 1980, 98.)

"Government Figures on Medical Services Disputed," *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, July 22, 1980. (JPRS 76232, No. 2280, August 14, 1980, 93-94.)

"Survey Predicts Population Growth, Needs by Year 2000," *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, July 25, 1980. (JPRS 76266, No. 2282, August 20, 1980, 84-86.)

van den Berghe, Pierre L. *South Africa: A Study in Conflict*. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1965.

de Villiers, André (ed.). *English-Speaking South Africa Today: Proceedings of the National Conference, July 1974*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Watts, H. L. "A Social and Demographic Portrait of English-speaking White South Africans." Pages 41-88 in André de Villiers (ed.), *English-Speaking South Africa Today: Proceedings of the National Conference, July 1974*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Welsh, David. "English-Speaking Whites and the Racial Problem." Pages 217-39 in André de Villiers (ed.), *English-Speaking South Africa Today: Proceedings of the National Conference, July 1974*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1976.

West, M. "African Churches in Soweto," Pages 18-38 in C. Kileff (ed.), *Urban Man in Southern Africa*. Gwelo, South Africa: 1975.

_____. *Bishops and Prophets in a Black City*. Cape Town: David Philip, 1975.

West, M., and J. Morris. *Abantu: An Introduction to the Black People of South Africa*. Cape Town: C. Struik, 1976.

West, Martin E. "The 'Apex of Subordination': The Urban African Population of South Africa." Pages 127-57 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

Whisson, M. G. *The Fairest Cape?—An Account of the Coloured People in the District of Simonstown*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1972.

Whisson, M. G., and M. West (eds.), *Religion and Social Change in Southern Africa*. Cape Town: David Philip, 1975.

413

Wilson, Francis. "Current Labor Issues in South Africa." Pages 152-73 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination.* Berkeley: University of California, 1980.

Chapter 3

Adams, John. "Economic Development in the Small Economies of Southern Africa: Contrasting Currents in the BLS Countries and the Homelands," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* [Leiden], XIII, No. 3-4, 1978, 244-55.

Africa South of the Sahara, 1980-81. (10th ed.) London: Europa Publications, 1980.

Africa's Powerhouse—The South African Economy: A Pictorial Ensemble. Sandton: African International Publishing Company, 1976.

Agriculture in South Africa. Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications, 1978.

Anglo American Corporation of South Africa. *62nd Annual Report 1979.* Johannesburg: n.d.

Bailey, Martin. *Oil Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link.* New York: Centre Against Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, April 1980.

Bailey, Martin, and Bernard Rivers. *Oil Sanctions Against South Africa.* New York: Centre Against Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Affairs, United Nations, June 1978.

Bance, Nigel. "South African Survey," *Euromoney* [London], June 1979, Supplement, 1-36.

Barber, James, and Michael Spicer. "Sanctions Against South Africa—Options for the West," *International Affairs* [London], 55, No. 3, July 1979, 385-401.

Barratt, John et al. (eds.). *Strategy for Development.* London: Macmillan, 1976.

Belfiglio, Valentine J. "United States Economic Relations with the Republic of South Africa," *Africa Today,* 25, No. 5, April-June 1978, 57-68.

Blumenfeld, J.P. "The South African Economy: Potential and Pitfalls," *The World Today* [London], 36, No. 9, September 1980, 334-42.

Brand, Simon S. "The Framework for Involvement in the Formulation of Development Projects in the South African Homelands." Pages 45-56 in John Barratt et al. (eds.), *Strategy for Development.* London: Macmillan, 1976.

Bromberger, Norman. "Unemployment in South Africa: A Survey of Research," *Social Dynamics* [Cape Town], 4, No. 1, June 1978, 12-28.

Bureau for Econmic Research re Bantu Development. *Transkei: Economic Review, 1975.* Pretoria: 1975.

Burnett, Richard. "Illegal Aliens Come Cheap," *Progressive*, 43, October 1979, 44–46.

Burns, John F. "South Africa, Plunged into Oil Crisis, Seeks to Cope," *New York Times*, July 13, 1979, C1.

Butler, Jeffrey, Robert I. Rotberg, and John Adams. *The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu*. (Perspectives on Southern Africa, 21.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Corporate Data Exchange, Inc. *Bank Loans to South Africa, 1972–1978*. New York: Centre Against Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, May 1979.

Davies, Robert. "Capital Restructuring and the Modification of the Racial Division of Labour in South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, [Oxford], 5, No. 2, April 1979, 181–98.

Day, John R. *Railways of Southern Africa*. London: Arthur Barker, 1963.

De Beers Consolidated Mines. *90th Annual Report: To 31st December 1977*. Kimberley, South Africa: 1978.

Eaton, Joseph W. *Can Business Save South Africa?* (American Universities Field Staff Reports. Africa Series, No. 20.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1980.

Economic Crisis in South Africa: The Workers' Burden. London: South African Congress of Trade Unions, 1977.

Etheredge, D.A. "Gold Mining Faces a Very Lively Future," *Mining Survey* [Johannesburg], No. 96, 1980, 2–5.

Fishlock, David. "South Africa's Two Bids for More Power," *Financial Times* [London], November 11, 1975, 12.

Golino, Frank R. "The Wiehahn Labor Reform Strategy: Promise and Reality." (Paper presented at a conference on Recent Developments in South Africa, sponsored by the Section of International Law, American Bar Association.) Washington: November 4, 1980.

Gordon, Loraine, et al. *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1977*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1978.

_____. *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1978*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1979.

Gordon, Loraine (ed.). *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1979*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1980.

"The Great Evasion—South Africa: A Survey," *Economist* [London], 275, No. 7138, June 21, 1980, 1–30.

Groenewald, J.A., and W. L. Nieuwoudt. "Welfare Aspects of State Intervention in Agriculture," *Finance & Trade Review* [Pretoria], XIII, No. 4, December 1979, 59–81.

Grotpeter, John. "Changing South Africa," *Current History*, 78, March 1980, 119–23, 134–36.

Grut, Mikael. *Forestry and Forest Industry in South Africa*. Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, 1965.

Guelke, Adrian. "Apartheid and the Labour Market." *Southern African Research in Progress.* (Papers given at a conference of the Centre for Southern African Studies, December 1974.) York: University of York, n.d.

Hattingh, P.S. "Bophuthatswana at a Glance," *South African Journal of African Affairs* [Pretoria], 7, No. 2, 1977, 213–19.

_____. "Boundaries, Surface Areas and Territorial Units: Aspects of Homeland Consolidation in the RSA," *Africa Institute Bulletin* [Pretoria], Nos. 9 and 10, 1977, 262–69.

Hauck, David. *The Minerals Industry in South Africa.* Washington: Investor Responsibility Research Center, March 1979.

Hiron, Jean-Claude. "South Africa's Triangle of Plenty," *The Furrow*, 85, No. 5, May–June 1980, 36–37.

Homelands: The Role of the Corporations in the Republic of South Africa. Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg, n.d.

Hoppe, Richard. "Synthetic Fuel the SASOL Way," *Engineering and Mining Journal*, 180, December 1979, 54–60.

Houghton, D. Hobart. *The South African Economy.* (4th ed.) Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Howard, James O. "Low-Priced Food Policy Works in South Africa," *Foreign Agriculture*, XVI, No. 47, November 20, 1978, 7–9.

International Labour Conference, 65th session, 1979. *Fifteenth Special Report of the Director-General on the Application of the Declaration Concerning the Policy of Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa.* Geneva: 1979.

International Monetary Fund. Bureau of Statistics. General Statistics Division. *Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1980.* Washington: 1980.

Jankowitsch, Odette, and Ellen Seidensticker. "Transnational Corporations in South Africa," *Dissent*, 26, No. 4, Fall 1979, 473–77.

"A Jumbo Gold Mine on the Runway," *Financial Times* [London], July 9, 1980, 4.

Knight, J.B. "Black Wages and Choice of Techniques in South Africa," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* [Oxford], 41, No. 2, May 1979, 117–44.

Knight, J.B., and M.D. McGrath. "An Analysis of Racial Wage Discrimination in South Africa," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* [Oxford], 39, No. 4, November 1977, 245–71.

de Kock, Gerhard. "South Africa and the World Economy," *South African Banker* [Marshalltown], 76, No. 4, November 1979, 200–202; 204–205.

de Kock, G.P.C. "Central Banking and Financial Markets in South Africa," *South African Journal of Economics* [Braamfontein], 46, No. 3, 1978, 197–212.

Koenderman, Tony. "Sanctions," *South Africa International* [Johannesburg], IX, No. 3, January 1979, 150–58.

_____. *South African Industry.* Cape Town: Macdonald South Africa, 1978.

Leeuwenburg, Jeff. *Transkei: A Study in Economic Regression.* London: Africa Bureau, January 1977.

Legassick, Martin, and Harold Wolpe. "The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* [London], No. 7, September–December 1976, 87–107.

Leistner, G.M.E. "Bophuthatswana: Economic Development—Problems and Policies," *South African Journal of African Affairs* [Pretoria], 7, No. 2, 1977, 135–47.

Liff, David M. *The Computer and Electronics Industry in South Africa.* Washington: Investor Responsibility Research Center, March 1979.

_____. *The Oil Industry in South Africa.* Washington: Investor Responsibility Research Center, January 1979.

Litvak, Lawrence, Robert DeGrasse, and Kathleen McTigue. *South Africa: Foreign Investment and Apartheid.* Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1978.

Lukk, Tiuu. "U.S. Banks and South Africa: Special Report," *Africa Report*, 23, No. 4, July–August 1978, 25–26.

Maasdorp, Gavin. *Economic Development Strategy in the African Homelands: The Rôle of Agriculture and Industry.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, May 1974.

Main, T.R.N. "Gold Production in South Africa: A Look at the 1980s," *Mining Survey* [Johannesburg], No. 94, 1979, 2–8.

Malan, T. "Mining Activity in Bophuthatswana," *Africa Institute Bulletin* [Pretoria], Nos. 9 and 10, 1977, 252–54.

_____. "South Africa and Economic Sanctions," *Africa Institute Bulletin* [Pretoria], 18, No. 3, 1978, 99–105.

Mehlman, Maxwell J., Thomas H. Milch, and Michael V. Toumanoff. "United States Restrictions on Exports to South Africa," *American Journal of International Law*, 73, October 1979, 581–603.

Mendelsohn, M.S. "South Africa Becomes Less Cramped," *Banker* [London], No. 130, April–May 1980, 57 and 59.

The Mineral Potential and Mining Development in the Black Homelands of South Africa. Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications, 1977.

Mingst, Karen A. "Southern Africa's Commodity Trade with the United States: The Impact of Political Change," *Africa Today*, 24, No. 2, April–June 1977, 5–28.

Molatlhwa, T.M. "Agriculture in Bophuthatswana." Pages 73–89 in John Barratt et al. (eds.), *Strategy for Development.* London: Macmillan, 1976.

Moolman, B.A. *Income and Expenditure Patterns of Black Households in Venda, 1977.* (Research Report No. 64.) Pretoria: Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa, 1978.

Murphy, Caryle. "Embargo Slows S. African A-Plans: Nuclear Fuel Denied by U.S.," *Washington Post*, September 12, 1980, A24.

_____. "S. Africa Admits Economic Error in Racial Policy," *Washington Post*, October 30, 1980, A30.

417

Murray, Roger. "Who Trades with South Africa?" *African Business* [London], No. 12, August 1979, 11-12.

Myers, Desaix, III. *Business and Labor in South Africa*. Washington: In or Responsibility Research Center, May 1979.

_____. *Labor Practices of U.S. Corporations in South Africa*. (Praeger Special Studies in International Business, Finance, and Trade.) New York: Praeger, 1977.

_____. *U.S. Business in South Africa: The Economic, Political, and Moral Issues*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980.

Myers, Desaix, III, and David M. Liff. "The Press of Business: South Africa Under Botha," *Foreign Policy*, No. 38, Spring 1980, 143-63.

Nedbank Group Economic Unit. *South Africa: An Appraisal—The Sovereign Risk Criteria*. Johannesburg, 1977.

North, James. "Capitalism and Apartheid," *New Republic*, 181, No. 18, May 5, 1979, 20-23.

Olson, Martha J. "University Investments with a South African Connection: Is Prudent Divestiture Possible?" *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 11, No. 3, Winter 1979, 543-80.

Oppenheimer, Nicholas. "Investment in South Africa: Today and Tomorrow, Address to the *Financial Mail* Conference, Investment in 1980, Johannesburg, November 9, 1979," *Optima* [Johannesburg], 29, No. 4, January 31, 1980, Supplement.

Peel, Quentin. "South Africa's Links with Its Neighbors: Economic Plight Outweighs Political Aversion," *Financial Times* [London], August 15, 1979, 3.

Pitterman, Shelley, and David Markun. "Campaigning for Divestment," *Africa Report*, 23, September-October 1978, 18-22.

du Plessis, F.J. "Monetary Policy in South Africa," *South African Journal of Economics* [Braamfontein], 47, No. 4, 1979, 331-42.

Porter, Richard C. "International Trade and Investment Sanctions: Potential Impact on the South African Economy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23, No. 4, December 1979, 579-612.

Potgieter, F.J. *Developing Bophuthatswana: Suggestions for a National Plan*. Potchefstroom: Institute for Regional Planning, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 1977.

Price Waterhouse. *Doing Business in South Africa*. (Information Guide) n. pl. August 1977.

_____. *Doing Business in South Africa: December 1979 Supplement*. (Information Guide) n. pl. 1979

_____. *Doing Business in South Africa: January 1979 Supplement*. (Information Guide) n. pl. 1979.

Propp, Kenneth. *The Domestic Debate Over South Africa*. Washington: Investor Responsibility Research Center, September 1979.

Propp, Kenneth, and Desaix Myers III. *The Motor Industry in South Africa*. Washington: Investor Responsibility Research Center, February 1979.

418

The Republic of Transkei. Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications, 1976.

Rotberg, Robert I. *Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Seidman, Ann, and Neva Seidman. *South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations*. Westport: Lawrence Hill, January 1978.

Setai, Bethuel. *The Political Economy of South Africa: The Making of Poverty*. Washington: University Press of America, 1977.

_____. "The Role of International Companies in the Economy of South Africa," *Review of Black Political Economy*, 8, Summer, 346-59.

Smalberger, John M. "The Role of the Diamond-Mining Industry in the Development of the Pass-Law System in South Africa," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, IX, No. 3, 1976, 419-34.

Smith, Robin. "Industrial Relations Policies and Political Change: The E.E.C. Code for South African Subsidiaries," *British Journal of Industrial Relations* [London], 18, March 1980, 99-114.

Smith, Timothy. "U.S. Firms and Apartheid: Belated Steps Analyzed," *Africa Today*, 24, No. 2, April-June 1977, 29-33.

Smith, Timothy H. "Bank Loans to South Africa: The Case Against 'Business as Usual'," *Issue*, VII, No. 1, Spring 1977, 12-14.

Smith, Tim, and Craig Howard. "U.S. Banks and South Africa: The Campaign for Withdrawal," *Africa Report*, 23, No. 4, July-August 1978, 43-46.

South Africa. *Budget Speeches, 1979-80*. Pretoria: Government Printer, n.d.

South Africa. Commission of Inquiry into the Fishing Industry. *The Utilisation of the Fish and Other Living Marine Resources of South Africa and South West Africa*. Cape Town, December 3, 1971.

South Africa. *Department of Finance. Budget Speech Delivered by Minister of Finance, 26 March 1980*. (Financial Perspective on Current Developments.) Pretoria, 1980.

South Africa. Department of Forestry. *Annual Report of the Department of Forestry for the Period Ended 31 March 1978*. n. pl., Government Printer, 1979.

South Africa. Department of Mines. Geological Survey. *Mineral Resources of the Republic of South Africa*. (Ed., C.B. Coetzee) (5th ed., Handbook 7.) Pretoria: Government Printer, 1976.

South Africa. Department of Statistics. *Labour Statistics: Wage Rates, Earnings, and Average Hours Worked in the Printing and Newspaper Industry, Engineering Industry, Building Industry, and Commerce, September 1976 and September 1977*. (Report No. 01-20-05.) Pretoria: Government Printer, n. d.

_____. *National Accounts of the Bantu Homelands, 1971 to 1975*. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1978.

South Africa. Division of Agricultural Marketing Research. *1979 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics*. Pretoria: n. d.

_____ . *1980 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics*. Pretoria: n. d.

South Africa. Electricity Supply Commission. *Annual Report 1979*. Sandton: 1980.

South Africa Embassy. Washington: *Foreign Investment in South Africa*. (Backgrounder No. 5). June 1980.

South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa. (6th ed.) Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications, 1979.

South African Airways. Public Relations Division. *50 Years of Flight*. Johannesburg: Da Gama Publishers, n. d.

South African Railways. Publicity and Travel Department. *Centenary of the South African Railways*. n. pl.: Union of South Africa, 1959.

South African Railways and Harbours. *South African Railways, Harbours, Airways, Pipelines, and Road Transport: Annual Report, 1977-1978*. Johannesburg: December 1978.

South African Reserve Bank. Economics Department. *Quarterly Bulletin* [Pretoria], No. 137, September 1980.

South African Timber Growers' Association. *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31st March 1977*. Pietermaritzburg: n. d.

Spandau, Arnt. *Economic Boycott Against South Africa*. Kenwyn: Juta, 1979.

Steenekamp, J.J.A. *A Regional Comparison of the Income and Expenditure Patterns of Urban Non-White Households in South Africa*. (Research Report No. 58.) Pretoria: Bureau of Market Research, University of South Africa, 1977.

Stokes, Randall G. "The Afrikaner Industrial Entrepreneur and Afrikaner Nationalism," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 22, No. 4, July 1974, 557-79.

Stokes, Randall, and Anthony Harris. "South African Development and the Paradox of Racial Particularism: Toward a Theory of Modernization from the Center," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 26, No. 2, January 1978, 245-69.

Stubbings, J.A. *Forestry Research and the Forest Industry*. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1974.

Stultz, Newell M. *Transkei's Half Loaf: Race Separatism in South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

Thatcher, Gary. "Zimbabwe Breaks Ties to S. Africa, Trade Goes On," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 10, 1980, 5.

Truu, M.L. *Public Policy and the South African Economy*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1976.

United Nations. Department of Public Information. "Bank Loans to South Africa," *Objective: Justice*, 11, No. 1-2, Spring-Summer 1979, 39-48.

_____ . "Transnational Corporations in South Africa: Impact on Financial and Social Structures," *Objective: Justice*, 10, No. 4, Winter 1978/79, 24-36.

United Nations. Economic and Social Council. *Activities of Transnational Corporations in Southern Africa: Impact on Financial and Social Structures. Report of the Secretariat.* (Document E/C.10/39.) New York: March 16, 1978.

United Nations. Economic and Social Council. Commission on Transnational Corporations. *Activities of Transnational Corporations in Southern Africa and Their Collaboration With Racist Minority Régimes in That Area: In-Depth Analysis of the Role of Transnational Corporations in the Industrial, Military and Nuclear Sectors of South Africa—Report of the Secretariat.* (Document E/C.10/66.) New York: April 2, 1980.

U.S. Congress. 95th, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. *U.S. Corporate Interests in South Africa.* Washington: GPO, January 1978.

U.S. Congress. 96th, 2d Session. House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on Mines and Mining. *Sub-Sahara Africa: Its Role in Critical Mineral Needs of the Western World.* Washington: GPO, 1980.

U.S. Embassy. Pretoria. *The Trend in Real Wages, 1970-1980.* Pretoria: August 1, 1980.

U.S. Embassy. Pretoria. Agricultural Attaché. *Republic of South Africa: Agricultural Situation.* Pretoria: January 1980.

_____. *Republic of South Africa: Grain and Feed.* Pretoria: January 1980.

_____. *South Africa: Livestock, Meat and By-Products.* Pretoria: April 1980.

van der Merwe, C.R. *Soil Groups and Subgroups of South Africa.* (2d ed.) (South Africa, Department of Agricultural Technical Services, Chemistry Series No. 165.) Pretoria: Government Printer, n. d.

van der Merwe, P.J. "Black Employment Problems in South Africa," *Finance & Trade Review* [Pretoria], XII, No. 2, December 1976, 47-75.

Venter, Denis. "Aspects of Transkei's Developmental Problems," *Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa* [Pretoria], 16, Nos. 9 and 10, 1978, 296-300.

_____. *The Republic of Transkei: Two Years of Independence 1976-1978.* Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, March 1979.

Wassenaar, A.D. *Assault on Private Enterprise: The Freeway to Communism.* Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1977.

Wicker, Tom. "Should American Business Pull Out of South Africa?" *New York Times Magazine,* June 3, 1979, 31, 33, 36-37, 72, 74, 76, 78.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Africa* [International Business, Economic and Political Magazine] [London], January 1976-November 1980; *African Business* [London], September 1978-November 1980; *Africa*

Research Bulletin [Economic, Financial and Technical Series] [Exeter], January 15, 1976–December 14, 1980; *Bulletin of Statistics* [Pretoria], June 1973–March 1980; *Finance & Trade Review* [Pretoria], December 1973–June 1980; Joint Publications Research Service, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, Nos. 2137–2308, July 31, 1979–October 20, 1980; *Mining Survey* [Johannesburg], April 1975–No. 2, 1980; *New African* [London], May 1978–January 1980; *Optima* [Johannesburg], March 1973–January 1980; *South African Digest* [Pretoria], January–December 1980; *Standard Bank Review* [Johannesburg], January 1976–November 1980.)

Chapter 4

Adam, Heribert, and Hermann Giliomee. *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

Amnesty International. *Political Imprisonment in South Africa.* London: Amnesty International Publications, 1978.

_____. *Political Imprisonment in South Africa - An Update to an Amnesty International Report.* New York: 1979.

"Apartheid in South Africa: Setting the Stage for Change Without Innovation," *The Guardian* [London], November 23, 1980, 12.

Ball, George. "Asking for Trouble in South Africa," *Atlantic Monthly*, 240, October 1977, 43–51.

Barratt, John. "Southern Africa: A South African View," *Foreign Affairs*, 55, No. 1, October 1976, 147–68.

Betts, Richard K. "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?" *International Security*, 4, No. 2, Fall 1979, 91–115.

Bissell, Richard E. *Apartheid and International Organizations.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1977.

Bissell, Richard E., and Chester A. Crocker (eds.) *South Africa into the 1980s.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Bonner, Philip. "Black Trade Unions in South Africa." Pages 174–93 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination.* Berkeley: University of California, 1980.

Breytenbach, Willie. *The Botha Strategy and the Eighties.* (South Africa Foundation Briefing Papers, 25.) Johannesburg: South Africa Foundation, July 1980.

Breytenbach, Willie (ed.), *The Constellation of States: A Consideration.* Johannesburg: South Africa Foundation, 1980.

A Bright New Constellation. (Backgrounder issued by the Information Counselor South African Embassy, Vol. 1/80.) Washington: South African Embassy, January 1980.

Butler, Jeffrey, Robert I. Rotberg, and John Adams. *The Black Homelands of South Africa: The Political and Economic Development of Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu.* (Perspectives on Southern Africa, 21.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Carter, Gwendolen M. *Which Way Is South Africa Going?* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, June 1980.

_____. "South Africa: Growing Black-White Confrontation." Pages 93–140 in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.

Chimutengwende, Chenhamo C. "The Media and the State in South African Politics," *Black Scholar,* 10, No. 1, September 1978, 44–57.

Cleary, Seamus. "Short Term South African Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Affairs Bulletin* [Johannesburg], 2, No. 3, 1978, 34–47.

Coetzee, J.H. "South Africa and Africa," *South Africa International* [Johannesburg], IX, No. 3, January 1979, 128–39.

de Crespigny, Anthony, and Robert Schrire (eds.). *The Government and Politics of South Africa.* Cape Town: Juta, 1978.

Crocker, Chester A. "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs,* 59, No. 2, Winter 1980–81, 323–51.

Danaher, Kevin. "U.S. Policy Options Toward South Africa: A Bibliographic Essay," *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs,* 13, No. 1, 1980–81, 2–25.

Daniel, John. "Racial Resistance in South Africa." Pages 55–73 in Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten (eds.), *Race and Politics in South Africa.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978.

Doman, E.J. "The In-Betweeners: A Look at the Coloured People of South Africa," *Optima* [Johannesburg], 25, No. 3, 1975, 131–51.

Duff, Tom. *Recent Political Developments.* (South Africa Foundation Briefing Papers.) Johannesburg: South Africa Foundation, September 1980.

Dugard, John. *Human Rights and the South African Legal Order.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Easum, Donald B. "United States Policy Toward South Africa." Pages 221–38 in Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten (eds.), *Race and Politics in South Africa.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978.

Ferguson, Clyde, and William R. Cotter. "South Africa: What Is to Be Done?" *Foreign Affairs,* 56, No. 2, January 1978, 253–74.

Frankel, Philip. "The Politics of Poverty: Political Competition in Soweto," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* [Ottawa], 14, No. 2, 1980, 201–20.

Gann, L.H., and Peter Duignan. *South Africa: War, Revolution or Peace?* (Hoover Institution Publication 199.) Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Geldenhuys, Deon. "The Political Prospects for Sanctions: Interaction of International Pressures and Domestic Developments."

(Paper presented at the Symposium of the South African Institute of Race Relations and the South Africa Institute of International Affairs, February 24, 1979.) Johannesburg: February 24, 1979.

Gerhart, Gail M. *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology.* (Perspectives on Southern Africa, Vol. 19.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

Gordon, Loraine, et al. *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1977.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1978.

_____. *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1978.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1979.

Gordon, Loraine (ed.). *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1980.

Grotpeter, John. "Changing South Africa," *Current History*, March 1980, 119–23; 134–36.

Hachten, William A. "Policies and Performance of South African Television," *Journal of Communication*, 29, Summer 1979, 62–72.

Halberstam, David. "The Fire to Come in South Africa," *Atlantic Monthly*, 245, No. 5, May 1980, 81–95.

Heard, K.A. "Change, Challenge and Response - A View of the 1977 South African General Election." Pages 171–91 in Douglas A. Anglin, Timothy M. Shaw, and Carl G. Widstrand (eds.). *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa.* Washington: University Press of America, 1978.

Horrell, Muriel (comp.). *Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa, 1948-1976.* Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1978.

Houser, George. *Carter's African Policy.* (Southern Africa Perspectives Vol. 2/79.) New York: The Africa Fund, 1979.

Howard, Norman (ed.). *Namibia: Review of Negotiations* (Statement by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Current Policy No. 22.) Washington: Department of State, September 9, 1980.

_____. *Southern Africa: U.S. Policy* (Statement by Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Current Policy No. 175.) Washington: Department of State, April 30, 1980.

Jenkins, Simon. "The Great Evasion/South Africa: A Survey," *The Economist* [London], 275, No. 7138, June 21, 1980, 1–30.

Johnson, R.W. *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Karis, Thomas. "United States Policy Toward South Africa." Pages 313–62 in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.

Lake, Anthony. "U.S. Policy Toward South Africa," *Department of State Bulletin*, 79, January 1979, 18-20.

Landis, Elizabeth S., and Michael T. Davis. "Namibia: Impending Independence?" Pages 141-74 in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.

Legum, Colin (ed.). *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1973-74*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1974.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1974-75*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1975.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1975-76*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1976.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1976-77*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1977.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1977-78*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1978.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1978-79*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1979.

_____. "South Africa in the Contemporary World." Pages 281-96 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

Lemarchand, Rene (ed.). *American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance*. Washington: University Press of America, 1978.

Libby, Ronald T. *Toward an Africanized U.S. Policy for Southern Africa: A Strategy for Increasing Political Leverage*. Berkeley: University of California, 1980.

McDonald, Steven F. "The Black Community." Pages 21-47 in Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker (eds.), *South Africa into the 1980s*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Marquard, Leo. *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa*. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Midlane, Matthew. "The South African General Election of 1977," *African Affairs* [London], 78, July 1979, 371-87.

Moose, Richard M. (Speech before conference of University and College Trustees at Ford Foundation, New York.) Washington: Department of State, March 1, 1979 (mimeo.).

Munger, Edwin S. *South Africa's 1974 General Election*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. Central and Southern Africa Series, XVIII, No. 1.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1974.

Myers, Desaix, III. *U.S. Business in South Africa: The Economic, Political and Moral Issues*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980.

A New South Africa. (Supplement to South African Digest.) Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, June 20, 1980.

O'Meara, Patrick. *South Africa's Watergate: The Muldergate*

Scandals. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. Central and Southern Africa Series, PO-1-79, 1979/No. 43.) Hanover, New Hampshire, AUFS, 1980.

Pogrund, Ben. "The South African Press," *Index on Censorship*, 5, No. 3, Autumn 1976.

Poovalingam, Pat. "The Indians of South Africa - A Century on the Defensive," *Optima* [Johannesburg], 28, No. 2, April 12, 1979, 66-91.

Potter, Elaine. *The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African Newspapers*. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Little-field, 1975.

Price, Robert M., and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.). *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. (Research series no. 43.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

"Progress in Inter-Group and Race Relations 1970-78." (Pamphlet issued by South African Bureau of National and International Communication.) Vol. 3, 60-65.

Rotberg, Robert I. *Suffer the Future - Policy Choices in Southern Africa*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Sachs, Albie. *Justice in South Africa*. (Perspectives on Southern Africa, No. 12.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

_____. "Law and Justice in South Africa." Pages 139-57 in Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten (eds.), *Race and Politics in South Africa*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978.

de St. Jorre, John. *A House Divided: South Africa's Uncertain Future*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977.

Schlemmer, Lawrence. "The Stirring Giant: Observations on the Inkatha and Other Black Political Movements in South Africa." Pages 99-126 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

_____. "White Voters and Change in South Africa," *Optima* [Johannesburg], April 27, 1978, 63-83.

Schoeman, Stan. "The President's Council," *Bulletin, Africa Institute of South Africa* [Pretoria], 20, No. 15, 1980, 109-13.

Seiler, John. "Afrikaner Nationalist Perspective." Pages 3-19 in Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker (eds.), *South Africa into the 1980s*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Serfontein, J.H.P. *Brotherhood of Power: An Exposé of the Secret Afrikaner Broederbond*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.

South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa. (6th ed.) Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications, 1979.

Spicer, Michael. "Change in South Africa? Mr. P.W. Botha's Strategy and Policies," *The World Today* [London], January 1980, 32-40.

_____. "Namibia: Elusive Independence," *The World Today* [London], 36, No. 10, October 1980, 406–14.

Stanbridge, Roland. "Contemporary African Political Organizations and Movements." Pages 66–98 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

Stokes, Randall. "External Liberation Movements." Pages 203–19 in Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten (eds.), *Race and Politics in South Africa*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978.

Stultz, Newell M. *Is South Africa Changing? Part I: Attitudes and Commitment*. (American Universities Fieldstaff Reports. Africa Series, No. 35.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1980.

_____. *Is South Africa Changing? Part II: Constitutional Matters*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. Africa Series, No. 36.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1980.

_____. "Some Implications of African 'Homelands' in South Africa." Pages 194–216 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

Sussman, Colleen (ed.). *Human Rights in South Africa*. (Statement by Patricia M. Derian, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Current Policy No. 181.) Washington: U.S. Department of State, May 13, 1980.

Thompson, Leonard, and Jeffrey Butler (eds.). *Change in Contemporary South Africa*. (Perspectives on Southern Africa No. 17.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

Ungar, Sanford J. "South Africa: The Siege Mentality," *Atlantic Monthly*, 242, No. 6, 1978, 6, 10–13.

U.S. Congress. 95th, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. *Conditions in South Africa*. Washington: GPO, February 3, 1978.

U.S. Congress. 96th. 1st Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. *U.S. Interests in Africa*. Washington: GPO, 1980.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Office of Technical Services. Joint Publications Research Service—JPRS (Washington). The following items are from the JPRS series:

Sub-Saharan Africa Report.

"Allister Sparks Analyzes Botha Policy Trends," *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, June 14, 1980. (JPRS 76035, No. 2267, July 14, 1980.)

"Black Sash Conference Report Cites Worsening Conditions," *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, March 12, 1980. (JPRS 74449, No. 2230, April 7, 1980.)

"Black T.V. Channel Commercials Will Face Language Problems," *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, July 14, 1980. (JPRS 76146, No. 2273, July 31, 1980.)

"Botha Government's Operating Procedures Described," *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, October, 14, 1979. (JPRS 74563, No. 2176, November, 14, 1979.)

"Botha's Options, Future Problems, Solutions Discussed," *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, April 13, 1980. (JPRS 75680, No. 2246, May 12, 1980.)

"Buthelezi Explains Attitude to ANC," *Post*, Johannesburg, March 19, 1980. (JPRS 75474, No. 2233, April 10, 1980.)

"Constitutional Accommodations," *Die Transvaler*, Johannesburg, August 13, 1980. (JPRS 76637, No. 2307, October 17, 1980.)

"Government, Homeland Leaders Hold Talks," *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, July 24, 1980. (JPRS 76232, No. 2280, August 14, 1980.)

"Motlana Interview" *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, September 28, 1979. (JPRS 74462, No. 2171, October 26, 1979.)

"Public Service Reorganization," *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, February 7, 1980. (JPRS 75241, No. 2219, March 3, 1980.)

"Research Casts Doubt on Government Pass Violation Figures," *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, June 22, 1980. (JPRS 76094, No. 2271, July 23, 1980.)

"Role of SABC in Military Reporting Explained," *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, February 12, 1980. (JPRS 75268, No. 2221, March 7, 1980.)

"Separate Development Will Never Be Scrapped," *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, July 31, 1980. (JPRS 76232, No. 2280, August 14, 1980.)

U.S. Department of State. *Background Notes - South Africa*. Washington: April 1980.

U.S. Department of State. "Republic of South Africa." Pages 181-99 in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate*. Washington: GPO, February 4, 1980.

van Niekerk, Barend. "Review Essay of *Crime and Punishment in South Africa*" (Eds., Midgley, Steyn, and Graser. Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill, 1975.), *Social Dynamics* [Stellenbosch], 1, No. 2, 1975, 183-87.

Wilkins, Roger. "South Africa: Changing Words Cannot Prevent a Racial Explosion," *Washington Post*, February 17, 1980, C1, C4.

Wilson, Frances. "Current Labor Issues in South Africa." Pages 152-73 in Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the

preparation of this chapter: *Africa Research Bulletin* [Exeter], January 1979–December 1980; *Christian Science Monitor*, July 1976–December 1980; *Financial Mail* [Johannesburg], August 1979–September 1980; *Financial Times* [London], January 1980–December 1980; Joint Publications Research Service, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, October 1979–December 1980; *Los Angeles Times*, July 1976–December 1980; *New York Times*, July 1976–December 1980; *South African Digest* [Pretoria], April 1980–December 1980; and *Washington Post*, July 1976–December 1980.)

Chapter 5

Adam, Heribert. "South Africa: Political Alternatives and Prognosis." Pages 214–34 in Douglas G. Anglin et al. (eds.), *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa: Papers From a Scandinavian-Canadian Conference*. Washington: University Press of America, 1978.

Adam, Heribert, and Hermann Giliomee. *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

Adelman, Kenneth L. *African Realities*. New York: Crane, Russak, 1980.

_____. "The Strategy of Defiance: South Africa," *Comparative Strategy*, 1, No. 1–2, 1978, 37–38.

Adelman, Kenneth, and Gerald J. Bender. "Conflict in Southern Africa: A Debate," *International Security*, 3, No. 2, Fall 1978.

Adelman, Kenneth L., and Albion W. Knight. "Can South Africa Go Nuclear?" *Orbis* [London], 23, No. 3, Fall 1979, 633–47.

Amnesty International. *Political Imprisonment in South Africa: An Amnesty International Report*. New York: 1978.

_____. *Political Imprisonment in South Africa: An Update to an Amnesty International Report*. New York: 1979.

_____. "South Africa." Pages 31–34 in *Amnesty International Report, 1979*. London: 1979.

Austin, Dennis. *Britain and South Africa*. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Baker, Pauline H. "South Africa's Strategic Vulnerabilities: The 'Citadel Assumption' Reconsidered," *African Studies* [Johannesburg], 20, No. 2, September 1977.

Betts, Richard K. "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?" *International Security*, 4, No. 2, Fall 1979, 91–115.

Beyers, Naude, C.F. "Human Rights and South Africa," *Africa Report*, 21, No. 2, March–April 1976, 2–6.

Birkby, Carol. "Defence Force Shows Off the Spoils," *To The Point* [Johannesburg], July 11, 1980, 19.

Bissell, Richard E. "How Strategic Is South Africa?" Pages 209–32 in Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker (eds.), *South Africa into the 1980s*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the Armies of Africa, the Orient

and Latin America. (Ed., John I.H. Owen.). London: Brassey's Publishers, 1980.

Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the World 1979. (Ed., John Owen.). New York: Crane, Russak, 1979.

British Broadcasting Corporation. "The White Tribe of Africa." David Harrison (producer) and David Dimbleby (presenter). London: 1979.

Carter, Gwendolen M. *Which Way Is South Africa Going?* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980.

"Conflict in Africa: Southern Africa." Pages 44–55 in International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1976*. London: 1977.

Cran, William. *Hot Shells! U.S. Arms for South Africa*. (World Special Report) Boston: WGBH Transcripts, 1980.

de Crespigny, Anthony, and Robert Schrire (eds.). *The Government and Politics of South Africa*. Cape Town: Juta, 1978.

Crocker, Chester A. "Current and Projected Mili⁺ ·y Balances in Southern Africa." Pages 71–106 in Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker (eds.), *South Africa into the 1980s*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Crozier, Brian (ed.). *Annual of Power and Conflict 1975–76: A Survey of Political Violence and International Influence*. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1976.

_____. *Annual of Power and Conflict 1976–77. A Survey of Political Violence and International Influence*. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1977.

_____. *Annual of Power and Conflict 1977–78. A Survey of Political Violence and International Influence*. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1978.

_____. *Annual of Power and Conflict 1978–79. A Survey of Political Violence and International Influence*. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979.

Dale, Richard. "The Armed Forces as an Instrument of South African Policy in Namibia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18, No. 1, March 1980, 57–72.

_____. "Political, Economic, and Security Changes in Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, 1966–79," *Parameters*, 9, No. 3, September 1979, 56–69.

_____. "South Africa and Namibia: Changing the Guard and Guarded Change," *Current History*, 76, No. 445, March 1979, 101–104.

_____. "South Africa and Namibia," *Current History*, 73, No. 432, December 1977, 209–13.

_____. "The South African Armed Forces and the Link with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth of Nations, 1910–1961," *Militaria* [Pretoria], 9, No. 1, 1970, 1–11.

Davenport, T.R.H. *South Africa: A Modern History*. (2d ed.) Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978.

_____. "The South African Rebellion, 1914," *The English Historical Review* [London], 78, No. 306, January 1963, 73-94.

Defense Marketing Survey. *DMS Market Intelligence Report. Foreign Military Markets.* Greenwich, Connecticut: 1979.

Dorey, Marcia A., and George J. Swidler. *World Police Systems: A Factual Text-Part I.* Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1974.

Dreyer, Peter. *Martyrs and Fanatics: South Africa and Human Destiny.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980.

Dugard, John. *Human Rights and the South African Legal Order.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

_____. *The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy Between South Africa and the United Nations.* (Perspectives on Southern Africa, 9.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

Dupuy, Trevor N., Grace P. Hayes, and John A.C. Andrews. *The Almanac of World Military Power.* (4th ed.) San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1980.

Eide, Asbjørn. "South Africa: Repression and the Transfer of Arms and Arms Technology." Pages 180-209 in Mary Kaldor and Asbjørn Eide (eds.), *The World Military Order: The Impact of Military Technology on the Third World.* London: Macmillan, 1979.

The Encyclopedia of World Air Power. (Consultant ed., Bill Gunston.) New York: Crescent, 1980.

Enloe, Cynthia. "Ethnic Factors in the Evolution of the South African Military." Pages 49-66 in *Police, Military and Ethnicity: Foundations of State.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1980.

Enloe, Cynthia H., and Ursula Semin-Panzer (eds.). *The Military, the Police and Domestic Order: British and Third World Experiences.* London: Richardson Institute of Conflict and Peace Research, 1976.

Frankel, Philip. "The Politics of Passes: Control and Change in South Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* [Cambridge, England], 17, No. 2, June 1979, 199-218.

Frankel, Philip H. "South Africa: The Politics of Police Control," *Comparative Politics*, 12, No. 4, July 1980, 481-99.

Gann, L.H., and Peter Duignan. *South Africa: War, Revolution or Peace?* (Hoover Institution Publication 199.) Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Geingob, Hage. "Namibia." Pages 117-30 in Douglas G. Anglin et al. (eds.), *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa: Papers From a Scandinavian-Canadian Conference.* Washington: University Press of America.

Gervaise, Sean. "Under the NATO Umbrella," *Africa Report*, 21, No. 5, 1976, 12-18.

_____. *The United States and the Arms Embargo Against South Africa: Evidence, Denial, and Refutation.* (South Africa Pamphlets, No. 2.) Binghamton: Foundation of the State University of New York at Binghamton, 1978.

Gervasi, Tom. *Arsenal of Democracy*. New York: Grove Press, 1978.

Gordon, Loraine, et al. *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1977*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1978.

_____. *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1978*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1979.

"The Great Evasion. South Africa: A Survey," *The Economist*, 275, No. 7138, June 21, 1980, Survey 1-30.

Grundy, Kenneth W. "The Assignment of South African Forces Abroad, 1912-1976," *Journal of African Studies*, 5, No. 4, Winter 1978, 396-413.

_____. *Defense Legislation and Communal Politics: The Evolution of a White South African Nation as Reflected in the Controversy Over the Assignment of Armed Forces Abroad, 1912-1976*. (Papers in International Studies, Africa Series No. 33.) Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, Africa Program, 1978.

_____. "Intermediary Power and Global Dependency: The Case of South Africa," *International Studies Quarterly*, 20, No. 4, December 1976, 553-80.

Gutteridge, William. "South Africa's Defence Posture," *World Today* [London], 36, No. 1, January 1980, 26-31.

_____. "Southern Africa: A Study in Conflict." Pages 231-39 in David Carlton and Carlo Schaert (eds.), *The Dynamics of the Arms Race*. New York: Halsted, 1975.

Hallett, Robert. *South African Involvement in Angola*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Africa Seminar, October 1977.

Heitman, Helmud Romer. "Riot Control in South Africa," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal* [Tavistock, England], 108, No. 3, July 1973, 314-18.

Hewish, Mark et al. *Air Forces of the World: An Illustrated Directory of the World's Military Power*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.

Hitjitevi, Vakundja. "It's Namibia Next," *Africa*, No. 111, November 1980, 16-20.

Ingleton, Roy D. *Police of the World*. London: Ian Allan, 1980.

International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research. *Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict. A Politico-Military Study*. (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) New York: Praeger, 1976.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance, 1966-1967*. London: 1966.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1967-1968*. London:. 1967.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1968-1969*. London:. 1968.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1969-1970*. London:. 1969.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1971-1972*. London:. 1971.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1972-1973*. London:. 1972.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1973-1974*. London:. 1973.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1974–1975*. London:. 1974.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1975–1976*. London:. 1975.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1976–1977*. London:. 1976.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1977–1978*. London:. 1977.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1978–1979*. London:. 1978.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1979–1980*. London:. 1979.

_____. *The Military Balance, 1980–1981*. London:. 1980.

_____. *Strategic Survey 1972*. London: 1973.

_____. *Strategic Survey 1973*. London: 1974.

_____. *Strategic Survey 1974*. London: 1975.

_____. *Strategic Survey 1975*. London: 1976.

_____. *Strategic Survey 1976*. London: 1977.

_____. *Strategic Survey 1978*. London: 1979.

_____. *Strategic Survey 1979*. London: 1980.

Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1980–81. (Ed., John W.R. Taylor.) London: Jane's Publishing, 1980.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1980–81. (Ed., John Moore.) London: Jane's Publishing, 1980.

Jane's Weapon Systems 1980–81. (11th ed.) (Ed., Ronald T. Pretty.) London: Jane's Publishing, 1980.

Jaster, Robert S. *South Africa's Narrowing Security Options*. (Adelphi Papers No. 159.) London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980.

Jensen, Holger. "A Nation at Battle Stations," *Newsweek*, September 29, 1980, 43–44.

Johns, Sheridan. "South Africa." Pages 431–33 in Richard F. Starr (ed.), *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1980*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

_____. "South Africa." Pages 427–29 in Richard Starr (ed.), *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1979*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

Johnson, R.G. "Torture and Coercion as Police Interrogation Techniques," *Military Police Law Enforcement Journal*, 1, No. 4, Fall 1974, 50–53.

Johnson, Richard W. *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Kemp, Geoffrey. "South Africa's Defence Programme," *Survival* [London], 14, No. 4, July/August 1972, 158–61.

Keppel-Jones, Arthur. *South Africa: A Short History*. London: Hutchinson University Library, 1968.

Klare, Michael T., and Eric Prokosch. *Evading the Embargo: How the United States Arms South Africa and Rhodesia*. (Notes and Documents 34/78.) New York: Centre Against Apartheid. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, October 1978.

Kunnert, Dirk. " 'Windows of Perils': Africa, the World and the 1980s," *South Africa International* [Johannesburg], 11, No. 1, July 1980, 1–20.

Legum, Colin. (ed.). *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey*

and Documents, 1971-1972. London: Africana Publishing, 1972.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1972-1973*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1973.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1973-1974*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1974.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1974-1975*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1975.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1975-1976*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1976.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1976-1977*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1977.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1977-1978*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1978.

_____. *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1978-1979*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1979.

_____. *The Western Crisis Over Southern Africa: South Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1979.

Legum, Colin, and Margaret Legum. "South Africa in the Contemporary World," *A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion*, 3, No. 3, Fall 1973, 17-27.

Lelyveld, Joseph. "Guerrilla War in Namibia: Frustration For Both Sides," *New York Times*, January 6, 1981, A2.

Lewis, William H. "U.S. Arms Embargo Against South Africa," *Department of State Bulletin*, 77, September 5, 1977, 320-22.

Libby, Ronald T. *Toward an Africanized U.S. Policy for Southern Africa: A Strategy for Increasing Political Leverage*. (Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 11.) Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1980.

Lodgaard, Sverre. "Prospects for Non-Proliferation," *Survival* [London], 22, No. 4, July-August 1980, 161-66.

MacBride, Sean. *Secret Collaboration of the West with South Africa*. (Notes and Documents 32/78.) New York: Centre Against Apartheid. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, 1978.

Marcum, John A. *The Angolan Revolution: Volume II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976)*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978.

Mathews, Anthony S. *Law, Order, and Liberty in South Africa*. (Perspectives on Southern Africa, 7.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.

Meyer, Cord. *Facing Reality*. New York: Harper and Row, 1980.

Midlane, Matthew. "South Africa." Pages 633-42 in John Keegan (ed.), *World Armies*. New York: Facts on File, 1979.

Murphy, Caryle. "South African Military Exerts Greater Influence in Policy," *Washington Post*, May 30, 1980, A20.

_____. "South Africa's White Establishment Beset By Crisis of Confidence," *Washington Post*, October 14, 1980, A23.

Nolutshungu, Sam C. "On External Intervention in South Africa."

Pages 235–64 in Douglas G. Anglin (ed.), *Conflict and Change in Southern Africa: Papers from a Scandinavian-Canadian Conference*. New York: University Press of America, 1978.

Nöthling, C.J. "Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians in the South African Defence Force," *South Africa International* [Johannesburg], 11, No. 1, July 1980, 21–28.

Nuechterlein, Donald E. "South Africa Today: Is Race War Inevitable?" *Foreign Service Journal*, No. 55, April 1978, 9–12, 36–38.

Oudes, Bruce J. "Evolving American Views of South Africa." Pages 159–86 in Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker (eds.), *South Africa into the 1980s*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Pakenham, Thomas. *The Boer War*. New York: Random House, 1979.

Peel, Quentin. "Pretoria Prepares for Total War," *The Financial Times* [London], February 29, 1980, 3.

_____. "Between Backlash and Revolt," *The Financial Times* [London], March 13, 1980, 17.

Reed, Douglas. *The Siege of Southern Africa*. Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1974.

Reitsma, Hendrik J.A. "South Africa and the Red Dragon: A Study in Perception," *Africa Today*, 23, No. 1, January–March 1976, 47–68.

Rotberg, Robert I. *Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Russell, D.E.H. *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa*. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

Sachs, Albie. "The Instruments of Domination in South Africa." Pages 223–50 in Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (eds.), *Change in Contemporary South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

_____. *Justice in South Africa*. (Perspectives on Southern Africa, No. 12.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.

de St. Jorre, John. *A House Divided: South Africa's Uncertain Future*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977.

_____. "South Africa: Up Against the World," *Foreign Policy*, No. 28, Fall 1977, 53–85.

Schieber, Michael T. "Apartheid Under Pressure: South Africa's Military Strength in a Changing Political Context," *Africa Today*, 23, No. 1, January–March 1976, 27–46.

Schuettinger, Robert L. (ed.). *South Africa—The Vital Link*. Washington: Council on American Affairs, 1976.

Seidman, Ann, and Neva Makgetla. *Transnational Corporations and the South African Military-Industrial Complex*. (Notes and Documents, 24/79.) New York: Centre Against Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, 1979.

Serfontein, Hennie. "South Africa's White Terrorists," *Africa* [London], No. 98, October 1979, 78–81.

Sheils, Merrill, with Jerry Buckley. "The Mineral Crisis," *Newsweek*, November 10, 1980, 98.

Slabbert, Frederick van Zyl, and David Walsh. *South Africa's Options: Strategies for Sharing Power*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Smock, David R., and Normal N. Miller. *Soviet Designs in Africa*. (American Universities Field Staff Reports. Africa Series, No. 17.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1980.

South Africa. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Security of the State*. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1971.

South Africa. Commission of Inquiry. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Penal System of the Republic of South Africa*. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1976.

South Africa. Department of Defence. *Nature and Extent of the South African Defence Force's Involvement in the Angolan Conflict*. Pretoria: Defence Headquarters Press Release, February 3, 1977.

South Africa. Department of Defence. *White Paper on Defence 1977*. Cape Town: March 29, 1977.

South Africa. Department of Defence. *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply 1979*. Cape Town: April 4, 1979.

South Africa. Department of Prisons. *Commission of Inquiry into the Penal System of the Republic of South Africa: Report*. Pretoria: Government Priner, 1976.

South Africa. Department of Prisons. *Report of the Commissioner of Prisons of the Republic of South Africa for the Period 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978*. Pretoria: Government Printer, 1979.

South Africa. Embassy in Washington. *Partners in Combat*. (Backgrounder No. 7). July 1978.

South Africa. Embassy in Washington. *The Cape Route-Passageway to Survival*. (Backgrounder No. 2). February 1980.

South Africa 1979: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa. (6th ed.) Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg Publications, 1979.

South African Institute of Race Relations. *Administration of Security Legislation in South Africa, January 1976–March 1977*. Johannesburg: 1977.

Spence, John E. *The Political and Military Framework*. (Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia [South-West Africa] London: Africa Publications Trust, 1975.

Spicer, Michael. "Namibia: Exclusive Independence," *The World Today* [London], 36, No. 10, October 1980, 406–14.

Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa. (12 vols.) Cape Town: Nasionale Opvoedkundige Uitgewery, 1970.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). *Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict. A Politico-Military*

Study. (Special Studies in International Politics and Government.) New York: Praeger, 1976.

_____. *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1975.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975.

_____. *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1977.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977.

_____. *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1978.* New York: Crane, Russak, 1978.

Thatcher, Gary. "South Africa: White 'Citizen-Soldiers' vs Black Unrest," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 72, No. 211, September 23, 1980, 3.

Thompson, W. Scott, and Brett Silvers. "South Africa in Soviet Strategy." Pages 133–58 in Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker (eds.), *South Africa into the 1980s.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1979.

Tunstall, W.C.B. *The Commonwealth and Regional Defence.* London: Athlone Press for the University of London, 1959.

U.S. Congress. 95th, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. *Conditions in South Africa.* Washington: GPO, February 3, 1978.

U.S. Congress. 96th, 1st Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. *The Current Situation in Namibia.* Washington: GPO, May 7, 1979.

U.S. Congress. 96th, 2d Session. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979.* Washington: GPO, February 4, 1980.

U.S. Congress. 96th 2d Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on Mines and Mining. *Sub-Sahara Africa: Its Role in Critical Mineral Needs of the Western World.* Washington: GPO, July 1, 1980.

van den Berghe, Pierre L. *South Africa: A Study in Conflict.* Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1965.

Wall, Patrick. "The West and South Africa." Pages 39–64 in Patrick Wall (ed.), *The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West.* London: Stacey International, 1975.

Walters, Ronald W. *South Africa's Nuclear Build-up and Its Implications.* (Notes and Documents 29/78.) New York: Centre Against Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, 1978.

Watt, D.C. "The Continuing Strategic Importance of Simonstown," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, 95, No. 10, 1969, 51–54.

Welz, Martin. "Psychological Action Plan: Defence Budget Debate. Amazing Order to Spike Opposition Guns," *The Sunday Times* [Johannesburg], March 23, 1980, 1.

Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars. *United States Military Involvement in Southern Africa.* Boston: South End Press, 1978.

Willers, David. "The Politics of Violence in South Africa," *South Africa International* [Johannesburg], 11, No. 1, July 1980, 29–41.

Woods, Donald. "South Africa's Face to the World," *Foreign Affairs*, 56, No. 3, April 1978, 521–28.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *AF Press Clips* [Washington], January 1976–December 1980; *Africa* [London], June 1976–December 1980; *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series* [Exeter, England], January 1973–December 1980; *Financial Times* [London], June 1976–December 1980; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report, Middle East and Africa*, April–December 1980; Joint Publications Research Service, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, November 1978–December 1980; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* [London], January 1973–December 1980; *New York Times*, June 1976–December 1980; *South African Digest* [Pretoria], June–December 1980; and *Washington Post*, June 1976–December 1980.)

apartheid—Afrikaans word literally meaning separateness; refers variously to: (1) ruling National Party's doctrine that the races should be geographically and socially separated to maximum feasible extent and (2) structure of policy and law resulting in racial segregation and White domination; doctrine began to be called separate development in 1960s and multinational development after early 1970s.

baasskap—Afrikaans word literally meaning mastery; generally accepted sociopolitical doctrine of White supremacy in South Africa.

Bantu—General term for languages spoken by Black Africans in areas south of equator; formerly used by South African government to describe all Black persons, who regard usage as pejorative and inaccurate.

Boer—Literally, farmer; term for most White South African settlers of Dutch, German, and French Huguenot origin; used until term Afrikaner came into general use.

Broederbond—Literally, Brotherhood; secret Afrikaner political organization established in 1918; aim is a unified Afrikaner stand on economic, cultural, and political matters.

difaqane—Sotho for "the hammering," roughly equivalent to *mfecane (q.v.)*.

endorse out—Procedure under influx control laws whereby Blacks deemed surplus to labor needs can be removed from White areas (*q.v.*) and returned to the homelands (*q.v.*).

fiscal year (FY)—April 1 through the following March 31.

GDP—Gross Domestic Product. The total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders during a fixed period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of compensation of employees, profits, and depreciation (consumption of capital). Subsistence production is included and consists of the imputed value of production by the farm family for its own use and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

GNP—Gross National Product. GDP (*q.v.*) plus the income received from abroad by residents, less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents.

group areas—Official term for sectors of cities, towns, and villages designated for occupation by specified racial groups; established by parliament through Group Areas Act of 1950 and subsequent amendments.

homelands—Specifically designated land reserved for Black settlement and eventual self-government; sometimes called reserves; since 1978 the South African government has tended to refer to these ten areas as Black states. Under the official plan of multinational development (*q.v.*), the government has granted

439

independent status to three of the homelands, a condition that is not recognized by countries other than South Africa. Transkei was given "independence" in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, and Venda in 1979. Ciskei moved to accept separate status projected for late 1981.

Kaffir—Term derived from Arabic word meaning "heathen"; formerly used by Whites to designate Black person; term is highly pejorative, and Blacks resent its use.

laager—Term descriptive of historic pioneer defense tactic of forming a circle with oxcarts when attacked; often used by contemporary critics to refer to Afrikaner defensiveness regarding apartheid (*q.v.*) policies.

locations—Former designation for Black urban townships set aside by the government on the outskirts of White communities.

mfecane—Nguni for "the crushing," referring to the period of warfare, migration, and integration related to the expansion of Shaka's Zulu empire in the 1820s and 1830s.

multinational development—*See* apartheid.

Namibia—Name given to South West Africa by United Nations General Assembly in 1968, after creation of eleven-nation council to administer area as trust territory; South Africa refused to recognize United Nations action.

Nationalist—Member of National Party, ruling political organization generally composed of Afrikaners.

pass laws—Popular usage for laws and regulations now mainly embodied in the Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act of 1952; they serve as a system of influx and labor control of Blacks within areas designated for White occupation.

patrilineage—A group whose members can, in principle, trace their descent through males from a common male ancestor. A lineage descended from a remote common ancestor may include groups (lineages) descended from more recent ancestors.

patrilineal clan—A group whose members are putatively descended through males from a common male ancestor without all links being known; often comprises a number of patrilineages (*q.v.*).

rand—The South African currency unit since February 14, 1961. A decimal currency of 100 cents, the rand (R) replaced the South African pound (*q.v.*) on that date. From February 1961 to December 1971 the rand's official exchange rate against the United States dollar was R1 equaled US$1.40. Thereafter the rate varied until September 1975 when the rand was established officially at a rate of R1 equaled US$1.15. This rate prevailed until January 1979 when the South African government allowed market forces to determine the rand's value. The rand subsequently appreciated in value, and in December 1980 R1 equaled approximately US$1.34 (US$1 equaled about R0.74).

Rand—Local contraction of Witwatersrand (*q.v.*).

reference book—Comprehensive identification document required

of all Blacks from age sixteen; established by so-called pass laws (*q.v.*) of 1952; includes identity card, personal history, employment record, work permit, and tax payment record; must be carried on person at all times and surrendered for examination on demand of police or other authority.

separate development—*See* apartheid.

South African pound—Unit of currency of the Union of South Africa. The South African Reserve Bank, when established in 1921, became the sole bank of issue for bank notes; previously, individual banks had issued their own notes. From September 1949 until February 1961 the par rate for the pound was approximately one pound equaled US$2.40. On February 14, 1961, a new South African currency unit, the rand (*q.v.*), was introduced; its par value was US$1.40. All prices and claims in pounds were adjusted simultaneously by the same ratio. Final withdrawal of pound notes was not completed for several years thereafter.

Trekboer—Nomadic herder of Dutch origin.

veld—Literally, a grassy plain; generally used to describe all open country.

voortrekker—Afrikaans for pioneer; used by Afrikaners to refer to those of their ancestors who participated in the Great Trek (beginning in the mid-1830s) from the Cape Colony to the north and east, where they established Boer republics.

White areas—Government-designated geographic areas limited to permanent occupation by White persons.

Witwatersrand—Literally, "ridge of white waters" in Afrikaans; name applied to country's richest and most extensive mining region in southern Transvaal; known chiefly for gold but also produces various other minerals.

World Bank—Group of three institutions consisting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the International Development Association (IDA). Established in 1945, the World Bank in 1980 was owned by the governments of approximately 140 countries, which subscribed the institutions' capital. The IFC works with the private sector in developing countries. The IDA operates in the same sectors and with the same policies as the IBRD but provides credits only to the poorer developing countries and on easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans.

Index

Active Citizens Force. *See* armed forces

Africa: 285–288; military balance in, 297; and nationalism, 309; and racial discrimination, 283; White-controlled, 280

Africa, Black (*see also* Lusaka Manifesto; Organization of African Unity): 50, 51, 55, 56, 283–284, 285, 286; anti-Cuban/Soviet countries, 287; and diplomatic relations, 282; radical, 281, 295; and security, 295; and trade, 206–207

Africa, W. S.: 264

African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI): 188, 345

African National Congress (ANC): 38, 40, 44, 46, 47, 48, 57, 58, 258, 259–260, 262, 371; and Indians, 265; military wing, 316, 317; and national security, 309, 316–317; and treason, 244; UmKonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), 48, 316, 317

African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL): 46, 47, 259

African Peoples Organization (APO): 39

African Resistance Movement: 48

Afrikaner Calvinist Movement (Afrikaanse Calvinistiese Beweging—ACB): 132

Afrikaner education: 143, 144, 145

Afrikanerdom: xxviii, xxix

Afrikaners (*see also* apartheid; Boers; Broederbond; Dutch Reformed Church, National Party; nationalism; Whites): xxiv, xxv, 3, 4, 10, 26–27, 28, 32, 35–36, 40, 43, 45, 60, 89–90; Afrikaner-Khoi, 99; and the armed forces, 304, 352; Blood River battle, 18, 22, 134, 299; cohesiveness, 90; in concentration camps, 31; dominance, 50, 66, 89, 114, 115, 135; and the economy, 37, 57, 114, 115; and ethnic identity, 104, 107; monuments, 134; Movement for Christian National Education, 132; origin, 89;, and politics, 56, 66, 114, 115, 224, 248, 249, 255; and religion, 126, 127, 132–136; rural, 89; and wealth, 114, 115; in World War I, 35; in World War II, 41

Agriculture (*see also* cattle, climate; crops; droughts; food supply; home-lands; irrigation; livestock; rainfall; soil; wool industry): xvi, 162–172; public sector, 163; wine industry, 169

Agulhas Bank: 175

air force: xx, 303–304, 311, 324, 325, 331–334, 355; air bases, 326, 333, 334; aircraft, 332–333, 335, 346–347, 399–400; insignia, 358–359; helicopters, 330; mission, 331–332; operational commands, 332; uniforms, 357, 358

air transportation: xviii, 202–203, 206; airports, 198–199, 203, 325; civil aviation, 203; equipment, 202; international, 202; and the Organization of African Unity, 202

Alice (town): 69, 150–151

All African Convention: 40–41

Aluminum Corporation of South Africa (ALUSAF): 204

Amin, Idi: 349

Amnesty International: 280, 372

Anglo-Boer War. *See* Boer wars

Anglo Transvaal Consolidated Investment: 191

Anglo-American Corporation: 254

Angola: xxvii, 6, 50, 55, 71, 281, 286–287, 312, 318, 321, 322, 338, 339, 348; Benguela Railway, 200, 305; and Marxism, 308–309; South African forces in, 304–306

Antarctic Treaty: 284

apartheid (*see also* Group Areas Act; homelands; legal system; multinational development; racism): xxv–xxvi, xxviii, 4, 42, 43–44, 45, 46, 56, 59, 65, 87–88, 102–112, 119; and the armed forces, 322, 340; and the churches, 129, 130, 132–136; conservatives and liberals, 50–51; and the economy, 161; and education, 150; and ethnic classification, 92, 94; and health care, 155; and homelands, 270; and jobs, 212, 216; justification for, 240; and land use, 164–167; legislation, 102, 104–106, 251; macrosegregation, 106; and manufacturing, 186; and mesosegregation, 106, 108, 110; and microsegregation, 106, 107; and municipal government, 234; and national government, 222; opposition to, xxvi, 46, 47, 48–50, 55,

443

446

AD-A112 860   AMERICAN UNIV WASHINGTON DC FOREIGN AREA STUDIES   F/6 8/6
              SOUTH AFRICA, A COUNTRY STUDY.(U)
              DEC 80 H D NELSON
UNCLASSIFIED   DA-PAM-550-93   NL

6 6

END
DATE
FILMED
4 82
DTIC

1.0

1.1

1.25   1.4   1.6

4.5
5.0
5.5

2.8   2.5
3.2   2.2
3.6
4.0   2.0

1.8

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Published Country Studies
(Area Handbook Series)

550-65	Afghanistan		550-165	Hungary
550-98	Albania		550-21	India
550-44	Algeria		550-154	Indian Ocean Territories
550-59	Angola			
550-73	Argentina		550-39	Indonesia
			550-68	Iran
550-169	Australia		550-31	Iraq
550-176	Austria		550-25	Israel
550-175	Bangladesh		550-182	Italy
550-170	Belgium			
550-66	Bolivia		550-69	Ivory Coast
			550-177	Jamaica
550-20	Brazil		550-30	Japan
550-168	Bulgaria		550-34	Jordan
550-61	Burma		550-56	Kenya
550-83	Burundi			
550-50	Cambodia		550-81	Korea, North
			550-41	Korea, South
550-166	Cameroon		550-58	Laos
550-96	Ceylon		550-24	Lebanon
550-159	Chad		550-38	Liberia
550-77	Chile			
550-60	China		550-85	Libya
			550-163	Malagasy Republic
550-63	China, Republic of		550-172	Malawi
550-26	Colombia		550-45	Malaysia
550-91	Congo		550-161	Mauritania
550-90	Costa Rica			
550-152	Cuba		550-79	Mexico
			550-76	Mongolia
550-22	Cyprus		550-49	Morocco
550-158	Czechoslovakia		550-64	Mozambique
550-54	Dominican Republic		550-35	Nepal, Bhutan & Sikkim
550-52	Ecuador			
550-43	Egypt		550-88	Nicaragua
			550-157	Nigeria
550-150	El Salvador		550-94	Oceania
550-28	Ethiopia		550-48	Pakistan
550-167	Finland		550-46	Panama
550-155	Germany, East			
550-173	Germany, Federal Republic of		550-156	Paraguay
			550-185	Persian Gulf States
550-153	Ghana		550-42	Peru
550-87	Greece		550-72	Philippines
550-78	Guatemala		550-162	Poland
550-174	Guinea			
550-82	Guyana		550-181	Portugal
			550-160	Romania
550-164	Haiti		550-84	Rwanda
550-151	Honduras		550-51	Saudi Arabia

550–70	Senegal		550–178	Trinidad and Tobago
			550–89	Tunisia
550–180	Sierra Leone		550–80	Turkey
550–184	Singapore		550–74	Uganda
550–86	Somalia			
550–93	South Africa		550–97	Uruguay
550–171	Southern Rhodesia		550–71	Venezuela
			550–57	Vietnam, North
550–95	Soviet Union		550–55	Vietnam, South
550–179	Spain		550–183	Yemens, The
550–27	Sudan			
550–47	Syria		550–99	Yugoslavia
550–62	Tanzania		550–67	Zaire
			550–75	Zambia
550–53	Thailand			